The Art of Hegel's Aesthetics. Hegelian Philosophy and the Perspectives of Art History by Squire, Michael et al.
 THE ART OF HEGEL’S  
 AESTHETICS
Hegelian Philosophy and the  
Perspectives of Art History 
PAUL  A . KOTTMAN AND MICHAEL  SQUIRE  (EDS.) 
MORPHOMATA
This volume explores one of modernity’s most profound 
and far-reaching philosophies of art: the Vorlesungen 
über die Ästhetik , delivered by Georg Friedrich Wilhelm 
Hegel in the 1820s. The book has two overriding 
objectives: first, to ask how Hegel’s work illuminates 
specific periods and artworks in light of contemporary 
art-historical discussions; second, to explore how art 
history helps us make better sense and use of Hegelian 
aesthetics. 
In bringing together a range of internationally acclaimed 
critical voices, the volume establishes an important 
disciplinary bridge between aesthetics and art history. 
Given the recent resurgence of interest in ‘global’ art 
history, and calls for more comparative approaches to 
‘visual culture’, contributors ask what role Hegel has 
played within the field – and what role he could play in 
the future. What can a historical treatment of art ac-
complish? How should we explain the ‘need’ for certain 
artistic forms at different historical junctures? Has art 
history been ‘Hegelian’ without fully acknowledging it? 
Indeed, have art historians shirked some of the funda-
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The origins of this book lie in a series of conversations between the two 
editors. From October 2014 to March 2015, we both held concurrent fel­
lowships at the Morphomata International Center for Advanced Studies 
– Genesis, Dynamics and Mediality of Cultural Figurations, University 
of Cologne: housed in neighbouring apartments (at the university guest­
house on Behringstraße), and working in adjacent offices, we began to talk 
through all aspects of Cologne life. As topics moved from German politics 
and the looming ‘Brexit’ vote to our own academic work, a shared interest 
in the history of aesthetics quickly emerged. Fuelled by copious amounts 
of Earl Grey tea, our talk soon began to home in upon Hegel. Neither 
of us could claim to have got to grips with all aspects of the Lectures on 
Aesthetics; indeed, it was clear that we had rather different approaches, and 
not altogether similar assessments of what a ‘Hegelian’ worldview looked 
like (or for that matter its appeal). We nonetheless shared a fundamental 
respect for Hegel’s approach: unlike so many modern­day academics, 
Hegel was able to sieve through the details so as to formulate those all­
important, bigger­picture questions.
As our discussions developed – and various points of agreement, 
discrepancy and confusion crystallised – we began to involve others in 
our conversations. We soon hit upon the idea of an experimental, in­
ternational workshop – an occasion to bring together philosophers, art 
historians and critics. Our plan was always to involve a range of partici­
pants, with expertise spanning the entire width and breadth of Hegel’s 
art historical account. Some of our collaborators would be internationally 
renowned Hegelian experts; others would be invited precisely because 
we were unsure about what their contribution would be (and we were 
curious to find out …). We attempted to identify speakers from differ­
ent academic backgrounds and countries; we likewise wanted to strike a 
balance between established and younger scholars, in the hope that our 
motley crew would reflect the past, present and future of their disciplines. 
The workshop took place at King’s College London from 8–10 June 
2016, convened under the auspices of the Centre of Hellenic Studies (part 
of the King’s Arts and Humanities Research Institute).1 Financial support 
came from a number of different quarters: in addition to seed­funding from 
King’s College London and the New School (the New School for Social 
Research and Eugene Lang College and the New School for Liberal Arts), 
we received generous funding from both the Leverhulme Trust and the 
Morphomata International Center for Advanced Studies. Organisational 
assistance was likewise offered on both sides of the Channel – above all, 
from Alex Creighton (in London), and from Thierry Greub and Semra 
Mägele (in Cologne). It is a pleasure to thank numerous others who also 
added to the workshop’s success: in particular, Ian Jenkins – who, as Senior 
Curator, organised a special ‘Hegelian’ tour of the British Museum and a 
closing reception in the Department of Greece and Rome. We are also grate­
ful to those who introduced, chaired and responded to sessions – Roderick 
Beaton, Dietrich Boschung, Jaś Elsner, William Fitzgerald, Simon Goldhill, 
Sacha Golob, Russell Goulbourne, Katharina Lorenz, Sebastian Matzner, 
Stephen Melville, Jeremy Tanner and Joanna Woodall.
We had little inkling that a conference on ‘The Art of Hegel’s Aesthet­
ics’ would spark the interest that it did. In total, we were able to accom­
modate up to 150 people within the ‘River Room’ at King’s. But it quickly 
became apparent that many more wanted to join our conversation: there 
was a waiting list of almost twice that number, and many other interested 
scholars contacted us by email. 
It was for this reason that we decided to transform the workshop 
– which was always intended to air ideas and to prompt discussion – 
into the edited volume at hand. Papers have been lightly revised to 
fit the published format, but we have tried to keep the informal and 
experimental thinking that spurred the original gathering. Predictably, 
the published volume has had to proceed without all the contributors 
who were originally invited to London: although the final book cannot 
include their chapters, we much look forward to reading elsewhere the 
papers by Joshua Billings (‘Hegel’s tragic poets’), Lydia Goehr (‘Mono­
chromy and monotony: On the colour and tone of the absolute in Hegel’s 
Aesthetics’), Ludwig Jäger (‘Zeichen/Künste: Der semiologische Subtext 
der Hegelschen Ästhetik’) and Richard Neer (‘Hegel and the classical’).
1 For further information – and a hyperlink to a video of the opening session 
of the workshop – see www.kcl.ac.uk/artshums/ahri/eventrecords/2015–2016/
CHS/hegel.aspx.
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We end by adding three additional words of thanks. First and fore­
most, we are grateful to all the volume’s contributors, who engaged with 
the editors – and most importantly with each other – with such warmth, 
comradery and enthusiasm. Second, it is a pleasure to thank Dietrich 
Boschung (co­director of the Morphomata International Center for Ad­
vanced Studies), whose support and encouragement have been fundamen­
tal throughout. Third and finally, we thank those who helped with the 
practical production of the volume: Thierry Greub for liaising with the 
press; Mary Morton, for her assistance with copy­editing; and Kathrin 
Roussel of Sichtvermerk, for typesetting the volume with characteristic 
care, patience and attention to detail. 
It was never our intention that this project should advance some 
sort of ‘party line’, still less that it should aim at offering any ‘last word’. 
Rather, the variety of perspectives reflected in this book – as indeed 
the range of evaluative responses to Hegelian aesthetics – continues the 
spirit of our original discussions in Cologne. Whether or not one believes 
Hegel’s dictum that ‘art is and remains a thing of the past’, we very much 
hope that our conversations about Hegelian aesthetics will stretch long 
into the future.
Michael Squire (London)
& Paul A. Kottman (New York)
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NOTE ON EDITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
One of the difficulties in working on the text of Hegel’s aesthetics is that 
there is in fact no ‘text’ to speak of. The Lectures on Aesthetics – or Vorlesungen 
über die Ästhetik – were never published during Hegel’s lifetime.1 Hegel 
did commit part of his thinking about the history of aesthetics to print 
(above all, in sections 556–563 of his 1830 Enzyklopädie der philosophischen 
Wissen schaften im Grundrisse). Other than that, however, Hegel privileged 
an oral medium, delivering a series of lectures first at Heidelberg (in 1818), 
and subsequently in Berlin (during the winter semesters of 1820–1821 and 
1828–1829, and during the summer semesters of 1823 and 1826). 
While there is no published treatise with which to engage head on, we 
do have a curious synthesis of notes. Foremost among these is the ‘version’ 
of the lectures put together by one of Hegel’s Berlin students, Heinrich 
Gustav Hotho. Hotho’s version is purportedly based, at least in part, on 
Hegel’s own manuscripts, which are long since lost. But they also certainly 
include a degree of elaboration and embellishment, which at times seems 
to derive more from Hotho than from Hegel. Hotho in fact published two 
versions of the Vorlesungen, first in 1835 (in three volumes of Hegel’s col­
lected works, following the author’s death in 1831), and again in 1842, based 
on the lectures of 1823, 1826 and 1828–1829. 
For this reason, contributors to this volume refer to a number of 
different critical editions of Hegel’s works. Since this volume has been 
published in English, and contributors aim to address broader evaluative 
questions rather than specific points about transmission or history, our 
foremost reference is to the English translation by T.M. Knox, published 
in two volumes: Hegel’s Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1975; reissued in paperback by Oxford University Press, 1988). In 
referring to the German text, most contributors have privileged the handy 
Suhrkamp edition by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, which has 
itself gone through various editions: the most recent is the twelfth edition, 
available in three volumes (Werke vols. 13–15) – G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen 
über die Ästhetik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2013).
1 On the title, see Squire’s introduction to this volume, pp. 23–24, n. 1.
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Some contributors have thought it important to refer to a larger range 
of specialist critical editions and commentaries (often using the standard 
abbreviations when referring to these versions). Of these, the most impor­
tant are the following:
PK  A Gethmann­Siefert, J.­I. Kwon and K. Berr (eds.) (2004) Philoso-
phie der Kunst. Vorlesung von 1826. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 
Verlag. 
PKÄ  A. Gethmann­Siefert and B. Collenberg­Plotnikov (eds.) (2004) 
Philosophie der Kunst oder Ästhetik. Nach Hegel. Im Sommer 1826. 
Mitschrift Friedrich Carl Hermann Victor von Kehler, Munich: 
Wilhelm Fink Verlag.
VÄ  H. Schneider (ed.) (1995) Vorlesung über Ästhetik. Berlin 1820/21. 
Eine Nachschrift. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
VPK  A. Gethmann­Siefert (ed.) (2003) Vorlesungen über die Philosophie 
der Kunst. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag. 
VPKN  N. Hebing (ed.) (2015) Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Kunst I. 
Nachschriften zu den Kollegien der Jahre 1820/21 und 1823. Hamburg: 
Felix Meiner Verlag.
Most of these versions are available only in German, with the exception 
of a recent translation of VPK by R.F. Brown: G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Art: The Hotho Transcript of the 1823 Berlin Lectures (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2014).2
Contributors also refer at times to the series of Hegel’s collected works, 
as published in German:
(1968–) Gesammelte Werke (Rheinisch­Westfälische Akademie der Wissen­
schaften). Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
(1983–) Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (Members 
of the Hegel­Archiv). Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
(1969–) E. Moldenhauer and K.M. Michel (eds.) Werke in zwanzig Bänden. 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.
(1999) Hauptwerke in sechs Bänden, Bd. III, Die Wissenschaft der Logik, 
Zweites Buch. Die Lehre vom Wesen. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
2 For a detailed discussion of the transmission problems in English, see Anne­
Marie Gethmann­Siefert’s opening chapter, ‘Introduction: the shape and influ­
ence of Hegel’s aesthetics’, at 7–176, esp. 30–66 (on ‘The sources for Hegel’s 
aesthetics’).
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While contributors have likewise at times turned to additional editions, 
they were requested to make particular use of the following English transla­
tions of some of Hegel’s other key works:
(1948) Early Theological Writings, ed. R. Kroner, trans. T.M. Knox. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
(1971) Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, Being Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the 
Philosophical Sciences (1830), trans. W. Wallace, together with the Zusätze in 
Boumann’s text (1845), trans. A.V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
(1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Introduction: Reason in 
History, trans. H.B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(1977) Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
(1978) Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit (3 vols.), ed. M.J. Petry. Dordrecht: 
Springer.
(1983) Hegel and the Human Spirit: A Translation of the Jena Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Spirit (1805–1806), ed. and trans. L. Rauch. Detroit: Wayne 
State University Press.
(1984) Hegel: The Letters, trans. C. Butler and C. Seiler. Bloomington, Ind.: 
Indiana University Press.
(1985) Hegel: The Letters, trans. C. Butler and C. Seiler. Bloomington, Ind.: 
Indiana University Press.
(1991) Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. A. Wood. Cambridge: Cam­
bridge University Press.
(1993) Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, trans. B. Bosanquet, ed. M.J. 
Inwood London: Penguin. 
(2002) The Miscellaneous Writings of G.W.F. Hegel, ed. J. Stewart. Evanston, 
Ill.: Northwestern University Press.
(2007) Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, trans. W. Wallace and A.V. Miller, rev. 
M.J. Inwood. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
(2010) The Science of Logic, trans. G. Di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
(2011) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, ed. and trans. R. Brown 
and P. Hodgson. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(2013) The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. T. Pinkard. Available at www.
academia.edu/16699140/Translation_of_Phenomenology_of_Spirit.
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MICHAEL  SQU IRE
INTRODUCTION 
Hegel and art history
… unsere Betrachtung … hatte kein anderes Ziel, als 
den Grundbegriff des Schönen und der Kunst durch alle 
Stadien hindurch, die er in seiner Realisation durchläuft, 
zu verfolgen und durch das Denken faßbar zu machen 
und zu bewähren.
My one aim has been to seize in thought and to prove 
the fundamental nature of the beautiful and art, and 
to follow it through all the stages it has gone through 
in the course of its realization.
Hegel 2013, III: 573 = Hegel 1975, 1237 
Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel was arguably the most cross­disciplinary 
thinker to have emerged from modern western academe [Fig. 1.1]. Long 
before ‘interdisciplinarity’ became a buzzword for project­proposals and 
grant applications – or indeed edited books like the one in hand – Hegel’s 
Lectures on Aesthetics provided a paradigm for bringing together differ­
ent modes of critical, historical and intellectual enquiry.1 In a formal 
1 Throughout this introduction I refer principally to T.M. Knox’s English 
translation of Hegel’s lectures (Hegel 1975) – based on the second, 1842 edition 
by H.G. Hotho; where relevant, I also quote the handy Suhrkamp German edi­
tion, based on the same Hotho version (Hegel 2013). The decision to refer to 
Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics rather than e.g. Lectures on Fine Art (the preferred 
English title of Hegel 1975) is deliberate – both in this introduction, and in 
the title of our book. Some contributors prefer other names, noting Hegel’s 
own dissatisfaction with the delineation of ‘aesthetics’ (cf. Hegel 1975, 1). Still, 
Hegel declares that the name ‘Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik’ can stand (‘daß er 
sense, Hegel designed his Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik as lessons in 
Idealist philosophy, complete with detailed ripostes to Enlightenment 
predecessors and contemporary rivals. At the same time, his approach 
to aesthetics forms a bridge with his critical study of religion – within a 
series of lectures that have almost as much to offer theologians as they do 
philosophers.2 No less importantly, Hegel also throws the study of art, in 
all its forms, into the mix, centring his discussion around the visual arts 
(including architecture, sculpture and painting), as well as music, poetry 
and other kinds of literary and theatrical composition.3 As a result, the 
Lectures address almost every department within the ‘arts and humanities’: 
if Hegel has something to offer individual specialists, he has still more to 
offer those committed to traversing disciplinary fault­lines.
Hegel’s intellectual ambition does not just pertain to his dizzying ar­
ray of academic subjects. From a personal perspective, as someone raised 
in the disciplinary paradigms of classics, what first attracted me to Hegel 
was his willingness to step out beyond the historical study of the past to 
reflections about the present and future – his insight that studying the 
past necessarily coalesces with our thinking about the present, and vice 
versa. Hegel often homes in on small visual details:4 skilled in the art of 
als Name kann beibehalten werden’), even though the ‘proper expression for our 
science is Philosophy of Art, and more definitely, “Philosophy of Fine Art”’ (Der 
eigentlich Ausdruck jedoch für unsere Wissenschaft ist ‘Philosophie der Kunst’ und 
bestimmter ‘Philosophie der schönen Künste’). While Hegel associates ‘aesthetics’ 
with the ‘science of sensation, of feeling’ – that is, with something distinct from 
the project at hand – the lectures do likewise incorporate important analyses of 
sensory perception along the way (cf. e.g. Hegel 1975, 38–39, 621–623).
2 For some stimulating recent comments on these interconnections, see the 
contributions to Braune­Krickau, Erne and Scholl 2014. Within an art historical 
context, Hegel’s chief contribution lies in bringing together the study of theology 
and art; in this sense, he played a critical role in founding what today has been 
called ‘visual theology’, whereby ‘the act of looking itself contributes to religious 
formation and, indeed, constitutes a powerful practice of belief ’ (Morgan 1998, 
3; cf. also Morgan 2000). Thiessen 2005 provides a useful guide to ‘theologi­
cal aesthetics’ within Christian intellectual traditions (with Hegel featuring on 
190–196), while Brent Plate 2002 offers a stimulating cross­cultural reader. 
3 Hegel also touches upon other kinds of art: although dance is not system­
atically treated, for example, there are passing references at e.g. Hegel 1975, 
352–353, 627–628, 1039, 1186–1187.
4 By this, I mean – as T.J. Clark nicely put it in one of his interventions during 
our London workshop – that Hegel is the most materialist of the Idealists, and 
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1.1  Jakob Schlesinger, Portrait of Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel, 1831 
(36.0 × 28.5 cm). Berlin: Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, Nationalgalerie,  
inv. A I556. Photograph by Michael Squire.
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looking,5 he makes stimulating (and often deeply persuasive) observa­
tions about specific case studies. For all Hegel’s philosophical concerns, 
artworks themselves likewise take centre­stage: art is not approached as a 
mirror for social­historical realities, but as a matrix through which those 
realities are established.6 Crucially, the Lectures on Aesthetics also dare 
to zoom out from that microscale. Hegel saw the question of theorising 
what art is as inseparable from understanding what it has been, and vice 
versa. Rather than tender an overriding theory of aesthetic judgment, he 
consequently offered a systematic treatment of art as historical practice: 
the Lectures devise a grand narrative of art that takes in the whole history 
of human self­understanding.7 FIG. 1.1
The Lectures on Aesthetics have not always received the attention they 
deserve. Until quite recently, the work attracted relatively little scholarly 
interest – at least when compared with other Hegelian treatises (above 
all, the Phenomenology of Spirit, Science of Logic and Encyclopaedia of the 
Philosophical Sciences).8 Here in Britain, Hegel has likewise established 
hence particularly worth reading for art historians: cf. e.g. Hegel 1975, 21–22, 
defining Idealism against the legacy of Platonic philosophy. Adorno 1977, 334, 
famously said that ‘Hegel and Kant were able to write major aesthetics without 
understanding anything about art’. While ‘this may or may not be true of Kant’, 
as the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Hegel (by Stephen 
Houlgate) concludes, ‘it is clearly quite untrue of Hegel: he had an extensive 
knowledge and a good understanding of many of the great works of art in the 
Western tradition. Nor was Hegel’s knowledge and interest restricted to Western 
art …’ (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hegel-aesthetics/); cf. below, pp. 48–50.
5 At least, one might add, when it comes to painting. ‘In order to discuss the 
details of a branch of art, a man must have seen a great deal, a very great deal, 
and seen it again [man muß vieles, sehr vieles gesehen und wiedergesehen haben]’ 
as Hegel puts it (Hegel 1975, 629 = 2013, II: 264): ‘I have seen a considerable 
amount, but not all that would be necessary for treating this subject in full 
detail’; cf. e.g. Hegel 1975, 169–171, 797–887. For Hegel’s thinking about the 
importance of autopsy in the field of painting, cf. below, n. 112.
6 I take my phrasing here from Kottman 2017, 16: ‘Art is not the passive mir­
ror for already established sociohistorical realities, but a fundamental matrix 
through which social reality is established, brought into being.’
7 On the Enlightenment thinking behind such ‘grand narratives’ – and its fun­
damental remove from the ‘(post­)modern condition’ at the end of the twentieth 
century – the classic discussion is Lyotard 1979.
8 Important early Anglophone studies include Bungay 1984, Henrich 1985 and 
Desmond 1986; in German, cf. especially Koespel 1975 – dedicated to the recep­
tion of Hegel’s aesthetics in the twentieth century – alongside the numerous 
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himself as the ultimate ‘Marmite’ philosopher, soliciting equally polarised 
responses from disciples and doubters alike: his Lectures have certainly 
attracted a small but devoted clique of proselytes (and Hegelian circles 
can have something of a sect about them …); at the same time, they have 
yielded an even more vociferous clan of critics, above all among those who 
(rightly or wrongly) judge a ‘Hegelian’ worldview to smack of totalitarian­
ism – and as anathema to a liberal ideology of multicultural relativism.9 
Love him or loathe him, Hegel can help us to articulate some of the 
most pressing questions within the critical study of art. As interlocutor, 
Hegel goads us into looking beyond our individual areas of expertise; he 
invites us to think bigger, to move beyond the strictures and confines of 
disciplines and engage with a broader spectrum of critical issues. Whether 
they persuade, incense, challenge or cajole, the Lectures on Aesthetics open 
up new types of conversation: they get us talking with one another, and 
in ways still all too rare within the twenty-first-century university. 
The aim of this book is to foster such conversations, above all by put­
ting Hegel’s philosophy of art across time and place into renewed dialogue 
with the field of art history (broadly defined). In calling upon a range of 
philosophers on the one hand, and of art historians with expertise in the 
various periods that Hegel discussed on the other, our overriding objective 
is twofold: first, to ask how Hegel’s work might illuminate specific periods 
and artworks in relation to contemporary art historical discussions; and 
second, to explore how disciplinary art historical perspectives might help 
us to better make sense (and use) of Hegel’s critical remarks in the Lectures. 
With the recent rise of ‘global’ art history, and the calls for more com­
parative approaches to ‘visual culture’,10 contributors have set out to explore 
pioneering contributions of Annemarie Gethmann Siefert. There has been a 
renaissance of Hegelian aesthetics in recent years, above all in North America 
and Britain: this is reflected in the work of (among others) Jay Bernstein, Lydia 
Goehr, Gregg Horowitz, Stephen Houlgate, Angelica Nuzzo, Terry Pinkard, 
Robert Pippin and Benjamin Rutter. Within the field of art history, numerous 
figures (like Theodor Adorno, T.J. Clark, Arthur Danto, Michael Fried and Jason 
Gaiger) have likewise drawn on aspects of the Hegelian account; indeed, in the 
analysis of modern and contemporary art in particular, the Lectures have become 
a touchstone for contemporary theoretical discussions (cf. below, pp. 43–44).
9 Cf. below, pp. 48–50, as well as Davis’ chapter in this book, with Kottman’s 
envoi. Once again, the underlying issue lies in (post­)modern resistance to the 
grands récits so in vogue during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
(cf. Lyotard 1979).
10 Cf. below, pp. 50–51.
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the role that Hegel has played – and could play – within the field of art 
history. An array of questions ensue. What do we mean by ‘art’? What does 
art make known, and how does it do so? How might artworks, existing in 
the present, help us to think about the past – to tackle ‘history’, no less than 
‘historicism’ and ‘historicity’? In what ways might art help to make sense of 
past phenomena that would otherwise remain unknown to us? By extension, 
what exactly might a historical treatment of art accomplish? How should 
we explain the ‘need’ for certain artistic forms and practices at different 
historical junctures? Can we devise a cross­cultural account for grasping the 
rise and fall of certain artistic practices over time and place? Has art history 
been ‘Hegelian’ without fully acknowledging the fact – and, conversely, in 
what ways might the discipline be thought to have shirked the questions 
that Hegel raised? While the chapters that follow offer varying responses 
to these and other issues, contributors share a conviction that Hegel can 
help us to formulate positions – and in a host of radical and urgent ways.
The institutional collaboration behind our project is no less im­
portant. Each chapter in this book was first aired during a workshop at 
King’s College London in June 2016, organised by the Arts and Humani­
ties Research Institute (AHRI): the event was sponsored by the Centre 
of Hellenic Studies at King’s (appropriately enough, given the pivotal 
role of Greek art in Hegel’s account);11 at the same time, the conference 
brought together the various departments within the Faculty of Arts and 
Humanities – in keeping with the AHRI’s aim ‘of fostering innovative 
interdisciplinary research’.12 Just as our project worked across academic 
subjects, so too did it seek to combine international perspectives. Right 
from the outset, King’s paired up with the New School in New York – 
above all, with the Eugene Lang College of Liberal Arts, which likewise 
champions cross­disciplinary relationships, with a view to social justice 
and reform.13 The third partner in our triumvirate was the Morphomata 
International Center for Advanced Studies at the University of Cologne 
– one of the Käte Hamburger Kollegs (‘Centres for Global Cooperation 
Research’) established by the German Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research in 2008. Hegel’s transhistorical, transcultural and transmedial 
approach speaks directly to the research agenda of the Morphomata In­
ternational Center for Advanced Studies, above all its concern with the 
11 Cf. above all the chapters in this book by Peters and Squire.
12 On the AHRI, see www.kcl.ac.uk/artshums/ahri/index.aspx.
13 Cf. www.newschool.edu/lang/.
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‘Genese, Dynamik und Medialität kultureller Figurationen’.14 More gener­
ally, though, our questions take up the invitation of the Käte Hamburger 
initiative, which offers ‘Freiraum für Geisteswissenschaften’ (‘freedom for 
research in the humanities’). This book is founded on that promise of ‘free 
space’, of providing a forum for thinking across disciplinary boundaries. 
Yet it also sets out to probe that very denomination of Geisteswissenschaften 
in the first place: to interrogate, through engagement with Hegel, this no­
tion of ‘spirit’ or Geist that – like it or not – lurks behind the humanities.
APPROACH ING  THE  AESTHET ICS
Before elaborating on the structure of the book, it is perhaps worth paus­
ing to say something about the Lectures on Aesthetics themselves, as well as 
their art historical reception.15 The ‘text’ of these lectures dates to a series 
of orations first delivered at the University of Heidelberg in the summer 
of 1818. Hegel moved to Berlin at the age of 48, taking up the Chair at 
the city’s newly established university (founded by Friedrich Wilhelm 
III in 1809). During his time in Berlin, Hegel repeated and elaborated 
upon those Heidelberg lectures on four subsequent occasions (during the 
winter semesters of 1820–1821 and 1828–1829, and the summer semesters 
of 1823 and 1826). Yet to talk of a ‘text’ here would be misleading. As we 
explain in our introductory ‘Note on editions’ (pp. 10–12), Hegel devised 
his lectures for oral delivery, and their precise form is a subject of lively 
scholarly debate.16 The point demands emphasis from the outset: part of 
14 For an introduction to the intellectual framework of the Morphomata In­
ternational Center for Advanced Studies – and its definitions of the ‘genesis, 
dynamics and mediality of cultural figurations’ – see the essays in Blamberger 
and Boschung 2011.
15 There are of course countless guides to Hegel’s aesthetics, and their place 
within the larger Hegelian corpus. I do not intend to survey the full bibliography 
here, since particular contributions are assessed in the chapters that follow. Suf­
fice to say that my own thinking has learned from the following in particular: 
Knox 1978, 79–122; Bungay 1984; Ferry 1993, 114–147; Wicks 1993; Houlgate 
1997; Wyss 1999, esp. 100–171; Besançon 2000, 203–221; Maker 2000; Franke 
and Gethmann­Siefert 2005; Hendrix 2005, 163–256; Pippin 2005, 279–306; 
Houlgate 2007; Nagl­Docekal, Rózsa and Gethmann­Siefert 2013; Arndt, Kruck 
and Zovko 2014; Pippin 2014; Peters 2015.
16 In addition to pp. 10–12 above, see the detailed English introduction by 
Gethmann­Siefert in Hegel 2014 (esp. 1–4), along with e.g. Gaiger 2006b, 
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the vibrant appeal of this ‘treatise’ resides in its perpetual state of being 
unfinished – its spur for students (which is to say now modern scholars) 
to ask questions, to run with arguments and to cut our critical teeth in 
resisting, rethinking and revising aspects of the professor’s thinking. 
What, then, do the Lectures argue? Restrictions of space mean that 
I can offer only a rudimentary sketch here.17 But since the chapters that 
follow often delve into the nitty­gritty, it seems worth outlining some of 
the preliminary principles. 
Perhaps the first thing to note is that, for Hegel, the history of 
art fits into a larger project of Idealist philosophy, centred around 
freedom, reason and self­consciousness (the beating heart of Ideal­
ism – associated with die Idee).18 Unlike Kant, whose foremost concern 
was the aesthetics of experiencing nature (which only ever amounted 
to a subsidiary interest) rather than a systematic approach to human 
artworks,19 Hegel ascribed to art a significance all of its own: what is 
important about ‘art’ [Kunst] is its function of making known, through 
material form, the workings of ‘spirit’ [Geist];20 ‘art has no other mis­
sion but to bring before sensuous contemplation the truth as it is in the 
spirit, reconciled in its totality with objectivity and the sphere of sense’.21 
161–164 and Rutter 2010. On Heinrich Gustav Hotho – and his key role in deter­
mining the posthumous argumentative fabric of the Lectures – cf. Ziemer 1993.
17 For my own earlier attempt at a summary, see Squire 2012. Wicks 1993 still 
provides a readable introductory overview.
18 Cf. Hegel 1975, esp. 1–90. Hegel’s approach to the philosophy of art forms 
part of his philosophy (rather than phenomenology) of spirit; the relation­
ship between Hegel’s system of logic, philosophy of nature and philosophy of 
spirit is set out in his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Enzyklopädie 
der philosophischen Wissenschaften, published in three editions  during Hegel’s 
lifetime – in 1817, 1827 and 1830). For some introductions to the various strains 
of Hegelian thinking – and the place of his philosophy of art within his phi­
losophy of absolute spirit – see e.g. Rockmore 1993, Beiser 2008, Nuzzo 2006 
and Houlgate and Baur 2011.
19 Cf. e.g. Hegel 1975, 116–152.
20 Cf. especially Hegel 1975, 12: ‘Now art and works of art, by springing forth 
and being created by the spirit, are themselves of a spiritual kind, even if their 
presentation assumes an appearance of sensuousness and pervades the sen­
suous with the spirit’; compare also ibid., 32–41. The thinking is reflected in 
Hegel’s formulation – in his Phenomenology of Spirit – that ‘spirit is artist’ (‘Der 
Geist ist Künstler’: Hegel 1988, 458). 
21 Hegel 1975, 623.
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Approached from this perspective, the revelations of art are related to 
those of religion and philosophy.22 Like those other two spheres, art 
gives expressive form to the spirit’s quest for self­understanding. But 
where philosophy makes things known through concepts, and religion 
operates through the figurative imagery of beliefs, art takes on sensu­
ous form: its purpose is to reveal to us aspects of ourselves – the work 
of art is the ‘spirit appearing in the sensuous’ [der Geist im Sinnlichen 
erscheinend],23 and artistic beauty ‘the sensible shining forth of the Idee 
[das sinnliche Scheinen der Idee]’.24 
It is this approach to Kunst that lends the history of art its critical 
significance. Where Kant had endeavoured to outline the principles 
governing timeless and universal aesthetic experience, centred around 
a shared aesthetic imperative of ‘disinterest’, Hegel advances a different 
thesis:25 namely, that ‘every work of art belongs to its own time, its own 
people, its own environment, and depends on particular historical and 
other ideas and purposes’.26 To study the history of art, it follows, is to 
unlock the course of human self­discovery:27
22 Cf. Hegel 1975, esp. 101–105. The complaint of Eagleton 1990, 143 – namely, 
that art occupies ‘a lowly rung on the ontological ladder, below religion and 
philosophy’ – strikes me as overly simplistic.
23 Hegel 1975, 621.
24 Hegel 2013, I: 151 (Knox translates the phrase as follows [Hegel 1975, 111]: 
‘Therefore the beautiful is characterized as the pure appearance of the Idea to 
sense’). Admittedly, as Gaiger 2006b, 163 reminds us, this particular ‘descrip­
tion of art … is nowhere to be found in any of the surviving sets of notes’ – and 
may well be one of Hotho’s interventions; still, it does relate closely to various 
passages in the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences.
25 On Hegel’s relationship to Kant – and the Romantic philosophical tradition 
at large – see Gardner’s chapter in this volume: among the most important pas­
sages responding to the Kritik der Urteilskraft are Hegel 1975, 56–61, 362–363; 
key modern discussions include Guyer 1990, D’Oro 1996 and Ameriks 2002. 
Kant’s ultimate legacy, of course, lies in Hegel’s abiding concern with freedom 
or Freiheit – albeit now shifted from Kantian ideas of the free play of subjective 
experience to the ‘freedom of spirit’ (cf. e.g. Hegel 1975, 97, 438). 
26 Hegel 1975, 14. It is for this reason, Hegel continues, that ‘scholarship in the 
field of art demands a vast wealth of historical, and indeed very detailed, facts, 
since the individual nature of the work of art is related to something individual 
and necessarily requires detailed knowledge for its understanding and explana­
tion.’ For further explication, cf. ibid., 25–55.
27 Hegel 1975, 7.
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In works of art the nations have deposited their richest inner institu­
tions and ideas, and art is often the key, and in many nations the sole 
key, to understanding their philosophy and religion.
The importance of art, in other words, lies in what it reveals about hu­
manity’s spiritual history, its Geistesgeschichte.
This helps to explain the particular challenge that Hegel set himself 
in his Lectures. By surveying the history of artistic production – across 
cultures, across the variables of time and space, and not least across dif­
ferent forms – Hegel sought to uncover what art has made known, and the 
various ways in which it has done so. There were of course precedents to 
the project. Among other forebears, one might think of Johann Joachim 
Winckelmann, in particular his 1764 Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums 
(a text to which Hegel frequently alluded).28 Writing a half­century or so 
earlier, Winckelmann had pivoted his discussion around ‘antiquity’.29 In 
stark contrast, Hegel casts a wider net: the Lectures extend from furthest 
antiquity right up to Hegel’s own time, as indeed back again.30 
28 Cf. e.g. Hegel 1975, 19, 63, 160–161, 172, 723–724, 733–737 (as indeed through­
out his discussion of sculpture in the third part of the Lectures: ibid., 701–791). 
‘Amongst those with this knowledge [of the sculptural ideal in Greek sculpture] 
and with an insight into Greek art and a burning love of it, it is Winckelmann 
above all who with the enthusiasm of his reproductive insight no less than with 
intelligence and sound judgment put an end to vague chatter about the ideal 
of Greek beauty by characterizing individually and with precision the forms 
of the parts [of Greek sculpture] – the sole undertaking that was instructive’ 
(ibid., 723). This is the reason why, when it comes to ‘particular aspects of the 
ideal form in sculpture’, Hegel promises to ‘follow Winckelmann in the main’ 
(ibid., 727); cf. also Peters’ chapter in this volume, pp. 117–120. 
29 This is not to deny, however, the essential parallels that Winckelmann draws 
between the four­stage history of ‘modern’ and ‘ancient’ Greek art: cf. Squire 
2011, 50–53.
30 Cf. Prettejohn 2012, 104–105, adding that by diverting ‘the historical study 
of art from its exclusive focus, in Winckelmann, on classical antiquity’, Hegel 
also ‘set up the terms for the modernist rejection of classicism as a universal 
principle of art’. While Hegel draws heavily on Winckelmann’s discussion of 
Greek sculpture (often with reference to its subsequent German reception), he 
takes from the Geschichte the idea of art’s organic development: cf. e.g. Hegel 
1975, 614: ‘For the products of all the arts are works of the spirit and therefore 
are not, like natural productions, complete all at once within their specific 
sphere; on the contrary, they have a beginning, a progress, a perfection, and an 
32
In terms of structure, Hegel seems to have organised his Lectures in 
three interconnecting parts.31 After a general introduction,32 the first sec­
tion addressed the issue of ‘beauty’ and the ideals of art.33 This gave rise, 
in the second part, to an exploration of the different forms of art, above 
all in historical perspective.34 The third section – at once the longest and 
most challenging – is structured around particular media: architecture, 
sculpture, painting, music and poetry in different genres.35 Two particular 
ideas prove crucial throughout. First, as we have said, Hegel understood 
the development of art as inextricable from the larger development of 
human self­understanding. Second, Hegel viewed that development as 
progressive: when it comes to the history of art, as indeed to history at 
large (a thesis championed in his Berlin lectures on the Philosophy of 
History), the narrative is one of unfolding, forward­moving advancement. 
Precisely how ‘linear’ we should judge this advancement remains moot: 
the third section, on the ‘System of the individual arts’, rather complicates 
the suggestion of any straightforward development over time.36 Still, the 
Lectures certainly do champion the idea that patterns of development can 
only be understood in retrospect: if the history of art must always be as­
sessed from a situated perspective, the modern western viewpoint onto 
end, a growth, blossoming, and decay.’ The fundamental difference, however, is 
that Winckelmann’s Geschichte is premised on the idea of a modernist German 
rekindling of art, whereas Hegel concerns himself with explaining its ‘pastness’.
31 For an outline of the structure and argument, see Hegel 1975, 69–90. Cf. also 
the repetitions about organisational outline – no doubt conceived with a view 
to the student audience – at e.g. ibid., 299–302, 613–614.
32 Hegel 1975, 1–90.
33 Hegel 1975: 91–298.
34 Hegel 1975, 299–611.
35 Hegel 1975, 613–1237.
36 For Hegel’s attempt to reconcile the second and third parts of the Lectures, 
see especially Hegel 1975, 614: ‘Now, just as the particular art­forms, taken as 
a group, have in them a progress, a development from the symbolic into the 
classical and then the romantic, so on the one hand we find in the individual 
arts also a similar progress because it is precisely the art­forms themselves 
which acquire their determinate existence through the individual arts. Yet, on 
the other hand, the individual arts too, independently of the art­forms which 
they objectify, have in themselves a development, a course which, considered 
rather abstractly, is common to them all. Each art has its time of efflorescence, 
of its perfect development as an art, and a history preceding and following this 
moment of perfection …’ Cf. below, n. 67.
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that history stands at the most advanced stage, and is more developed 
than any other.
The point takes us back to the relationship between Hegel’s histo­
ries of art, religion and philosophy. For Hegel, one of the things that 
art makes known is mankind’s understanding of itself – no less than 
of the world in which mankind finds itself. In this sense, the history of 
art is a history of expressing the supersensory in sensory form,37 since 
a primary purpose of art is its need ‘above all to make the Divine the 
centre of its representations’.38 
From the outset, however, Hegel posits a rupture between modern 
western modalities, as made known through art, and those of earlier times 
and places. Rather than demand worship, art today solicits a different 
sort of appreciation and response:39
No matter how excellent we find the statues of the Greek gods, no 
matter how we see God the Father, Christ, and Mary so estimably 
and perfectly portrayed: it is no help; we bow the knee no longer.
By looking back from our modern­day vantage­point, we can see a break 
with past attitudes. ‘Transferred into our ideas instead of maintaining its 
earlier necessity in reality and occupying its higher place’, art ‘considered 
in its highest vocation, is and remains for us a thing of the past’.40 So 
how is it, Hegel asks, that we have ended up in this situation? How has 
the historical development of art made known this critical self­under­
standing? Likewise, how might our present viewpoint shed light on art’s 
past – and its ‘pastness’?
It is these questions that led Hegel, from the position of hindsight, 
at once to narrate and explain the history of art, and from the distant 
past right up to the present day. Our modern condition, according to 
Hegel, relates to a tripartite history of artistic progress, one that moves 
from ‘symbolic’, through ‘classical’, and on to ‘romantic’ forms of art 
37 As Besançon 2000, 224, summarises the Hegelian argument, ‘the history 
of God can be grasped only through the history of art, at least until the point 
when God disappeared and dragged art along with him’. 
38 Hegel 1975, 175; cf. ibid., 83. For Hegel, the point is crucial for distinguishing 
between works of art and nature (ibid., esp. 29–30, and above, pp. 30–31). 
39 Hegel 1975, 103; cf. Squire’s chapter in this volume.
40 Hegel 1975, 11. Cf. below, pp. 38–43.
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[Kunstformen].41 The chapters that follow have more to say about these 
three ‘stages’, and their various configurations of external sensuous 
‘form’ and inner ‘content’.42 For now, though, a brief overview can 
suffice. 
For Hegel, art’s first – symbolic – stage failed to achieve genuine beau­
ty, leading him to associate it with what he labels ‘pre­art’, or Vorkunst.43 In 
discussing the symbolic, Hegel introduced various cultural and religious 
perspectives – among them, Persian and Zoroastrian, Indian (which is 
to say, for Hegel, Hindu), Egyptian, Judaic and Islamic.44 While of course 
disparate in appearance, these forms all share a vague and abstract grasp 
of their subjects, which explains their sensuous deficiencies.45 Egyptian 
art offers the clearest example of what Hegel meant by his ‘symbolic’ 
nomenclature. In the case of imagery (as for that matter hieroglyphic writ­
ing) from Egypt,46 the relationship between form and content – between 
sensuous appearance and the concepts that they represent – is arbitrary: 
while Egyptian images certainly do attempt a disclosure, they only ever 
point to – they only ever symbolise – something, so that the thing sym­
bolised remains forever occluded from view.47 Hegel’s classic example is 
41 For a summary, cf. Hegel 1975, 299–302, along with e.g. ibid., 75–81. Pinkard 
2007 offers one of the best recent discussions.
42 Cf. e.g. Hegel 1975, 70: ‘… the content of art is the Idea, while its form is 
the configuration of sensuous material’: for further comments, compare the 
chapters by Davis, Peters, Squire and Pippin in this volume.
43 Cf. Hegel 1975, 303–426. In symbolic art­forms, it is argued (ibid., 74), the de­
fectiveness of form stems from a defectiveness of content: ‘the Chinese, Indians 
and Egyptians, in their artistic shapes, images of gods, and idols, never get 
beyond formlessness or a bad and untrue definiteness of form’; ‘they could not 
master true beauty because their mythological ideas, the content and thought 
of their works of art, were still indeterminate, or determined badly, and so did 
not consist of the content which is absolute in itself ’; cf. also ibid., 76–77. 
44 On the relationship, see Hegel 1975, 319–321; cf. below, pp. 48–50.
45 As Hammermeister 2002, 98, puts it, the symbolic ‘is a sublime expression of 
man’s search for meaning, yet it does not move beyond a manifestation of the 
insufficient and vague idea in inadequate forms’. For a provocative challenge 
to Hegel’s thinking here, see Davis’ chapter in this volume.
46 For the parallels between Egyptian art and hieroglyphic script, see Hegel 
1975, 357.
47 Cf. e.g. Hegel 1975, 360: ‘The works of Egyptian art in their mysterious 
symbolism are therefore riddles; the objective riddle par excellence’ [Die Werke 
der ägyptischen Kunst in ihrer geheimnisvollen Symbolik sind deshalb Rätsel, das 
objective Rätsel selbst = Hegel 2013, I: 465]. In this connection, Hegel introduces 
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the pyramid, designed to contain the body of the dead (that is, something 
that signals mortality, absence, an empty negation of spiritual life): the 
pyramid gives sensuous form to a realm of interiority that it has yet to 
understand; as (pre­)artistic form, it has failed to grasp the true inward­
ness of human spirit.48
The second, ‘classical’ stage – associated with Greek antiquity – 
offers the decisive advancement.49 Unlike the symbolic, classical art 
achieves true beauty: it gives perfect sensuous expression to a new 
conception of divinity, and hence to the spiritual freedom that Greek 
religion enshrines.50 Through the very beauty of those forms, Greek 
art nonetheless comes to make known a deficiency in spiritual self-
understanding. The more perfectly ancient sculptors attempted to em­
body the spiritual life of the gods in the human form of their statues, 
the more they revealed it to lie beyond bodily, sensuous expression.51 
the literal riddle posed by the theriomorphic figure of the sphinx in Greek 
myth: the Greeks offered the decisive solution to the problems of both Egyptian 
religion and art, Hegel argues, and with an answer that is (revealingly!) oriented 
around both the human and the humanistic.
48 Cf. Hegel 1975, 356: ‘The Pyramids are such an external environment in 
which an inner meaning rests concealed’; as a result, ‘the Pyramids put before 
our eyes the simple prototype of symbolical art itself ’. Hegel returns to the 
Pyramids in his subsequent discussion of architecture at 651–654: ‘though 
astonishing in themselves’, it is argued, they ‘are just simple crystals, shells 
enclosing a kernel, a departed spirit, and serve to preserve its enduring body 
and form’ (653).
49 Hegel 1975, 427–516.
50 Cf. e.g. Hegel 1975, 77: ‘The classical art­form clears up this double defect 
[of symbolic forms]; it is the free and adequate embodiment of the Idea in 
the shape peculiarly appropriate to the Idea itself in its essential nature. With 
this shape, therefore, the Idea is able to come into free and complete harmony. 
Thus the classical art­form is the first to afford the production and vision of 
the completed Ideal and to present it as actualized in fact.’
51 Hegel 1975, 502–16, with summary at e.g. ibid., 78–9. For Hegel, the limits 
of classical art are clearly bound up with the spiritual finitudes of anthropo­
morphism itself: the visualised human forms ‘pervert the gods into the reverse 
of what constitutes the essence of the substantial and Divine’; as a result, ‘the 
downfall of these beautiful gods of art is therefore necessitated purely by their 
own nature, since in the end the mind cannot any longer find rest in them and 
therefore turns back from them into itself ’ (ibid., 504). Here, as throughout 
Hegel’s treatment of art history, it is the very configuration of the art­form that 
contains within it the seeds of its dissolution.
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A certain ‘melancholy’ ensued: ‘the blessed gods mourn as it were 
over the blessedness of their bodily form’; ‘we read in their faces the 
fate that awaits them, and its development, as the actual emergence 
of that contradiction between loftiness and particularity, between 
spirituality and sensuous existence, drags classical art itself to its ruin’.52 
This ‘ruin’ gave rise to a new religion – Christianity – and to a third, 
‘romantic’ form of art, associated with the rise of western Christendom.53 
Whereas the classical gods were ‘sightless’, because the ‘light of the soul 
falls outside them and belongs to the spectator alone’, the ‘God of roman­
tic art appears seeing, self­knowing, inwardly subjective, and disclosing 
his inner being to man’s inner being’.54 The Christian Incarnation proves 
crucial to both romantic art and religion alike.55 Just as the Incarnation 
is premised upon a new relationship between God and humanity, art 
makes known the disjuncture between the material and spiritual realms: 
where the classical had concerned itself with the perfection of outward 
form, art now points to something wholly more subjective, a ‘beauty of 
inwardness’ [Schönheit der Innigkeit].56 Unlike symbolic art,57 romantic art 
52 Hegel 1975, 485. The previous sentence is important: ‘the more that serious­
ness and spiritual freedom appear in the shapes of the gods, so much the more 
can we feel a contrast between (a) this loftiness and (b) determinacy and bodily 
form’. Cf. also ibid., 817: ‘The gods of the classical ideal too do not lack a trait 
of mourning, of a fateful negative [an dem schicksalsvollen Negativen: Hegel 2013, 
III: 42], present in the cold necessity imprinted on these serene figures …’
53 Hegel 1975, 517–611.
54 Hegel 1975, 521.
55 To put the point more strongly, one might say that the fate of romantic 
art follows the spiritual paradigm of Christ Himself (cf. Hegel 1975, 505–506, 
537–539): ‘This history of the spirit, consummated in one individual, contains 
nothing except what we have already touched on above, namely that the indi­
vidual man casts aside his individuality of body and spirit, i.e. that he suffers 
and dies, but conversely through the grief of death rises out of death, and 
ascends as God in his glory, as the actual spirit which now has indeed entered 
existence as an individual, as this subject, yet even so is essentially truly God 
only as Spirit in his Church’ (ibid., 534–535). 
56 Hegel 1975, 531; cf. ibid., 79–81, 518–519. On Hegel’s thinking here, see es­
pecially Pippin’s chapter in this volume, developing aspects of Pippin 2014.
57 For the distinction, see e.g. Hegel 1975, 81: ‘Thereby the separation of Idea 
and shape, their indifference and inadequacy to each other, come to the fore 
again, as in symbolic art, but with this essential difference, that, in romantic 
art, the Idea, the deficiency of which in the symbol brought with it deficiency 
of shape, now has to appear perfected in itself as spirit and heart.’
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discloses rather than symbolises. But the spiritual truth that it reveals 
transcends the sensuous realm of art. It is for this reason that Hegel posits 
the Reformation as the defining culmination of both Christianity and 
romantic art: ‘when the urge for knowledge and research, and the need for 
inner spirituality, instigated the Reformation, religious ideas were drawn 
away from their wrapping in the element of sense and brought back to 
the inwardness of heart and thinking’.58 FIG. 1.2
To my eyes, the painting that gives clearest visual form to Hegel’s 
thinking about the romantic Kunstform is a ceiling­fresco by Tomasso 
Laureti in the mid­1580s. The fresco crowns the Sala di Costantino in the 
Vatican, and it was surrounded by other paintings relating to the history 
of Christianity [Fig. 1.2].59 Working in the wake of the 1563 Council of 
Trent, amid the so­called ‘Counter­Reformation’, Laureti here depicts – 
and of course in a painted medium – the ‘triumph of Christianity’. Hegel 
himself never saw the painting (or visited Rome). Had he known of the 
fresco, though, he might have seized upon it as an iconic emblem of the 
intertwined self­discoveries of both romantic art and religion: in this 
act of religious iconoclasm, (the image of) Christ on the cross is shown 
to destroy the pagan sculptures of classical antiquity; Christianity at 
once empties ancient art of its idolatrous totemism and renders classical 
sculpture a past, cultural ruin.60
Hegel’s discussion of the romantic leads to his famous predictions 
about the future Auflösung, or ‘dissolution’, of art.61 The Reformation, 
58 Hegel 1975, 103. On the centrality of the Reformation to Hegel’s teleology, 
see – in addition to Squire’s chapter in this volume – Eberling 1974, esp. 15–18; 
B.M.G. Reardon 1977, esp. 58–76; Knox 1978, 93–104; and Houlgate 1997, 
esp. 5–15; cf. also Koerner 2004, esp. 32–37.
59 Cf. Squire 2011, 154–201, esp. 154–157, 197–198; for further discussion, see 
Bull 2005, 385–387.
60 Yet what makes the painting so interesting, in my view, are the ontological 
ambiguities to which it gives form (that is, what we might call its ‘iconoclash’: 
cf. Koerner 2004, 12, along with Koerner 2002 and the other essays in Latour 
and Weibel 2002). Set up on its pedestal, the embodied effigy of Christ is 
inscribed with the same totemic immediacy as the ancient statue which it 
destroys: the crucifix, in other words, out­idols even the pagan idolatry that it 
annihilates …
61 See above all Hegel 1975, 9–11, 593–611, 1236–1237. Hegel’s discussions of the 
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Hegel argues, had emancipated art from the hegemony of religion:62 
‘we have got beyond venerating works of art as divine and worshipping 
them’, so that ‘the impression they make is of a more reflective kind, and 
what they arouse in us needs a higher touchstone and a different test’.63 
Now that art has transcended its earlier purpose of making the divine 
sensuously present, and indeed of aspiring to an ideal beauty of form, it 
is free to chart a new secular path.64 And yet, since art satisfies us when 
it takes an active role in religious life – that is, when it gives sensuous 
form to the divine – art can no longer engage us in the ways it had done 
addition to the chapters in this volume by e.g. Pippin, Clark, Kottman, Torsen 
and Gardner, see inter alios Bungay 1984, 71–89; Henrich 1985; Belting 1987; 
Hast 1991; Carter 1993; Gethmann­Siefert 1994; Houlgate 1997; Clark 1999; 
Besançon 2000, 215–221; Rapp 2000; Weibel 2002; Horowitz 2002; Oetjen 2003; 
Danto 2004 (alongside the author’s key earlier contributions – cf. below, n. 75); 
Franke and Gethmann­Siefert 2005; Pippin 2005, 296–302; Gaiger 2006a; 
Geulen 2006; Speight 2009; Pippin 2014.
62 Cf. Hendrix 2005, 6 (‘Romantic art frees reason from an identity with the 
real, and enacts an allegory of the dialectical relation of reason to itself in self­
consciousness; Romantic art is thus the first modern art, or the new beginning of 
artistic representation in the modern world’), along with Houlgate 1997, 9 (‘What 
is distinctive about Protestantism is not that it shuns all aesthetic expression 
as such, but rather that it frees art from dominance by religion and so allows 
it to become fully secular’). As Hegel 1975, 517–29, explains, the modern condi­
tion, which allows artistic form to express itself independently of content (and 
vice versa), might in fact be to art’s benefit. In classical art, the subjective inner 
element is so integral to the external form that each is dependent on the other; 
romantic art, by contrast, ‘as art is not the didactic revelation which produces 
the content of truth for contemplation simply and solely in the form of art; on 
the contrary, the content of romantic art is already present explicitly to mind 
and feeling outside the sphere of art … Therewith externality is regarded as an 
indifferent element in which spirit has no final trust or persistence’ (ibid., 526). 
63 Hegel 1975, 10.
64 See e.g. Hegel 1975, 594: ‘In romantic art [in contrast to the classical] …, 
where inwardness withdraws itself into itself, the entire material of the external 
world acquires freedom to go its own way and maintain itself according to its 
own special and particular character’; cf. e.g. ibid., 602, 605 (discussing how, ‘in 
our day, in the case of almost all peoples, criticism, the cultivation of reflection, 
and, in our German case, freedom of thought have mastered the artists too, 
and have made them, so to say, a tabula rasa in respect of the material and the 
form of their productions, after the necessary particular stages of the romantic 
art­form have been traversed’, 605).
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before. Since art has lost its highest vocation as art, it must instead look 
to philosophy for ratification, refutation or reification:65
In all these respects art, considered in its highest vocation, is and 
remains for us a thing of the past. Thereby it has lost for us genuine 
truth and life, and has rather been transferred into our ideas instead 
of maintaining its earlier necessity in reality and occupying its 
higher place. What is now aroused in us by works of art is not just 
immediate enjoyment but our judgement also, since we subject to 
our intellectual consideration (i) the content of art, and (ii) the work 
of art’s means of presentation, and the appropriateness or inappro­
priateness of both to one another. The philosophy of art is therefore 
a greater need in our day than it was in days when art by itself as art 
yielded full satisfaction. Art invites us to intellectual consideration, 
and that not for the purpose of creating art again, but for knowing 
philosophically what art is.
Hegel is slightly vague about what future art might look like. But he 
does provide some hints in the third and final section of the Lectures, 
dedicated to ‘The system of individual arts’ [Das System der einzelnen 
Künste].66 Different kinds of art are differently suited to the three ar­
tistic forms sketched in the second part of the Lectures, he explains:67 
65 Hegel 1975, 11. As Pippin 2005, 300, glosses the sentiment: ‘Representational 
art cannot adequately express the full subjectivity of experience, the wholly self­
legislating, self­authorizing status of the norms that constitute such subjectiv­
ity, or, thus, cannot adequately express who we (now) are. Only philosophy can 
“heal” such a self­inflicted wound and allow the self­determining character of 
experience its adequate expression.’
66 Hegel 1975, 613–1237 – with synopses at 82–90 and 621–629.
67 Cf. Hegel 1975, 90. On the connection between the second and third parts 
of the Lectures, cf. above, n. 36. Hegel is at pains to emphasise the complexity of 
the relationship between the individual types of art and their generic symbolic, 
classical and romantic forms: there are of course classical and romantic kinds of 
architecture (cf. ibid., 634), and Hegel discusses both at length (ibid., 660–700). 
Likewise, sculpture is not specific to the classical form of art – its history en­
compasses both symbolic and romantic Christian forms (e.g. ibid., 708, 966). 
By extension, painting has a classical prehistory (ibid., 799–802), and Hegel is 
not unaware of Chinese and Indian forms (e.g. ibid., 799). Most complex of all 
is the history of poetry, not least given the range of subsidiary genres (e.g. ibid., 
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broadly speaking, the ‘external’ art of architecture proves to be the form 
most suited to the symbolic, the ‘objective’ art of sculpture is perfected 
by the classical, and the ‘subjective’ art of painting (like music and 
poetry – above all lyric)68 reaches fruition in the romantic.69 And yet 
in the modern, (post­) romantic world, none of these media can truly 
satisfy, at least in the ways they had done before.70 Hegel’s comments 
about Dutch and Flemish still­lifes – judged among the most ‘advanced’ 
genres of romantic painting precisely because of their ‘prosaic’ subject71 – 
intimate something about the direction of the visual arts. But clearly 
1035–1039). In each case, Hegel explains, it is possible to trace the development 
of specific kinds of art across his tripartite system of artistic forms – whether 
to chart earlier histories, or posthumous shifts; however, ‘these deviations did 
not reach the summit of art but either were the preparatory attempts of inferior 
beginnings or else displayed the start of a transition to an art which, in this 
transition, seized on a subject­matter, and a way of treating the material, of a 
type that only a further art was permitted to develop completely’ (ibid., 966).
68 Cf. Hegel 1975, 527–528, on music and lyric, along with e.g. ibid., 1031 and 
1111–1157 on lyric poetry.
69 For the connection, cf. e.g. Hegel 1975, 626: ‘For painting is not concerned 
with making visible as such but with the visibility which is both self­particu­
larizing and also inwardized’ – along with the chapters in this volume by Rush, 
Grootenboer and Pippin.
70 Not even poetry – after reaching its zenith – can satisfy the prosaic mindset 
of the modern: ‘No Homer, Sophocles, etc., no Dante, Ariosto, or Shakespeare 
can appear in our day; what was so magnificently sung, what so freely expressed, 
has been expressed; these are materials, ways of looking at them and treating 
them which have been sung once and for all … (Hegel 1975, 608). Cf. ibid., 968: 
‘Only as a result of considering the series of the arts in this way does poetry 
appear as that particular art in which art itself begins at the same time to dis­
solve and acquire in the eyes of philosophy its point of transition to religious 
pictorial thinking as such, as well as to the prose of scientific thought. The 
realm of the beautiful … is bordered on one side by the prose of finitude and 
commonplace thinking, out of which art struggles on its way to truth, and on 
the other side the higher spheres of religion and philosophy where there is a 
transition to that apprehension of the Absolute which is still further removed 
from the sensuous sphere.’
71 For Hegel’s thinking about Dutch and Flemish painting (which he is at pains 
to associate with the Protestant theologies: cf. e.g. Hegel 1975, 597–598), see 
especially the chapters in this book by Rush and Grootenboer. More generally 
on the forms of modern art, see e.g. Rush 2010 and Rutter 2010.
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Hegel envisages art’s future as lying in non­visual kinds of art – in his 
comments about contemporary music (Bach, Handel and Mozart),72 for 
example, and not least his comments on poetry (epic, lyric, drama and 
above all comedy).73
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Hegel’s comments on the ‘dissolution’ or Auflösung of art have had a 
profound and enduring impact on the historiography of modern art. As 
Hegel predicted (and in part helped to initiate),74 the phenomenon of 
‘modernism’ has come to preoccupy the study of aesthetics. The Hegelian 
idea of a modernist rupture has likewise shaped the stories that modern 
histories of art and aesthetics have come to tell – from Arthur Danto’s 
writings on art as the ‘object of its own theoretical consciousness’,75 to 
72 Cf. Hegel 1975, 888–958, defining ‘what alone is fitted for expression in 
music’ as ‘the object­free inner life, abstract subjectivity as such’ (891); cf. ibid., 
959, on the ‘forward step’ of romantic music ‘in that it made inner life as such, 
and subjective feeling, something for apprehension by the inner life, not in vis­
ible shapes, but in the figurations of inwardly reverberating sound’. On Hegel’s 
attitudes towards music – something which is (not for want of trying!) rather 
downplayed in our volume – see e.g. Johnson 1991, Espiña 1997, Rollmann 2005, 
Bowie 2007 and Goehr 2008, esp. 71–75. ‘I am little versed in this sphere [of 
music]’, Hegel 1975, 893, claimed, ‘and must therefore excuse myself in advance 
for restricting myself simply to the more general points and to single remarks’ 
(cf. e.g. ibid., 1093).
73 For some comments on Hegel’s approach to the history of poetry’s develop­
ment (cf. Hegel 1975, 627–628, 1035–1039) – and the flourishing field of schol­
arship on Hegel­Shakespeare studies in particular – see Kottman’s chapter in 
this volume. According to Hegel, comedy ‘leads … to the dissolution of art al­
together’: ‘satisfied in itself, it [absolute subjective personality] no longer unites 
itself with anything objective and particularized and it brings the negative side 
of this dissolution into consciousness in the humour of comedy’ (Hegel 1975, 
1236, with discussion in e.g. Pippin 2014, 142–143).
74 Cf. Hegel 1975, 1236: ‘Now at the end we have arranged every essential 
category of the beautiful and every essential form of art into a philosophical 
garland, and weaving it is one of the worthiest tasks that philosophy is capable 
of completing.’
75 Danto 1986, 111. Cf. e.g. Danto 1997 and 2004 – along with e.g. Gaiger 2000 
and Houlgate 2013.
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Georges Didi­Hubermann’s laments about our modernist ‘forgetting’ of 
earlier visual modes.76
But Hegel has exerted a still more profound influence on the broader 
disciplinary project of art history. If, as Ernst Gombrich famously wrote, 
Hegel is in one sense the ‘father of art history’,77 it is also true (as Michael 
Ann Holly puts it) that ‘there remains something of the Hegelian episte­
mology in the work of every art historian’.78 One aspect of this heritage lies 
in the art historical quest to make objects speak of the broader cultural 
contexts in which they are situated – whether social, economic, cultural, 
intellectual and theological. Another part lies in the drive to track changes 
in both artistic form and cultural framework, and thereby to construct a 
narrative of development: quite apart from the work of Jacob Burckhardt 
a little later in the nineteenth century, one might consider the histories 
of stylistic form that Heinrich Wölfflin and Alois Riegl constructed (not 
least Riegl’s notion of Kunstwollen).79 In all this, Hegel’s foremost legacy 
has been to offer a counterweight to Kant: where Kant bestowed art his­
tory with its essentialist concept of subjective aesthetic experience, Hegel 
has given it its residual historicising impulse.80 
76 Didi­Hubermann 1990, 16. On the ways in which Hegel set the agenda for 
modern definitions of art, cf. the important recent contribution of Andina 2013; 
Podro 1982, esp. 17–30, still offers a stimulating introduction to Hegel’s place 
within a German tradition of the ‘critical historians of art’.
77 Gombrich 1977, 203 (cf. Gombrich 1989, 59). On Gombrich’s relation to Hegel 
– and his self­characterisation as a ‘runaway Hegelian’ – see also Summers 2007.
78 Holly 1984, 30.
79 The bibliography is immense: for the best introduction, see Elsner 2006a. 
For my own attempt to chart some of the broader Kantian and Hegelian tussles 
of art history from the early nineteenth century to the modern day, cf. Squire 
2009, 74–87 (with more detailed bibliography). Among recent disciplinary ‘his­
tories’ of art history, Locher 2001, 17–97; Minor 2007; and Iversen and Melville 
2010 are particularly recommended.
80 Cf. e.g. Cheetham 1998, 6: ‘Kant and Hegel have arguably had the greatest 
influence of any philosophers on the discipline of art history and on artists, 
and their effects are perhaps equal in scope and significance’ (with further com­
ments in Cheetham 2001); cf. also Foster 2002, 85, on the Kantian and Hegelian 
positions as a ‘tension [that] has run through the discipline like a fault line’. 
This historiography, I think, goes some way to explaining an essential quandary 
of art history as a discipline: ‘we seem faced with an inescapable choice between 
an ahistorical appreciation of the artwork as an aesthetic object and a historical 
understanding of it that tends to reduce it to a symptom of its social­historical 
context’ (Mattick 2003, 114); cf. also Podro 1982, xviii–xx (‘One reason why there 
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Hegel’s particular mode of historicising can of course be situated 
within his cultural context, above all in early nineteenth­century Prus­
sia.81 His account of the development of the classical and romantic, for 
example, might be thought to be indebted to a long­standing competition 
between ‘ancient’ and ‘modern’ forms, ultimately stemming back to the 
Querelles des anciens et des modernes in late seventeenth­century France.82 
Likewise, as Whitney Davis shows in this book, Hegel’s thinking about 
Egyptian art – and about symbolic art­forms in general – is indebted 
to the views of earlier German thinkers: ultimately, the symbolic and 
romantic both serve as a foil for championing the supreme beauty of 
Greek forms.83 The history of collecting and displaying artworks proves 
was difficulty about the distinction between two kinds of inquiry stems from 
what has been observed about the nature of art itself – its being both context­
bound and yet irreducible to its contextual conditions … The critical historians 
were constantly treading a tightrope between the two’).
81 For some introductions, see the essays in Pöggeler and Bonsiepen 1981 and 
Pöggeler and Gethmann­Siefert 1983.
82 Cf. Barasch 2000, II: 182–183. On the ways in which these querelles stimu­
lated discussion of aesthetics in late eighteenth­ and early nineteenth­century 
Germany, see Jauss 1970, 67–106; Szondi 1974; Levine 1999; for their continu­
ing influence beyond the Enlightenment, the key contribution is Riley 2001, 
esp. 86. The history of earlier Enlightenment views of ‘antiquity’ prove crucial 
here: for a survey of the recent bibliography (with reference to e.g. the work of 
Dan Edelstein, Peter Gay and Franco Venturi), see Lifschitz and Squire 2017, 
esp. 23–29, in the context of Lessing’s 1766 Laocoon.
83 In essence, Hegel’s tripartite narrative of art amounts to a history of ‘pre­
Greek’, ‘Greek’ and ‘post­Greek’ forms: cf. Squire’s chapter in this volume. On 
Greek antiquity’s grip over the aesthetic thinking of the German Enlightenment 
and early nineteenth century, see e.g. Butler 1935, Marchand 1996, Billings 2014 
and Valdez 2014; Koch 2013, 201–404, provides an excellent introduction to ‘die 
neuzeitliche Erschließung der antiken Kunstschriftstellerei’ more generally. 
Compare Güthenke 2008, esp. 20–43: on the one hand, as Güthenke’s sugges­
tively puts it, the legacy of classical antiquity constituted the ‘Greek landscape 
of the German soul’ (44–92). On the other, it also gave rise to a particular 
self­defining attitude of ‘modernity’, shaped by the Hellenophilia of German 
romanticism: ‘ “Modern” is seen in opposition to two notions: that of the com­
plete or harmonious or not fragmented, which is its lost origin and in an altered 
shape its driving goal, and secondly, that of the past or ancient, especially at a 
time when artistic debate redefined or at least still remembered the normative 
character of ancient models. The difference from the past becomes the condition 
of modernity … Here Greece enters’ (41).
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crucial too. Beat Wyss, for example, has drawn a comparison between 
Hegel’s thinking and the organisation of Karl Friedrich Schinkel’s new 
Königliches Museum in Berlin (now known as the Altes Museum), which 
was being constructed at precisely the time when Hegel delivered his 
lectures.84 Beyond Prussia, one might draw an analogy between the story 
of artistic progress told by Hegel and the sorts of narratives being forged 
by newly founded national museums across Europe.85 A particularly 
revealing parallel comes in James Stephanoff ’s painting, dating from the 
early 1840s, of An Assemblage of Works of Art, from the Earliest Period to 
the Time of Pheidias [Fig. 1.3]. Stephanoff ’s ‘assemblage’ brings together 
works from (among other places) Egypt, South America, India, Etruria 
and Greece. Embedded within the painting, however, is also an idea of 
progressive artistic advancement: it is classical art that occupies the literal 
and metaphorical high point; indeed, the triangular pediment that encase 
the Aegina architectural statues signals the progressive forward thrust of 
art’s development.86 FIG. 1.3
84 Wyss 1999, esp. 104–110. Although Hegel does not mention Schinkel by name, 
the neoclassical deigns of his new museum (and the Prussian capital at large) 
seem to lie behind the statement that ‘in Germany we have long followed the 
Italians or the French [in architecture], until now at last we have turned to the 
Greeks again and taken classical art in its purer form as our model’ (Hegel 
1975, 683). The Lectures also at times mention particular Berlin galleries and 
exhibitions (e.g. ibid., 790, 820–821, 856).
85 For the most explicit comments – made, according to Hotho, on 17 February 
1829, before the opening of the Königliches Museum in August 1830 – see Hegel 
1975, 870: ‘For example, unless we bring with us in the case of each picture a 
knowledge of the country, period, and school to which it belongs and of the 
master who painted it, most galleries seem to be a senseless confusion out of 
which we cannot find our way. Thus, the greatest aid to study and intelligent 
enjoyment is an historical arrangement. Such a collection, historically ordered, 
unique and invaluable of its kind, we shall soon have an opportunity to admire 
in the picture gallery of the Royal Museum [Königliches Museum] here in 
Berlin. In this collection there will be clearly recognizable not only the external 
history of painting, i.e. the development of technique, but the essential progress 
of the inner history of painting, i.e. its different schools and subjects, as well as 
the conception of these and their mode of treatment.’
86 On Stephanoff ’s image, cf. Jenkins 1992, 61–65. More generally on the rise of 
European museums, see the essays in Paul 2014 – with Thomas W. Gaehtgen’s 
chapter on ‘Building Prussia’s first modern museum’ (at 285–304).
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1.3  James Stephanoff, An Assemblage of Works of Art from the Earliest Period 
to the Time of Pheidias, c. 1845 (74.3 × 62.2 cm). Drawing and watercolour on 
paper. London: British Museum, inv. 1994.1210.6. © Trustees of the British 
Museum. Reproduced in colour as Plate 1.
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Hegel himself would have been the first to acknowledge the ‘situ­
atedness’ of his account.87 Within the Hegelian teleology, art is said to 
have reached its most developed forms in Protestant Prussia: in an age 
of mounting pan­Germanism, Hegel even associates the achievements 
of Flemish and Dutch painting with ‘what is strictly German’ (playing 
upon the adjective ‘deutsch ’ to refer to both the German and the Dutch).88 
In all this, national stereotypes loom large – no surprise, perhaps, given 
Hegel’s foundational premise that the art itself reveals the distinctive 
cultural outlooks of different peoples.89 Hegel is no less explicit about his 
own contemporary German perspective:90 following good Enlightenment 
precedent, he frequently alludes to how ‘we Germans’ [wir Deutsche] view 
the world and themselves,91 often defining (as indeed at times lampoon­
ing) German aesthetic tastes against a French antitype.92 
But simply to label the Lectures on Aesthetics ‘Eurocentric’, ‘nationalist’ 
or ‘imperialist’ would be unfair. True, Hegel was no postcolonial thinker 
(how could he have been?): his views were shaped by his age and national 
context. Likewise, many of Hegel’s specific judgments – about ‘primitive’ 
peoples, and by extension perhaps even his teleological narrative about 
artistic self­discovery – lend themselves to cultural and political misuse; 
given the conditioning of our own viewpoints in the twenty-first century 
(not least the unmitigated horrors of National Socialism), it is easier to 
dismiss the Lectures than it is seriously to engage with them. However, 
87 Cf. above, pp. 30–32 – along with e.g. Hegel 1975, 603: ‘Now just as every 
man is a child of his time in every activity, whether political, religious, or sci­
entific, and just as he has the task of bringing out the essential content and the 
therefore necessary form of that time, so it is the vocation of art to find for the 
spirit of a people the artistic expression corresponding to it.’
88 Cf. Hegel 1975, 882–7, quotation from 882. On Hegel’s comments here, cf. 
the chapters by Rush and Grootenboer in this volume; more generally on the 
nationalist stakes, cf. Moxey 1998.
89 Cf. Hegel 1975, 285: ‘In this way art and its specific mode of production hangs 
together with the specific nationality of peoples.’ 
90 Hence Hegel’s reflections on his own national tastes, not least in the context 
of contemporary German poetry. Particularly relevant are his assessments of 
Schiller and Goethe: ‘Goethe’s songs are the most excellent, profound and ef­
fective things given to Germany in recent times, because they belong entirely 
to him and his nation, and since they have emerged on our own soil they also 
completely strike the fundamental note of our spirit’ (Hegel 1975, 1157).
91 E.g. Hegel 1975, 235, 269, 274, 620, 919, 946, 1124.
92 E.g. Hegel 1975, 6–7, 268, 269, 620, 684, 1175.
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to reject the whole project of Hegelian aesthetics as simply ‘totalitarian’ 
would be a mistake. Quite apart from the dazzling breadth of knowledge 
that they display, the Lectures show a degree of respect to all forms of 
artistic production.93 Unlike many of his contemporaries, Hegel in fact 
invested a great deal of effort in engaging with the history of art across 
the globe, whether in his treatment of Indian poetry,94 for example, or 
in his analyses of Indian, Persian and Chinese art.95 While he did not 
shrink from making qualitative judgments about the form or content of 
art across the globe – and while he was convinced, given his teleological 
93 The introduction to the Lectures nicely demonstrates the point in the context 
of art that is either geographically or chronologically removed from nineteenth­
century German tastes (Hegel 1975, 20–21). One can learn from and enjoy the 
artistic products of all times and places, we are told, even if they ‘lie outside the 
circle and forms’ of the romantic: ‘These works, because of their age or foreign 
nationality, have of course something strange about them for us, but they have 
a content which outsoars their foreignness and is common to all mankind, and 
only by the prejudice of theory could they be stamped as products of a barbarous 
bad taste’. Indeed, it is the ‘growth of spiritual receptivity’ in modern Europe 
that has enabled scholarship on the history of art in the first place – which has 
in turn ‘extended people’s intellectual horizons in every direction’.
94 Cf. Hegel 1975, 366–368 (and cf. e.g. ibid., 374–375, 478, 978). Despite the 
‘wealth of fancy which seems at first sight to be deployed there’, Krishna’s 
recitations in Indian poetry are nonetheless said to be, ‘extremely monotonous 
and, on the whole, empty and wearisome’ (367–368). For Hegel, Indian poetry 
cannot rival Greek – which is ‘always admired and imitated anew by the most 
different peoples because human nature has reached its most beautiful develop­
ment in it alike in its subject­matter and artistic form (978). ‘Yet even Indian 
poetry,’ Hegel continues, ‘despite all its distance from our view of the world and 
from our mode of portrayal, is not wholly strange to us, and we can laud its as 
a high privilege of our age to have begun more and more to unveil its sense for 
the whole richness of art and, in short, of the human spirit.’ Something similar 
might be said of what Hegel labelled the ‘Mohammadan’ poetry of Persia (cf. 
ibid., 368–371): on account of its ‘depth and childlikeness of heart’ (ibid., 370), 
such poetry deserves ‘special praise’ for offering ‘a contemplative view of the 
world, a relation of the spirit to the things of this world which lies nearer to 
the mind of age than of youth’ (ibid., 999; cf. 1094–1098).
95 Hegel’s assessments of other ‘eastern’ art­forms are essentially similar to 
those of Egyptian sculpture (cf. above, pp. 35–36): e.g. Hegel 1975, 341 (‘Indian 
art does not get beyond the grotesque intermixture of the natural and the human, 
so that neither side gets its right, and both are reciprocally vitiated’). Chinese 
and Indian painting is mentioned only in passing (above all at ibid., 799).
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framework, that his own views were more advanced than those of other 
peoples96 – his system is nonetheless founded on a certain degree of 
relativism.97 Indeed, Hegel’s own national pride is based on the values of 
post­Enlightenment, German Wissenschaft:98 
Therefore we must keep to the primitive epics and disentangle our­
selves not only from views antagonistic to them and current in our 
actual present but also, and above all, from false aesthetic theories and 
claims, if we wish to study and enjoy the original outlook of peoples, 
this great natural history of spirit. We may congratulate recent times, 
and our German nation in particular, on attaining this end by break­
ing down the old limitations of the scientific intellect, and by freeing 
spirit from restricted views, making it receptive of such outlooks. 
These we must receive as those of individuals, entitled to be what 
they were, as the justified spirits of peoples whose minds and deeds 
confront us as revealed in their epics.
For Hegel, what is so advanced about his 1820s Prussian academic context 
is its abiding respect for all forms of knowledge: the achievement whereby, 
in the wake of the Aufklärung, all aspects of human culture, regardless 
of time and place, are deemed worthy of serious ‘scientific’ study. In this 
sense, as Kai Hammermeister has put it, Hegel offered ‘a veritable world 
history of art’.99 
But there is another reason why the Lectures on Aesthetics deserve 
scholarly revisiting. In recent years, especially in the UK and North 
America, many of the interests that motivated Hegel have resurfaced 
in the disciplinary field of art history (despite a certain reluctance to 
96 For the classic postcolonial deconstruction of western attitudes to the ‘ori­
ental’ other in particular (albeit without reference to Hegel), see Said 1978.
97 For an example, cf. e.g. Hegel 1975, 44–5, discussing at once non­European 
responses to the European configurations of beauty, and the European recep­
tion of Chinese, Hottentot and African art: ‘Indeed, if we examine the works of 
art of these non­European peoples, their images of the gods, for example, which 
have sprung from their fancy as sublime and worthy of veneration, they may 
present themselves to us as the most hideous idols; and while their music may 
sound in our ears as the most detestable noise, they on their side will regard 
our sculptures, pictures, and music, as meaningless or ugly.’
98 Hegel 1975, 1077 (in the context of analysing poetry).
99 Hammermeister 2002, 24.
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engage with the Hegelian ancestry). Over the last decade in particular, 
there has been much talk of ‘global’ approaches to the history of art, 
with a burgeoning bibliography to match.100 Likewise, the transformation 
of so many departments of ‘art history’ into centres for ‘visual studies’, 
often championing a comparative or cross­cultural aspect, chimes with 
elements of Hegel’s own approach – not least in probing how visual ma­
terials not only reflect but also constitute cultural ideas.101 In some ways, 
the underlying concerns of Hegel’s Lectures look more contemporary than 
ever. And the questions that Hegel raised, some two centuries ago, have 
never appeared more urgent.
100 For some of the most scintillating recent interventions, see e.g. Summers 
2002, Elkins 2007, Carrier 2008, Belting 2011 (translating an influential German 
book that was first published in 2001) and Elsner 2017 – each with detailed 
bibliographic review. These new intellectual horizons provide an opportunity 
at once to expand and revisit Hegelian approaches – to defuse the prejudices 
of Hegel’s arguments while nonetheless testing their philosophical force. One 
might argue, for example, that Hegel misdiagnosed the ‘Oriental’ east, out of ig­
norance or parochial prejudice (cf. Davis’ chapter in this volume). And yet – if it 
were deemed possible to keep at arm’s length the racism or cultural prejudice – 
one might still think that aspects of the account prove enlightening: an argu­
ment might be made, for instance, for parallel developments in ‘symbolic’, 
‘classical’ and ‘romantic’ forms in the arts of China, Japan or India …
101 The earliest use of the term ‘visual culture’ in English that I know of is 
Alpers 1983: xxv, acknowledging a debt to the work of Michael Baxandall. On 
the ideology of ‘visual culture’, see Herbert 2003, together with the discussions 
in Bryson, Holly and Moxey 1994, Mitchell 1995 and Mirzoeff 1999. For some 
sharp­sighted overviews of the term’s epistemological stakes, see Moxey 2001, 
103–123; Bal 2003; Elkins 2003, esp. 125–195; and Cherry 2004. Hegel, I think, 
would have wanted to reserve the special place for ‘art’ (cf. Hegel 1975, 3–14, dis­
tinguishing between ‘art which is free alike in its ends and in its means’ [7] and 
hence, for instance, between ‘the war­paint of the savages’ and ‘the splendour of 
temples with all their riches of adornment’ [3]). Still, there is something deeply 
Hegelian in contemporary talk of ‘visual culture’. As van Eck and Winters 2005, 
4, maintain, the very notion of visual culture, derived as it is from structural 
semiotics, is itself predicated on an ideological subsumption of images to words: 
‘the visuality studied by practitioners of visual culture is not the visual as such, 
but its verbal interpretation by the beholder’; ‘their visual theory is not a theory 
of the visual arts, but a theory of the beholder who speaks; and that theory is 
derived directly from semiology’. 
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INTER VENT ION IST  CONVERSAT IONS
In putting this volume together, we were not unaware that 2018 marks 
the second centenary of the Lectures on Aesthetics: it was in the summer 
semester of 1818, at the University of Heidelberg, that Hegel first ascended 
the podium to offer a version of his Vorlesungen. The anniversary strikes us 
as an appropriate occasion for thinking about what Hegel might offer the 
contemporary field of art history, as indeed about how modern art historical 
insights might nuance our retrospective view of Hegelian aesthetics. How 
can a Hegelian perspective inform our art historical questions? And how 
can art history help us to make sense – and use – of Hegelian philosophy?
Of course, ours is not the first book to explore Hegel’s contribution in 
the field of art history.102 Where this book differs, though, is in its range 
of disciplinary perspectives, and hence in the sorts of conversations that 
it seeks to initiate. Hegel has loomed large in the study of ‘modernism’, 
above all with reference to the art of the nineteenth to the twenty-first 
centuries. But he has been conspicuously missing in (among other sub­
jects) the fields of Egyptology, classical archaeology and mediaeval art 
history, or for that matter in the study of non­western art. For Hegel, all 
of these subjects form part and parcel of a single mode of historical­cum­
philosophical analysis. By bringing together different specialists, we thus 
stage a dialogue between Hegelian scholars and those who work on the 
specific cultures, periods and art-forms that Hegel discussed.
We begin, in the first part of the book, with three contributions 
that look back to antiquity, whether to explore how Hegel helps us to 
understand the historical workings of Egyptian and Graeco­Roman art, 
or else to assess how those materials shed light on Hegel’s thinking. 
The next chapter, by Whitney Davis, reaches furthest back in time – to 
the Egyptian materials that Hegel associated with the first, ‘symbolic’ 
stage of art. Fundamental to Hegel’s understanding of this material, as 
we have noted, is its supposed opacity: the symbolic is defined around 
the arbitrary relation between inner ‘meaning’ [Bedeutung] and outer 
form [Gestalt]. For Hegel, Egyptian imagery – like Egyptian architecture 
and writing – is subsequently defined around its enigmatic resistance 
to full decipherability. But to what extent, Davis asks, is this a feature 
102 See especially the essays in Houlgate 2007.
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that inheres in Egyptian art, and to what extent is it instead a modern 
ideological projection? 
In answering that question, Davis’s chapter is concerned as much 
with ideological colour as with historiographic derivation. Hegel’s atti­
tudes towards Egypt are adapted from those of other thinkers in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Davis argues. While tracing 
some of Hegel’s conceptual debts, Davis nonetheless adopts a different 
(and wholly more relativist) global art historical perspective: by looking 
to modern parallels in world art – many of them unknown to Hegel – he 
teases out some of the parochial aspects of Hegel’s thinking. The chapter 
concentrates on just one aspect of Egyptian figurative art: namely, its 
recourse to ‘theriomorphic’ images of rulers and gods – hybrid forms 
that combine animal and human elements (as used to figure the likes 
of Anubis and Horus, for example, or most famously in the Egyptian 
sphinx).103 In Hegel’s eyes, such forms epitomise the primitive confu­
sions of Egyptian art:104 theriomorphism itself serves as a ‘symbol’ for 
the ‘symbolic’, since Hegel thinks that the ‘body of a brute’ can never be 
the ‘domicile’ of a human soul.105 But a global history of art – a degree of 
‘cosmological perspectivism’ (as Davis puts it) – can help us to see other­
wise. What happens to the Hegelian narrative when we view Egyptian 
theriomorphism from a broader comparative anthropological perspective? 
Need the phenomenon necessarily point to a ‘pre­self­consciousness’, 
as Hegel would suggest, rather than to alternative (but equally sophisti­
cated) ‘onto­theologies’, premised on non­anthropomorphic theodicies of 
representation? Indeed, if we proceed from this wholly more relativist, 
postcolonial starting­point, what are the implications for Hegel’s narra­
tive – and in world art terms?
103 Cf. above, n. 47. According to Hegel (e.g. 1975, 656), such forms themselves 
provide a symbol for the external forms of symbolic architecture.
104 Cf. above, pp. 35–36. Among those whose art is symbolic in form, Hegel 
claims, the Egyptians are the ‘properly artistic people’ (Hegel 1975, 354). But 
‘their works remain mysterious and dumb, mute and motionless, because here 
spirit itself has still not really found its inner life and still cannot speak the 
clear and distinct language of spirit’. 
105 The sentiment is fundamental to the shift that Hegel posits between sym­
bolic and classical forms: ‘Thus in classical art the character of the animal form 
is altered in every respect; here the animal form is used to indicate the evil, the 
bad, the trivial, the natural, and the unspiritual, whereas formerly it was the 
expression of the positive and the Absolute’ (Hegel 1975, 453; cf. e.g. ibid., 714).
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With Julia Peters’ chapter we move from the symbolic to the classical 
– and, above all, to Hegel’s discussion of Greek sculpture. For Hegel, the 
classical stands at a liminal moment: the inherent beauty of Greek statu­
ary, Hegel claims, resides in the new convergence of form with content.106 
Peters explores what the ideal beauty of classical art reveals about the 
larger assumptions driving the Hegelian narrative, homing in on Hegel’s 
discussion of spirit [Geist] and nature [Natur] in particular. According to 
Hegel’s account, she argues, what is so special – and indeed, revealing – 
about classical art is not the anthropological gesture of liberating subjects 
from the realm of nature; rather, classical sculpture reveals that mankind, 
as spiritual being, is identical with (and indeed made manifest through) 
external, natural form. What classical art makes known, then, is the idea 
that nature is inherently spiritual. This explains the importance that 
Hegel ascribes to the human figurative forms of classical image-making 
– the feature which, appropriately enough, modern parlance describes as 
its ‘naturalism’:107 for all the differences between the histories of Greek 
philosophy and sculpture (the one proceeding conceptually, the other 
by taking on sensory form), both reveal nature – and more specifically, 
human nature – to be a manifestation of spirit. 
Michael Squire’s chapter likewise takes its lead from Hegel’s com­
ments on classical art­forms. Where Peters is interested in the Hegelian 
philosophy of Greek art, however, Squire approaches his subject from the 
disciplinary perspective of classical art history. The Lectures on Aesthetics 
have much to offer classical art historians, he argues, not least in their 
intertwined approach to the history of art and religion; indeed, Hegel 
anticipated some of the most scintillating work in the field – above all, 
recent discussions of art, epiphany and religion, not to mention work 
on the ontology of ancient imagery. And yet, in Squire’s self­confessedly 
‘bipolar’ response, Hegel’s own theological assumptions give cause for 
anxiety. Fundamental to Hegel’s account, after all, are theologically 
106 As Hegel 1975, 427, programmatically puts it, the classical is founded on 
‘a unification of the content with its entirely adequate shape’; cf. also Squire’s 
chapter in this volume.
107 For an overview, cf. Squire 2011, 32–68 – along with Elsner 2006b and Neer 
2010. Indebted to earlier thinkers (above all Winckelmann), Hegel of course 
anticipated the point that the ‘naturalistic’ figurative forms of Greek sculpture 
nonetheless reach beyond the ‘natural’ – ‘not as merely natural form but as the 
figure and expression of the spirit’ (Hegel 1975, 726–727).
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contingent ideas about the ‘form’ and ‘content’ of art – ideas derived, first 
and foremost, from the theological protestations of sixteenth­century 
reformers. If, in the words of Joseph Koerner, ‘the Reformation reshaped 
what the visual image is’,108 Hegel was the first to devise a grand narra­
tive of artistic progress around this shift. But is it possible to subscribe 
to the Hegelian account – to operate within it – without subscribing to 
the underlying theology? Does it matter that the very system of Hegelian 
aesthetics – the whole progressivist thrust of its teleology – is centred 
around a theologically contingent problem of art? Indeed, as Squire asks, 
what is left from the Hegelian account when one attempts to reconcile it 
with other theological perspectives?
While the first three contributors begin by looking back to antiquity, 
the following pair of chapters – by Fred Rush and Hanneke Grootenboer – 
explore the rise of artistic self­consciousness. Both chapters take their 
lead from Hegel’s analysis of romantic painting. Yet they tackle the theme 
from disparate chronological perspectives. On the one hand, Rush focuses 
on Dutch and Flemish painting from the late sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries: he charts the rise of painterly genres which – with profound 
self-consciousness and reflexivity – thematise the resources of painting 
as artistic medium. On the other, Grootenboer begins in the twentieth 
century, examining the literal and metaphorical ‘reflections’ of Richard 
Estes’ photorealistic paintings (above all those from the late 1960s and 
1970s): if the concern, once again, is with the self­awareness with which 
painting has come to probe the nature of representation, her chapter 
centres around a post­Hegelian painterly case study.
Hegel’s comments about Dutch and Flemish painting – one of the 
most famous sections of the Lectures on Aesthetics – provide Rush with 
his starting­point. As is well known, Hegel inverts contemporary hierar­
chies of painterly subject: rather than champion history or mythological 
subjects, he constructed a schema in which so­called ‘still life’ images 
occupy, at least philosophically, the zenith of romantic painting.109 In what 
ways, then, might an art historical examination of this material help us 
to understand and evaluate Hegel’s thinking? In order to demonstrate 
why Dutch and Flemish examples materialise the principal achievement 
of romantic painting, Rush turns to the history of both the still life and 
108 Koerner 2004, 39.
109 Cf. e.g. Hegel 1975, 887.
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the painted portrait. If these forms occupy an advanced stage within 
art’s historical­conceptual progression, Rush argues, their philosophi­
cal interest lies precisely in their place within that longer teleology. Of 
course, the development of such genres stretches back to Renaissance 
precedents. Yet the innovation of Northern European painting lies not 
only in the ‘triumph of art over the transitory’, but also in the questions 
it poses about the nature of painterly representation – the self­conscious 
(which is to say deeply conceptual) interrogation of the ontology of art.110 
Taking his lead from Hegel, Rush attempts to show how, in Dutch and 
Flemish painting, this self­consciousness reveals itself in visual terms: 
what is so special about still­life paintings in particular, he argues, is 
their examination of how colour and light lend themselves (as indeed, 
crucially, do not lend themselves) to painterly form.
Grootenboer – herself a renowned expert on the still­life paintings 
that Rush discusses111 – takes a different tack. As with the previous 
chapter, her analysis centres around Hegel’s comments on Dutch and 
Flemish art. Rather than look back to the late sixteenth century, however, 
Grootenboer introduces a modern case study: Central Savings, a photoreal­
ist painting of a Manhattan diner by Richard Estes in 1975 [Fig. 6.1]. Of 
course, both the subject and form of this image lie beyond the scope of 
what Hegel could have imagined in the 1820s. But Estes’ focus on reflec­
tive surfaces – his visually mediated meditation on painterly and photo­
graphic representation – richly resonates with Hegel’s deliberations on 
Dutch painting, not least his speculative concern with das Schein (at once 
‘shine’ and ‘appearance’). As Grootenboer demonstrates, Central Savings 
offers a provocative lens for revisiting Hegelian ideas about romantic art: 
while figuratively reflecting upon the mimetic strategies of both painting 
and photography, the physical reflections of Estes’ image interrogates the 
110 Cf. Hegel 1975, 597–600, esp. 599: ‘In other words, apart from the things 
depicted, the means of the portrayal also becomes an end in itself, so that the 
artist’s subjective skill and his application of the means of artistic production 
are raised to the status of an objective matter in works of art.’ There is an im­
portant – albeit unstated – connection here with Schopenhauer’s earlier Die Welt 
als Wille und Vorstellung (first published in 1819). Likewise, a line can be traced 
between Hegel’s comments and Heidegger’s famous discussion of Vincent van 
Gogh’s ‘still lifes’ in Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes: for analysis, cf. Squire 2017, 
197–201.
111 Cf. Grootenboer 2005 (with brief reference to Hegel at 143). 
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very essence of painting – not as something that inheres in material form, 
or indeed in subject matter, but rather in the capacity to generate thought 
(‘reflections on reflection’, as Grootenboer nicely puts it). 
The next three chapters – by Robert Pippin, T.J. Clark and Paul A. 
Kottman – likewise touch upon themes of artistic self­consciousness. At 
stake in these chapters, though, are Hegelian ideas about the ‘modern’ 
– that is, the emergence of new modalities for understanding the world 
and our place within it. Robert Pippin begins by returning to the medium 
of painting, as introduced in the chapters by Rush and Grootenboer. What 
drives the chapter, though, is the Hegelian association between painting 
and romantic forms of art: what is it about painting that helps us to see 
– indeed, that makes visible – an aspect of modern self­understanding? 
For Pippin, as for Hegel, the answer to this question pivots around a new­
found inwardness [Innerlichkeit] of human subjectivity. What is particular 
about painting is its special capacity to make ‘appear’ or ‘shine’ – that 
key Hegelian verb scheinen, once again – a particular aspect of modern 
self­condition: the supremacy of painting, in other words, has to do with 
its capacity, quite unrivalled by other visual media, to give form to the 
‘liveliness’ or ‘life’ of subjectivity.112 
Clark’s contribution likewise relates to the modern history of paint­
ing. The key difference, however, lies in relating Hegel’s comments about 
romantic painting to the post­Hegelian history of the medium: Clark 
attempts to trace how painters themselves responded to Hegel’s prog­
nosis of modernism as cultural and artistic condition.113 To what extent 
112 This is the reason, it seems, why Hegel suggests that (at least in the frame­
work of the technologies available in the 1820s) the philosophical study of 
painting requires a different degree of autopsy from that of architecture and 
painting. ‘For architecture and sculpture you can make do, at first, with copies, 
descriptions, and casts, because in these arts the range of the subject­matter is 
more restricted, the forms and means of representation are less plentiful and 
varied, and their particular specific characterisations are simpler and more 
decisive. Painting demands a sight of the individual works of art themselves; 
in its case especially mere descriptions are inadequate, however often you have 
to content yourself with them’ (Hegel 1975, 869–870). 
113 Cf. above, pp. 34, 38–43. One instance of the reasoning is Hegel 1975, 
605–606: since ‘bondage to a particular subject­matter and a mode of portrayal 
suitable for this material alone are for artists today something past’, Hegel 
posits, ‘art therefore has become a free instrument which the artist can wield in 
proportion to his subjective skill in relation to any material of whatever kind’. 
‘Today there is no material which stands in and for itself above this relativity, 
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did Hegelian thinking about world and consciousness set an agenda for 
painting in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries? How did art­
ists react to the ‘fractal logic’ (to quote Clark) of the romantic? Indeed, 
given the ‘devastating, scandalous, astonishing’ implications of Hegel’s 
thesis, how could artists respond to – and thereby make known through 
visual form – the modern condition that Hegel diagnosed? In responding 
to these questions, Clark offers a magisterial overview of the history of 
European painting between the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: 
on the one hand, he champions modern art’s extreme epistemological 
debts to Hegelian thinking; on the other, he argues that the very history 
of modern painting – stretching from Friedrich to Matisse, and seeping 
from Germany to France – delivered an evolving response to Hegelian 
themes of painterly negation. 
The discourse of modernism also comes to the fore in Kottman’s 
contribution. Where the previous two chapters focus on the supreme 
romantic medium of painting, Kottman throws a literary case study 
into the mix: the works (and above all dramatic works) of William 
Shakespeare.114 The passage around which the chapter revolves is 
the epilogue to The Tempest (probably written in 1610/1611), in which 
Prospero – the play’s protagonist, standing in for the literary author 
himself – declares that ‘Now my charms are all o’erthrown / And what 
strength I have’s mine own’. What would it mean, Kottman asks, if the 
first to express the ‘Hegelian’ sentiment that ‘art … is and remains for 
us a thing of the past’ were not in fact Hegel, but Shakespeare? Did 
Hegel recognise the philosophical debt, and hence allude to it at the 
end of his Lectures?115 If so, what might this shared declaration about 
the belatedness of art help us to understand? For Kottman, the two 
declarations about art – by Hegel on the one hand, and by Shakespeare 
on the other – can each shed light on the other. No less importantly, 
he suggests that a comparative analysis can illuminate the significance 
and even if one matter be raised above it, still there is at least no absolute need 
for its representation by art.’ 
114 Any book on the ‘artworks’ discussed in the Lectures, Kottman insists, ought 
to include a discussion of Shakespeare. According to Hegel, after all, ‘in the 
portrayal of concretely human individuals and characters it is especially the 
English who are distinguished masters and above them all Shakespeare stands 
at an almost unapproachable height’ (Hegel 1975, 1227).
115 Cf. Pippin 2014, 142–143.
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of art’s ‘pastness’: the very proximity between the two figures throws a 
spotlight onto modernism as cultural trait, not only with regards to the 
cultural and historical parameters of each thinker, but also across time 
(and by extension with respect to the art produced after Hegel’s death, 
up to and including the present day). 
The final two chapters, by Ingvil Torsen and Sebastian Gardner, turn 
to Hegelian philosophies of form, the one from a phenomenological per­
spective, the other with an eye on intellectual history. Torsen approaches 
Hegel as a springboard for examining the art of the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries, concentrating on the artistic subject of the body in 
particular. For Hegel, as Peters emphasises earlier in the book, the body 
was the prime subject of classical art, and the very trope of embodiment 
is associated with sculpture (that is, the supreme medium of classical 
form); by contrast, as Pippin, Rush, Grootenboer and Clark explore in 
their earlier chapters, Hegel insists that painting – not sculpture – is the 
abiding form of the romantic. Many Hegelian­led histories of modernism 
have consequently concentrated on the development of painting, not least 
the rise of painterly abstraction.116 But in what ways might the history of 
sculpture in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries nuance (might one 
even say undermine?) the Hegelian account? Why does the problem of 
embodiment still captivate modern artists? And how do post­Hegelian 
explorations of sculptural form complicate Hegel’s own characterisation 
of the romantic? To answer these questions, Torsen attempts to fuse a 
Hegelian philosophy of art with a more phenomenological approach, 
above all the work of Merleau­Ponty. 
Where Torsen looks forward to the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, 
Gardner explores Hegelian ideas about art by turning backwards: his chap­
ter offers a ‘rational reconstruction’ of Hegelian thinking against its earlier 
intellectual historical backdrop. A number of contributors to this volume 
engage with Hegel’s so­called ‘end of art’ hypothesis – the idea that art has 
lost its higher vocation.117 But what, Gardner asks, is the precise relationship 
between art and philosophy for Hegel? Must the rise in philosophy’s fortune 
go hand in hand with the demise of art? Indeed, how can a longer view of 
such intellectual debates – above all in the wake of Kant, and among the 
likes of Schlegel, Novalis, Schiller, Schelling and Solger – help us to make 
116 Cf. above, pp. 43–44.
117 Cf. especially the chapters by Kottman and Clark – and above, pp. 38–43.
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sense of Hegel’s position? On the one hand, Gardner approaches Hegel’s 
comments about art’s loss of vocation as a means of countering ‘philosophi­
cal Romanticism’: rather than form a strict or logical pre­requisite for his 
history of art­consciousness, Hegel’s assertions are prompted by the need 
to counter the claims of his immediate predecessors and contemporaries. 
On the other hand, the chapter takes a more macroscopic view, teasing out 
the implications of this ‘end of art’ thesis for approaching modern artistic 
production and the history of aesthetics. Either we must relinquish Hegel’s 
thesis about art’s loss of higher vocation (and thereby judge Hegelian aes­
thetics in much closer association with Romanticism than Hegel himself 
suggests), Gardner claims. Or else, if Hegel’s riposte to Romanticism is 
sustained, it is necessary to tell a new history of modern painting, above all 
with a view to the rise of pictorial abstraction: we must think either that 
late romantic art has lost its vocation, but is either unaware of that fate; or 
alternatively, in its state of ‘unhappy consciousness’, that painting pretends 
not to know about its own state of artistic demise.
* * * * *
As this brief overview makes clear, contributors to the volume approach 
‘the art of Hegel’s aesthetics’ from a variety of perspectives. There are 
numerous points of intersection, as indeed of convergence. But the chap­
ters do not offer a uniform response  – either in terms of the answers that 
they derive, or the questions that they pose. This plurality of viewpoints 
has been fundamental to our project: rather than offer some a last word 
on Hegel’s art history, we set out to stage an intervention – to celebrate 
their 200th anniversary by allowing the Lectures to spur some new sorts 
of dialogue.
With that plurality in mind, it is left to my co­editor, Paul A. 
Kottman, to weave some of the book’s strands together in the form 
of a concluding envoi. While contributors adopt a miscellany of ap­
proaches to the Lectures on Aesthetics, Kottman explains, all share an 
abiding respect for Hegel’s ability to get us talking with one another. 
The sentiment seems an appropriate one on which to end. What Hegel 
shows us, I think, is the critical shortcomings of so much academic 
scholarship: to define our field of enquiry in overly narrow (and often 
narrowly historical) disciplinary terms is to renege on our intellectual 
duty as critics. Ultimately, our hope for this volume is therefore that it 
will vivify art’s claims on our thinking, as indeed on aesthetic criticism 
as it continues to be practised: the last word, we think, should belong 
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neither to art nor to philosophy, but to the mutual dependence of each 
on the other.118 
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WHITNEY  DAV IS
THE ABSOLUTE IN THE MIRROR
Symbolic art and cosmological  
perspectivism
I take it to be uncontroversial that for many art historians Hegel’s art 
history offers little – beyond fodder for post­colonial critiques (e.g., 
Buck­Morss 2009; Tibebu 2011) – to the study of arts outside the Greco­
Roman and Christian­modern western traditions, including the arts of 
ancient Persia, India and Egypt to which Hegel devoted many words in 
his Lectures on Fine Art and elsewhere. Most present­day historians of 
the traditions of Asian visual and material cultures, I venture to say, will 
find that it simply will not wash to take Hegel’s view that the ‘artistic 
shapes’ of classical Chinese painting, sculpture and ceramics are nothing 
but ‘formlessness’ (Hegel 1975, 74). 
To be sure, as Benjamin Rutter reminds us, Hegel notoriously ‘distin­
guished art’s empirical record from its principled history’, his philosophi­
cal history of its ‘inner and necessary connection[s]’ (Rutter 2010, 50).1 But 
at the conference out of which this volume arose, the organisers (and the 
editors of the present volume) asked contributors to reflect on this very 
issue, among others. In this chapter, then, I propose to explore Hegel’s 
main philosophical­anthropological argument (as partly distinct from 
any aesthetic prejudice, cultural bias and empirical ignorance) that would 
exclude most world arts – especially many ancient arts and non­western 
indigenous traditions of art, of material, spatial and visual culture – from 
the Hegelian art history of ‘the development of the ideal in the particular 
1 As T.M. Knox commented on the relevant passage in the Lectures on Fine 
Art, ‘nothing is more striking in Hegel than his dismissal of “purely” historical 
questions, although history is the guiding thread through all his major works’ 
(in Hegel 1975, 780).
forms of art’ (the overall title of part two of Hegel’s Lectures on Fine Art 
[Hegel 1975, 299]) conceived as the sensuous form of the idea; or if it does 
not exclude them entirely, classifies them as relatively undeveloped and 
inadequate. Not all sensuous forms are created equal. Indeed, one stands 
in mastery over all others. And that will be our problem.
According to Plato (Laws, 2.656e–657a), ancient Egyptian art had 
been governed in the service of showing what ‘really is’ for ‘ten thousand 
years’ by unchanging rules of form and meaning – a stability Plato ap­
proved. (Plato knew Egyptian art in small­scale artefacts circulating in 
the Greek world and in the reports of Greek travellers to Egypt such as 
Herodotus).2 By contrast, Hegel took this adherence to ‘static types’ (Hegel 
1975, 448) to be one main reason why Egyptian art could not fully liber­
ate the human spirit of free subjective individuality struggling to extract 
itself from nature and its materials; indeed, it is a fundamental principle 
of Hegel’s thought that it is in the very ‘nature of spirit’, Hegel averred, 
to follow an ‘infinite impulse to alter its forms’ (Hegel 1899, 206). Still, 
as this might suggest, Hegel saw Egyptian art – the third and final phase 
of what he called ‘symbolic art’, at the very threshold of ‘becoming clas­
sical’ (Hegel 1975, 780) and indeed in communication with the cultural 
emergence of classical Greek art – as an art, maybe the art, in extreme and 
potentially productive tension with itself, in a sense belying its inexpres­
siveness and supposed lack of inwardness [Innerlichkeit].3 I agree with H.S. 
Harris’ subtle judgment that, for Hegel, the artistic culture of Egypt was 
2 For Plato’s remarks on Egyptian art, culture and laws, see Davis 1979, with 
full references to the copious literature; an especially incisive treatment can 
be found in Froidefond 1971, 326–337. Hegel’s main art­historical source, the 
antiquarian J.J. Winckelmann, cited Plato’s account of ‘the painted Egyptian 
statues of his day [that] differed neither in form nor in any other respect from 
those that were made a thousand or more years before’ (Winckelmann 2002, 
lxi; 2006b, 130). Nevertheless, Winckelmann went on to differentiate earlier 
and later Egyptian styles – a point about the art history of Egypt that Hegel 
conveniently overlooked. A conspectus of all the Egyptian and Egyptianising 
artefacts specifically mentioned by Winckelmann in his History of the Art of 
Antiquity (monuments, sculptures, gems, etc.) can be found in Winckelmann 
2006a, 33–70, nos. 1–107; in general, see Syndram 1990, Grimm and Mina Zeni 
2004, Grimm and Schoske 2005, with fulsome references.
3 Hegel revised and restructured his account of symbolic art throughout 
his several series of lectures on aesthetics and fine art between 1820/1821 and 
1828/1829 (see Kwon 1992), but nothing I will say will depend in any deep way 
on attending to these reworkings in fine detail.
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a ‘positive development’ for Spirit; it gave Spirit a ‘unique occasion’ – as 
Hegel saw it – to ‘experience conflict, struggle, and perplexity’, ‘its longing 
for resolution’, and ‘its confusion in the face of questions’ (Harris 1997, I: 
130). To identify this ‘Egyptian’ moment counts as a theoretical contribu­
tion to the history of art sine qua non. For every art is always somewhat 
‘Egyptian’ – indeed, I will suggest, must be ‘Egyptian’.
I do not suggest that historians should adopt Hegel’s account of 
Egyptian art as the historical transition, the ‘middle’, between East and 
West, between ancient Orient and Greece, and, as he also noted, between 
Africa and Europe (Hegel 1899, 218; 1975, 326). Egyptian civilisation sur­
prised Hegel because in its supposed ‘African imprisonment of ideas’, its 
‘African stupidity’, one nonetheless finds ‘reflective intelligence’ (Hegel 
1899, 204). Nonetheless, in his own ideological context Hegel succeeded in 
identifying a question for the historical phenomenology of all arts world­
wide that partly work through seemingly symbolic representations of 
man and cosmos – namely, the question ‘whether’, as Hegel wrote, ‘what 
is represented as person has also actual individuality and subjectivity or 
whether it carries in itself only the empty semblance of the same as mere 
personification’ (Hegel 1975, 314). For my purposes I will take this to be 
a valid question, when properly reconstructed. And Hegel’s answer?2.1
In 1820, Hegel visited Dresden, where he saw Raphael’s Sistine 
Madonna of 1512; students later gave him an engraving of it [Fig. 2.1]. In 
the same year, Baron Johann Heinrich von Minutoli (a military officer 
encouraged by the Prussian monarchy) began collecting artefacts in Egypt 
(Minutoli 1824, Pöggeler 1982, 205–21; Karig 1998) – his ‘Aegyptiaca’, 
which Hegel visited in early May 1823 at its exhibition in Berlin.4 As 
Hegel wrote to his friend Friedrich Creuzer (the great philologist and 
historian of religion) a few days later, here he could see the ‘most beauti­
ful’ bird and animal mummies; ‘dozens of idols a foot and a half high, 
[and] hundreds of small ones’; a stela featuring the falcon­headed sun­god 
Re­Harakhte in his solar boat and worshippers praising the scarab­beetle 
Khepri, the rising sun [Fig. 2.2], a representation of the kind he described 
4 Unfortunately, about one hundred crates – four­fifths of Minutoli’s entire col­
lection – were lost at sea in shipment from Egypt to Hamburg. For the Prussian 
cultural politics of the collection and display of Egyptian and other antiqui­
ties and the formation of new museums in Berlin and elsewhere (including 
the museum of Egyptian antiquities) – an important matrix for the aesthetic 
speculations of Hegel and his students – see Pöggeler 1987, Betthausen and 
Kroll 2016; cf. Squire’s introduction to this volume, pp. 45–46.
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2.1  Franz Anton Eric Moritz Steinla, Sistine Madonna (engraving after 
Raphael), c. 1820 (33.5 × 23 cm). Cambridge, MA: Harvard Art Museums /  
Fogg Museum, Gift of William Gray from the collection of Francis Calley 
Gray, inv. G3710. © President and Fellows of Harvard College.
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in his lectures on the philosophy of history as ‘hieroglyphical figures … 
of falcons, dung­beetles, etc.’ (Hegel 1899, 213); and above all a bronze 
figurine of the goddess Isis suckling her child Horus, an avatar of the 
king [Fig. 2.3].5 As Hegel went on to say in his lectures on fine art, Isis 
lacks the Gemüt, the ‘heart’, the ‘feeling’, the ‘soulfulness’, of Raphael’s 
Madonna [Fig. 2.1] – or, to take a different example, the vivacity of the 
beggar boys (despite their poverty) in Bartolomé Estaban Murillo’s 
well­known paintings in Munich, which Hegel admired for their ‘full 
feeling’ of ‘inner freedom’ (Hegel 1975, 170; Hegel referred to The Grapes 
and Melon Eaters of c. 1650 and Beggar-Boys Playing Dice of c. 1675–1680, 
both acquired by the gallery in Munich in 1698). According to Hegel, the 
Egyptian artisan did not ‘breathe into’ the figure of Isis ‘either the life 
that the human form otherwise has in reality, or the higher life which can 
be the vehicle for expressing what the Spirit effects or weaves in these 
forms now made adequate to it. On the contrary, their works reveal only 
a rather lifeless seriousness, an undisclosed secret. … “There is neither 
goddess, nor mother, nor son, nor god – there is only a physical sign of 
a thought incapable of emotion or passion”.’6 2.2 and 2.3
As Hegel went on, ‘this [artefact] does precisely mark the breach 
between meaning and shape [Bedeutung und Gestalt] and the inadequate 
development of the artistic intuition in the Egyptians’ (Hegel 1975, 784). 
To use a pithy formula he employed in his lectures on the philosophy of 
history, in Egyptian civilisation and its sculpture, ‘Spirit still has an iron 
band around its forehead’ (Hegel 1899, 207). 
An iron band almost literally speaking. Hegel was much struck by 
an observation made by the antiquarian Johann Joachim Winckelmann 
in his History of the Art of Antiquity of 1764, Hegel’s principal source for 
5 For Hegel’s letter to Creuzer, a close colleague during Hegel’s days at the 
university in Heidelberg, see Hegel 1984, 369–371 (6 May 1823). It is beyond the 
scope of this chapter to explore Creuzer’s substantial influence on Hegel’s views 
of ancient Oriental religions and their symbolism and on Hegel’s emerging ac­
count of symbolic art. For key texts of the period, see Berndt and Drügh 2008, 
and for commentary see Stewart 2014. Beyond Minutoli’s artefact [Fig. 2.3], 
there are several examples of figurines of Isis lactans that were or could have 
been known to Winckelmann and Hegel; see, for example, Grimm and Schoske 
2005, 56–57, no. 33 (Turin), 61, no. 38 (Berlin – formerly collection of Giovanni 
Pietro Bellori), and 82, no. 61 (Munich).
6 Hegel 1975, 784. At the end of the quoted passage, Hegel was citing the 
antiquarian Desiré­Raoul Rochette’s Cours d’archéologie of 1828, though he 
would modify the term ‘sign’.
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2.2  Egyptian painted wooden funerary stele of an unknown person, c. 1330 
BC. After Heinrich Freiherr von Minutoli, Reise zum Tempel des Jupiter 
Ammon in der Libyschen Wüste und nach Ober-Aegypten in den Jahren 1820 und 
1821 (Berlin, 1824), plate 34.2.
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2.3  Egyptian bronze statue of Isis suckling the child Horus (Isis lactans), 
probably fourth century BC (height 23.5 cm). Berlin: Ägyptisches Museum, 
inv. 8286. © bpk Bildagentur / Ägyptisches Museum und Papyrussammlung 
der Staatlichen Museen zu Berlin (Preußischer Kulturbesitz: photographer 
Sandra Steiß) / Art Resource, New York.
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descriptions of both Egyptian and Greco­Roman sculpture. In Egyptian 
sculpture, Winckelmann had written, ‘the eyes are drawn flat and oblique … 
almost flush with the forehead’ (Winckelmann 2002, 66–67; 2006b, 133) 
[Fig. 2.4].7 In ideal Greek sculpture, however, the eye is set even deeper 
than it is in nature: therefore, ‘the forehead protrudes more than it does 
in nature, the intellectual [sinnende] part of the face predominates and 
its expression of Spirit leaps to the eye more clearly, while strengthened 
shadow in the orbits give us of itself a feeling of depth and undistracted 
inner life, blindness to external things, and a withdrawal into the essence 
of individuality, the depth of which is suffused over the entire figure’ 
(Hegel 1975, 734). 2.4
In Egyptian sculpture, by contrast, ‘the head above all has no expres­
sion of spirituality, because animalism prevails and does not allow the 
Spirit to emerge in independent existence’ (Hegel 1975, 783). Indeed, an 
Egyptian king or queen (believed to be a god) could take animal form 
in whole or in part, as in the sphinx of King Senwosret III illustrated 
here [Fig. 2.5], royal human head on lion’s body. (We know it’s Senwosret 
not only because it bears an inscription of his name but also because it 
matches the magnificent sculptural portraits of him [Fig. 2.6].) It is here, 
perhaps, that the negative way of an eventual sublation of the symbol 
could open up – the ‘intuition of a secret inner being’, ‘an inkling, in the 
animal form, of a secret inwardness’ beginning to ‘portray its own inner 
being’ (Hegel 1975, 357–359). But this requires a moment Hegel could not 
quite find in Egyptian culture – namely, the moment when animal form, 
such as King Senwosret’s lion shape, is immediately unriddled to mean 
nothing less, nothing more and nothing other than free human subjec­
tive individuality, as if the lion visibly is King Senwosret in his absolute 
subjective identity. As I have already intimated, this was the very question 
Hegel put to symbolic art, though he had to answer adversely. 2.5 and 2.6
Of course, we are inherently in the domain of riddles and decipher­
ments when the forms of art are assimilated to ‘hieroglyphical figures’, 
7 Winckelmann referred specifically to the head of a queen or princess in the 
Villa Albani at his time of writing (now in the Brooklyn Museum), illustrated 
here as Fig. 2.4; for full discussion see Grimm and Schoske 2005, 152–155. 
Winckelmann assigned it to the earlier style of Egyptian sculpture; it is now 
dated more precisely to the reign of King Amenemhet II in the Twelfth Dynasty 
(c. 1990–1800 BC). Ironically, at an exhibition in 2000 it was included among 
other putative exemplifications of the ‘birth of the individual’ in the Twelfth 
Dynasty (Wildung 2000, 90–91, fig. 28).
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2.4  Green chlorite head of an Egyptian female sphinx, Twelfth Dynasty, 
c. 1876–1842 BC (38.9 × 33.3 × 35.4 cm). Brooklyn Museum: Charles Edwin 
Wilbour Fund, inv. 56.85 (formerly in the Villa Albani, Rome). Image courtesy 
of the Brooklyn Museum.
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2.5  Egyptian gneiss sphinx of King Senwosret III, possibly from Karnak, 
Thebes, c. 1870–1840 BC (42.5 × w. 29.5 × 73 cm). New York: Metropolitan 
Museum of Art, Gift of Edward S. Harkness, inv. 1917.9.2. Image courtesy of 
the Metropolitan Museum of Art.
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2.6  Egyptian red quartzite portrait of King Senwosret III, c. 1870–1840 
BC (16.5 × 12.6 × 11.4 cm). New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, Gift of 
Edward S. Harkness, inv. 1926.7.1934. Image courtesy of the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art.
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albeit hieroglyphics that supposedly cannot be fully read by their own 
makers. (Needless to say, Hegel was neither the first philosopher nor the 
last to find a ‘constitutive incomprehensibility’, a ‘constitutive moment 
of opacity’, to be essential to the ‘condition of possibility’ of art as such, 
as Jay Bernstein has put it in commenting on Theodor W. Adorno’s ac­
count of the ‘enigmaticalness’ of art (Bernstein 2007, 237; cf. Adorno 1997, 
120).) Hieroglyphs are signs, and when Hegel was writing the Egyptian 
hieroglyphs were being correctly read for the first time; Jean-François 
Champollion’s Panthéon égyptien, a fulsome lexicography and iconog­
raphy of the Egyptian gods, appeared in the same year Hegel visited 
the Minutoli collection.8 But the partly undecipherable ‘hieroglyphical 
figures’ are symbols, an expression (Ausdruck) that ‘indicates a meaning 
(Bedeutung) it does not actually contain’ (Magnus 2001, 115): necessar­
ily, ‘meaning and shape present, equally with their affinity, their mutual 
externality, foreignness, and incompatability’ (Hegel 1975, 300, 305). It is 
for this structural reason that the symbol – and therefore symbolic art – 
inevitably defeats the mind, wherever it searches. (In this, as David James 
argues, Hegel’s concept of symbolic art has affinities with – and perhaps 
takes from – Kant’s concept of the mathematical sublime (James 2009, 
7–17).) On the one side, the ‘meaning’ is ‘measureless [in fact, ‘sublime’] … 
and cannot find in concrete appearance any specific form corresponding 
completely with this abstraction and universality’ (Hegel 1975, 305). And 
on the other side, the forms, the shapes, merely proliferate the ‘abstract 
determinacy … equally well in infinitely many other configurations’ (Hegel 
1975, 305). Unbounded morphological productivity in the particulars is 
the reciprocal of the unavailability of their universal to absolutely clear 
conception. (Perhaps one might have advised Hegel to leave his entire 
philosophy of art just there.)
8 See Iversen 1971 for a full review of European theories (from classical antiquity 
to the time of Champollion’s decipherment) of the allegorical status of hiero­
glyphic pictographs as a sacred writing of ideas. Hegel’s vision of Egypt as a 
‘middle’, as ‘becoming classical’, was driven partly by his awareness – in the 
wake of Champollion’s decipherment – that hieroglyphs were not exclusively 
pictographic, based on ‘only the sensuous image, not the letter itself ’, as he 
once mistakenly said (Hegel 1899, 199), but were also partly phonetic – a writing 
on its way to ‘the “Greek/German” into which Hegel translated the inscription 
on the Temple of Neith at Saïs’ (Derrida 1986, 256). Influential treatments of 
Hegel’s theory of signs and symbols can be found, not surprisingly, in Derrida 
1982 and de Man 1982.
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The upshot, as Hegel sees it, is paradoxical. The symbol itself is 
‘essentially ambiguous’ – abstract meaning indeterminate; particular 
expression underdetermined. The symbol, then, is quite unlike the simile, 
in which both sides can be determinately named in a comparison: king 
is like lion, as distinct from king as lion. This is straightforward enough. 
But Hegel went on to extract a subtle conclusion. The ambiguity as 
such creates a primal doubt, pervasive and persistent, about whether a 
symbol is present to the mind in the very first instance. ‘In the picture of 
a lion there confronts us not only the meaning which it may have as a 
symbol, but also this visible shape and existent’ (Hegel 1975, 306). And 
for many beholders ‘it remains every time doubtful whether they have to 
content themselves with what confronts them or whether thereby they 
are referred to still other ideas and thoughts’ (Hegel 1975, 308, my ital­
ics). The original historical moment of mind in working in art, then, and 
even though it is ultimately just a ‘mere attempt’, a ‘Vorkunst’ or ‘pre­art’ 
(Hegel 1975, 303), is to adopt the ‘standpoint of the symbol proper’, as the 
Egyptians did unconsciously – where ‘shapes stand before us as problems, 
as making the demand that we shall conjecture the inner meaning lying 
in them’ (Hegel 1975, 320). 
But an obvious question arises. Why would anyone adopt ‘the stand­
point of the symbol proper’, however unconsciously, when that standpoint 
must always defeat the mind, leaving it, as Hegel says, ‘wandering among 
problems’ (Hegel 1975, 308), framed by the primal problem I have identi­
fied – the unavoidable doubt whether there is a problem in the very first 
place? Now that we can read hieroglyphs, maybe we are constrained to 
adopt the standpoint of the symbol about the whole array of dubiously 
(un)readable ‘hieroglyphical figures’ to be found in Egyptian iconog­
raphy, such as the stela in the Minutoli collection that Hegel had seen 
[Fig. 2.2]. But why would the Egyptians need to adopt said standpoint 
for themselves, or even be drawn into it unconsciously by an inexorable 
order of thought? After all, Hegel admits – one of the more extraordinary 
concessions, circularities and potentially catastrophic self­contradictions 
in his art history – the ‘shapes presenting themselves’ actually ‘might have 
been clear and intelligible as a meaning to the insight of the Egyptians 
themselves’ (Hegel 1975, 360). Except they weren’t – because they were 
symbols.
The most general answer to the question – why should the symbol-
shape jump­start the history of art, what the mind accomplishes overall in 
history in working in ‘sensuous forms of the idea’? – therefore prolepti­
cally must invoke the entire world history Hegel set forth for the threefold 
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development of the ideal in the particular forms of art (that is, symbolic, 
classical and romantic art). Beginning always at the negative pole (see 
Hegel 1975, 347, 351), and as Kathleen Dow Magnus has written, ‘by work­
ing itself through various oppositions of form and content [initially in 
symbols], spirit tests the extent of its identity with nature and discovers its 
difference from it’, leading to a more precise conception of this very idea 
(Magnus 2001, 121). But there is a more particular and local answer too. 
We are not sure if a sign, a figure, a form-shape, a configuration 
present to us, is a symbol – primal doubt. Still, as Hegel puts it, ‘there 
are configurations which reveal in themselves at once that they are not 
merely chosen to display themselves alone, but that they are meant to hint 
at meanings that lie deeper and are more comprehensive’ (Hegel 1975, 352, 
italics in original). These, we can say, are ‘the simple [the very] image’ [das 
einfache Bild] of symbolism (Hegel 1975, 359), indeed ‘symbols of symbol’ 
– and Egypt was their native land, which ‘posed to itself the spiritual task 
of self­deciphering [der Selbstentzifferung] without really achieving the 
deciphering’ (Hegel 1975, 456–457) because the symbols Egypt made are 
opaque in their very nature. As we have seen, they are opaque in their 
essential cognitive or semiotic nature (as distinct from mere displays, 
signs and similes) and in their epistemological status (in primal doubt 
that frames ambiguity that produces incomprehensibility). But they are 
also opaque in a literal sense: Egyptian symbols endow nature with just 
enough spirituality (or spirituality of just the right form­shape) to raise 
the question experienced by the mind as a riddle. Overall, then, there are 
two doubts framing the passage of Spirit through the forms of symbolic 
art: doubt about the presence of symbol; doubt about the symbol of pres­
ence. I have considered the first. Now I move to the second. 
In his sections in the Lectures on Fine Art on symbolic art in Egypt, 
repeated in his lectures on the philosophy of history and the philosophy 
of religion, Hegel says the same thing over and over again. Within the 
Egyptian standpoint of the symbol, the expressions [Gestaltungen, Aus-
drücke] are technically well made, bespeaking the reflective intelligence 
of craft labour – of the master artisan, der Werkmeister, described in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit (Hegel 1977, 421–424; for comments, see Forster 
1998, 310–311, and Stewart 2000, 401–402). But even though ‘everything 
in the ordinary daylight is well organized’ by craft labour, there is ‘no 
“inner light”’ (Harris 1997, I: 565): meanings [Bedeutungen, Sinne] are 
‘variously confused and sundered abstractions of the life of nature, inter­
mingled with thoughts of the actuality of spirit’ (Hegel 1975, 637); form 
is ‘not homogeneous with that content’ (Hegel 1975, 317) but instead ‘a 
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continuing struggle for compatibility’ (Hegel 1975, 317), an ‘enigmatic 
unity still undivided and fermenting in this contradictory linkage’ (Hegel 
1975, 318), ‘laboring ceaselessly to render its idea visible to itself, to bring 
into clearness, into consciousness, what it inwardly is’ (Hegel 1895, II: 
109), and only ‘beginning to wrest its way out of the natural’ (Hegel 1975, 
350). ‘The more enigmatical and obscure it is to itself, so much the more 
does it feel the impulse to labor to deliver itself … and to gain a clear 
objective view of itself ’: such is the ‘mighty taskmaster’ of the ‘impulse 
to comprehend’ (Hegel 1899, 214).
Egyptian funerary practices, Egyptian architecture and Egyptian 
writing – all these Hegel reviews in these terms. But above all it was the 
theriomorphism of a good deal of Egyptian art that strikes him, and to 
some extent demands – motivates – his application of the logic of the 
symbol in the first place, though in the sequence of argument such logic 
had ostensibly been set forth as the a priori frame for describing symbolic 
art as such, as well as its subsequent sublations. I need only cite Hegel’s 
remarks on such symbols as the human­bodied god with a jackal’s head, 
Anubis god of embalmers (Hegel took him to be a human priest wearing 
an animal mask – specifically a dog’s) (Hegel 1975, 355–361; Hegel 1899, 
210) and the many sphinxes, with a leonine body and the human head 
of a king or queen [Fig. 2.5]. ‘The sphinx may be regarded as a symbol of 
the Egyptian Spirit. The human head looking out from the brute body 
exhibits Spirit as it begins to emerge from the merely Natural – to tear 
itself loose therefrom and already to look more freely around it, without, 
however, entirely freeing itself from the fetters Nature had imposed’ 
(Hegel 1899, 199). 
Or as Hegel said in the Lectures on Fine Art, ‘the hidden meaning – the 
Spiritual – emerges as a human face from the brute … But conversely, the 
human form is also disfigured by a brute face’ (Hegel 1975, 213). ‘Out of 
the dull strength and power of the animal the human spirit tries to push 
itself forward, without coming to a perfect portrayal of its own freedom 
and animated shape, because it must still remain confused and associated 
with what is other than itself ’ (Hegel 1975, 361).
By contrast, in the ‘free and animated’ form of a human being, ‘free 
individuality constitutes the content and form of the representation’. ‘For 
the person is what is significant for himself and is his own self-explana­
tion … [T]he whole range of his spiritual and visible appearance has no 
other meaning but the person who, in this development and unfolding 
of himself, brings before our contemplation only himself as master over 
his entire objective world’ (Hegel 1975, 313). 
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As Jon Stewart nicely puts it, then, ‘The Sphinx sheds its pelt and 
tail; its paws are transformed into hands and feet; it stands upright and 
is metamorphised into the Greek sculpture of the god as self­conscious 
Spirit’ (Stewart 2000, 407; see Fig. 2.11).9 Indeed, as Hegel says with utter 
finality, ‘the human soul has its peculiar organs, and the body of a brute 
cannot be its domicile’ (Hegel 1899, 216).
So here we are in world art history according to Hegel: ‘The body of a 
brute cannot be the domicile’ of Spirit recognising itself as free individu­
ality – as ‘person significant for himself and his own self-explanation’? 
Oh, really? Why not? Writers prior to Hegel, notably Johann Gottfried 
Herder, entertained the notion of Seelenwanderung, the transmigration 
of souls (see Herling 2006). And Hegel knew from his ancient Greek 
source, the geographer and historian Herodotus (Histories 2.123), that 
the Egyptians believed in the ‘metempsychosis’ of human souls into 
animal complements after death (actually they did not – but no matter), 
which became objects of ‘contemplation and veneration’. They treated 
the ‘soul’, then, ‘Spirit – as an affirmative being, though only abstractedly 
affirmative’ (Hegel 1899, 216), by which Hegel could be taken to mean 
that the animal form of the deceased Egyptian person was not adequately 
or appropriately ensouled and incarnated but instead simply symbolised 
some such abstract meaning as ‘life of the soul after death’, perhaps 
‘immortality’. Indeed, Hegel says, ‘the transmigration of souls is … 
an abstract idea, and physiology should have made it one of its chief 
propositions that life in its development had necessarily to proceed to 
the human form as the one and only sensuous appearance appropriate 
to spirit’ (Hegel 1975, 78).10
9 As H.S. Harris writes in Hegel’s Ladder , in the sphinx and such other 
therianthropomorphic figures as Anubis, ‘the solution of the riddle [of the 
symbol] is there before our eyes. The God’s shape [i.e., as having a human head] 
tells us that she thinks, just as we do. Why should her language not be ours? She 
does not have a dog’s head now, or the head of an ape. So her language ought 
to be ours. Alongside the sculptor there must stand someone who knows how 
to express our communal thoughts as thoughts. … The stone symbolizes the 
perpetuity of Absolute Spirit. But by giving it a human form, the sculptor has 
expressed the clear consciousness that it is our Spirit. He has made its bodily 
shape. A craftsman of a new kind must now make its human voice’ (Harris 
1997, I: 556).
10 As Knox comments following Hegel’s English translator Bernard Bosanquet, 
the idea of transmigration ‘is abstract because it represents the soul as inde­
pendent of an appropriate body – the human soul as capable of existing in a 
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But we can set metempsychosis aside. In his commentary on Hegel’s 
introduction to the Lectures on Fine Art, Michael Inwood writes that ‘to 
see the Absolute as a bison is, in Hegel’s view, as disorienting as seeing 
a bison when one looks in the mirror’ (Inwood in Hegel 1993, xix). (By 
‘mirror’, one means Hegel’s Gegenschein, ‘counter-appearance’ or ‘reflected 
appearance’: ‘becoming conscious and becoming aware of other things 
are not two distinct activities … One sees oneself as it were reflected 
off the world as off a mirror’ (Inwood in Hegel 1993, xix).) But when 
King Senwosret III looked in his mirror and saw a lion [Fig. 2.5], or a 
Magdalenian clan leader looked in his mirror and saw a bison [Fig. 2.7] 
(see Raphael 1945, Clottes and Lewis­Williams 1996), or a San shaman 
looked in his mirror and saw an eland [Fig. 2.8] (see Lewis­Williams 
1981), or an Olmec warrior prince looked in his mirror and saw a jaguar 
beast’s body’ (Knox in Hegel 1975, 78, referring to Bosanquet in Hegel 1886, 
185). Therefore Hegel tautologically has to qualify transmigration as a process 
within the anthropic register in order to reach the sense he intends – that is, ‘the 
human form as the one and only sensuous appearance appropriate to spirit’ (my 
italics). Even if the Egyptians worshipped ensouled animals, ‘metamorphoses 
entail essentially a negative tendency against nature, a tendency to make ani­
mals and inorganic forms into a presentation of the degradation of man’ (Hegel 
1975, 448). (Compare Hegel 1975, 650–651, on the ‘imperfect preservation of 
spiritual individuality … when it is maintained that the deceased has for 3,000 
years to go through the whole series of animals inhabiting land, water, and 
air, and only thereafter migrate into a human body again’ – as Herodotus had 
reported of the Egyptians’ supposed belief ). Perhaps it is awkward for Hegel’s 
thesis that, as Herodotus says, certain Greek philosophers adopted the Egyptian 
idea of transmigration; both Orphic and Pythagorean thinkers were widely 
thought to teach the doctrine (Hegel 1899, 216; cf. Nilsson 1955, 691). Regardless 
of Greek practice, according to Hegel the worship of animals is ‘repugnant’ to 
Spirit fully self­conscious of itself and of its adequate representation in sensu­
ous forms of its idea of itself – that is, for us in the Christian, scientific and 
modern world (Hegel 1975, 357). Lest we suppose that Hegel’s view was super­
seded by Egyptological and other experts, I note that one of the most creative 
interpreters of ancient Egyptian religion in the mid­twentieth century, Henri 
Frankfort, a follower of Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms and 
sometime Director of the Warburg Institute, opened his inquiry into Egyptian 
religion by asserting that its pantheon of ‘sacred animals’ is its ‘most baffling, 
most persistent, and to us most alien feature’; in its plethora of ‘unorganic and 
mechanical’ symbols, ‘it makes no difference whether a quadruped’s head, an ibis’ 
neck, or a snake’s forepart emerges from the human shoulder’ (Frankfort 1948, 
8, 12, italics mine). These lines could have been written by Hegel.
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2.7  Painted relief of a bison from the Cave of Altamira, Magdalenian, 
c. 15,000 BC (pastel copy by Henri Breuil). After H. Breuil and É. Carthailac, 
La caverne d’Altamira (Monaco: 1906), plate 25.
2.8  Southern San painting from Catherine’s Post Caves (Cape Colony in 
South Africa), nineteenth century. After M. Helen Tongue, Bushman Paintings 
(Oxford: 1909), plate 11.
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[Fig. 2.9] (see Coe 1965, Davis 1977), were they disoriented, merely ‘wan­
dering among problems’?11 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9
11 I should make it clear that I am not proposing or defending any particular 
anthropology or iconography of Egyptian, Magdalenian, Olmec and San repre­
sentations of animals; there are several and sometimes conflicting interpreta­
tions of each of the cultural traditions mentioned. But the general thesis that 
they relay information about and imaginations of human relations is so wide­
spread (for example, ‘in African cultures animals and their associated qualities 
provide apt metaphors for human identity and social relationships’ (Roberts 
1995, 104)) as to be almost cliché. For a range of case studies, see Morphy 1989.
2.9  Olmec jadeite were­jaguar mask, tenth–sixth century BC (17.1 × 16.5 cm). 
New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, Bequest of Alice K. Bache, 
inv. 1977.187.33. Image courtesy of the Metropolitan Museum of Art.
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Inwood gives several reasons why art, according to Hegel, ‘should 
especially portray human beings’. For one thing, the bison’s mind (as we 
suppose at any rate) does not contain and cannot constitute templates, 
schemas or types of things with general features, as does a human mind 
(which is therefore capable of what David Summers [2003] has called 
‘abstraction to the notional’), however much the Egyptian mind struggled 
to attach abstract ideas and particular forms. For another thing, the bi­
son, Inwood thinks, is ‘fairly inexpressive’ (to our eyes at any rate) and 
suggests no inner life, let alone Gemüt, and therefore cannot be an ‘ap­
propriate counterpart to man himself ’. Moreover, only a human being, 
not a bison, can make an image of a bison or symbolise a bison (in Hegel’s 
terms, animals are ‘sensing’ creatures, not ‘representing’ ones (Pinkard 
2012, 27–30)). Most generally, ‘since the relation between the Absolute, 
conceived as the inner depth of the world, and man is the relation between 
the Absolute in itself and its consciousness of itself, and since, among 
the entities in the world, only man is self­conscious, the Absolute as a 
whole, and not simply its explicitly human phase, is seen on the model 
of a human being’ (all quotations from Inwood, in Hegel 1993, xvi–xix).
Still, and as I am suggesting, the more self­assured this account has 
become (perhaps it has been the most self­assured in Hegel’s art history), 
the less it accommodates a worldwide anthropology of art – and the more 
it relays what might be called an ‘indigenous ontology’ of the western 
world, despite Hegel’s great interest in (and in his context his deep knowl­
edge of) non­western religions and their traditions of symbolism. (Since 
Hegel’s day, many archaeologies, anthropologies and histories have been 
proposed, following what Marshall Sahlins calls ‘the native anthropol­
ogy of western society, [its] indigenous conceptions of human existence’ 
(Sahlins 1994, 395); Sahlins himself refers specifically to Sidney Mintz’s 
Sweetness and Power (Mintz 1958).) The world history of art, and more 
generally of culturally specific symbolic forms, encounters many different 
indigenous ontologies of the distribution of self­aware subjectivity and of 
reciprocities and exchanges of perspectives among all creatures that have 
the capacity to occupy a point of view, to say ‘I’. And in this world his­
tory the Absolute is not always seen on the model of a human being even 
if it is the inner depth of the world counter-reflecting the inner depth of 
humanity. The bison, the lion, the jaguar or the jackal is – perhaps col­
lectively are – the Absolute, as apprehended as and by a subjectivity that 
does not always display human shape. And the form of a human being 
stands to this Absolute not as jackal­headed Anubis [Fig. 2.10] stands to 
the Greek statue of an athlete in a fully human shape [Fig. 2.11], that is, 
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as merely ‘becoming classical’ insofar as the Greek statue supposedly has 
fully liberated the human (including its capacity to represent its own in­
wardness) from the animal that is other to it. Rather, the form of a human 
being stands to the Absolute as the Greek sculpture of a human being 
in human shape [Fig. 2.11] stands to jackal­headed Anubis (a personage 
frequently depicted in the Greco­Roman tradition itself, and in ‘classi­
cal’ style) [Fig. 2.12], that is, as ‘becoming symbolic’ (and self­consciously 
known to itself as such).12 This form struggles to wrest itself free of the 
natural material that is the human body, opaque and enigmatic to itself, 
despite its putative self­consciousness – perhaps the least­comprehended 
of all the natural things Spirit might comprehend. It seeks to realise the 
subjective individuality of jackal­god (or of lion­king [Fig. 2.5], or bison­
chief [Fig. 2.7], or were­jaguar [Fig. 2.9] or eland­shaman [Fig. 2.8]) that 
might be the true inner spiritual life of that body, counter-reflected in 
the world. 2.10, 2.11 and 2.12
I have plunged into deep waters. In order to reconcile the anthro­
pocentric narrative given by Hegel to cultural traditions of the self­
recognition of theriomorphic individuality and subjectivity with which 
I have counterposed it – perhaps a supplement, perhaps a complement, 
perhaps a contradiction – we would have to make several adjustments in 
Hegel’s aesthetics. At the most elementary, and for one thing, we would 
have to jettison Hegel’s view of animals (both in nature and as repre­
sented in works of art) as ‘inexpressive’ – as not showing inner life. It is 
telling that Hegel himself was not certain on this very point. On the one 
hand, animals, he says, ‘are exceedingly quick and discerning in pursuing 
the ends of their existence, while they are at the same time silent and 
12 We might wonder whether Hegel knew about such artefacts. Winckelmann 
certainly did: he knew the white marble Anubis with a caduceus (an Anubis­
Hermes) in the Capitoline Museum (now in the Museo Gregoriano Egizio of 
the Musei Vaticani: Fig. 2.12) – ‘not a work of Egyptian art but … made at the 
time of Hadrian’ (it was found in Antium in 1749) (Winckelmann 2000, 73; 
2006b, 134). More generally, Winckelmann devoted a section of his treatise 
to Egyptianising sculpture of Hadrianic vintage, which he considered to be a 
‘third style’ of Egyptian sculpture after the ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ styles of pharaonic 
sculpture (Winckelmann 2000, 87–92; 2006b, 139–142). Egyptianising figures 
of Antinous, the beloved of the emperor Hadrian and deified by him after the 
young man drowned in the Nile, are distinguished by the fact that the ‘eyes do 
not lie – as in nature and in the earliest Egyptian heads – on almost the same 
plane as the eye sockets; instead, they are deeply recessed in the Greek artistic 
manner’ (Winckelmann 2000, 86–87; 2006b, 140).
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2.10  Egyptian plaster and painted wood statuette of Anubis, Ptolemaic Period 
(42.3 × 10.1 × 20.7 cm). New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, Gift of  
Mrs. Myron C. Taylor, inv. 1938.5. Image courtesy of the Metropolitan Museum 
of Art. 
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2.11  Roman marble copy of Polyclitus’ Diadumenos (youth tying a fillet 
around his head); first century AD, after Polyclitus’ fifth­century BC original 
bronze statue (height 184.5 cm). New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 
Fletcher Fund, inv. 1925.78.56. Image courtesy of the Metropolitan Museum 
of Art.
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2.12  Egyptian marble statue of Anubis holding the caduceus of Hermes,  
first or second century AD (height 155 cm). Rome: Museo Gregoriano Egizio, 
inv. 76. © Scala / Art Resource, New York. 
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shut up within themselves; we cannot make out what “possesses” them’ 
(Hegel 1899, 211). On the other hand, Hegel acknowledged (following 
Winckelmann) that symbolic art in Egypt treated animals ‘with much 
understanding, with an elegant multiplicity of softly changing outlines 
and fluid transitions between separate parts’ (Winckelmann 2002, 67; 
2006b, 132), quite different from the ‘forced and stiff ’ representation of 
human bodies (Hegel 1975, 782–783). Wasn’t this to say, then, that what 
‘possesses’ the animal was rather more comprehensible to human subjec­
tivity than less – that in a sense figurations of animals were more human 
than representations of human beings in human form? 
For another thing, we might give more emphasis than has been usual 
in most of the commentaries to Hegel’s obscure remark in the Phenom-
enology of Spirit that the Understanding, despite having developed from 
prior conditions of awareness in Sense­Certainty and Perception, should 
not be ‘primitively identified as exclusively human’ (as H.S. Harris points 
out): nonhuman creatures can instinctively produce their ‘Vorstellung, 
being­for­self spelled out [herausgesetze] in the form of an object’, such 
as the hives of the bees (Harris 1997, I: 559). In describing the develop­
ment of the Understanding, Hegel’s basic argument is not so much that 
the Understanding (as such) primevally and in today’s world is human, 
or not. His argument is more narrow: only human Understanding be­
comes self-conscious, reflective and rational, and not at all times at that. 
(Egyptian symbolic understanding is unconscious, its reflectiveness is 
partial and its rationality, if any, is merely that of the master­craftsman.) 
But if animals are ‘exceedingly quick and discerning in pursuing the ends 
of their existence’, can they not be regarded as rational? And if we cannot 
tell what ‘possesses’ an animal, how do we know it is not self­conscious? 
Indeed, in many indigenous ontologies around the world it is known 
that animals are self­conscious – because actually they are not primally 
and originally animals at all.
This takes me, finally, to the propositions of the contemporary an­
thropology now often known as ‘cosmological perspectivism’, identified 
with the work (and to cite only a selection of foundational writings from 
the 1980s and 1990s) of Pascal Boyer (1993), Robert Brightman (1993), 
Jon Crocker (1985), Philippe Descola (1986), Signe Howell (1996), Tim 
Ingold (1991, 1994), Ann Osborn (1990), Bernard Saladin d’Anglure (1989) 
and perhaps above all Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (1998a, 1998b). (To 
be sure, these writers are very diverse, deal with many different cultural 
traditions and situations, and can disagree both on points of ethnographic 
interpretation and on matters of analysis and theory; greatly simplifying, 
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I briefly extract what I need for the purposes of this chapter.) Accounts 
of cosmological perspectivism have been developed most robustly with 
respect to the indigenous ontologies of traditional societies in Melanesia, 
the circumpolar arctic, Amazonia and the northwest coast of North 
America. But it has also made sense of many other societies with sha­
manistic cultures and/or ‘venatic ideologies’ (Viveiros de Castro 1998a) – 
that outlook or perspective of human hunters in which ‘animals are 
perceived and/or conceptually construed as autonomous, bodily subjects 
and agents’ (Århem 2015, 298). 
A culture with the ontology of cosmological perspectivism thinks 
not that people, humans with cultures and spiritualities, are animals. It 
thinks that animals are people, that is, persons, and ‘appear to [themselves] 
as human’ with cultures, individualities and spiritualities (Viveiros de 
Castro 1998a, 13). In the languages and classifications of these ontolo­
gies, usually there is no collective category ‘The Animal’ or ‘Animals’, no 
‘Nature’, as in Hegel’s ontology. Instead, the world contains the many 
peoples in their many shapes having the many species of subjective out­
looks that make up life in the cosmos – a florid ‘multinaturalism’ that 
dwarfs the most global ‘multiculturalism’ found by anthropology in the 
cognitive and communicative life of subjects who have specifically hu­
man shape. And all these multinatural peoples have views of one another 
as fellow subjects (Viveiros de Castro uses the term ‘subject’ advisedly) 
having the capacity to occupy a point of view – to say ‘I’ in relation to 
the other, in relation to the world comprehended as the world of its own 
understanding at its Absolute, and in relation to itself self-reflexively 
apprehending these relations to putative alterity. (In this multinatural 
world, and to quote H.S. Harris’ summation of Hegel’s view of the world 
of self­consciousness, there would be ‘a community of communities that 
do things differently, and a communication system in which all parties 
recognize both the legitimacy of this, and the “freedom” that is involved 
in it’ (Harris 1997, I: 564).) In the trans­American myth cycles compiled 
by Claude Lévi­Strauss in Mythologiques (e.g. Lévi­Strauss 1969), ‘the 
original common condition of both humans and animals is not animality, 
but rather humanity’ (Viveiros de Castro 1998a, 56). As Descola writes, 
‘the common point of reference for all beings of nature is not humans as 
a species but humanity as a condition’ (Descola 1986, 101): the condition 
that accepts for itself its forms in ‘animal’ and ‘human’ bodies as might 
be, as all their own among all the peoples, all the humanities reflected to 
themselves off the world – the jaguar and the peccary, the wolf and the 
deer, the lion and the man. Of course, we might say (following Inwood 
94
explicating Hegel) that it is only the man­animal – the symbol­making 
animal – who produces the representation in which the jaguar says ‘I’ to 
the man who also says ‘I’, using his symbol of all the self­conscious free 
individual subjective perspectives of all the persons among the peoples, 
human in form or not, who think ‘I’ and the other as absolutely as I do. 
But evidently the man­animal does not always need to believe this idea 
(and indeed perhaps he rarely has), or always needs to act within its 
ontological frame – Hegel notwithstanding. To the indigenous western 
ontology crystallised by Hegel, deep cosmological perspectivism must 
seem enigmatic, almost incomprehensible and indecipherable, especially 
when it means understanding what the god­creature says [e.g., Figs. 2.4, 
2.5, 2.10 and 2.12] in its partly nonhuman person as Absolute. But again, 
is it really ‘wandering among problems’? 
Whether or not a symbolic art relays a cosmologically perpectivist 
ontology in the strictest ethnographic sense (Olmec and San arts probably 
do), its theriomorphisms and therianthropies would seem to open a route 
to the Absolute – or at any rate to self­consciousness of itself as adequate 
for self­recognitions – no different in kind or degree from the supposed 
explicit anthropomorphism of classical art. Indeed, the point is not that 
anthropomorphism, or at any rate a naturalistic anthropomorphism, in­
trinsically enables greater self­consciousness of free subjective individu­
ality. The point is rather that the ‘inwardness’ of self­consciousness, of 
perspective, cannot not be symbolised in art insofar as art (qua art) must 
operate, as Hegel claims, exclusively in the ‘sensuous form’ of such inte­
riority – whether the symbolic form takes the shape of a human being or 
a nonhuman person or a god or an animal brute or, as seems most likely 
to me, always already a hybrid of all of the above, regardless of the merely 
apparent shape, the presentation. Symbolic art, then, is not Vorkunst at all. 
Rather, it is something like art­as­such, Kunst-an-sich, along with the other 
ostensibly succeeding and ostensibly more advanced (post­‘symbolic’) de­
velopments of the particular forms of the ideal in classical art and romantic 
art, and (as Hegel recognised) dialectically framing their very conditions of 
possibility: ‘spirit’s symbolic experience actually conditions and completes 
its self­determining activity’ (Magnus 2001, 3, italics in original). And 
one might be tempted to say that the more art tries to seem nonsymbolic 
– which is simply to naturalise the symbol in, say, the illusion that an 
anthropomorphic shape simply indexes a human subjectivity – the more it 
is ‘wandering among problems’, confused not by the fair doubt whether it 
is a symbol, a personification when it represents all the peoples in human 
shape or not, but by the false dogma that it cannot be one. 
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Hegel was right to install doubt, uncertainty and unknowing about 
the very presence of the symbol at the heart of his art history, that is, at 
its dialectical beginning in the operations of the Understanding relative to 
Sense­Certainty and Perception. Human beings are divided from them­
selves as symbol­making creatures – especially when they need to sym­
bolise such abstractions as free subjectivity individuality in the domicile 
of a human body. Hegel wandered among problems, however, when his 
treatment of symbolic art reduced that constitutive division (the division 
with which his dialectic of Spirit in art properly begins, that is, with the 
‘symbol in general’ [Hegel 1975, 303–314]) to the division of meaning and 
shape in the symbol supposedly to be overcome in the world­historical 
unfolding of art. That very division of meaning and shape has always let 
us see the far more absolute fact that we made it.
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JUL I A  PETERS 
HEGEL ON SPIRIT, NATURE AND  
THE FUNCTION OF CLASSICAL ART
It marks an interesting development in Hegel scholarship in recent years 
that defenders of what is often called a non­metaphysical reading of 
Hegel’s conception of Spirit [Geist] – according to which Spirit for Hegel 
is the totality of our historically evolving and socially embedded norma­
tive practices and institutions – have increasingly begun to address the 
question of how Spirit, understood in this way, relates to nature in Hegel’s 
view. What is remarkable is that this question is, at least on the face of it, a 
metaphysical or ontological one. Accordingly, it has triggered an extensive 
debate about the ontological status of Spirit and its relation to nature. 
Even more remarkably perhaps, commentators who have participated in 
this debate have in general leaned towards reading Hegel as a naturalist 
of sorts.1 To be sure, Hegel cannot be considered a reductive naturalist. 
Rather, as has been pointed out by a number of interpreters, in order to 
understand the sense in which Hegel’s conception of Spirit can count 
as naturalist, we need to appreciate that Hegel’s philosophy of Spirit is 
deeply indebted to Aristotle, in particular to the Aristotelian conception 
of soul in De Anima.2 We will then be able to see that Hegel embraces a 
form of hylemorphism according to which the normative practices which 
are constitutive of Spirit cannot operate independently of some natural 
substrate: the persons which engage in these practices are necessarily, at 
the same time, naturally embodied creatures. Hegel can be considered a 
naturalist in this weak, non­reductive sense. 
1 See for instance Pippin 2008, Pinkard 2012 and McCumber 2014 – and 
several contributions to Stern 2013.
2 For extensive discussion, see Wolff 1992; for a more general discussion of 
Hegel’s relation to Aristotle, see Ferrarin 2001. 
Nevertheless, anyone familiar with the letter of Hegel’s mature 
philosophy of Spirit as presented in his Encyclopaedia of Philosophical 
Sciences may be surprised that it should be possible to ascribe any 
naturalistic leanings to Hegel at all. After all, in this text Hegel never 
tires of repeating that it is essential to Spirit that it takes some kind of 
negative attitude towards nature: the telos of Spirit is to liberate itself 
from nature, even to negate nature. In the following chapter, I want to 
look at how two prominent defenders of a non­metaphysical interpreta­
tion of Hegel’s notion of Spirit understand this claim, and in particular 
why it is in their view compatible with reading Hegel as a naturalist of 
sorts. I shall take this discussion as my starting point for raising anew, 
against the background of these influential readings, the question of how 
Spirit relates to nature in Hegel’s view. It will not be my aim to criticise 
the readings under consideration, but rather to emphasise an aspect of 
Hegel’s understanding of Spirit’s relation to nature which is implicitly 
acknowledged by them, but which has received comparatively little at­
tention, even though it is, as I shall suggest, of great significance. I shall 
then make the somewhat unorthodox suggestion that we can learn more 
about this aspect of Hegel’s view by looking at his philosophy of art, and 
in particular at his account of classical art. Hegel’s theory of classical art, 
I want to demonstrate, is a major source for tracing Hegel’s conception 
of the relation between Spirit and nature. 
SP IR I T  AND  I TS  L IBERAT ION  FROM NATURE
In his influential recent book Hegel’s Naturalism: Mind, Nature, and the 
Final Ends of Life, Terry Pinkard gives the following summary of what 
constitutes a spiritual creature according to Hegel: ‘The “nature” of a 
self­conscious agent is that it need not be at one with itself, and this way 
of existing is a way of living that the rest of organic life does not share. 
His nature is not to have what is natural be definitive for him’ (Pinkard 
2012, 60). A spiritual creature essentially ‘assumes a stance of “negativ­
ity” toward his world and himself ’ (Pinkard 2012, 60). Pinkard gives a 
detailed account of what precisely this stance of negativity amounts to. 
For instance, with regard to perception, it means that spiritual creatures 
do not merely receive sensory input, but treat such input as potential 
justificatory grounds for belief (see Pinkard 2012, 28–29). With regard 
to action, it means that spiritual creatures do not simply follow their 
natural desires, but ask themselves whether they have reason to do so 
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(see Pinkard 2012, 63). Ultimately, this negative stance towards anything 
that is given by nature generates a demand for self­determination or self­
sufficiency: to be a spiritual creature, then, is to be able to set normative 
standards for oneself, to ‘give oneself the law’ (see Pinkard 2012, 55). How 
spiritual creatures attempt to meet this dauntingly high, vaguely Kantian 
standard – first, and unsuccessfully, in solitary effort, then through en­
counters, conflicts and negotiations with others – is a central theme of 
Pinkard’s book. 
In his earlier book on Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency 
as Ethical Life, Robert Pippin has developed an interpretation of Hegel’s 
account of Spirit, similar to Pinkard’s in important respects. One pas­
sage where he summarises his interpretation reads as follows (Pippin 
2008, 58): 
What spirit is, in other words, is not non­nature or immaterial, but, 
in Hegel’s constant phrase, the negation of nature … He thinks this 
notion is comprehensive enough to cover both cognitive relations to 
nature, where the mere immediacy of our sensible contact with the 
world must be ‘negated’ or conceptualized in order to play any role 
in cognition, and practical relations […].
The negative stance of Spirit towards nature which both Pinkard and 
Pippin emphasise is expressed by Hegel in his ubiquitous phrase that it 
is essential to Spirit that it ‘liberates’ itself from nature. For instance, in 
a passage from a transcript of Hegel’s lectures on Subjective Spirit from 
1825 quoted by Pippin, Hegel states (Hegel 1978, 7):3
3 The passage is from a transcript by Kehler; an almost identical version of the 
same passage can be found in Griesheim’s transcript from the same year (see 
Hegel 2008, 151; cf. Hegel 1978, 92 – A Fragment on the Philosophy of Spirit). Here, 
and in what follows, I quote Hegel’s Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences from 
1830 according to numbered paragraphs; when quoting from the additions to 
the Encyclopaedia paragraphs compiled by Boumann, I add the page numbers 
in the first volume of Hegel 1978. When citing from the lecture transcripts or 
additional texts (such as the Fragment on the Philosophy of Spirit), I quote the 
page numbers in the first volume of Hegel 1978. I use M.J. Petry’s translation 
(first and second volumes) when quoting, in Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit, from 
passages from the introduction or from the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit; other­
wise I use the translation by W. Wallace and A.V. Miller. 
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Spirit has its beginning in nature in general. One must not think 
merely of external nature, but also of the sensuous nature of man 
himself, his sensuous, bodily being, sensing, being in relation with 
other general objects; mere sensing is confined solely to animals. The 
extreme to which spirit tends is its freedom, its infinity, its being in 
and for itself. These are the two aspects, but if we ask what spirit is, 
the immediate answer is that it is this motion, this process of pro­
ceeding forth from, of freeing itself from nature; this is the being, 
the substance of spirit itself. 
As both Pinkard and Pippin emphasise, it is crucial to Hegel’s account 
that Spirit is not an entity which can be identified independently of the 
motion or process in which it is involved, as if engaging in this motion 
or process was accidental to this entity. Rather, the passage just quoted 
continues: ‘Spirit is usually spoken of as subject, as doing something, and 
apart from what it does, as this motion, this process, as still particularized, 
its activity being more or less contingent […].’ In contrast to this, Hegel 
states that ‘it is of the very nature of Spirit to be this absolute liveliness, 
this process, to proceed forth from naturality, immediacy, to sublate, to 
quit its naturality […]’. What makes something a spiritual creature, then, 
is that it engages in the relevant kind of activity; engaging in this activity 
is constitutive of it as spiritual creature. Spirit, on the present account, is 
therefore not a static entity, but active form.4 Furthermore, both Pippin 
and Pinkard point out that with regard to Spirit’s relation to nature, Hegel 
defends a ‘non­dualist’ (and yet non­reductive) account (Pippin 2008, 
52; see Pinkard 2012, 27–30). The entities which engage in the activity 
of liberation from nature are, from an ontological point of view, natural 
creatures or animals. By describing them as spiritual creatures, we do 
not introduce a novel ontological entity over and above their natural 
animal body, but rather ascribe to them forms of activity which cannot 
be explained within a purely naturalistic framework. While Spirit can­
not be explained in exclusively naturalistic terms, spiritual creatures are 
nevertheless necessarily naturally embodied (Pippin 2008, 52).
One may at this point raise the question of why, on this reading of 
Hegel, spiritual creatures are necessarily natural animals. The most obvi­
ous answer would seem to be something like the following: if Spirit is not 
4 There are clear Aristotelian undertones in Hegel’s account in this regard, 
as both Pinkard and Pippin emphasise. 
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a static entity, but activity, one has to postulate a subject who engages 
in this activity, otherwise the activity could not get off the ground. This 
subject is the natural animal. On this view, being naturally embodied is 
an external, necessary condition for a spiritual creature to be what it is.5 
However, this line of thought does not quite do justice to the relation 
between spiritual activity and natural body in Hegel’s account. Return­
ing to the passage from the lectures quoted above, one can make the 
following simple, but striking observation. When Hegel speaks of Spirit 
as liberating itself from nature, he does not merely mean that spiritual 
creatures constitutively engage in activities which make them ever more 
unlike natural creatures, thus widening the distance between Spirit and 
nature. Rather, he seems to have in mind that Spirit liberates itself from 
its own nature. As he puts it in the passage above, ‘spirit has its beginning 
in nature’ – and it is from this nature, the nature from which it begins, 
that Spirit strives to liberate itself. In fact, Hegel’s expression that Spirit 
‘liberates’ itself from nature would be ill chosen unless nature was in some 
sense ‘attached’ to Spirit to begin with. I can distance myself or move away 
from something which is external to me, but in order for me to liberate 
myself from something, it has to have previously impinged on me in some 
sense. Liberation implies an act of separation, which in turn presupposes 
some form of connection. In short: nature, and more specifically the 
natural body, does not just constitute a necessary condition for Spirit 
– more specifically, for spiritual activity – in Hegel’s account. Rather, in 
this account, nature must be thought of as in some sense constitutive of 
Spirit. There must be a sense in which Spirit is nature – only against this 
background can its impetus to liberate itself from nature arise. 
I do not think this is in itself a controversial claim. Pinkard, for 
instance, in formulating again the thought that it is of the essence of 
Spirit to take a negative stance towards nature, writes that ‘it is the very 
nature of a self­conscious agent to be potentially at odds with its own 
nature’ (Pinkard 2012, 58) – thus indicating that it is its own nature which 
Spirit is at odds with. Even more explicit is the following statement: ‘A 
self­conscious agent both is his body (since the person is an animal) 
and is not his body since the agent establishes a practical distinction 
between himself and his body’ (Pinkard 2012, 29).6 However, I do think 
5 Some passages in Pippin can be read as if he conceived of the natural body as 
an enabling condition for spiritual activity in this way: see for instance Pippin 
2008, 53.
6 See also Pippin 2008, 53.
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it is worth emphasising this aspect of Hegel’s account of Spirit, since 
it is not discussed prominently in reconstructions of Hegel’s position 
which centre on Spirit’s negative stance towards nature. Furthermore, 
by turning our attention towards this aspect of Hegel’s account – instead 
towards the negativity­claim – we will be able to bring into view novel, 
perhaps surprising implications of Hegel’s notion of Spirit and its rela­
tion to nature. As long as one focuses on Spirit’s negative attitude and 
activity towards nature one may gain the impression that Spirit is for 
Hegel absolute, self­grounded activity – an activity which is free in the 
sense of unconditioned – much like the self­producing activity which 
underlies Fichte’s ‘I’. Indeed, there are passages in Hegel which seem to 
render support to this line of reading: for instance, when he states repeat­
edly that Spirit is a ‘product of itself ’ (1986a, § 377, Addition, 7; see also 
Hegel 2008, 152), or that its ‘actuality’ is ‘merely that it has made itself 
into what it is’ (1986a, § 377, Addition, 7). In contrast, by attending to 
the fact that Hegel’s account must leave room for the idea that Spirit is 
originally constituted by nature, one will be able to see that Hegel’s picture 
is in fact quite different from Fichte’s. Spirit, for Hegel, is not self­created 
in the way in which Fichte’s ‘I’ is. Rather, it is to a certain extent due to 
and dependent on something other than itself – nature. 
One might object at this point that this way of putting the matter 
comes dangerously close to ascribing Hegel some kind of reductive natu­
ralism. But this cannot be Hegel’s intention. What we need, instead, is an 
interpretation which allows us to see how nature as constitutive of Spirit 
can be both Spirit’s own nature and Spirit’s own nature. Whatever nature 
precisely turns out to be on this account, it must possess characteristics 
which warrant calling it natural; at the same time, it must possess char­
acteristics which warrant describing it as Spirit’s own nature. Thus, when 
we say that in Hegel’s account, Spirit is to a certain extent dependent on 
something other than itself, we need not understand this in the sense that 
it is dependent on something which is completely heterogeneous to itself. 
Rather, it is dependent on nature as inherently spiritual – or, more accu­
rately, it is dependent on nature being such that it is inherently spiritual.
In the next section, I shall render support to these remarks through 
a close reading of some passages from Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit in his 
Encyclopaedia. In particular I shall focus on two central claims which 
Hegel makes here: the claim that Spirit’s liberation from nature essen­
tially involves pain; and the claim that Spirit is essentially manifestation. 
Against this background, we will then be in a position to consider, in the 
final section, how Hegel’s account of classical art can be seen as standing 
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in continuity with the interpretation suggested here. As we shall see, this 
will not merely provide further confirmation for the suggested interpreta­
tion, but also, on the other hand, shed novel light on Hegel’s conception 
of art, especially of classical art.
MANIFESTAT ION  AND  PA IN
In his introduction to the Philosophy of Spirit in his Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophical Sciences, Hegel opens the section titled ‘Notion of Spirit’ 
(1986a, §§ 381–384) with a paragraph dedicated to reflections on the rela­
tion between Spirit and nature. This paragraph is notoriously intricate 
and wide­ranging,7 but for our present purposes I merely want to draw 
our attention to the fact that Hegel here introduces nature in relation 
with the notion of externality and externalisation. Spirit, Hegel writes, 
‘has its complete external objectivity in nature’ (1986a, § 381); nature is 
its ‘externalization’ (ibid.). In the next paragraph, § 382, Hegel then goes 
on to highlight an aspect of the notion of Spirit which he does not yet 
mention explicitly in § 381: the ‘essence of spirit’, Hegel writes here, is 
‘freedom’ (1986a, § 382).8 Explaining what this freedom amounts to more 
specifically, Hegel writes: ‘On account of this formal determination, spirit 
can abstract from all that is external and even from its own externality, its 
determinate being’ (Hegel 1986a, § 382). Given the connection between 
nature and externality made in the preceding paragraph, the idea intro­
duced here appears to be close to the thesis that Spirit essentially liberates 
itself from nature, as found in the lecture transcript from 1825. However, 
in the present context, Hegel seems to put particular emphasis on how 
radical and thorough this liberation is. It is not unreasonable to suppose 
that Hegel here implicitly refers to Kant’s conception of transcendental 
freedom as involving not merely the freedom from particular desires and 
7 See Quante 2011, 116–139, for extensive discussion. 
8 More accurately, Hegel writes: ‘Das Wesen des Geistes ist […] formell die 
Freiheit’ (Hegel 1986a, § 382, my emphasis). Hegel’s notion of the term ‘formell’ 
would deserve a more extensive discussion and analysis, which I cannot give at 
this point. My tentative suggestion is that with the term ‘formell’, Hegel wants 
to emphasise that focusing on Spirit as freedom renders a merely one­sided 
and, to a certain extent, abstract account of Spirit, the more concrete account 
being given in the following paragraphs, where Hegel introduces the notion of 
manifestation. 
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inclinations (and hence the capacity to suspend the satisfaction of any 
particular desire), but from natural desires and inclinations altogether.9 
However, Hegel has a different take on this kind of freedom than Kant: 
he describes it as a capacity, rather than a transcendental fact, suggesting 
that freedom in its complete form involves the exercise of this capacity 
for abstraction. This quasi­Kantian conception of freedom resonates 
with the emphasis on Spirit’s negative stance towards nature by recent 
interpretations of Hegel’s notion of Spirit, as discussed above. 
The next sentence of § 382 introduces a novel aspect. It reads: ‘[Spirit] 
can bear the infinite pain of the negation of its individual immediacy 
i.e. maintain itself affirmatively in this negativity and have identity as 
a being­for­self.’ A spiritual creature essentially has the capacity to ab­
stract altogether from its externality and determinate being. But now we 
learn that such negation brings with it ‘infinite pain’, more specifically, 
the ‘infinite pain of the negation of its individual immediacy’. The pain 
which Hegel has in mind here is obviously neither a mere physiological 
event, nor a simple sense datum. Rather, Hegel refers to a complex state 
involving some form of inner division or separation.10 In abstracting from 
individual immediacy, a spiritual creature abstracts from its own indi­
vidual immediacy, thus introducing a rift into itself. This rift underlies 
the pain in question. Accordingly, in order for this pain to be possible, 
Spirit must be both individual immediacy and the process of abstracting 
from or negating it. Both these aspects must be ascribed to Spirit itself. 
The pain in question is therefore, as Hegel explains in the addition to 
the same paragraph, self-inflicted (Hegel 1986a § 382, Addition, 51): ‘Pain 
therefore is not derived by spirit from without, as it was imagined to be 
when men enquired into the manner of its having come into the world.’ 
(Hegel 1986a § 377, Addition, 7) In fact, this idea is already implicit in 
the first sentence of the paragraph: Hegel states here that Spirit abstracts 
from its own externality etc., indicating that Spirit finds itself identical 
with that which it abstracts from. 
The discussion of freedom and pain prepares Hegel’s introduction 
of a further notion in the next paragraph, which is central to his ac­
count of Spirit in the Encyclopaedia. The relevant passage reads as fol­
lows: ‘The determinateness of spirit is therefore manifestation. Spirit is 
9 Compare also the Kantian aspect of Hegel’s account of free will in The Phi-
losophy of Right (Hegel 1986b, § 5). 
10 See also Hegel 1986a, § 472 for Hegel’s discussion of pain as an essential 
characteristic of practical Spirit. 
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not a certain determinateness or content, the expression [Äußerung] or 
exteriority [Äußerlichkeit] of which is merely a distinct form of it. Rather 
than revealing something therefore, its determinateness and content is 
itself this revelation’ (Hegel 1986a § 383). At first sight, it is not clear that 
notions such as manifestation and revelation bear any connection to the 
preceding discussion about freedom as abstraction and pain. However, 
some of Hegel’s reflections in the addition to § 382 indicate how one 
might draw such a connection. Hegel here argues roughly as follows. The 
pain which is characteristic of Spirit is not merely self-inflicted by Spirit, 
it is also essential to Spirit. The abstraction from individual immediacy 
which is constitutive of Spirit always and necessarily occurs against the 
background of an identification with individual immediacy; therefore, it 
is always and necessarily accompanied by pain. Thus, the addition states: 
‘The other, the negative, the contradiction, the disunion, is therefore 
inherent in the nature of spirit. This disunion carries with it the possibil­
ity of pain.’ (Hegel 1986a, § 382, Addition, 51) To be a spiritual creature, 
then, is essentially to identify with something which is at the same time 
external (insofar as it is something one can abstract from, something 
one can negate). Highlighting this aspect of externality, one can put the 
same point by saying that Spirit is essentially externalised. It is at this 
point that the notion of manifestation becomes relevant. We can bring 
into view what Hegel means by it by returning to § 383, where the notion 
of manifestation is contrasted with the notion of expression. To quote 
again: ‘Spirit is not a certain determinateness or content, the expression 
[Äußerung] or exteriority [Äußerlichkeit] of which is merely a distinct 
form of it. Rather than revealing something therefore, its determinate­
ness and content is itself this revelation’ (Hegel 1986a, § 383). When we 
speak of something being expressed or expressing itself – for instance, 
a feeling – Hegel argues, we hold that it possesses certain features by 
which we can individuate it – it possesses ‘a certain determinateness 
or content’, as Hegel puts it. For instance, a feeling has a characteristic 
way of what it feels like to have it. However, the feeling has this feature 
independently of whether it also comes to be expressed, let us say, in 
certain facial expressions or bodily movements. The feeling is what it is, 
in other words, independently of whether it is being expressed or not.11 In 
11 Obviously, this is not true for all feelings; in fact, perhaps no actual feeling 
fully satisfies this description. But this is of no importance for the present ar­
gument – for our purposes it is enough to assume that there may be cases like 
the one described above. 
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this sense, it is a content ‘the expression or exteriority of which is merely 
a distinct form of it’. In contrast, Spirit is not what it is independently 
of being expressed or externalised. As we have seen, for Hegel it is con­
stitutive of Spirit that it is externalised: it identifies with that in which 
it is externalised. Spirit’s externalisation is therefore not an ‘ordinary’ 
case of expression. Rather, it is a case of expression where that which is 
being expressed is constituted by its expression. In other words: Spirit 
is not a content whose (external) form is distinct from it. Rather, it is 
constitutive of this content that it assumes this external form. It is for 
these cases of externalisation that Hegel wants to reserve the notion of 
manifestation, in contrast to that of expression. In order to illustrate this 
point, he also draws on the notion of revelation, making a connection to 
the Christian notion of revelation in the addition: one usually thinks of 
Christ as God’s external organ or instrument of revelation, Hegel argues. 
However, he continues, this is a misunderstanding. In fact, what God 
reveals in Christ is that it is His own essence and nature ‘to differentiate, 
to limit Himself, yet to remain with Himself in His difference’ (Hegel 
1986a, § 383, Addition, 57). God reveals in Christ that it is His essence 
to reveal Himself in this way. In this respect, Christ is not merely an 
external form in which the content of God becomes expressed; rather, 
Christ Himself is the content of revelation.
Combining now these results with our initial reading of § 381, ac­
cording to which the externality of Spirit is associated with nature, we 
can sum up the preceding discussion as follows. Spirit, for Hegel, is 
manifest in nature, where this means that it is externalised in nature, but 
in such a way that this externalisation is constitutive of it. At the same 
time, Spirit involves the capacity to abstract from or negate its external 
manifestation, which is why it is essentially associated with inner pain 
and division. Putting this in more simple terms, one might say: Spirit 
can only negate nature insofar as it also and at the same time finds itself 
identical with it. 
Obviously, these are very abstract claims which beg further illustra­
tion. The next section will be dedicated to making them more concrete. 
Before proceeding to that, however, I want to pause for some brief reflec­
tions on the results obtained so far. As we have seen, Hegel speaks in the 
1825 lecture of Spirit as the ‘process’ or ‘movement’ of liberating itself 
from nature. This can be interpreted in the sense sketched in the first 
section: it is constitutive of spiritual creatures that they engage in the 
activity of liberating themselves from nature. The same aspect of Hegel’s 
view appears to be captured in § 382 of the Encyclopaedia in the claim that 
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Spirit has the capacity to abstract from its ‘externality’ and ‘determinate 
being’. However, we have now seen that this activity of abstraction and 
liberation from externality can only occur against the background of a 
preceding or underlying identification with externality. 
Now one may raise the question: what makes this preceding or un­
derlying identification possible, what underlies it? There are passages 
which seem to suggest that in Hegel’s view this identification, again, is 
due to some activity on the part of Spirit, an activity of appropriation 
or assimilation. For instance, he states in the addition to § 381: ‘All the 
activities of spirit are nothing but the various modes in which that which 
is external is led back into the internality, to what spirit is itself, and it 
is only by means of this leading back, this idealizing or assimilation of 
that which is external, that spirit becomes and is spirit’ (Hegel 1986a, § 
381, Addition, 37).12 However, the main text of the same paragraph sug­
gests that even this activity of assimilation can only occur against the 
background of some preceding identification: Hegel states here that ‘the 
Notion has its complete external objectivity in nature, and has become 
identical with itself in that this its externalization has been sublated’ 
(Hegel 1986a, § 381, my emphasis). If this is correct, one may wonder 
whether it is true that on Hegel’s account, Spirit is activity all the way 
down. Should we not rather say that there is one aspect of its identity 
– its original identification with some external, natural immediacy – with 
regard to which Spirit is passive, rather than active? Or in other words, 
should we not add that there is some aspect about its identity which it 
receives, rather than actively brings about?
THE  FUNCT ION  OF  CLASS ICAL  ART
Following up the suggestion made at the end of the preceding section, we 
can say that to be a spiritual creature for Hegel is not merely to engage in 
the activity of liberating oneself from nature, but also, and simultaneously, 
to find oneself identical with, or manifest in, some external, natural form. 
This latter aspect of one’s identity as a spiritual creature is not something 
which one actively brings about, but rather something with regard to 
which one is passive, which is presupposed in one’s activity. One is, as it 
12 See the interpretation in McCumber 2014, which considers this activity of 
appropriation as the central characteristic of Spirit. 
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were, always already manifest in nature and becomes active only against 
this background. However, if Spirit’s being manifest in nature is not due 
to its own activity, it must be due to nature itself. Nature, in other words, 
must be such as to allow Spirit to be manifest in it; it must be in some 
sense inherently ‘spiritual’, without therefore ceasing to be nature (and 
thus to be something which is in a certain respect external to Spirit). 
I would suggest that there is an entire part of Hegel’s mature system 
which is dedicated to showing that nature is in and of itself inherently 
spiritual: this is Hegel’s ‘Anthropology’, the first part of his Philosophy of 
Subjective Spirit in the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences. The nature 
Hegel is concerned with here is, specifically, human nature. Hegel wants 
to show that many features which are constitutive of human nature – such 
as human sensation, feeling, self­feeling, habituation – can be consid­
ered as proto­spiritual features or processes. Anthropology is therefore 
in Hegel a curious hybrid discipline, standing at the intersection of the 
philosophy of Spirit and the philosophy of nature, and being concerned 
with what Hegel dubs ‘Naturgeist’ (Hegel 1986a, § 387). This gives us a 
hint as to how the preceding considerations regarding Spirit’s relation 
to nature can be made more concrete: the inherently spiritual nature 
which Hegel is concerned with may be tentatively assumed to be human 
nature, and the human natural body. Seen from this perspective, Hegel’s 
position as interpreted above has some immediate and intuitive plausi­
bility: we identify with our natural body, we are this body, even though 
it is not something we have brought about; rather, it has been given to 
us. Furthermore, we have the capacity to ‘negate’ it in various ways (for 
instance, by ignoring its needs and desires, or by trying to suppress them, 
by altering, shaping and utilising the body etc.). While this seems to be 
an intuitively plausible and phenomenologically basic way of relating to 
our own natural body, at the same time, there are many different perspec­
tives from which one can look at the human body: one can look at it as a 
mechanical object, for instance, or as the locus of biochemical processes. 
Hegel seems to hold that we need a discipline such as philosophical an­
thropology in order to enlighten us about the inherently spiritual aspect 
of the human body – in order to show us that this perspective on it is 
the ultimately true and valid one.13 
13 See for instance Hegel 1986a. § 401, where Hegel writes: ‘In physiology the 
intestines and organs are treated only as moments of the animal organism, but 
they also constitute a systematic embodying of what is spiritual [Verleiblichung 
des Geistigen], and so come in for quite another interpretation’.
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However, instead of focusing on Hegel’s anthropology, I want to 
pursue a different route in the following. I want to argue that for Hegel, 
art – specifically, classical art – has a function which is similar to the 
function of anthropology: the task of classical art is to show that nature 
is inherently spiritual. The inherently spiritual nature in question is hu­
man nature – which is why, as we shall see, on Hegel’s account classical 
art revolves around the human figure as its main form and content. To 
be sure, the way in which classical art presents this content is crucially 
different from the way it is treated in a philosophical discipline such 
as philosophical anthropology. Most obviously, it presents this content 
as an aesthetic property, hence as something which is to be sensuously 
perceived or intuited, rather than grasped in conceptual form. Neverthe­
less, there is a striking continuity between classical art and philosophical 
anthropology on this reading: both are dedicated to bringing into view 
nature, specifically human nature, as a manifestation of Spirit.14 My main 
aim in the following will be to point out connections between Hegel’s 
account of classical art and the more general reflections on Hegel’s notion 
of Spirit discussed in the preceding section. If my reading is on the right 
track, it will turn out that through classical art we experience Spirit as 
manifest in nature, but in such a way that this manifestation is not just 
the result of our own doing, but rather inherent in nature itself.
I will start with a discussion of Hegel’s account of the central features 
of classical art in general, and then proceed to look at how these features 
are instantiated in classical sculpture more specifically. My primary source 
will be the transcript of Hegel’s lectures on the philosophy of art from 
1823 by C.G. Hotho,15 but I will occasionally indicate parallel passages 
in Hotho’s edited version of the lectures, in other lecture transcripts, as 
well as in Hegel’s discussion of art in the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical 
Sciences.
Introducing the notion of classical art in his 1823 lecture, Hegel says 
the following (VPK, 36 = Hegel 2014, 213): 
14 We will see later on that there is textual evidence for this parallel between 
classical art and anthropology in Hegel. It is a further question which of these 
two ‘media’ is more apt to fully reveal the content in question in Hegel’s view. 
I will briefly address this question towards the end.
15 In contrast to other available lecture transcripts, this one has recently been 
translated into English. I occasionally retain the original German expression 
instead of following R.F. Brown’s translation in cases where my own interpreta­
tion would speak in favour of a different translation. 
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The second mode is classical art. It is the free, adequate Einbildung 
of the configuration within the concept; a content that has the shape 
appropriate to it, a content that, as wahrhafter content, does not lack 
wahrhafte form. This is the locus of art’s ideal. Here the sensuous, 
the pictorial, no longer counts as sensuous and is no natural being; 
it is of course a natural shape but, by removing the insufficiency of 
the finite, it is the kind of natural shape that is perfectly adequate 
to its concept. The wahrhafte content is what is concretely spiritual, 
and its shape is the human figure; for this figure alone is the shape of 
the spiritual, the kind of shape in which what is spiritual can depict 
itself outwardly within temporal existence. 
I want to focus on two claims from this passage which are central to 
Hegel’s account of classical art: i) classical art is characterised by what 
one may call a ‘unity’ of content and form:16 it has a content which ‘does 
not lack wahrhafte form’;17 and ii) the central content and/or form of 
classical art is the human figure.18 Let us consider these claims in turn.
i) When Hegel speaks of the unity of form and content in classical 
art, he does not just mean that classical art has a certain content and 
presents this content in a form which is adequate to it. Rather, he has 
something stronger in mind: in some sense, in classical art, the form is 
the content and vice versa. One may therefore say that the subject matter 
– the content – of classical art just is the unity of form and content. It is 
helpful to turn back to our discussion of Hegel’s notion of manifestation 
at this point, in order to see how one might understand these claims. 
As we saw, for Spirit to be manifest means for it to have an external 
form which is constitutive of it as content. I would suggest that Hegel’s 
statement about the relation between form and content in classical art 
should be understood analogously. In classical art, we have a spiritual 
content [das Geistige] which is constituted by the external form it takes. 
Classical art, therefore, does not present some content in a certain form 
which is distinct from (even though perhaps adequate to) the content. 
Rather, it simply presents a content which is at the same time form, and 
vice versa: it presents the unity of form and content. In other words, to 
16 See VPK, 154 = Hegel 2014, 311.
17 See also Hegel 1975, 427; VPK, 153–154 = Hegel 2014, 311.; PKÄ, 28; PK, 145.
18 See also Hegel 1975, 432, 433; VPK, 157–158 = Hegel 2014, 313–315; PKÄ, 28, 
115–116, 123; PK, 146. 
114
use Hegel’s own terminology: classical art presents Spirit as manifest in 
a certain external form.19 
ii) More specifically, classical art presents Spirit as manifest in the 
human body. This means that classical art presents not merely the unity 
of form and content, but the unity of spiritual content and natural form. 
Classical art presents the human natural body as ‘shape of the spiritual’, 
or Spirit as manifest in the human natural body. But what precisely does 
it mean to present the human figure in this way – how does classical 
art accomplish this? I want to address this question by now turning to 
Hegel’s theory of classical sculpture; this will give us a more concrete 
picture of how precisely Hegel conceives this central feature of classical 
art. My discussion will be guided by the following hypothesis: it is cen­
tral to Hegel’s account of classical art in general, and classical sculpture 
in particular, that this form of art strikes a careful and fragile balance 
between receiving something as given from nature, and idealising this 
given form of nature by turning it into an artistic form. The fragile bal­
ance which results from this constitutes what Hegel calls ‘ideality’, the 
defining aesthetic property of classical art. 
We can look at both threads in Hegel’s position separately, starting 
with the idea that it is essential to classical art that it receives something 
as given from nature. Hegel expresses this thought in his discussion of 
art in the Encyclopaedia. He writes: ‘Art not only needs, for the intuitions 
to be produced by it, an external given material, which includes subjective 
images and representations. It also needs, for the expression of spiritual 
content, the given forms of nature together with their meaning, which art 
must discern and appropriate (cf. § 411)’ (Hegel 1986a, § 558).20 The lectures 
make more explicit that the given forms of nature in question are, more 
specifically, the human figure. Hegel states (VPK, 157 = Hegel 2014, 311): 
More specifically, this appearance then determines itself in such a 
way that the shape can only be the human figure, because what is 
spiritual can reveal itself in the human figure alone. Here the shape 
19 This reading is confirmed by the fact that Hegel often speaks of the ‘mani­
festation’ of Spirit in the context of his account of classical art, in particular in 
relation to its characteristic unity of form and content; this is true especially 
about his 1826 lecture: see for instance PKÄ, 28, 116; PK, 146. 
20 Note that Hegel here explicitly refers to § 411 in his ‘Anthropology’, where 
he discusses how Spirit becomes manifest in the human body through processes 
of habituation and appropriation. 
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is no longer symbolic but is instead the appearance of spirit, the de­
termination of spirit, its emergence out into existence. The sensible 
shape of the human being is alone that in which spirit is able to 
appear. The sensible shape is significant in itself; what it signifies is 
the spirit that emerges within it. 
A classical artist, then, will always and necessarily draw on the human 
figure as a ‘given form of nature’. This claim is of crucial importance 
for Hegel: in his discussion of sculpture in his 1823 lecture, he makes it 
repeatedly in different formulations. He states: ‘Artists do not devise the 
prototype; instead it is a given for them. They did not devise the living 
figure but instead found it. The living figure belongs to nature […]’ (VPK, 
233–234 = Hegel 2014, 376). And again, a few lines further down (VPK, 
234–235 = Hegel 2014, 377):
The human bodily nature is a given for the artist; it is the expres­
sion of the concept as such; and beyond this, it is the expression of 
spirit as the concept existent­for­itself. The human body, then, is 
not solely body as such, but is also the expression of spirit in what 
is particular. This too is presupposed. As falling within the natural 
realm, this congruence of the spiritual with what is bodily belongs 
rather to sensibility, and it is not to be traced back to specific thought-
determinations. 
In a certain respect, then, the classical artist may appear to be very much 
constrained with regard to both his subject matter and the form in which 
he may represent it: his task seems to be simply to replicate the human 
figure as he finds it in nature. Hegel concedes that it may in fact appear 
this way: the classical artist may appear to be merely replicating what 
he finds ready made in nature. He states (VPK, 155 = Hegel 2014, 312): 
This rules out caprice on the artist’s part because the content is 
present at hand for the artist, who comes upon it, and the artist is 
only the subjective activity of portraying, is formative as such. In this 
formative activity the artist certainly also gives the content further 
shape, but imperceptibly so, inconspicuously, by seeming only to 
execute what is already complete on its own. 
As Hegel makes clear in this statement, the classical artist replicates or 
executes something which he finds given in nature, but this is only one 
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aspect of what he does: he also ‘gives the content further shape’, even 
though he does this ‘imperceptively’, ‘inconspicuously’. This brings us to 
the second strand in Hegel’s position. Classical art draws on given forms 
of nature, but it presents them insofar as and to the extent that Spirit be­
comes manifest in them. In order for that to be possible, the classical artist 
cannot just replicate the human figure as he finds it in nature, rather he 
must do something to it – he must, as we will see in a moment, ‘idealise’ it.
Hegel holds that it is specifically the task of classical sculpture to 
present the human figure as a natural form in which Spirit becomes mani­
fest. He states: ‘So sculpture has spiritual individuality as its object, and 
sculpture allows Spirit to appear in an immediately material way’ (VPK, 
229 = Hegel 2014, 373). The question we need to pursue, then, is what 
precisely the classical sculptor does in order to present the human figure 
as a material manifestation of Spirit – or in other words, what exactly it 
is about classical sculpture which turns it into a manifestation of Spirit. 
In his 1826 lecture, Hegel makes the following statement about what we 
should look out for when studying classical sculpture: ‘One of the most 
important aspects of the study of sculpture is to get to know the forms 
which most completely express Spirit, through which ideality is accom­
plished’ (PKÄ, 175, my translation). This association between ideality and 
the expression or (more accurately) manifestation of Spirit can also be 
found in the 1823 lecture (VPK, 235–236 = Hegel 2014, 377–378): 
If a work of sculpture based on the human figure is supposed to 
show how this figure expresses the divine as such, and one wants 
to examine this sculpture very specifically, then one has to explain 
which parts of it, which of its features or configurations, correspond 
to a specific inwardness. We are led to such a study by the ancient 
works. […] So then, in examining the particular formation with regard 
to its spiritual expression, the procedure had to have been determin­
ing the extent to which these features would be something ideal and 
expressive of what is spiritual […]. 
This statement is a prelude to an extensive discussion of Winckelmann’s 
account of classical Greek sculpture, in particular of his comparison 
between ancient Egyptian and ancient Greek sculpture. Winckelmann, 
Hegel claims, was the first to understand that ideality is the unique and 
outstanding feature of Greek sculpture. Since Hegel interprets ideality as 
the feature of a sculptural body through which it becomes ‘expressive’ of 
Spirit, this implies that Winckelmann is in Hegel’s view the first to have 
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had a clear vision of that unique feature of the ancient Greek sculptural 
body which makes it apt for the manifestation of Spirit. This feature is 
thrown into relief by Winckelmann especially through his contrasting 
comparison with ancient Egyptian sculptures: ‘With refined sensibility, 
Winckelmann highlighted the features that the Greeks characteristically 
specified for the ideal. Egyptian works of sculpture demonstrate great 
technical skill; they have excellent features, but the ideal is not yet present 
in their case’ (VPK, 236 = Hegel 2014, 378). In discussing this contrast, 
Hegel follows Winckelmann’s History of Ancient Art in great detail. It is 
noteworthy that he begins his discussion by arguing that some Archaic 
Egyptian and Greek sculptures, such as the pediments from the Temple 
of Aphaea at Aegina, are deficient precisely because they imitate nature 
too faithfully, to the detriment of their ‘ideality’: ‘The Aeginetans stand 
out because of their most faithful imitation of nature. This imitation 
goes so far as reproducing random features of the skin, with no striving 
for ideality’ (VPK, 237–238 = Hegel 2014, 379). More generally, however, 
Hegel follows Winckelmann in charging Egyptian sculpture with being 
too static, lifeless and monotonous. Egyptian sculptures, Hegel states, are 
typically composed of geometrical lines. Their posture is stiff, appears 
strained and somewhat mechanical; their feet are ‘positioned unnaturally’ 
(VPK, 238 = Hegel 2014, 380), standing in parallel posture; their arms 
‘hang straight down at the sides’ (VPK, 238 = Hegel 2014, 380). All of this 
means, most importantly, that they are not properly engaged in action.
In contrast to that, Greek sculptures ‘are […] utterly ideal, and we 
must learn from them what is ideal, for they are unrivalled’ (VPK, 239 
= Hegel 2014, 381). Furthermore, Hegel states that we owe the ‘criterion 
distinguishing the ideal from what is natural’ VPK, 238 = Hegel 2014, 
380) to Winckelmann. It is not clear that Winckelmann thought of him­
self as possessing such a criterion.21 More importantly, it is not obvious 
that Hegel himself operates with such a criterion, whether or not it may 
be correctly ascribed to Winckelmann. Rather, it is striking that Hegel 
approaches the ideality of Greek sculpture primarily in negative fashion, 
pointing out which features of the sculpture are not constitutive of it. For 
instance, he emphasises that it is not simply in virtue of the physical 
features of the human bodies they represent that Greek sculptures are 
ideal. Rather, if they are ideal, this is the case because they assume certain 
21 See Winckelmann 1764, 142, where he offers reasons as to why finding a 
conceptual criterion for beauty seems difficult if not impossible. Instead, he 
here refers to beauty as ‘eins von den großen Geheimnissen der Natur ’. 
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postures (VPK, 243 = Hegel 2014, 385). However, Hegel has little to say 
about exactly which postures are conducive to ideality. He makes clear, 
in any case, that ideal sculptures ought not to display expressive gestures, 
but rather a composed posture – abstaining, nevertheless, from the static 
monotony of Egyptian sculptures (VPK, 243–244 = Hegel 2014, 384–385). 
Hegel goes into more detail when discussing the ideality of the Greek 
face, in particular the Greek profile. Again, he follows Winckelmann’s 
guidance in some detail,22 but he takes a step beyond his guide in one im­
portant instance. It is characteristic of the ideal profile, Hegel states, that 
it is defined by two perpendicular lines: one line connecting forehead and 
nose, another one connecting the tip of the nose with the ear. However, 
instead of simply describing the proportions and geometrical features 
which are constitutive of the ideality of a Greek profile, like Winckelmann, 
Hegel tries to come up with an explanatory account of what it is that 
makes them ideal. He states (VPK, 241 = Hegel 2014, 383–383):
The eye is the organ of a theoretical relationship to things. The mouth 
is the practical organ. This second or ideal disposition towards ob­
jects, the reflective disposition, appears in the upper portion of the 
countenance; it faces outwards and is the main thing, and it furnishes 
the ideal character of human physiognomy.
One may reconstruct Hegel’s argument roughly as follows. Human 
features are ideal to the extent that Spirit is manifest in them. It is es­
sential to spiritual creatures that they can take a ‘theoretical’ attitude 
towards things (one may hear a faint echo of Hegel’s thesis that Spirit 
is the movement of liberating itself from nature in this claim). Eye and 
forehead are the organs of the theoretical attitude towards things. The 
mouth is the organ of a more primitive, practical (i.e. licking, devouring 
etc.) attitude towards things. In the ideal Greek profile, eye and forehead 
are more dominant than the mouth. Accordingly, this profile is more apt 
as manifestation of Spirit than other types of (human or animal) profile 
in which the mouth is more protruding, or the forehead more receding.23 
22 See Winckelmann 1764, 176–177.
23 The argument about the Greek profile sketched above can also be found in 
the 1826 lecture, though it is here less explicit: see PK, 201–202; PKÄ, 177–178. 
Hegel’s view here is probably influenced by the theory of the ‘facial angle’ de­
veloped by the eighteenth­century Dutch anatomist, Petrus Camper; Hegel was 
familiar with Camper’s theory. 
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It is easy to find fault with this argument. Most importantly, the argu­
ment seems to presuppose what it is supposed to establish: that certain 
parts of the human body, or rather a certain arrangement of such parts, 
are particularly apt to give expression to Spirit. Thus, Hegel seems to 
presuppose that the human eye and forehead are ‘spiritual organs’, as they 
are the organs of a theoretical attitude towards things, while the mouth, 
in contrast, is the organ of a more primitive, animal­like attitude towards 
the world. However, without further argument, this presupposition seems 
arbitrary and ad hoc: why not emphasise instead, for instance, that the 
mouth is the organ of speech, and therefore of an essentially spiritual 
activity? On the basis of this assumption, one would reach the contrary 
result that a protruding mouth is more apt for the manifestation of spirit 
than a receding mouth, and therefore more ideal. 
However, one should note that it is a very isolated instance of this 
type of explanation in the lectures.24 In general, Hegel abstains from at­
tempting to give a reductive explanation of what makes human bodily 
features apt for the manifestation of Spirit, or to present and apply a posi­
tive, conceptual criterion for ideality. Instead, he follows Winckelmann 
in describing features of classical Greek sculptures which are conducive 
to ideality. More often than not, however, he takes a negative approach 
by describing in contrast those features which are detrimental to ideality 
24 This is true even though Hegel alludes with careful approval to the physi­
ognomic project of explaining what makes certain bodily organs apt for the 
expression of mental states at one point in the 1823 lecture. Here he even refers 
to phrenologist and anatomist Franz Joseph Gall as a potential guide for this 
undertaking: ‘Each bodily part must be examined from two perspectives: physi­
cally, and how it is capable of expressing something spiritual. This would be 
to consider it the way Gall did, crudely to be sure, using the cranium’ (VPK, 
236 = Hegel 2014, 377). It would be worthwhile – though beyond the scope of 
this chapter – to investigate to what extent this marks a change of position on 
Hegel’s part with regard to his trenchant critique of phrenology in his earlier 
Phenomenology of Spirit. It is noteworthy that in Hotho’s own edition of the 
lectures (from which Knox’s translation derives), Hegel’s qualified approval 
of Gall’s approach is instead turned by Hotho into downright rejection: ‘In 
this matter each organ must in general be considered from two points of view, 
the purely physical one and that of spiritual expression. It is true that in this 
connection we may not proceed after the manner of Gall who makes the spirit 
into a bump on the skull’ (Hegel 1975, 716). Note the close parallel between the 
passages from the lectures on aesthetics just quoted and the passage from the 
‘Anthropology’ in Hegel 1986a § 401 (mentioned in footnote 13). 
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in a sculpture. Considering Hegel’s overall method of providing an in­
direct, descriptive account of ideality, it seems reasonable to suppose, 
then, that for Hegel ideality – the manifestation of Spirit in a human 
natural body – is to a certain extent an irreducibly aesthetic property. 
Or in any case, if it can be reduced to properties which can be grasped 
in conceptual form, such that one might derive general ‘criteria of ideal­
ity’ from this finding, such a reduction is at least no trivial endeavour, 
and Hegel does not pursue it systematically. This conjecture finds more 
explicit confirmation in a statement from Hegel’s discussion of sculpture 
quoted above: ‘As falling within the natural realm, this congruence of the 
spiritual with what is bodily belongs rather to sensibility, and it is not 
to be traced back to specific thought-determinations’ (VPK, 234–235 = 
Hegel 2014, 377). Ideality – the ‘congruence of the spiritual with what is 
bodily’ – is something which has to be sensed or intuited, and cannot be 
reduced to ‘specific thought-determinations’. 
A classical Greek sculpture, then, insofar as it displays ideality, is on 
the one hand modelled after human nature. But it is not just a faithful 
replication of whatever the artist finds in human nature. Rather, it pres­
ents the human body in such a way that it is turned into as thorough a 
manifestation of Spirit as possible – this is what it means to idealise it. 
However, if the preceding analysis is correct, it is impossible, or at least 
not trivial, to give a reductive explanatory account of what it means to 
idealise the human body. Instead, this seems to be something which the 
artist – and the spectator – must simply intuit. 
Let us now connect these results with the preceding general reflections 
on Hegel’s notion of Spirit. We have seen plenty of textual evidence to 
suggest that in Hegel’s view the task of classical art is to show Spirit as 
manifest in human natural form. Given Hegel’s notion of manifestation, 
this does not just mean that classical art presents some (spiritual) content 
in a (natural) form which is adequate or appropriate to this content. Rath­
er, a classical work of art presents the natural human body as constitutive 
of Spirit. Or in other words, it presents the unity of spiritual content and 
natural human form. This result, then, ties in with our general analysis 
according to which the notion that Spirit is manifest in nature is central 
to Hegel’s account of Spirit. What was not yet apparent from this general 
analysis, however, is the crucial function of art – and in particular that of 
classical art: namely, to bring that state of affairs into view, by showing 
how Spirit becomes manifest in nature. I also suggested, furthermore, that 
for Hegel, Spirit’s becoming manifest in nature cannot be solely due to 
Spirit’s own doing and activity. Rather, it must be to a certain extent due 
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to nature itself. Now it may seem that this claim does not sit well with the 
result that Spirit’s becoming manifest in human natural form is brought 
into view by works of art, in particular by sculptures. After all, works of art 
are artefacts, made from lifeless material such as stone or bronze through 
human manipulation. Nothing would seem to be more obviously the result 
of spiritual activity than a sculpture. However, I would like to emphasise 
again the curious position of classical art, standing in between passivity 
and activity. The classical artist essentially draws on the given forms of 
nature, the human body. As Hegel repeats again and again, this is a content 
and form which he finds ready-made in nature, which is given to him. 
It is true that he must do something to this form or content in order to 
turn it into a work of art which displays ideality, but he thereby merely 
‘imperceptively, inconspicuously’ gives further shape to what is already 
there. If a classical sculpture can bring into view Spirit’s manifestation 
in the ‘given form of nature’ which is the human body, then, this is not 
merely due to the artist’s activity, but also to these given forms of nature 
themselves. And this twofold origin of the classical work of art is also 
reflected and contained in its content: the classical work presents Spirit’s 
becoming manifest in nature as partly due to nature itself. 
Returning briefly at this point to Hegel’s general remarks to the effect 
that the central characteristic of Spirit is manifestation, it is interesting 
to note that Hegel sometimes tends to present this as part of a heroic 
story in which Spirit triumphantly overcomes and defeats ‘otherness’. 
For Spirit to be manifest means for it to find itself in the other, hence to 
overcome or even submerge otherness in a certain sense. For instance, in 
the addition to Encyclopaedia § 382, he states: ‘Spirit is not free however, 
simply in that it is independent of its other in being external to it, for it 
achieves this independence within this other. Its freedom is actualized 
not through the withdrawal [Flucht] from this other, but through the 
overcoming [Überwindung] of it’ (Hegel 1986a, § 382, Addition, 49–51). 
However, in light of our preceding discussion, one might as well reverse 
this perspective. Spirit’s becoming manifest in nature is not just the result 
of a ‘heroic’ feat on the part of Spirit. Rather, there is something about 
nature which makes this possible, something which nature contributes 
to this result. Hence Spirit’s manifestation in nature may equally well 
be considered as part of a story which ought to inspire the humbleness 
which comes with finding oneself dependent on an ‘other’.
Before closing, I want to draw our attention to an important ques­
tion raised by the preceding discussion. I will not be able to answer this 
question here; I merely want to flag it. According to the interpretation 
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developed above, the ideality of a Greek classical sculpture, in virtue of 
which it embodies the manifestation of Spirit in natural human form, 
appears to be for Hegel an irreducibly aesthetic quality. What makes a 
sculpture ideal has to be intuited and cannot be reduced to conceptual 
principles. One may wonder how this squares with Hegel’s famous claim 
that art and philosophy (and religion) have the same content, but that 
philosophy captures this content in a more truthful, complete and therefore 
ultimately ‘higher’ form (VPK, 5 = Hegel 2014, 183). According to our inter­
pretation, classical art on the one hand has a content which is certainly of 
great philosophical relevance: it presents Spirit’s being manifest in nature. 
On the other hand, this content is (to a certain degree at least) irreducibly 
aesthetic. How is it possible, on this view, to maintain either the claim that 
philosophy and art have the same content, or that philosophy is higher 
than art? For instance, how can we say that philosophical anthropology, 
as suggested above, has for Hegel a similar function as classical art – both 
convey the same content – if only classical art can fulfil this function fully 
or properly? Furthermore, if only art can properly convey this content, how 
can philosophy be said to be higher than art for the reason that it conveys 
the same content, but in more complete and truthful form?
It seems to me that one can hold on to the claim that philosophy 
and art (and more specifically in this case: philosophical anthropology 
and classical art) have the same content even if the content conveyed by 
classical works of art is to a certain extent irreducibly aesthetic. For one 
might argue that philosophy and art convey different aspects of the same 
content, and thereby complement each other: for instance, philosophy 
makes a general, conceptual claim about Spirit being manifest in human 
nature, while works of art demonstrate this in individual, concrete in­
stances. And this need not be taken to imply that art is thereby relegated 
to a subordinate, merely illustrative function. For one might argue that 
in order to have genuine knowledge of the fact that Spirit is manifest 
in nature, one must grasp this both in conceptual, general form, and be 
presented with concrete, individual instances of it. On the other hand, 
opting for such a strategy may make it more difficult to maintain the 
second claim, that philosophy is higher than art for the reason that it 
presents the same content, but in more complete and truthful form. It is 
natural to understand this claim in the sense that philosophy in Hegel’s 
view is capable of doing everything that art does, only better (more com­
pletely, more truthfully). If, however, philosophy and art complement 
each other in the way just indicated, and art is indeed indispensable in 
this respect, then philosophy cannot be considered as higher than art in 
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this sense. On this reading, art can certainly never be simply replaced or 
made obsolete by philosophy. Perhaps one need not read Hegel’s claim 
in this strong sense, but assuming that one does, the present reading of 
Hegel’s notion of classical art in fact has revisionary consequences: it 
implies that philosophy is not, after all, higher than art.25 
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MICHAEL  SQU IRE
UNSER KNIE BEUGEN WIR DOCH NICHT MEHR ? 
Hegel, classical art and the Reformation  
of art history
This chapter is an attempt to articulate a particular – and no doubt par­
ticularly idiosyncratic – response to Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics.1 It is 
written from an academic background quite different from that of other 
contributors: I cannot lay claim to any specialist knowledge of German 
Idealism, and the intricacies of Hegel’s philosophy, not to mention its 
Nachleben among the likes of Nietzsche and Heidegger, are several phe­
nomenological (dare one say idealist?) levels above my pay­grade. Over 
the past decade or so, I have nonetheless found myself returning to Hegel, 
and most frequently to the Lectures on Aesthetics. Hegel has not always 
provided the answers. Again and again, though, he has helped me to 
formulate my questions. 
These frequent revisits have led to a rather ambivalent relationship. In 
one sense, my chapter pays homage to the extraordinary explanatory pow­
er of Hegel’s history of art: in particular, it surveys what, as we approach 
1 This chapter is lightly adapted from the transcript of the paper delivered at 
our London workshop in June 2016. It is a pleasure to thank the Morphomata 
International Center for Advanced Studies for providing the opportunity to 
revisit Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics (during a happy residence at the University 
of Cologne in 2014–2015, above all in conversation with Paul A. Kottman); sub­
sequent research – both for this chapter, and for the book as a whole – has been 
supported by the Leverhulme Trust. For their comments on earlier versions of 
this paper, I am grateful to Jaś Elsner, Jonas Grethlein and Paul Kottman, as 
well as to the participants of the 2016 London workshop (in particular Joshua 
Billings, Lydia Goehr, Simon Goldhill, Robert Pippin, Fred Rush, Jeremy 
Tanner and Joanna Woodall). 
their 200th anniversary, the Lectures offer a historian of classical art. 
While bowing a reverential knee, however, I also want to push back 
against some of the assumptions directing Hegel’s account of art and art 
history. Hegel offers a compelling diagnosis of the modernist cultural 
distance between what he labels the ‘classical’ and the ‘romantic’;2 from 
an intellectual and cultural historical viewpoint, a foremost contribution 
lies in marrying the history of western art with the history of religion 
– that is, with ideas about the divine, the Christian Incarnation, and with 
the centrality of Judaeo-Christian traditions in defining our attitudes to 
the material world around us. But for all the seductive power of Hegel’s 
lectures, I worry about their ideological underpinnings:3 above all, I feel 
uneasy with that recurrent first person plural – the Hegelian ‘we’ that 
defines the viewpoint for reifying art’s present, past and future. In all 
this, it is the contingencies of Hegelian theology – the very assumptions 
informing and informed by Hegelian teleology – that trouble me most. 
Indeed, my bipolar relationship with the Lectures no doubt has to do with 
my own troubled theological conditioning – schooled in a Benedictine 
monastery, and struggling to reconcile Hegel’s deeply Protestant thinking 
with a residual Roman Catholic upbringing …
To give my comments a structure, I organise them in two parts, cor­
responding with that personal push and pull of the Hegelian account. 
In the first section, I chart why I think art historians – especially those 
interested in Greek and Roman materials – should care about Hegel, 
situating a number of recent scholarly developments against the backdrop 
of Hegelian interests. The second section, by contrast, is a preliminary 
attempt to explain some of my own difficulties – above all with a view to 
the contingencies of theology.4 
2 For Hegel’s account of symbolic, classical and romantic Kunstformen – and 
the ‘Entwicklung des Ideals zu den besonderen Formen des Kunstschönen’ – cf. 
below, pp. 142–146, as well as the introduction to this volume (pp. 34–42).
3 My talk of ‘ideology’ draws above all on the work of W.J.T. Mitchell: cf. below, 
n. 86. Comparison might be made with Whitney Davis’ postcolonial anxieties 
about rival ‘onto­theologies’, as expressed in this volume: cf. pp. 93–95. 
4 The chapter’s second section thus returns to some of the ideas that first led 
me to Hegel – within a project on Image and Text in Graeco-Roman Antiquity, 
and especially the residual logocentricism of ‘Protestant’ art history: cf. Squire 
2009, 1–193, esp. 58–71. 
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Let me begin with the pull: how can Hegel help a classicist and classical 
art historian formulate questions about the materials we study, and how 
can his particular answers aid us in our modern­day understanding of 
the Greek and Roman past?
I have always found it surprising that classicists have not made more 
of the Lectures on Aesthetics. When I discussed the present project with 
classicist colleagues in the UK and elsewhere (especially in Germany), 
many responded with bemused bewilderment: whatever the Lectures rep­
resented, they were generally deemed to be alien to the research agendas 
of my various interlocutors. This corresponds, I think, with a broader 
pattern of scholarly (non­)engagement. Countless historians of aesthetics 
have turned to Hegel as a sort of Nostradamus of western art history: not 
only did he diagnose a cultural state of modernism, he also prophesied 
so much of art’s modernist march; the various art historical ‘­isms’ of 
the last 150 years all in some sense speak, if not quite of art’s Auflösung, 
at least perhaps of its convergence with philosophy – its ‘invitation to 
intellectual consideration …, for knowing philosophically what art is’.5 
But whereas the likes of Arthur Danto, Michael Fried, T.J. Clark and 
Robert Pippin (to name but a few) have revisited the history of modern 
art through a Hegelian lens, very few art historians have done the same 
for the earlier materials that Hegel surveys, at least over the half­century 
or so. Indeed, one might wonder whether the disciplinary practices of 
modern­day art history – if not the antiquarian isolationism of so much 
classical art history, then perhaps the propensity of so many students 
and scholars towards the modern and contemporary, not to mention art 
history’s decided bias towards the study of painting over sculpture – play 
out the Geistesgeschichte that Hegel articulates.6 
5 Hegel 1975, 11 (cf. below, pp. 144–146). On this condition of ‘after the beauti­
ful’, the most important recent book is Pippin 2014; see also the chapters in 
this volume by e.g. Pippin, Clark, Kottman and Gardner.
6 I refer here to Hegel’s argument about why classical sculpture leaves us 
‘cold’ – its lack of concern with ‘a person’s own subjective inwardness, the life 
of his heart, the soul of his most personal feelings’ (Hegel 1975, 797): ‘We do 
not linger over them [Greek statues] long, or our lingering is rather a scholarly 
study of the fine shades of difference in their shape and in the forms given to a 
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But classicists, and classical art historians in particular, should care 
about Hegel. All manner of reasons could be cited here. From my own 
disciplinary perspective, though, three preliminary motives might stand 
out in particular. 
First is an argument of shameless self­interest: Hegel’s account 
should interest classicists, I think, precisely because of the prominent 
position that it ascribes to Greek sculpture (as indeed to Greek poetry).7 
Hegel has some very interesting things to say about the perceived ‘cold­
ness’ of classical art, related in turn to our ‘feeling more at home in 
painting’.8 Yet Hegel articulates a systematic place for classical materials 
within the larger project of art historical enquiry.9 The point may seem 
facetious. But in an academic context where Greek and Roman materi­
als are so often thought peripheral to ‘art history’ proper – and where, 
for their part, classical art historians have largely spoken to themselves 
(and often, one has to admit, said relatively little of interest to the larger 
single individual. We cannot take it amiss if people do not show that profound 
interest in profound sculptures which they deserve. For we have to study them 
before we can appreciate them … But a pleasure that can only be produced af­
ter a study, reflection, scholarship, and examination often repeated, is not the 
direct aim of art. And, even in the case of a pleasure gained by this circuitous 
route, what remains unsatisfied in the sculpture of antiquity is the demand 
that a character should develop and proceed outwardly to deeds and actions, 
and inwardly to a deepening of the soul. For this reason we are at once more 
at home in painting …’ Cf. also ibid., 485.
7 To my mind, Hegel is in fact at his most interesting when discussing the 
relationship between Greek sculpture and poetry: one thinks, for example, of his 
comments on classical sculpture and epic poetry (e.g. Hegel 1975, 1093–1094), 
or about the interconnected workings of Greek sculpture and theatre (‘the ac­
tor comes on the stage as a totally solid objective statue’, albeit one that is now 
‘vitalized’; ‘masks presented an unalterable statuesque picture and its plasticity 
inhibited both the ever­shifting expression of particular emotional moods and 
also the revelation of the dramatis personae’: ibid., 1186–1187).
8 Hegel 1975, 797. As Hegel continues: ‘Painting … opens the way for the first 
time to the principle of finite and inherently infinite subjectivity, the principle 
of our own life and existence, and in paintings we see what is effective and 
active in ourselves’; cf. Pippin’s chapter in this volume, p. 213.
9 In this connection, Hegel likewise has much to offer recent debates about 
whether – and to what extent – we might talk about ‘art’ as a meaningful cat­
egory within classical antiquity, as well as about how ideas change over time: 
see in particular the essays in Platt and Squire 2010, written in response to 
Tanner 2006, with scholarly overview in Squire 2010, 137–152.
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discipline)10 – Hegel offers an important corrective: he demonstrates how 
the whole history of western art is inextricable from its classical heritage. 
The lesson is particularly timely at our present moment, not least here 
in London. One might do well, for example, to shout it next door to the 
Courtauld Institute of Art: after abandoning its teaching position in 
ancient Greek and Roman materials, the Courtauld Institute has radi­
cally reduced its undergraduate and graduate teaching in classical art, 
concentrating instead on what it calls ‘world’ or ‘global’ art history.11 Such 
talk of a large­scale, comparative history of art is of course in itself deeply 
Hegelian, however much contemporary art historians may want to dis­
tance themselves from Hegel’s agenda. But Hegel simultaneously shows 
how, within western traditions, if not within the history of all art, the 
classical art of Greece plays a definite and defining role. Whatever else one 
makes of the Lectures, Hegel demonstrates that Greek and Roman materi­
als have a central place within formalist and critical art history, as indeed 
in the historiography of the discipline: one simply cannot make out as 
though western art history begins with the Byzantine or the mediaeval.12 
10 For one bleak (but not entirely unjustified!) recent evaluation of classical art 
history, see Wood 2012, 17: ‘Art historical classicists are in fact so lacking in self­
assertiveness that they have more or less retreated into a corner of their own, 
isolated from the rest of the discipline … nor does any classicist dare to build a 
case for the unavoidability of their field, any case at all.’ On the peculiarity (if 
not parochialism) of so much classical art history, cf. Tanner 1994; Donohue 
2003 (speaking of a ‘disciplinary no­man’s land’); Donohue 2005, 1–14; Elsner 
2007a; Squire 2011, xi–xiv; Squire 2012a; Lorenz 2016, esp. 3–7. Numerous 
soundbites might be cited: e.g. Boardman 1993, 2 (asking why we should want 
to force antiquity’s artistic splendours into ‘anthropological moulds and struc­
tures’, or ‘subject it to the service of ideologies bred by modern concerns with 
race, gender and psychologies’); Whitley 2001, xxiii (‘all art is material culture … 
Classical art history therefore is archaeology, or it is nothing); compare also 
Squire 2017b (reviewing Coleman 2015).
11 On the disciplinary stakes, cf. the introduction to this volume – esp. pp. 50–51.
12 Hegel is likewise insistent about the need for careful scholarly study of classi­
cal materials. Although there are clear intellectual connections between the two 
thinkers, Hegel would have little truck with the sentiment of e.g. Curtius 1948, 
23 – ‘Pindars Gedichte zu verstehen, kostet Kopfzerbrechen; der Parthenonfries 
nicht … Die Bilderwissenschaft ist mühelos, verglichen mit der Bücherwissen­
schaft’. For an excellent recent championing of ‘the classical tradition’, see now 
Silk, Gildenhard and Barrow 2014 (with numerous discussions of classical art 
and its afterlives: e.g. 102–118, 394–401).
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This takes me to a second point. For while championing the funda­
mental importance of classical materials, Hegel also demonstrates how 
our interpretations are situated.13 By nature, classicists can be doggedly 
positivist creatures, wedded to an idea of the Graeco­Roman past ‘as it 
really was’, free from the posthumous retrospectives perspectives.14 Hegel 
is of course sensitive to issues of history: ‘every work of art belongs to 
its own time, its own people, its own environment, and depends on par­
ticular historical and other ideas and purposes’; ‘consequently, scholar­
ship in the field of art is related to something individual and necessarily 
requires detailed knowledge for its understanding and explanation’.15 But 
fundamental to his account is an argument about the conditioning of 
our viewpoints (our Sehepunkte, as Johann Martin Chladni had already 
labelled it in the eighteenth century). Indeed, Hegel might be said to 
speak rather more convincingly about the challenges of understanding 
the past from subsequent and present perspectives than many within the 
burgeoning field of modern-day ‘classical reception studies’: whatever we 
have to say about the art of the past, our reflections always reflect the 
historical actuality of our own age; by definition, the study of past arte­
facts must always therefore be a comparative venture.16 As the true ‘father 
of art history’, in Ernst Gombrich’s assessment, Hegel consequently has 
something to teach not just classicists, but every student who looks to 
art to reflect upon the past:17 central to his Idealist project is the notion 
13 For discussion, cf. the introduction to this volume, esp. pp. 30–32, 45–48. 
14 For one of the most important critiques within the field of classics, see 
Martindale 1993, esp. 1–34; compare also Martindale 2006 and 2007 (along with 
the other essays in the same edited books). Taking his lead from Iser, Jauss and 
associated theories of Rezeptionsästhetik, Martindale argues not only that ‘the 
interpretation of texts is inseparable from the history of their reception’ (Mar­
tindale 1993, xiii), but also that ‘there is no Archimedean point from which we 
can arrive at a final, correct meaning for any text’ (Martindale 2006, 3–4). The 
subsequent championing of ‘reception’ nonetheless takes more from Kant than it 
does from Hegel: Martindale argues for ‘a different temporality, involving the active 
participation of readers (including readers who are themselves creative artists) in 
a two­way process, backward as well as forward, in which the present and past are 
in dialogue with each other’ (Martindale 2007, 298; cf. also Martindale 2005). 
15 Hegel 1975, 14.
16 For an overview of current work on ‘reception studies’ within the study of 
classical art, see Squire 2014, responding in particular to Prettejohn 2012. 
17 Gombrich 1977, 203; cf. the introduction to this volume, p. 44. That said, the 
Lectures on Aesthetics have little time for what Hegel called ‘historical pedantries’ 
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that history is pregnant with extra-historical significance; for Hegel, art 
is as at once bound to its historical context and yet able to speak beyond 
those contextual conditions.
Third, and most importantly, classical art historians – like all other 
historians of art – should care about Hegel because Hegel has himself 
exerted an incalculable influence on what it is that we do.18 Like it or not, 
the disciplinary history of art history is a story of adopting and adapt­
ing Hegel’s thinking – whether one thinks of Burckhardt and his idea 
of the ‘spirit’ of the Renaissance, Riegl and his talk of Kunstwollen, or 
Panofsky and his system of ‘iconology’ (not to mention his writings about 
the development of linear perspective – the list could be extended almost 
indefinitely).19 As a classicist, I have Hegel in part to thank for the very 
delineation of ‘classical art’ as a meaningful category of academic study 
in the first place – that is, as something defined in relation to what comes 
(in both formal and cultural terms) before and after.20 Many of our most 
deep­set metanarratives about classical art – its stylistic forms, motiva­
tions and execution – derive from Hegel (in turn adapted from the likes 
of Winckelmann, Lessing and Herder).21 Somewhat alarmingly, though, 
(‘historische Gelehrsamkeiten ’: e.g. Hegel 1975, 629 = Hegel 2013, II: 265) or ‘blind 
pedantry’ (‘blinde Gelehrsamkeit ’: e.g. Hegel 1975, 691 = Hegel 2013, II: 339).
18 ‘There remains something of the Hegelian epistemology in the work of every 
art historian’, as Michael Ann Holly puts it (Holly 1984, 30).
19 Cf. the introduction to this volume, p. 44.
20 The Lectures have much to say about this term ‘classical’: see especially Hegel 
1975, 441. Hegel acknowledges that the term connotes ‘every perfect work of art’, 
but characterises this perfection as ‘grounded in the complete inter penetration 
of inner free individuality and the external existent in which and as which this 
individuality appears’. 
21 Among numerous famous examples, one might cite e.g. Gombrich 1950, 
49–64 or Clark 1956. For a demonstration of just how great a purchase so 
many of these Hegelian ideas still have, consider the recent ‘Defining Beauty’ 
exhibition at the British Museum, dedicated to the ‘Body in ancient Greek art’ 
(cf. Jenkins 2015). Many of the descriptions could almost have been lifted from 
Hegel: cf. e.g. Hegel 1975, 724, apparently referring to the Parthenon pediment 
sculptures, especially the river­god Ilissos from the west pediment, Hegel 
notes the ‘universal praise’ bestowed on the ‘expression of independence, of 
self­repose, in these figures’; ‘especially has our admiration been intensified 
to an extreme by the free vivacity, by the way in which the natural material is 
permeated and conquered by the spirit and in which the artist has softened the 
marble, animated it, and given it a soul’. ‘In particular, whenever that praise is 
exhausted, [it] comes back ever anew to the figure of the recumbent river­god 
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the discipline of classical art history is deeply Hegelian without duly 
acknowledging the philosophical debts of its explanatory framework.22
Of course, our knowledge of the actual materials of classical art has 
changed substantially over the last 200 years. In the same way that Hegel 
differentiates his understanding of Greek art from Winckelmann’s a half­
century or so earlier – since ‘nowadays … we have come to know works 
deeper in expression and more vital and more mature in form’ (Hegel cites 
in particular the so­called ‘Elgin marbles’ and Aegina pediments) – so too 
the corpus available to us is different from the one available to Hegel.23 
Some of those discoveries must challenge aspects of Hegel’s account.24 A 
foremost example is what we today know about the polychromy of Greek 
sculpture – including sculptures such as those from the pediments of 
the Parthenon in Athens, which Hegel associates with a ‘purer artistic 
which is amongst the most beautiful things preserved to us from antiquity.’
22 To point out these intellectual debts is not always a welcome gesture: see 
e.g. Stewart 2012 (with response). On Hegel’s own response to Winckelmann, 
see the introduction to this volume, p. 32 – along with the chapters by Davis 
(esp. pp. 73–76) and Peters (esp. pp. 117–120); on Hegel and Lessing, see below, 
pp. 149–151.
23 Hegel 1975, 766 (discussing the praise, in the time of Winckelmann and 
Lessing some fifty years earlier, bestowed on the likes of the Medici Venus 
and Apollo Belvedere); cf. ibid., 723–724, along with Prettejohn 2012, 44–52. 
For Hegel’s response to the Aegina pediments, restored by Thorvaldsen and 
installed within the Munich Glyptothek in 1827, see Hegel 1975, 724, 785–786. 
On the ‘Elgin marbles’, see Hegel 1975, 173, 724, 726 (an apparent reference to 
the horse of Selene from the Parthenon’s east pediment). It is worth noting 
that Hegel was a strong advocate of Lord Elgin’s exploits in Athens (ibid., 724): 
‘These acquisitions have been signalized as sacrilege and sharply criticized, but 
in fact what Lord Elgin did was precisely to save these works of art for Europe 
and preserve them from complete destruction, and his enterprise deserves 
recognition through all time’. 
24 On re­reading Hegel’s Lectures, I was particularly struck by his argument 
about the eyes of Greek sculpture (Hegel 1975, esp. 731–735). For Hegel, clas­
sical statuary’s ‘sacrifice’ of the eye – ‘this simple expression of soul’ – has a 
programmatic importance, above all when it comes to thinking about differ­
ences between sculpture and painting on the one hand, and between classical 
and romantic forms on the other (ibid., 521). Suffice it to say that Hegel’s thesis 
– namely, that ‘the iris and the glance expressive of the spirit is missing from 
the really classic and free statues and busts preserved to us from antiquity’ – is 
far from ‘incontestable’.
132
taste’ that dispensed with the superfluous trappings of colour.25 Where 
Hegel, like others before him, is wholly dismissive of the dissolution of 
classical sculpture in Roman art – ‘we find no beautiful, free, and great 
art in Rome’26 – much recent work has emphasised the creative and 
self­conscious appropriations of later Hellenistic and Roman art.27 Such 
revisions must be accommodated in a Hegelian history of the classical. 
Still, it might be argued, they need not necessarily discredit the general 
thrust of his argument. 
But what, in methodological terms, can the Lectures on Aesthetics offer? 
I have to admit, on re­reading the Lectures in preparation for this chapter, 
I am not sure how much Hegel would help me if I were an Egyptologist, 
or for that matter a specialist in any of the ‘symbolic’ pre­art forms that 
Hegel discussed:28 I get the sense that my observations would be of little 
or no broader relevance for the Hegelian account (‘historical pedantries’, 
as it might have dismissed them). Indeed, since everything I might say 
could be bracketed under the rubric of an arbitrary relation between form 
and content – and an essentially deficient and confused content at that – I 
wonder why I would wish to say anything much at all.29 When it comes to 
classical and romantic materials, by contrast, what strikes me is the bal­
ance Hegel strikes between formalist analysis and interpretive critique: if 
Hegel’s understanding of art is premised on its material form – as some­
thing that makes something sensuously known – the frequent recourse 
25 See Hegel 1975, 703–708, esp. 708 (with discussion by e.g. Donohue 2005, 
66–68): leaning heavily on J.H. Meyer’s Geschichte der bildenden Künste in 
Griechenland (1824–1836) and its responses to Winckelmann, Hegel argues 
that, at the zenith of the classical (above all in the fifth century BC), sculptors 
abandoned the painting of statues. The argument does not stand: a key recent 
contribution came in Brinkmann and Wünsche 2004; compare also the essays 
in Panzanelli, Schmidt and Lapatin 2008.
26 Hegel 1975, 514; cf. e.g. ibid., 185, 682, 788. Perhaps inevitably, given the close 
associations he makes between the forms of classical sculpture and epic poetry, 
Hegel also takes a dim view of Virgil’s Aeneid (cf. ibid., 1073–1074).
27 The bibliography is now formidable: for a survey, cf. Squire 2012b. Suffice 
it to say that, at least in Britain and North America, Roman art has given rise 
to a far more exhilarating scholarly field than Greek art over the last thirty or 
so years. 
28 Cf. Davis’ chapter in this volume – with response in Kottman’s envoi.
29 Of course, Hegel did nonetheless insist upon the importance of studying 
such materials: cf. e.g. Hegel 1975, 1077 (in the context of studying ‘primitive’ 
poetry).
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to actual case studies plays out the point.30 To this I would add Hegel’s 
extraordinary sensitivity to the importance of media. Unlike so much 
contemporary art historical scholarship, Hegel’s account is premised on 
how different artistic media function differently, not least the distinction in 
viewer-object relations between sculpture and painting, or the significance 
of sculpted relief between a fully plastic medium and two­dimensional 
pictures (something further developed by Hildebrand and Riegl).31
For me, though, the chief methodological appeal of the Hegelian 
account lies in the associations Hegel draws between art and religion. 
Fundamental to this grand narrative is the premise that art has ‘above 
all to make the Divine the centre of its representation’:32 art, like religion 
and philosophy, is a practice through which historical transformations 
are realised and made intelligible; at the same time, art is ‘often the key, 
and in many nations the sole key, to understanding their philosophy 
and religion’.33
The point returns us squarely to current work in classical art history. 
In recent years, some of the most interesting research among classicist 
circles has developed a related line of critique and explanation. It is none­
theless fair to say, I think, that classicists have not yet reckoned with the 
Hegelian ancestry to their thinking. One might think here of the work of 
Jean­Pierre Vernant in the 1970s and 1980s, and above all what Vernant 
labelled ‘the birth of the image’ in Archaic and Classical Greece.34 More 
30 In the context of classical sculpture specifically (cf. especially Hegel 1975, 
701–796), much of Hegel’s knowledge is derived from the work of Winckelmann 
and his immediate successors. The sculptural case study to which Hegel most 
frequently turns is the statue housed in the Munich Glyptothek, portraying a 
‘faun’ holding the baby Dionysus (cf. ibid., 202, 453, 733, 801). It has often struck 
me as a strange exemplum – not least since this satyr (with his pointy ears) com­
bines the human with the animalesque, and in a way that speaks against Hegel’s 
comments on the truly classical forms of art and religion (cf. e.g. ibid., 452–453). 
31 On the relationship between free­standing and relief sculpture in Greek 
art, see Hegel 1975, esp. 765, 771. In relief, Hegel argues, ‘what conditions the 
work is the surface, so that the figures stand on one and the same plane, and 
the three­dimensional character, from which sculpture starts, begins more and 
more to disappear’ (771). The best recent discussion of Classical Greek relief 
sculpture is Neer 2010a, 182–213, esp. 183–184; cf. also Summers 2002. 
32 Hegel 1975, 175.
33 Hegel 1975, 7; cf. the discussion in this volume’s introduction, pp. 30–32, 34. 
34 See Vernant 1991, esp. 141–192 – with the insightful overview and critical 
response of Neer 2010b.
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recently, we could compare scholarship on what has come to be labelled 
the ‘ontology’ of ancient Greek and Roman imagery – constituting, in my 
opinion, some of the most exciting work within the discipline. Particularly 
relevant is the work of scholars like Jaś Elsner, Milette Gaifman and Verity 
Platt, concerned with how Greek and Roman art mediated, revealed and 
made known thinking about the divine.35 To be sure, these studies do 
not map in any straightforward way onto Hegel’s chronological account: 
I suspect that all three would shrink from Hegel’s essential talk of art as 
the ‘sensuous shining forth of the Idea’ [das sinnliche Scheinen der Idee]; 
likewise, as Gaifman and Platt in particular have argued, we can trace a 
‘spectrum of iconicity’ throughout the history of Greek art, with artists 
exploring different strategies of presenting and representing the gods.36 
Still, even if such scholars might puzzle over Hegel’s statement that ‘art 
in Greece has become the supreme expression of the Absolute’, they 
would likely have less difficulty with the statement that ‘Greek religion 
is the religion of art itself ’.37 Recent scholars, in short, share with Hegel 
an interest in the history of Greek and Roman art as a history of making 
known, through material form, what the gods are; a view, moreover, that 
35 E.g. Elsner 2007b, esp. 1–26 (revising Elsner 2000); Gaifman 2006, 2012 and 
2017; and Platt 2011 and 2016a; numerous other studies could be compared, inter 
alios Gladigow, 1985–1986; Versnel 1987; Steiner 2001, 79–134; Tanner 2006, 
esp. 40–55, 67–96; Osborne 2011: 185–215; Mylonopoulos 2010; Kristensen 2013. 
For a review of other relevant work, cf. Squire 2009, 113–116, along with Squire 
2011, 154–201 (with further bibliography at 222–228). An important reference­
point here is Richard Gordon’s article on ‘production and religion in the 
Graeco­Roman world’, which has striking resonances with Hegel’s arguments 
(Gordon 1979): for ancient viewers, Gordon suggests, images could be gods, and 
gods could be images; the visual sphere conflated any straightforward distinc­
tion between prototype and representation – between ‘reality’ and ‘imagination’. 
36 For the phrase, see Gaifman 2012, 13 (arguing that ‘anthropomorphism and 
the predominance of figural renditions of gods in Greek art are insufficient 
reason to assume a uniform and consistent perception of Greek gods’: ‘the hu­
man figure as a means by which to visualize the divine was predominant, but 
not exclusive’, 12); cf. Platt 2011, esp. 24–25. Hegel himself has interesting things 
to say about many of the representative strategies that have interested modern 
scholars – among them, animalesque appearances (e.g. Hegel 1975, 444–445), 
‘semi­iconic’ herms (e.g. ibid., 641) and aniconic forms (e.g. ibid., 456).
37 Hegel 1975, 438. Compare e.g. Platt 2011, 48: ‘The reciprocal relationship 
between images and epiphanies thus provided an essential binding element 
within the representational system of Greek religion.’
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the history of Greek and Roman religion is inseparable from the presen­
tations and representations of Graeco­Roman art (the idea expressed in 
the Hegelian formulation of Greek Kunstreligion).38 
I I .
So much for the pull. But what of the resistance?
We might begin with some general preliminary quandaries. Hegel’s 
account certainly provides a revealing lens for approaching the alleged 
‘crisis’ of visual modernism, especially in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries (in the context of our present volume, one need only 
look to T.J. Clark’s chapter). But even here I have some questions about 
what gets omitted: how, for example, should one reconcile Hegel’s ac­
count with what has been termed the ‘iconic’ or ‘pictorial turn’ of the later 
twentieth century?39 Then there is the recurring presence of artistic media 
that should, according to Hegel, be behind us: what, for example, do we 
do with the history of sculpture?40 How do modernist sculptors fit into a 
Hegelian account of the ‘romantic’? For that matter, where exactly should 
sculpture lie within an account of ‘after the beautiful’ – a condition, ac­
cording to Hegel, where ‘sculpture is insufficient for giving actuality to 
38 Cf. e.g. Gaifman 2015 and Platt 2015; one might note, however, that Hegel 
does not appear in this Oxford Handbook of Ancient Greek Religion. Hegel dis­
cusses Greek ‘Kunstreligion’ at numerous points in his Lectures on Aesthetics, 
and of course elsewhere: cf. e.g. Hegel 1975, 102 (‘in the case of the Greeks, art 
was the highest form in which the people represented the gods to themselves 
and gave themselves some awareness of truth’), 718–719. 
39 On the ‘pictorial turn’, see Mitchell 1994, 11–34, along with e.g. 106 discussing 
‘the increasing mediatization of reality in postmodernism’; cf. Mitchell 2002, 
240–241; compare also Boehm 1995, 13, on the ‘iconic turn’. In this connection, 
I also wonder about the various ‘material turns’ that have come to play such an 
important role in the arts and humanities over the last decade, especially over 
the last fifteen years (cf. inter alios Mersch 2002, Gumbrecht 2004, Seel 2005, 
Bennett and Joyce 2010, Schubert 2010, esp. 1–2; compare also Platt 2016b, in 
the context of classical art history): if these developments suggest that art and 
aesthetics have moved beyond the Hegelian ‘end of art’, do they not suggest a 
retrospective step backwards within Hegel’s teleology? 
40 In that connection, I am often struck by just how little Hegel has to say 
about sculpture after ancient Greece: cf. Hegel 1975, 779, 788–791 (with brief 
mention of Michelangelo at 790). 
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this material, so that other arts had to appear in order to realize what 
sculpture is never able to achieve’?41 As someone interested in the long 
classical tradition – not least the self­conscious neoclassicism that Hegel 
at times touches upon in the Lectures – I especially wonder what one 
makes of knowing engagements with Greek art, and across the longue 
durée of western art history: the recourse to classical sculpture not just as 
something ‘past’, but also something ‘present’, refashionable, and made 
new (‘liquid antiquity’, as a recent exhibition in Athens nicely labels it).42
I guess all my questions here really have to do with the teleological 
linearity of Hegel’s account, both with a view to the grand sweep of world 
history, and with respect to the particular genres of art that Hegel surveys 
in the second part of his Lectures. What so interests me about Graeco­
Roman traditions of image­making, for example, is their susceptibility to 
multiple sorts of historical contextualisation.43 Hegel of course emphasises 
the figurative and the naturalistic forms of sculpture. But other stories 
might equally be told. Although Hegel downplays the history of Greek 
and Roman painting (explicitly declaring classical painting ‘backward’ in 
comparison with contemporary sculpture),44 for instance, it might be pos­
41 Hegel 1975, 791; cf. Torsen’s chapter in this volume. One might note the 
complete absence of modern sculpture in Pippin 2014.
42 See Holmes and Marta 2017. For some relevant comments here, see Hegel 
1975, 264: ‘Now to whatever age a work of art belongs, it always carries details 
in itself which separate it from the characteristics proper to other peoples and 
other centuries. Poets, painters, sculptors, composers choose materials above 
all from past times whose civilization, morals, usages, constitution, and religion 
are different from the whole civilization contemporary with themselves. Such 
a step backward into the past has … the great advantage that this departure 
from the present and its immediacy brings about automatically, owing to our 
memory, that generalization of material with which art cannot dispense.’
43 For an example of what I mean here, see Platt and Squire 2017, esp. 59–74: 
the sort of ‘self­awareness’ that Stoichita 1993 associated with the Renaissance 
is not an exclusively ‘early modern’ phenomenon, but can already be witnessed 
in ancient art – indeed, it stretches right back to the beginnings of Greek figu­
rative traditions.
44 Cf. Hegel 1975, 799–800: ‘however excellent even these original [Greek] paint­
ings may have been, we still have to say that, compared with the unsurpassable 
beauty of their sculptures, the Greeks and Romans could not bring painting 
to the degree of proper development which was achieved in the Christian 
Middle Ages and then especially in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
This backwardness of painting in comparison with sculpture in antiquity is 
quite naturally to be expected, because the inmost heart of the Greek outlook 
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sible to spin a narrative of that history in proto­modernist terms: without 
going into technicalities like the history of the ‘Four Styles’ of Pompeian 
wall­painting, one might think of anecdotes like the one preserved by 
Pliny, concerning the ‘line­painting’ drawn by Apelles and Protogenes 
– an absolutum opus, in Pliny’s words, ‘containing nothing on its vast 
surface’ except three ‘almost invisible lines’ of supreme artistic mastery.45 
My point is not that ancient vignettes like this – which might have us 
reaching for Clement Greenberg and his comments on modernism’s 
emphasis on painterly facture, abstraction and two­dimensionality46 – 
need necessarily compromise Hegel’s linear, big­picture account: after all, 
it would be possible to complicate and extend Hegelian categories while 
leaving intact the general framework of his progressivist teleology. Rather, 
I worry about why a Hegelian history of the classical must be so selective, 
predicated as it is on the need to explain the ‘romantic’. At the very least, 
we must reckon with the manipulations and omissions – whether to ac­
commodate them within the linear thrust of the Hegelian account, or else 
to reconfigure that linear history as something more circular and cyclical. 
But what troubles me most about Hegel’s history of art – as indeed 
his definition of art in the first place – is its theological conditioning. 
Unlike so much art history, as we have said, Hegel gives religion a pivotal 
role: for Hegel, the history of art goes hand in hand with the history 
of religion, revealing through sensuous form the movement of spirit 
which religion makes intelligible through beliefs. In the first part of this 
chapter, I declared that such intertwined thinking about art and religion 
was Hegel’s foremost contribution, and I stick by that assessment. In 
contrast, so much contemporary art history conspicuously downplays 
issues of religion and ‘visual theology’:47 look up ‘God’ in the index to 
the best­selling Chicago graduate handbook on The Critical Terms for 
Art History, for example, and you will find just three references – in an 
entry that ultimately brackets ‘God’ as ‘phallocentric master signifier’.48 
corresponds, more than in the case with any other art, precisely with the prin­
ciple of what sculpture, and sculpture alone, can achieve’ (800).
45 Pliny, Natural History 35.81–83 (spatiose nihil aliud continentem quam lineas 
uisum effugientes); for discussion and further bibliography, see Squire 2015, 
183–184.
46 Greenberg 1940; on the programmatic ‘materialist’ importance of the anec­
dote for approaching ancient aesthetics, cf. Porter 2010, 11–13.
47 For the term, see the introduction to this volume, esp. p. 24, n. 2.
48 Nelson and Shiff 2003, 502. 
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My reservation, then, is not that Hegel puts issues of religion at the 
forefront of his art historical enquiry. Rather, my unease concerns the 
way that Hegel constructs a universal history of art around his own local 
theological position;49 indeed, how he defines the very essence of ‘religion’ 
within a peculiarly (and peculiarly post­Lutheran!) Christian conceptual 
framework.50 
Intrinsic to this history is the Hegelian premise that the culmination 
of both art and religion lies not just in Christianity, but specifically in the 
Christianity of the Protestant Reformation.51 For Hegel, the Reformation 
transformed Christianity from the Roman Catholic institutionalised reli­
gion of exterior ritual into an introspective, subjective faith. The thinking 
comes to the fore in the introduction to the Lectures, in Hegel’s famous 
discussion of the ‘pastness’ of art.52 Still more explicit is the following 
49 For Hegel, of course, the history of religion is ‘analogous’ to that of art, and 
likewise undergoes a three­part development (Hegel 1975, 83): ‘First, earthly 
natural life in its finitude confronts us on one side; but then, secondly, our 
consciousness makes God its object wherein the different of objectivity and 
subjectivity falls away, until thirdly, and lastly, we advance from God as such 
to worship by the community, i.e. to God as living and present in subjective 
consciousness. These three fundamental differences arise also in the world of 
art in independent development’. 
50 On the restrictive (and themselves theologically coloured) conceptual 
frameworks that ‘religion’ implies, cf. e.g. Bergrunder 2012, with further bib­
liographic review.
51 On the centrality of the Reformation to Hegel’s teleology, see in particular 
Eberling 1974, esp. 15–18; Reardon 1977, 58–76, esp. 74–76; and Houlgate 1997, 
especially 5–15. Hegel studied theology at the Protestant Seminary at Tübingen 
University between 1788 and 1793: on the formative influence of this period, see 
Harris 1972, 57–153, Dickey 1987, 157–179 and Pinkard 2000, 19–44. As Pinkard 
2000, 1–3 stresses, Hegel was born in Württemberg at a time of renewed an­
tagonism between Catholic and Protestant traditions (following the succession 
of the Catholic Duke Karl Eugen), and to a family who defined themselves by 
their Protestant ancestry: the key analysis of the ‘Protestant culture of “Old­
Württemberg”’ (ix), and of ‘Hegel in a Protestant cultural context’ (1–32) is 
Dickey 1987 – focused around his early political writings.
52 Hegel 1975, 8–12 (cf. the introduction to this volume, pp. 34, 38–43): ‘The 
peculiar nature of artistic production and of works of art no longer fills our 
highest need. We have got beyond venerating works of art as divine and wor­
shipping them. The impression they make is of a more reflective kind, and what 
they arouse in us needs a higher touchstone and a different test. Thought and 
reflection have spread their wings above fine art’ (10).
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passage, from Hegel’s introduction to the first part of his Lectures and 
discussing ‘die Idee des Kunstschönen oder das Ideal ’:53
but when the urge for knowledge and research, and the need for 
inner spirituality, instigated the Reformation, religious ideas were 
drawn away from their wrapping in the element of sense and brought 
back to the inwardness of heart and thinking. Thus the ‘after’ of art 
consists in the fact that there dwells in the spirit the need to satisfy 
itself solely in its own inner self as the true form for truth to take. 
Art in its beginnings still leaves over something mysterious, a secret 
foreboding and a longing, because its creations have not completely 
set forth their full content for imaginative vision. But if the perfect 
content has been perfectly revealed in artistic shapes, then the more 
far­seeking spirit rejects this objective manifestation and turns back 
into its inner self. This is the case in our own time. We may well 
hope that art will always rise higher and come to perfection, but the 
form of art has ceased to be the supreme need of the spirit. No matter 
how excellent we find the statues of the Greek gods, no matter how 
we see God the Father, Christ, and Mary so estimably and perfectly 
portrayed: it is no help; we bow the knee no longer [unser Knie beugen 
wir doch nicht mehr].
The very history of art that Hegel forges – premised on the relationship 
between the form and content of art – serves as a way of retrospectively 
making sense of this development. It is the Reformation that delivered 
the divisive blow to artistic beauty (first in the field of the visual arts, but 
then when it comes to music and poetry too): the Reformation freed art 
from religion, at once allowing art to traverse a new secular path, while 
also discrediting its function as art.54 
53 Hegel 1975, 103.
54 As Houlgate 1997, 9, paraphrases, ‘What is distinctive about Protestantism 
is not that it shuns all aesthetic expression as such, but rather that it frees art 
from dominance by religion and so allows it to become fully secular’. And yet 
romantic art cannot satisfy in the ways that classical art had earlier done: cf. 
e.g. Hegel 1975, 517–527 (romantic art ‘as art is not the didactic revelation which 
produces the content of truth for contemplation simply and solely in the form of 
art; on the contrary, the content of romantic art is already present explicitly to 
mind and feeling outside the sphere of art … Therewith externality is regarded 
as an indifferent element in which spirit has no final trust or persistence’, 526). 
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As Joseph Koerner has argued in his seminal 2004 book, The 
Reformation of the Image, Hegel was one of the first philosophers to see 
the Reformation as a pivotal turning­point – not only in the history of 
western thought, but also in the history of art and aesthetics.55 In Hegel’s 
terms, the Reformation changes forever our engagements with the mate­
rial realm. With his emphasis on ‘faith alone’ (sola fides), Martin Luther 
overturned the Roman Catholic equation of the material and the spiritual. 
‘To the Lutherans’, as Hegel explains in his Philosophy of History, ‘truth 
is not a manufactured object’;56 in Koerner’s provocative paraphrase, 
‘Luther proclaims that faith can only be a commitment to the represen­
tation of truth, rather than to the truth embedded in a representation’.57 
Where mediaeval Catholicism left Christians hungry – claiming through 
the Eucharist to present the actual body of Christ, as sensuous matter 
separate from the intellect, and thus destined (in Hegel’s terms) ever to 
‘melt away in the mouth’58 – the Reformation is said to have made known 
the truth of the Spirit’s concealment, thereby fulfilling Christianity’s 
spiritual promise.59 
As Koerner intimates, Hegel’s approach to the ontology of the artwork 
closely echoes the theological defence that Luther himself devised to 
justify visual imagery. In particular, Hegel’s framework of theorising art in 
terms of ‘form’ and ‘content’ – that is, as inner meaning configured in an 
55 Koerner 2004, esp. 33–37. Aspects of Koerner’s argument are foreshadowed 
in Koerner 1993, 363–410 and 2002. Cf. e.g. Cottin 1994, 259–311, on the ‘anti­
aesthetic’ brought about by the Reformation, contrasting Lutheran and Calvin­
ist traditions. 
56 Hegel 1956, 414.
57 Koerner 2004, 206. In this way, Koerner 2004, 39 posits, ‘the Reformation 
reshaped what the visual image is’. On Lutheran attitudes towards images and 
representation, cf. Squire 2009, 8–11, 15–43 (with summary at 42–43, and further 
bibliography at 24–25, n. 38). Numerous other recent analyses might be cited 
here: particularly exhilarating, in my view, are Heuer 2015 and the essays in 
Heal and Koerner 2017. 
58 On the Eucharist, see Hegel 1975, 324–325; cf. Hegel 1948, 252–253, with 
discussion in Besançon 2000, 217. 
59 Arthur Danto anticipated the point when reviewing Koerner 2004 in The 
Nation on 7 March 2005 – namely, that Hegelian aesthetics are themselves 
formulated within the framework of Lutheran theology: ‘Reading Koerner’s 
singular and compelling analyses, I felt that I could catch something of the 
atmosphere that Hegel must have breathed, sitting in the Lutheran church 
interiors of his native Saxony two and a half centuries later.’
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external sensuous appearance60 – aligns with a Lutheran understanding 
of the image as an outward vehicle for an invisible kernel of meaning: an 
external ‘wrapping’ that ultimately gives way to something interior, spiri­
tual and subjective.61 For Luther (as opposed to numerous other religious 
reformers), this approach proved decisive to a theological justification of 
images, not least in his 1525 tract Against the Heavenly Prophets.62 
It is this relationship between phenomenal outer form and inner con­
tent or meaning – whereby the ‘content of art is the Idea, while its form 
is the configuration of sensuous material’63 – that provides Hegel with 
his triadic system for approaching the history of art. Most significantly, 
the thinking gives rise to Hegel’s delineation of symbolic, classical and 
romantic Kunstformen:64 
Symbolic art seeks that perfect unity of inner meaning and external 
shape which classical art finds in the presentation of substantial 
individuality to sensuous contemplation, and which romantic art 
transcends in its superior spirituality. 
60 For the division between ‘the content, the thing’ [der Inhalt, die Sache] on 
the one hand, and the ‘manner and mode of presentation’ [die Art und Weise 
der Darstellung] on the other, see e.g. Hegel 1975, 17–19 (discussing the work of 
A.L. Hirt and J.H. Meyer). ‘In a work of art we begin with what is immediately 
presented to us and only then ask what its meaning or content is’, Hegel 1975, 
20, concludes. ‘The former, the external appearance, has no immediate value 
for us; we assume behind it something inward, a meaning whereby the exter­
nal appearance is endowed with spirit. It is to this, its soul, that the external 
points … [The work of art] should disclose an inner life, feeling, soul, a content 
and spirit, which is just what we call the significance of a work of art.’
61 On the resulting ‘linguistification’ of the image in Lutheran art, cf. Koerner 
2004, 151–152; on the underlying premise of sola fides, cf. ibid., 38–51. ‘The dras­
tically formulaic character of painting as painting’, Koerner 2004, 235, concludes, 
‘suits a religion where the real truth, by definition, lies not in faithfulness to a 
world but in faith in words.’ For the abiding influence of Lutheran views here, 
cf. Belting 1998, esp. 1–32, discussing not only how, in the wake of the Reforma­
tion, images were deemed ‘a threat to Christian values’ in Northern Germany, 
but also how ‘the painted image had to be censored, justified and ultimately 
dominated through theoretical discourse’. 
62 For discussion, see especially Koerner 2004, 159–164; cf. e.g. Michalski 1993, 
1–42.
63 Hegel 1975, 70.
64 Hegel 1975, 302; cf. e.g. ibid., 613. On Hegel’s tripartite system of Kunstformen, 
see also the introduction to this volume, pp. 34–42.
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In the first, or ‘symbolic’, stage, associated with the ‘oriental’ east, there 
is wholly arbitrary relationship between external expression and inter­
nal content: ‘the character of the symbolic consists precisely in the ever 
purely imperfect unification of the soul of meaning with its corporeal 
shape’.65 Classical art reconfigures that relationship, so that the divine is 
now embodied through the image of the idealised, human body (hence 
Hegel’s definition of the classical as ‘a unification of the content with its 
entirely adequate shape’);66 indeed, it is precisely this ‘entirely harmonious 
unity of content and form’67 that lends classical art its supremacy as art.68 
The third, romantic, form of art, by contrast, made known that the very 
spiritedness of such idealisation is beyond sensuous formal expression, 
leading to a ‘beauty of inwardness’ [Schönheit der Innigkeit]69 – a transcen­
65 Hegel 1975, 426. Cf. e.g. ibid., 439: ‘symbolic art tosses about in a thousand 
forms without being able to hit upon the plainly adequate one; with an imagina­
tion that runs riot without proportion and definition, it gropes around in order 
to adapt to the meaning sought the shapes that ever remain alien’.
66 Hegel 1975, 427. Cf. e.g. ibid., 482: ‘by being beauty in classical art, the 
inherently determinate divine character appears not only spiritually but also 
externally in its bodily form, i.e. in a shape visible to the eyes as well as to the 
spirit’. On the importance of the human bodily form here, see e.g. ibid., 433 
(‘This shape is essentially the human form because the external human form is 
alone capable of revealing the spiritual in a sensuous way’), with Peters’ chapter 
in this volume.
67 Hegel 1975, 301. Cf. ibid., 9: ‘Only one sphere and stage of truth is capable 
of being represented in the element of art. In order to be a genuine content for 
art, such truth must in virtue of its own specific character be able to go forth 
into [the sphere of] sense and remain adequate to itself there. This is the case, 
for example, with the gods of Greece …’.
68 Hegel 1975, 79: ‘The classical form of art has attained the pinnacle of what 
illustration by art could achieve, and if there is something defective in it, the 
defect is just art itself and the restrictedness of the sphere of art’. Numerous 
other soundbites could be cited: e.g. ibid., 436: ‘As regards the actualization of 
classical art in history, it is scarcely necessary to remark that we have to look 
for it in the Greeks. Classical beauty with its infinite range of content, material, 
and form is the gift vouchsafed to the Greek people, and we must honour this 
people for having produced art in its supreme vitality’; cf. ibid., 719–720.
69 For a clear articulation of the thinking, cf. Hegel 1975, 518: ‘This spiritual 
elevation is the fundamental principle of romantic art. Bound up with it at once 
is the essential point that at this final stage of art the beauty of the classical 
ideal, and therefore beauty in its very own shape and its most adequate content, 
is no longer the ultimate thing. For at the stage of romantic art the spirit knows 
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dence of content over form that itself follows in the model of Christ’s own 
Passion, Resurrection and Ascension.70 The ensuing transformation is at 
once religious and artistic:71
Abandoning this [classical] principle, the romantic form of art can­
cels the undivided unity of classical art because it has won a content 
which goes beyond and above the classical form of art and its mode 
of expression. This content – to recall familiar ideas – coincides with 
what Christianity asserts of God as a spirit, in distinction from the 
Greek religion which is the essential and most appropriate content 
for classical art … Now if in this way what was implicit at the previ­
ous stage, the unity of divine and human nature, is raised from an 
immediate to a known unity, the true element for the realization of 
this content is no longer the sensuous immediate existence of the 
spiritual in the bodily form of man, but instead the inwardness of 
self-consciousness. Now Christianity brings God before our imagina­
tion as spirit, not as an individual, particular spirit, but as absolute 
in spirit and in truth. For this reason it retreats from the sensuous­
ness of imagination into spiritual inwardness and makes this, and 
not the body, the medium and existence of truth’s content … In this 
that its truth does not consist in its immersion in corporeality; on the contrary, 
it only becomes sure of its truth by withdrawing from the external into its own 
intimacy with itself and positing external reality as an existence inadequate to 
itself. Even if, therefore, this new content too comprises in itself the task of 
making itself beautiful, still beauty in the sense hitherto expounded remains for 
it something subordinate, and beauty becomes the spiritual beauty of the ab­
solute inner life as inherently infinite spiritual subjectivity’. On Hegelian ideas 
about the Schönheit der Innigkeit, see especially Pippin’s chapter in this volume.
70 Cf. Hegel 1975, 505–506: ‘The Divine, God himself, has become flesh, was 
born, lived, suffered, died, and is risen. This is material which art did not 
invent; it was present outside art; consequently, art did not derive it from its 
own resources but found it ready for configuration’ (505). For the fundamental 
remove of romantic art and religion from the classical, cf. ibid., 72: ‘The Greek 
god is not abstract but individual, closely related to the natural [human] form. 
The Christian God too is indeed a concrete personality, but is pure spirituality 
and is to be known as spirit and in spirit. His medium of existence is therefore 
essentially inner knowledge and not the external natural form through which 
he can be represented only imperfectly and not in the whole profundity of his 
nature.’
71 Hegel 1975, 79–80.
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way romantic art is the self­transcendence of art but within its own 
sphere and in the form of art itself.
What matters in post­Reformation romantic art, it follows, is ‘the inner 
conviction, feeling, and conception of this eternal truth’ that exists inde­
pendently of artistic form – in short, the ‘faith which bears witness to itself 
of the absolute truth and thereby imparts it to the inner life of mind’.72 It 
is in this connection that Hegel diagnoses the ‘pastness’ of art – its loss 
of genuine truth: ‘transferred into our ideas instead of maintaining its 
earlier necessity in reality and occupying its higher place’, art ‘considered 
in its highest vocation, is and remains for us a thing of the past’.73 ‘We 
have got beyond venerating works of art as divine and worshipping them’, 
as he puts it: ‘the impression they make is of a more reflective kind’.74
As someone whose day­job is centred around the historiography of 
Greek and Roman art, one of the things that interests me about this ac­
count is the way in which it constructs the classical as at once the supreme 
form of art, while also an ancestral antitype to the modern. The artistic 
ideals of pagan antiquity are forever lost to us, Hegel implies, and yet 
they amount to everything that Protestantism has forbidden, denied and 
72 Hegel 1975, 535. ‘A developed faith’, Hegel continues, ‘consists in the im­
mediate conviction that the conception of the factors in this history suffices to 
bring truth before consciousness’. ‘But if it is a matter of the consciousness of 
truth, then the beauty of the appearance, and the representation, is an accessory 
and rather indifferent, for the truth is present for consciousness independently 
of art.’
73 Hegel 1975, 11. Art, Hegel explains, has lost its higher vocation as art, merging 
into philosophy – that is, ‘for knowing philosophically what art is’. Art may no 
longer satisfy as it did in the past. Yet it lends itself to intellectualisation, and 
precisely with regards to the relationship between form and content: ‘What is 
now aroused in us by works of art is not just immediate enjoyment but our 
judgement also, since we subject to our intellectual consideration (i) the content 
of art, and (ii) the work of art’s means of presentation, and the appropriateness 
or inappropriateness of both to one another.’ One might add that such philo­
sophical interrogation forms precisely the subject of the Lectures on Aesthetics 
themselves (cf. Hegel 1975, 1236–1237: ‘Now at the end we have arranged every 
essential category of the beautiful and every essential form of art into a philo­
sophical garland, and weaving it is one of the worthiest tasks that philosophy 
is capable of completing’, 1236). On the Hegelian relationship between art and 
philosophy, cf. Gardner’s chapter in this volume.
74 Hegel 1975, 10. 
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negated. It was E.M. Butler, in her 1935 study of The Tyranny of Greece over 
Germany, who declared that the Hellenophilia of the German Enlighten­
ment lay in the promise of Greek art supplying artists, poets and critics 
with the ‘absolute beauty’ of which Luther had deprived them.75 What 
we find in Hegel, I think, is a system of charting the history of art that 
duly recognises the point – and formalises it in a narrative of progress. In 
essence, Hegel’s triadic system for charting the history of art boils down 
to the history of the pre­Greek, Greek and post­Greek. ‘Classical beauty’, 
at least for Hegel, ‘has for its inner being the free independent meaning, 
i.e. not a meaning of this or that but what means [das Bedeutende] itself 
and therefore intimates [Deutende]’:76 the classical is thus defined around 
the very conciliation of form and meaning that romantic art transcends;77 
by extension, the symbolic is duly constructed as a way of explaining the 
origins, emergence and supreme perfection of the classical.78
One might venture still further. If the Lectures on Aesthetics view the 
classical as embodying the absolute beauty that Protestantism dispensed 
with, they thereby also create a category of supreme beauty based on 
actual objects (as opposed to the subjective experience advocated by 
Kant, centred around the beauties of nature). The classical – and Greek 
sculpture in particular – comprises an ideal of beauty that is denied to 
the romantic. And yet those forms can still be seen, witnessed and expe­
rienced – they are material and present, even if philosophically surpassed 
by the spiritual beauties of Protestantism. 
75 Butler 1935, esp. 4–5. Cf. Mattick 1993, 3, on how ‘the discovery of modern 
aestheticians of the beginning of their discipline in the mid-1700s … is almost 
invariably accompanied by the identification of an earlier origin in classical 
Greece’. 
76 Hegel 1975, 427. Cf. e.g. ibid., 517: ‘the perfection of art reached its peak here 
precisely because the spiritual was completely drawn through its external ap­
pearance; in this beautiful unification it idealized the natural and made it into 
an adequate embodiment of spirit’s own substantial individuality. Therefore 
classical art became a conceptually adequate representation of the Ideal, the 
consummation of the realm of beauty. Nothing can be or become more beautiful.’
77 Cf. e.g. Hegel 1975, 309: in classical art ‘the significance, the meaning, is 
no other than that which actually lies in the external shape, since both sides 
correspond perfectly’.
78 Hence the recurrent emphasis that the classical is itself the result of the 
symbolic, developing out of that earlier prehistory (e.g. Hegel 1975, 441–442); 
indeed, the classical ‘has the multiple intermediate and transitional stages of 
the symbolic as its presupposition’ (ibid., 317).
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Where, then, does my difficulty lie? My unease lies in the assumed 
telos that gives Hegel his starting­point – the way in which the Lectures 
end up devising a system for theorising art around a particular theological 
problem. The whole approach for making sense of art in the Lectures is 
predicated not just on a discrediting of matter, but on the problematic of 
relating artistic form to content. To put the point another way, we might 
say that Hegel’s retrospective examination of what art was amounts to an 
attempt to explain his own theological difficulties with coming to terms 
with what post­Reformation art is (or rather, is said to be): ultimately, 
everything rests on his position that ‘the Divine, explicitly regarded as 
unity and universality, is essentially only present to thinking and, as 
in itself imageless, is not susceptible of being imaged and shaped by 
imagination’.79 
For Hegel, of course, religion is one of the ways – like philosophy 
and art themselves – in which spirit makes itself known, in the form of 
the figurative images of belief (rather than in the form of philosophical 
concepts or sensuous artistic matter). And Hegel has a lot of very specific 
things to say elsewhere about Christianity, Luther and Protestantism: 
there is a familiar joke among Hegelians that Hegel is a member of a 
Christian sect of which he is the sole member. My point, though, is that 
Hegel’s thinking about the pastness of art is staked on theological ideas 
that it attempts teleologically to explain: the Lectures amount to a retro­
spective attempt to explain the rise of a specific, theologically coloured 
understanding of the world, of salvation through inner faith, of subjec­
tivity removed from matter. Hegel recognises the particular Protestant 
flavour of his thinking. But he insists that alternative ‘world-views’ are 
inherently either ‘past’ or else less ‘developed’ than his own. There can 
be no way ‘back’:80 
It is therefore no help to him [the artist] to adopt again, as that 
substance, so to say, past world­views, i.e. to propose to root himself 
firmly in one of these ways of looking at things, e.g. to turn Roman 
Catholic as in recent times many have done for art’s sake in order to 
give stability to their mind and to give the character of something 
absolute to the specifically limited character of their artistic product 
in itself.
79 Hegel 1975, 175.
80 Hegel 1975, 606.
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According to Hegel, our modern condition has emptied the material realm 
of its truth or persuasiveness. Whether ‘we nowadays propose to make 
the subject of a statue or a painting a Greek god, or, Protestants as we 
are today, the Virgin Mary’, the venture is futile: ‘we are not seriously in 
earnest with this material’.81
Does this theological conditioning matter? Or rather is it possible to 
subscribe to Hegel’s account while holding at arm’s length the theology 
that underpins it – as has been argued, for example, of Hegel’s cultural 
prejudices, Eurocentric chauvinism and Prussian triumphalism?82 Here 
I think we get to the nub of German Idealism: namely, the envisaging of 
history as the forward­marching movement of Spirit, which itself under­
pins the teleological drive of the Hegelian system. One might argue that 
the spiritual advance that Protestantism makes known finds other sorts 
of expression (so as thereby to corroborate, as it were, the turn to the 
inner self ): notice in the long passage cited above (p. 140), for example, 
how Hegel frames the Reformation not only in terms of the ‘need for 
inner spirituality’, but also ‘the urge for knowledge and research’ – the 
birth of the new sciences, new forms of rational criteria for judgments, a 
new social and ethical world, the rise of the modern subject, etc.83 Still, if 
we are to operate within the system of Hegelian teleology, it is simply not 
possible to opt out of his particular view of theological progress, with all 
its beliefs about the higher truth of Protestant spirituality. 
It follows, I think, that the force of Hegel’s narrative of art past, pres­
ent and future ultimately depends upon subscribing to a set of theologi­
cal tenets – upon belonging to that all­important ‘we’ of Hegel’s early 
nineteenth­century, Prussian Protestant community. Likewise, Hegel’s 
very understanding of what art is – as something communicative, das 
sinnliche Scheinen der Idee – is premised on a theology that privileges the 
conceptual, speculative and immaterial: once again, if one operates with 
the teleology of Hegelian Idealism, the retrospective account of what art 
was depends upon a particular categorical reification of what art is. 
81 Hegel 1975, 603–604.
82 Cf. the introduction to this volume, pp. 45–50.
83 Cf. e.g. § 802–803 of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, with Kalkavage 2007, 
441–442. The classic sociological interpretation of the Reformation is Weber 
1985 (deeply influenced, of course, by Hegelian views). On the influence of 
humanistic thought on the theology of the Reformation, cf. e.g. McGrath 2004, 
esp. 34–66.
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In this connection, it is important to note that Hegel’s narrative 
entails not only a history about the ‘forms’ of art (the symbolic, classical 
and romantic), but also a hierarchy about different ‘kinds’ of art (architec­
ture, sculpture, painting, music and the different strands of poetry). For 
Hegel, the Lutheran commitment to the subjective ‘inner life’ removed 
from material trappings translates into a commitment to poetry as the 
most developed stage of art,84 a belief, as Luther famously put it, that 
‘Christendom will not be known by sight, but by faith, and faith has to 
do with things not seen’.85 That hierarchy matters, once again, precisely 
because of the ideology that underpins it.86 Re­reading the Lectures after 
a related project on Lessing’s Laocoon, that foundational 1766 treatise 
on the ‘limits of painting and poetry’,87 I was struck by just how much 
84 In the ‘cerebral, learned sort of religion’ of the Reformers, as Carlos Eire 
puts it, there was a profound shift ‘from the visual to the verbal as a means of 
communication’: the word of God alone was allowed to ‘stand as an image of the 
invisible reality of the spiritual dimension’ (Eire 1986, 315–16); cf. e.g. Belting 
1994, 465, on the Protestant task of rediscovering ‘the primal sound of the word, 
free of all the dross and errors of papism, and to teach it to the congregation’.
85 For Luther’s comments here (on Hebrews 11:1), see Koerner 2004, 201–211, 
esp. 210. One might compare Luther’s famous declaration that ‘Christ’s king­
dom is a hearing kingdom, not a seeing kingdom; for the eyes do not lead and 
guide us to where we know and find Christ, but rather the ears do this’ (quoted 
in Koerner 2004, 41). Zwingli would express the sentiment more vehemently (cf. 
Thiessen 2005, 136): ‘Now let someone show us where [the saints] have painted 
or copied this faith. We cannot show it save in their hearts. Therefore it must 
follow that we also must learn that faith is necessary in our hearts if we want 
to do anything pleasing to God. This we cannot learn from walls but only from 
the gracious pulling of God out of his own word.’ 
86 For the ‘ideological’ underpinnings of every attempt to distinguish between 
‘words’ and ‘image’ see Mitchell 1986, on the ‘dialectical struggle in which the 
opposed terms take on different ideological roles and relationships at different 
moments in history’ (98); cf. Mitchell 1994, 5 (‘There are no “purely” visual or 
verbal arts, though the impulse to purify media is one of the central utopian 
gestures of modernism’); Mitchell 2003. 
87 The handiest German edition of Lessing’s essay, first published in 1766, 
is Lessing 2012; for an English translation, see Lessing 1984. Hegel’s longest 
discussion of the Laocoon statue­group comes at Hegel 1975, 769 (cf. Rush, this 
volume, p. 168): Hegel comments on German discussions of the group over the 
last ‘forty or fifty’ years, mentioning Winckelmann (but not Lessing) explicitly; 
Hegel was likewise the first to situate the statue within the later history of 
Greek art – arguing that ‘the step from the innocence and greatness of art to 
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Hegel owes to the Protestant hue of Lessing’s ‘limits’ – not only Lessing’s 
championing of poetry over painting,88 but also his deeply logocentric 
understanding of both arts as signs that appeal to the imagination, to 
Vorstellung.89 Like Lessing, Hegel argues for the supreme advancement 
of poetry over other kinds of art, because poetry does not set before our 
eyes the thing itself in an external trapping, ‘but gives us on the contrary 
an inner vision and feeling of it’.90 It follows, at least for Hegel, that:91 
The power of poetry’s way of putting things consists therefore in 
the fact that poetry gives shape to a subject­matter within, with­
out proceeding to express it in actual visible shapes or in series of 
melodies; poetry thereby makes the external object produced by the 
other arts into an internal one which the spirit itself externalizes for 
the imagination in the form that this internal object and is to keep 
within the spirit.
mannerism has here already been taken’. While the Lectures on Aesthetics are 
concerned with the divergent resources of different visual media, complicating 
the Laocoon’s grouping of sculpture and painting together, Lessing’s arguments 
about the spatial bodies of images and the temporal actions of poetry prove 
foundational to his argument (cf. e.g. Hegel 1975, 702–704, 854–855, 981–982, 
959–960); indeed, Hegel’s essential qualification of Lessing’s argument lies in 
the understanding that, while sculpture and painting are both ‘spatial’ (cf. e.g. 
ibid., 913), painting reduces the ‘spatial dimensions of sculpture to a flat surface’ 
(ibid., 890).
88 See e.g. Gombrich 1957, 140: ‘It has often been said that Lessing did not 
know much about art. I am afraid the truth may be even more embarrassing 
to an historian of art …: he had not much use for art … The more one reads 
Laokoon, the stronger becomes the impression that it was not so much a book 
about as against the visual arts’; cf. Mitchell 1986, 95–115.
89 For discussion, see Squire 2017a (with detailed further bibliography), along 
with Hien 2013. For Hegel’s talk of Vorstellung in the context of poetry, see 
e.g. Hegel 1975, 1035–1036; cf. ibid., 89, 622–623, 626–627, 966–967, 961–962, 
971–972, 1001–1003, 1111–1112.
90 Hegel 1975, 1111. Cf. ibid., 997–998, on how the poet ‘has problems which the 
other arts are not required to face or solve to the same extent’, since ‘poetry lives 
purely in the sphere of inner imagination …’: ‘while availing itself of a means of 
external communication just as these [other] sphere do, [poetry] avails itself of 
language; and by the use of language it stands on a ground of conception and 
expression different from that of the visual arts and music’.
91 Hegel 1975, 1001.
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Given the theological conditioning of Hegel’s account, poetry has to oc­
cupy a more ‘developed’ stage of spiritual progress than the visual arts 
of sculpture and painting. His progressivist narrative of artistic devel­
opment, in short, is premised upon a logocentric assumption that gives 
pride of artistic place to the verbal over the visual.
Now, it is of course possible to subscribe to the religious underpin­
nings of Hegel’s account: one might believe them to be true.92 By exten­
sion, it is possible to think – as Hegel does – that the very history of 
religion forms part of a larger unfolding of human discovery and self­
consciousness: whether or not one believes in the theological tenets of 
post­Reformation Christianity, one might therefore assent to the tenets 
of Hegel’s Idealist philosophy. But such claims are in and of themselves 
theological: they are premised on the history of religion as one of pro­
gressive advancement, reaching its zenith in the Reformed Christianity 
of the modern day. From this perspective, the Lectures on Aesthetics at­
tempt to explain a universal history of art around a particular ideological 
position about religious progress: ultimately, they strive to legitimate 
an ideology of art and religion through a history of their intertwined, 
forward­marching progress. 
* * * * *
At the beginning of this paper, I said that my relationship with Hegel 
was bipolar. Whether as therapy or as confessional, my chapter has been 
an attempt to vocalise that ambivalence. I remain in awe of Hegel’s big­
picture narrative, its breadth, its explanatory power. Ultimately, though, I 
worry about charting history – whether of art, religion or philosophy – in 
Hegelian teleological terms. One part of this unease – from a classicist’s 
perspective – must be about what historically gets squeezed out from our 
account: the ideologies that underlie every attempt to chart a history of 
artistic style, form and thinking (particularly conspicuous to someone 
concerned with the history and historiography of the Greek and Roman 
past). But another part of my worry concerns the definition of the artwork 
92 Cf. e.g. Besançon 2000: after opening with an epigraph from Hegel, Besançon 
declares that Hegel ‘articulated before I did, and infinitely better than I, the 
main points of my thesis’ (5). Something similar might be said about Koerner 
2004, arguing that Christianity was ‘iconoclastic from the start’ – and that the 
Reformation was therefore an inevitability (Koerner 2004, 12–13; cf. Koerner 
2002, 189–200).  
151SQU IRE :  HEGEL , CLASS ICAL  ART  AND  THE  REFORMAT ION  OF  ART  H ISTORY
with which Hegel leaves us. There can be no doubt that Hegel diagnoses 
so many of the problems that still beleaguer the discipline of art history in 
particular – the insufficiency of our frameworks to deal with the ‘power of 
images’ (in Freedberg’s term), or else (to cite Gumbrecht) to reckon with 
their ‘presence’;93 likewise, one might think of W.J.T. Mitchell’s famous 
assessment at the end of What do Pictures Want: The Lives and Loves of 
Images – ‘what pictures want from us, what we have failed to give them, is 
an idea of visuality adequate to their ontology’.94 In diagnosing that mod­
ern condition, though, I wonder if Hegel might not himself be part of the 
problem: his descriptive history of art normalises the artwork as ‘empty’ 
form subjugated to spiritual content – an object that has us look beyond 
it, a site for subjective reification, a prompt for philosophical speculation.95 
Perhaps this paper has to do with the classicist’s desire to imagine 
things otherwise. As noted at the outset, it no doubt also has to do with 
the author’s Roman Catholic upbringing – a predisposition to read Hegel, 
as it were, with a whiff of incense lingering between the pages. At the 
very least, however, this brief intervention has been an attempt to put 
theology back on the table – not as teleological starting­point, nor indeed 
as spiritual revelation, but as loaded ideological construction.
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FRED  RUSH
STILL LIFE AND THE END OF PAINTING
In memoriam Arthur C. Danto
Hegel’s account of the historical­conceptual development of painting cul­
minates with exceedingly compressed thoughts concerning Flemish and 
Dutch art of the so­called ‘Golden Age’, roughly during and just after the 
War of Dutch Independence (c. 1568–1672). The new Dutch Republic saw 
its art centres shift from the south in Flanders to the northern provinces 
and a flourishing of painting due to the Republic’s emerging economic 
status. Dutch painting in this period is dominated by genre – the Dutch 
invented the practice – a fact tailor­made for Hegelian treatment and on 
which Hegel places special emphasis.1 The standard hierarchy of subject 
matter is fully in play: history painting at the top, portraiture in second 
position, depictions of everyday life in third and still lifes at the bottom. 
Hegel’s understanding of art’s and, more specifically, painting’s progres­
sive tendency subtly inverts this art­historical hierarchy to yield a schema 
in which Dutch still lifes can claim to hold the most philosophical interest 
for Hegel.2 Hegel does not say this precisely, but I shall argue the case from 
what I take to be the core precepts that govern Hegel’s account of painting 
at its ‘end’. The point I wish to establish, or at least make plausible, is that 
1 Hegel 1971b, XV: 60–61/Hegel 1975, 832–833. I cite Hegel’s lectures on the 
philosophy of art as they are published in Hotho’s compilation of lectures from 
the 1820s. I have also consulted the 1820/1 and 1823 lectures, which are newly 
available in the ongoing but incomplete standard scholarly edition, Gesammelte 
Werke. Likewise, I have compared the Hotho edition with the 1826 lectures. All 
versions are remarkably similar on the major points treated in this chapter, 
although there are differences in wording, emphasis and example. When such 
differences are material, I point them out. Citation of the original German 
source is followed by citation of the most adequate available English translation. 
2 Both the English still life and the German Stillleben derive from the Dutch 
stilleven.
for Hegel still lifes of this period are the most indicative paintings of the 
final resources of painting qua painting. They are so because they are the 
most ‘subjective’ form of painting that does not compromise what Hegel 
takes to be inherent to painting as a mode of art and inherent to subjectiv­
ity as a mode of agency. I enter this qualification to leave open for Hegel, 
as I think one must, cases of painting that are even more subjective, but 
are so in ways that compromise what he holds to be the inherent nature 
of painting. In other words, the term ‘painting’ [Malerei] is, without fur­
ther qualification, ambiguous for him as between two senses. On the one 
hand, the term is descriptive, referring to the action and result of artistic 
creation by means of paint and canvas. On the other hand, the term is 
evaluative, picking out from amongst the paintings in the first sense of the 
term those that pass whatever muster Hegel thinks is required to count 
as an expression of the inherent task of painting relative to its essential 
end. Thus, the archetypical Hegelian thought that a painting in the first 
sense could fail to be a painting in the second sense. 
Hegel is a systematic philosopher of a particularly demanding sort, 
and it can often seem that to say something sensible about some aspect 
of his thought one must say everything sensible about all aspects of his 
thought. That is an impossibility, but one can begin appreciating the 
important role that still lifes play for Hegel’s discussion of the essence 
of painting – for he is an essentialist when it comes to questions of the 
meaning of painting – by clarifying the basic terms of his account of 
beauty.3 In itself that is hardly a very controversial point of departure. 
But I believe it is a bit more non­standard to seek initial orientation by 
looking to Hegel’s treatment of natural beauty. This is because Hegel 
can seem dismissive of the very phenomenon of beauty in nature. In 
part this is why he states at the outset of the Lectures on Aesthetics that 
he is retaining the term ‘aesthetics’ for the sake of convenience only. If 
‘aesthetics’ refers to an approach to beauty that accords pride of place to 
beauty given in nature, not that made by humanity [Geist], aesthetics is 
of decidedly secondary importance.
As a general matter, understanding Hegel’s views on beauty is crucial 
on account of the fact that beauty is the primary metric of artistic pro­
gression for him. Some may contest this point; however, the four extant 
3 ‘Beauty’ is not sensu stricto a logical concept for Hegel – it does not figure in 
the demonstrations of either the Science of Logic or the Encyclopaedia; neverthe­
less, the structure of beautiful things expresses the Idea in its interlocked three 
phases: particularity, universality and individuality.
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student transcripts of Hegel’s Berlin aesthetics lectures do not deviate 
from one another at all in this regard: fine art just is beautiful art [schöne 
Kunst]; in point of fact, calling something ‘fine art’ for Hegel is identi­
cal with calling such art beautiful, as the German word for both makes 
clear. And it is only fine art that Hegel cares about – fine/beautiful art is 
the only art that qualifies as the cognitive type ‘Art’ for him. This means 
that one may substitute ‘beautiful art’ salva veritate for any occurrence 
of ‘Art’. This is not to say of course that all art has the same degree of 
beauty nor does it follow that beauty is not differently instantiated in 
different sub­types of art (e.g. beautiful sculpture is not beautiful in the 
same way as is beautiful music). Hegel charts the advance and decline of 
particular artistic forms – art epochs, art types, genres, even something 
like individual artists’ styles on the rare occasions when he talks about 
them – in terms of beauty. For each form there are two epitomes, two 
points of special conceptual importance. The first of these is the point at 
which what Hegel takes to be the inherent potential of the form is fully 
actualised in those terms. Perhaps the illustrious and illustrative case 
involves Hegel’s claims for Attic sculpture in the Classical period of the 
fifth and fourth centuries BC. This is classical art and sculpture at their 
peaks and this means the most beautiful classical art and most beautiful 
sculpture. It is a well­known if not notorious feature of Hegel’s account 
of such ‘peaks’ that he says that the relevant form of art has ended with 
that peak. It has reached its zenith in terms of its inherent potential. This 
means neither that the art form stops at that point nor does it mean that 
there cannot be progression of a sort in the art form after that point. 
But that progression will not be one that can be indexed to the inherent 
potential of the art form. For with potential comes limitation. Any such 
progression will be progression in other terms and will express the opera­
tion of those terms as a limiting condition on the art. The second epitome 
has to do with this idea of an art form’s life in its expiration, in its passing 
out of its maturity and moving towards the point when it can no longer 
even minimally condition the terms of its progression. This ‘second end’ 
of the art form is the final end of the form in question. It is exceedingly 
important to add to this account that ‘being past’ for Hegel is inherently 
imperfect in grammatical aspect. Art that is past is not simply dead nor 
is it merely of antiquarian or nostalgic interest. Such art – indeed Hegel 
holds ultimately all art – is always with Geist in its being­past. Hegel’s 
doctrines of recollection [Wiederholung/Erinnerung] and reconciliation 
[Versöhnung] require this result. 
Hegel’s treatment of painting conforms to this schema. Considered 
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relative to what Hegel takes to be its inherent end, painting will have a 
zenith at which it fully actualises its potential. And, nearing its philo­
sophically appointed end, painting will be less beautiful than it was at 
that zenith and, therefore, less artful than it was at that prior point of 
equilibrium. But such painting will also be more advanced than ‘perfect 
painting’, more advanced that is by incorporating in it, through sensuous 
adaptation, elements that are more conceptually advanced than painting 
(e.g. music, poetry, philosophy). 
Hegel holds that beauty is the sensuous manifestation of ‘the Idea’ 
and treats nature as the first ‘existence’ of the Idea.4 ‘Art’ is a mode of 
human self­understanding through making intelligible and, thus, is a 
mode of cognition. Sense experience is thus, one might say, the domain 
in which art makes significance manifest. Beauty is the formal element 
in this domain in terms of which the Idea is manifest and that towards 
which art progresses is ultimately extramundane relative to the sensuous 
domain – i.e. philosophical thought, or a full specification of the Idea. 
This full specification will be non­sensuous but reaching that pleni­
tude is at certain stages of development dependent on the domain of 
the sensuous and, even past that point, is entangled with the sensuous 
through dialectical retrospection. The more philosophical any art is, 
the less beautiful it is, for the sensuous mode of the Idea is distended 
by attempts within the form of beauty to accommodate non­sensuous 
content. 
As to the end­state of painting, one might say, in line with the pre­
sentation above, that the proximate force that installs Dutch still life at 
the end of painting is the dawning of the conception of a kind of painting 
that takes as its principle the attempt to push the native means of paint­
ing to the point of exhaustion. This idea need not be explicit as such in 
the intent of the artist, for instance, as it might be in a more recognisably 
modern avant­garde context. Indeed, the idea will be present in terms 
of an increasingly confident artistic practice, a practice that does have 
the express idea behind it that painting can do nearly everything. Look­
ing back on such practice from a more advantaged (according to Hegel) 
point in the dialectical progression of art, one can always cast what is 
driving the art in the terms of the successor form. To do so in this case 
yields the observation that end­state painting is painting that, as much 
4 Hegel 1971b, XIII: 157–166 / Hegel 1975, 116–117.
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as is possible for it, approximates the condition of music.5 More specifi­
cally colour, which, as we shall see later, Hegel nominates as the primary 
beauty­bearing formal characteristic of Dutch painting, functions as 
tonality functions in musical structure.6 
L I FE , L I VEL INESS  AND  BEAUTY
Standard theoretical conceptions of beauty of the generation prior to 
Hegel are recognisably neoclassical in the sort of structure they require 
on the part of beautiful objects. One finds diverse formulations of the 
same point: beautiful things stand out from their mundane counterparts 
in that they have a particularly intense and rich structural integrity. More 
precisely, beautiful objects achieve an optimal balance between internal 
complexity and unity. That is, the parts of such objects are not so diversely 
complex that they undermine the unity of the object, and the object is not 
so simple and univocal so as to cause its parts to be reduced to it and lose 
their inherent interest. This harmonised unity animates the mind of the 
aesthetic subject, with the overall experienced effect of easy yet diversified 
perception. The ease in question does not merely allow the object to pass 
through consciousness; rather, the object seems tailor­made to grab one’s 
attention in a way that makes that attention linger of its own force, ever 
deepening one’s perceptual engagement in the thing. Everyday concern 
with the thing and its relation to other matters drops away, leaving one 
with an entity that is experienced as singular, as being self-sufficient rela­
tive to its appearance. Hegel qualifiedly, but only qualifiedly, embraces 
this conception of the structure of beauty.
Just here, turning to Hegel’s account of natural beauty can be clarify­
ing. Hegel holds that natural beauty is inferior to artistic beauty because 
5 Hegel’s account of the succession of art types – architecture, sculpture, paint­
ing, music and poetry – assigns the principle of succession (and by extension, 
regression) to a metaphysical variant of the idea of ekphrasis. A successor form 
is a successor, in part, due to its ability to render its precursor in its own terms. 
Notwithstanding such superior wherewithal, such rendering cannot reconstruct 
without remainder the precursor in the precursor’s own terms. 
6 See Hegel 1968, XXVIII.1: 178. Hegel holds that sight is inherently limited 
when it comes to portraying ‘the inner’, which is truly the province of hearing. 
Music is time become corporeal, which is to say sound. See Hegel 1971b, X: 
104–105 / Hegel 2007, 74–75. 
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the beauty of art is an intended result of a making – a beautiful work of 
art is beautiful because its beauty has human agency as its cause, even if 
the work is not meant to be beautiful. Natural beauty is by comparison 
incidental. Hegel holds that beautiful nature is not so in itself. He writes 
that nature is only beautiful for us.7 That is not a throwaway, of course, 
and one might expend significant conceptual effort in expounding on 
the conditions under which this can be the case at all, as did Kant. Yet, 
it impresses Hegel that Kant argues that in order to find a natural object 
beautiful one must consider it as if it were art, revealing thereby the force 
of the idea of agency in the natural realm, the realm of ‘purposiveness 
without purpose’. Kant certainly embraces a version of neoclassical va­
riety in unity paradigm, in which it is the feeling of the mind instantiat­
ing such a harmony that is strictly speaking beautiful. Schelling, from 
whom some of Hegel’s main views on the philosophical significance of 
art proximately descend, holds that there is a telling isomorphism be­
tween organic conceptual structure and organic composite beauties that 
is crucial for aesthetic thought.8 These are but two aspects of one and 
the same system: human cognitive responsiveness in its organic structure 
is a very articulated instance of the very same structure that underlies 
the internal constitution of objects: dynamic relations of part to whole in 
progressive development. 
This idea that beauty is a dynamic, not a static, unity is of decisive 
importance for Hegel, which becomes amply apparent when one turns to 
the first precept in his account of the beauty of nature: that only living 
things, or ‘life’ [Leben] can be beautiful.9 Indeed the livelier a thing is the 
more beautiful it is. ‘Liveliness’ [Lebendigkeit] is the lens through which 
Hegel’s dynamic modification of the neoclassical conception of beauty 
is best viewed. ‘Life’ is a signal concept for Hegel, one that originates 
in his early writings;10 makes a brief but important appearance in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit;11 figures prominently in the part of the Science 
7 Hegel 1971b, XIII: 167 / Hegel 1975, 123–124.
8 I am not using the term ‘isomorphism’ here to denote a one­to­one mapping 
of items in one cognitive domain onto items in another such domain. The idea 
rather is one of structural overlap.
9 See Hegel 1971b, XIII: 167 / Hegel 1975, 123. Hegel does not make the asser­
tion as such, but inferences drawn from the properties of organisms, as Hegel 
understands them, towards this conclusion seem to mandate it.
10 See Hegel 1971b, I: 414, 420–424 / Hegel 1948, 297, 310–315.
11 See Hegel 1971b, III: 139–142 / Hegel 1977, 106–110.
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of Logic which Hegel denominates ‘subjective logic’;12 and plays a central 
role in his discussion of the ‘unconscious creativity of nature’ in the 
second volume of the Encyclopaedia, which is devoted to the philosophy 
of nature.13 Life is the dialectical structuration of organic development 
and liveliness is the sensuous appearance of being so structured.14 The 
key idea here is the interplay of parts and wholes in allowing a thing 
to persist over time and through internal alteration in response to the 
world at large. Organisms have dynamic, active forms of integrity, in 
which the part­whole relations are reciprocally supportive and allow for 
developing and ongoing interchange with other beings. As Hegel puts 
matters, such parts are not merely parts; they are members of a whole [sie 
sind nicht mehr bloß zusammenhängende und zueinander sich verhaltende 
Teile, sondern Glieder …].15 The interplay in question involves attempts 
on the part of the entity to achieve stability relative to the demands both 
of and on the entity. This stability is always relative to such demands, 
which demands Hegel holds always slightly outpace any status quo, until 
the exhaustion of the entire series of possible alterations in response to 
demands. That is, Hegel envisages the integrity of any given bit of life 
to consist in encountering the world in part as prima facie recalcitrant to 
the demanding integrity of that bit of life at a given stage in its develop­
ment. The entity in question overcomes the barriers by expanding its 
integrative understanding of itself and the world to encompass as, now, 
familiar what was initially unknown and un­mastered. ‘Understand­
ing’ as it is used in this context need not denote an explicit cognitive 
process, i.e. as if such understanding requires reflective capacities. But 
in humans such integration does require those capacities, such that 
theoretical purchase on and predictive responses to the world would 
count as highly articulated forms of persistence, that is, of life and of 
12 Hegel 1971b, VI: 469–487 / Hegel 2010, 676–688.
13 See Hegel 1971b, IX: 464 / Hegel 1971, II: 381 [§ 357 Zusatz].
14 Hegel writes that appearance [Erscheinung] is analytic to natural life and, 
metaphysically speaking, is a process in which a real thing externalises itself 
in a negativity, i.e. in something that is not initially recognised as its own 
externalisation and thus something that it is ‘not’. This is in fact a process of 
self­affirmation (‘affirmative Beziehung auf sich selbst ’) (Hegel 1971b, XIII: 164 / 
Hegel 1975, 121). See also Hegel 1971b, VI: 76 / Hegel 2010, 382–383, where Hegel 
states that liveliness obtains when the ‘positive appears outside itself as the 
negative’.
15 Hegel 1971b, XIII: 160 / Hegel 1975, 118.
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liveliness. Life integrates itself and develops through time by externalis­
ing its internal demands through action in the world and incorporat­
ing what were elements of the world foreign to life into life. Because 
liveliness is the appearance of such activity, liveliness likewise will be 
two­fold. One encounters liveliness as a manifestation of a process that 
has a developing internal component that is instantiated externally. This 
means that appearance is never mere appearance, but rather tokens its 
role in a greater developmental arc which arc must be, at least implicitly, 
seen through its lens. This is Hegel’s variation of the concept of Schein 
so key to understanding the aesthetic thought of Goethe, Schiller, the 
romantics, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.
‘Liveliness’ and ‘beauty’ are not synonyms, but they are closely 
related in meaning for Hegel. Recall that Hegel holds that only living 
things qualify as beautiful. Rocks, rivers, canyons, ‘der bestirnte Himmel 
über mir’ are not strictly speaking beauties.16 Put in terms of the idea 
of dialectical structuration just canvassed, one might say that beauty is 
the integrative and differentiating activity joined in life and liveliness 
at a particular point of balance of one to the other. Different balances 
may be struck, with the result that, while all life may be beautiful to a 
degree due to its liveliness, life can be more or less lively and thus more 
or less beautiful. At points of relatively high equipoise, beautiful things 
represent a total structure of ends­directed integrity in sensuous form. 
Accordingly, neoclassical conceptions of beauty, even in Kantian garb, 
are too static and formulaic for Hegel. Still, one might say without too 
much imprecision that Hegel modifies rather than rejects the neoclas­
sical conception. 
‘ INWARDNESS ’ AND  ‘ THE  HEARTFELT ’
Application of the life­liveliness­beauty troika to art is straightforward. 
Hegel analyses intentional structures and, more than that, reflective 
intentional structures as highly developed forms of life with their own 
forms of liveliness. We mentioned in passing that natural beauties are 
only beautiful in Hegel’s estimation if humans perceive them to be. What 
16 They might be so derivatively by incorporation, for instance in the karesansui 
(Zen rock garden). The idea would be that the placement of the rocks, say, and 
the raking of the garden, would curate the inorganic matter, thereby making it 
art. 
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makes such perception as of beauty possible for Hegel is an isomorphism 
between one form of life and another: between the liveliness of the object 
and a conscious form of liveliness that is responsive to that liveliness. 
Human capacities are instantiations and expressions of life. Artefacts are 
products of intentions, specifically intentions to make them and through 
the making of them to convey meaning. Artefacts are external manifes­
tations of meaning in objects that is both integral to and integrating of 
humans. If one makes such artefacts with the intent that they be beautiful 
and, thus, with the intent that they instantiate and express their liveliness 
in this heightened way, this too is a form of life and liveliness. Moreover, 
such objects are interactive focal points for audiences’ intentional activity 
(interpretation, etc.) and, thus, qualify as integral to and integrative of 
the audience as a form of social being. Art’s integrative function has a 
species aspect, if one likes speaking that way.
In order to consider Hegel’s account of painting at what he takes to 
be its endpoint, one must further specify the idea of lively self­integration 
in the terms appropriate to the romantic stage of art’s progression. The 
relevant specification must register that human intellectual demands have 
developed to outpace the capacity of the sensuous to render liveliness in 
adequate terms – i.e. in terms that humans will find satisfactory for pro­
gressively comprehensive self-understanding. This specification is what 
Hegel terms ‘inwardness’ [Innerlichkeit]. Inwardness is the registering in 
the external expression of a living thing that its liveliness has been exter­
nalised according to internal demands. Inwardness is the external appear­
ance of the internal as internal. Hegel writes that inwardness need not be 
a product of reflective or even conscious liveliness and is not limited to 
human liveliness.17 Given the inherent intentionality of art, however, con­
scious and reflective forms of inwardness are of the essence. Saying that 
inwardness is conscious is not to say that its manifestation in art requires 
the artist to plan to make inwardness an artistic topic. Nevertheless, as is 
the case with any externalisation, there is surface reference to an internal 
counterpart. Moreover, when Hegel speaks of the inwardness of art he 
links that phenomenon closely with religion, a sphere in which what is 
internal is conceived as a soul and what is external as a body – inward­
ness consists in the bodily expression of being ensouled.18 Hegel holds 
that these more explicitly subjective forms of inwardness are necessary 
17 See Hegel 1971b, XIII: 178 / Hegel 1975, 133. For discussion, see also Pippin’s 
chapter in this volume.
18 Hegel 1971b, XII: 166 / Hegel 2011, I: 215.
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components of western European social life beginning with the Roman 
Republic and persisting in ever more complicated forms to the present.19 
Note that the idea of inwardness is neutral with respect to whether 
the external reference is adequate to its internal referent, i.e. as to whether 
one can cleanly read off of the external expression the internal expressed 
state. One possible reason for this lack of transparency from the outer 
to the inner is that the externalisation itself holds back the revelation 
of the internal to some degree. An art­historical example of transparent 
Inner lichkeit might be Winckelmann’s contention concerning the Laocoon 
statue group. Recall that Winckelmann interprets the group as depicting 
in part Laocoon’s noble forbearance, a characterful state that fully and 
clearly presents on the surface of the sculpture. For reclusive Innerlichkeit, 
i.e. inwardness that would require more discernment to plumb the inter­
nal content that it instantiates, Hegel at times deploys a slightly different 
term, one that resonates romanticism: Innigkeit.20 His use of this term is 
not, in my view, systematic, and it would be mistaken to treat it as termi­
nologically rigid. In particular the distinction between it and Innerlichkeit 
is not clean. Innigkeit, or ‘the heartfelt’,21 is an intensified subspecies of 
self­conscious inwardness in which the external expression of the internal 
is, from the perspective of the internal aspect, unable to convey adequately 
the rich and special nature of the internal. There is a particular form 
of Lebendigkeit associated with Innigkeit and, thus, a particular form of 
beauty. As it develops in romantic art Innigkeit conveys intimacy of such 
intensity that the outside world recedes in significance. At its limits, the 
heartfelt expresses insularity – a world that is only comprehensible from 
within.22 It is important to note, however, that the heartfelt does not reject 
outright its external expression. Rather, part of its form of expression 
is reticence about the very act of expression. Increasingly this external 
19 Hegel 1971b, XII: 342 / Hegel 2011, I: 434.
20 Hegel 1971b, XIV: 86, 140, 144, 154–156, 170 / Hegel 1975, 485, 527, 531, 
539–540, 552–553; See also Hegel 1971b, XV: 61 / Hegel 1975, 832. Rutter 2010, 
73–75 and Peters 2015, 112 both contain good treatments of the concept. 
21 The German is quite difficult to capture in translation. I have opted for 
‘the heartfelt’ primarily for negative reasons. Some other possible translations, 
for instance ‘fervent’ and ‘ardor’, are a bit too dramatic, others, like ‘earnest,’ 
‘unfeigned’ or ‘profound’ too moralistic.
22 In his lectures on history Hegel ascribes this quality to the German people 
as a whole. See Hegel 1971b, XII: 494–496 / Hegel 2011, I: 508. He extends it in 
the lectures on aesthetics to the life of the Low Countries.
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expression of turning away from the idea of adequate expression typifies 
the advance of art in the romantic period. 
Painting is an art that is at its core romantic; accordingly, painting 
becomes the painting of worldly withdrawal. This development is of a 
piece with a general trend in modern intellectual life, which Hegel takes 
to be represented in German romantic poetry (i.e. that of the ‘Beautiful 
Soul’), Protestant Christianity and Fichte’s idealism. Each one of them 
presents spiritual exercises of radically subjective self-purification. This is 
the realm of heightened reflection, reflexivity and self-criticism in which 
what is taken to be external to the rapidly expanding internalised self 
is seen as a screen upon which the requirements of intensified subjec­
tive self­understanding throw up a plurality of images in order to drive 
home the superiority of subjective requirements to any possible state of 
the external world. 
SPACE , L IGHT  AND  COLOUR
Hegel famously holds that Attic sculpture is absolutely adequate to the 
level of self­understanding present at the time of its making, at which, he 
claims, there is a much less developed conception of individuality than 
is the case in modern Europe. When Hegel speaks about what makes 
sculpture adequate in this way, he emphasises four connected matters: 
(1) it is human in form, and not merely humanoid; (2) the rendering of 
human form is idealised and yet personal (has ‘individuality’, unlike, e.g. 
Archaic Greek korai statues), providing an immediate and ineluctable 
sense of the divine within the human; (3) it is fully three­dimensional in 
its representation; and (4) in it the hand of the artist is emergent (unlike 
the sculpture of the symbolic period), but the personality of the artist 
does not dominate the art. Hegel charts the supersession of sculpture by 
painting largely in terms of the provision of spatiality to the artist and 
art.23 In sculpture three­dimensional space is a representational given; 
23 Hegel’s use of the term ‘space’ [Raum] in his discussion of classical art is 
anachronistic, a defect that is especially egregious given his insistence that 
dialectical critique must be immanent. Of course one might counter that the 
Lectures are not supposed to be dialectical demonstrations, so the requirement 
on immanent critique may be relaxed. In any case, there is no conception of 
space at all in antiquity, but rather a conception of place [τόπος / locus]. I pass 
over this infelicity in the text. 
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the artist need not represent the space as being otherwise than it is. For 
this reason, sculpture is less representational an art to the extent that the 
basis for representation is not itself the product of representation, or so 
Hegel argues. The painter, on the other hand, does have to construct the 
representational space itself. The point is by now anodyne; it was close 
to being so even in Hegel’s time. In order to secure representationally 
vivid results, a painter must paint space itself pictorially, rendering three 
planes in two. Hegel connects this challenge intimately with inwardness 
and being heartfelt. Submitting the given external conditions for repre­
sentation to the fictional demands of pictorial space is to make the world 
submit to stringent subjective, imaginative criteria. This project condi­
tions all painting for Hegel: painting’s internal and intrinsic end – that 
towards which its concept develops in full – is to so detach the visually 
represented world from given models of representing it that the work, 
though externalised in a painting, is as far as a visual article can go in 
pushing the representational limits of rendering the world in visual terms.
Hegel also charts the development of painting towards its endpoint 
in terms of its basis in light (Licht). This is a romantic preoccupation in 
part – Hölderlin deploys highly idiosyncratic understandings concerning 
the phenomenal nature of light as a form of inverse depth in his hymns 
(a treatment extraordinarily important for Heidegger from the 1930s 
on) – but it is also closely related to questions of the nature of colour, 
to which we shall turn momentarily. Considered in physical terms, light 
is the ‘principle of individuation and specification of matter’,24 the ‘pure 
existential power of spatial plenitude’,25 the ‘space become physical’26 and 
the incipience in nature of subjectivity.27 Light plays an important role 
in the history of religion, providing the basis for classical Persian forms 
of worship (e.g. Zoroastrianism), in which light is revered as both the 
‘principle of activity and life’ and the source of spiritual intuition.28 This 
devotional aspect is connected with Hegel’s view of the significance of 
light in nature: light is the most inchoate presence of the subjective in 
nature and thus of the divine. Because it is the precondition for being 
seen, Hegel writes that light is the physical basis for all painting, one that 
24 Hegel 1971b, IV: 38 [§§ 116–117].
25 Hegel 1971b, IX: 112 / Hegel 1978, II: 87 [§ 275 Zusatz].
26 Hegel 1971b, X: 104 / Hegel 2007, 774.
27 Hegel 1971b, IX: 111–125 / Hegel 1978, II: 87–96 [§§ 275–278 & Zusätze]; see 
also Hegel 1971b, XV: 30–31 / Hegel 1975, 808.
28 Hegel 1971b, XII: 215–216 / Hegel 2011, I: 310–312.
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emerges from the material of painting;29 accordingly, painting’s rendering 
of light as a material basis will be a marker of its developing reflective 
relation to itself. The point is one we have already seen at work in space: 
architecture and sculpture deal with given light. The visibility of painting 
requires light, e.g. a lighted room in which the painting is hung, but light 
as a form of making visible in the world depicted by the painting must 
itself be painted – the artist must provide light. 
Hegel also holds that the relation of light and dark [Dunkel], of the 
making visible to being invisible [Unsichtbarkeit], are reciprocally relat­
ed.30 It is possible philosophically to have an analysis of absolute light 
without taking into account dark; but, like all analyses for Hegel, it will 
be importantly incomplete. Light and dark are a dyadic single structure 
for Hegel and this means a fortiori that the same is true for the relation 
of the visible to the invisible. This idea, which had a profound formative 
effect on Merleau­Ponty, is in turn crucial to Hegel’s treatment of colour. 
The main idea is that light as an individuating force requires antecedently 
invisible things (unlit things, which are to that extent dark). This means 
that degrees of interplay of light and dark are constitutive of visibility and 
of the visibility rendered in painting. Objects are more or less lit, and that 
is the same thing for Hegel as saying that they are more or less shadow. 
This, again, is a thought – i.e. that shadow is not indicative of a deficient 
state of visibility – that wields a great deal of power in phenomenological 
approaches to sight (Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau­Ponty, Sartre). 
Colour finds its proximity to the question of the nature of light 
through the account of shadow. Recall that Hegel was an admirer of 
Goethe’s Towards a Theory of Colour and is interested primarily in the 
phenomenology of colour, i.e. how it is that colour is experienced.31 Goethe 
29 Hegel 1971b, XV: 31 / Hegel 1975, 809.
30 Hegel 1971b, XV: 31–33 / Hegel 1975, 809–810.
31 Hegel 1971b, XV: 32–34 / Hegel 1975, 810–11; cf. Hegel 1971b, IX: 241–269; II: 
194–217 [§ 320 and Zusatz]; Hegel 1971b, X: 108 / Hegel 2007, 77 [§ 410 Zusatz]; 
see also Hegel 2004, 206–207. Wittgenstein’s statement that ‘what Goethe 
was really seeking […] was not a physiological but a psychological theory of 
colours’ (see Wittgenstein 1980, 18) seems right, with the proviso that Goethe 
is not really offering a theory (i.e. an explanatory account) of colour; rather 
he is offering experiments in colour perception that he hopes will be useful 
theoretically. Wittgenstein recognises this feature of Goethe’s account else­
where. See Wittgenstein 1978, 11. It is instructive to note that admiration for 
Goethe’s work on colour is perhaps the only positive point of contact between 
Hegel and Schopenhauer, both of whom had conversations with Goethe on this 
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took exception to Newton’s analysis of colour in his Opticks, which ar­
gues that colour only emerges from white light as a result of prismatic 
refraction. It might not entirely stretch plausibility to say that Goethe’s 
contention is a kind of Copernican Turn in the theory of colour, i.e. that 
one must also take into account the distance of the reflective surface upon 
which refracted light is projected when one is determining questions of 
the nature of colour. Accordingly, Goethe does not view colour as in­
substantial as he charges Newton does (i.e. all light is really white light). 
Individual colours have more autonomy, for all colours, white included, 
depend on background conditions such as spatial distance, composi­
tion of reflective surfaces, size of the reflective area, etc. White light, as 
Newton understands it, is a one­sided abstraction for Hegel. Light always 
manifests in gradations of darkness. Colours, in turn, are different instan­
tiations of the synthetic presence of light and dark. But again, these are 
not antecedently independent things. As he says a bit more figuratively, 
light is in itself ‘murky’ [getrübt] because always ‘darkened’ [verdunkelt].32 
Hegel’s main point is that what one might take to be mere effects 
of light – shadow, colouring – are central to the nature of light itself.33 
Thus, he writes that shadows are not so much cast by figures as they are 
proper parts of figured objects.34 Painting that manipulates light, colour 
and shadow within pictorial space – that submits the very basis of vision 
and visibility to the hand of ingenuity – is art advancing itself in terms 
of explicit theoretical self­knowledge. Hegel borrows a term from the 
aesthetics of the Venetian Renaissance to speak of colour at the edge of 
this thematic potential: Kolorit (Italian: colorito). This is the forerunner 
of Dutch colour effects [Färbung] in Hegel’s estimation. Colorito displaces 
disegno as the basis for craft and virtuosity, signalling the passage from 
late Renaissance to Reformation painting in Titian.35
topic. For Schopenhauer’s view, see Schopenhauer 1972, I: § 14. It may be that 
Schopenhauer is the source of Wittgenstein’s interest in Goethe’s account.
32 Cf. Goethe’s views. For an incisive treatment of Goethe’s account of colour 
in the context of the development of German idealism, see Förster 2011, 175–80.
33 Hegel XXIX.1: 479.
34 Hegel 1971b, XV: 33 / Hegel 1975, 810. The locus classicus for this point is 
Merleau­Ponty 1964; see also Podro 1998. The best treatment known to me of 
the decisive shift in Merleau­Ponty’s understanding of the primacy of percep­
tion is Hughes 2013. For attention to the historical dimensions of the ontology 
of shadow, see Baxandall 1995. 
35 Hegel 2004, 213, 215.
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GOING  DUTCH :  PORTRA I TS  AND  ST I L L  L I FES 
The painting of the High Italian Renaissance is for Hegel the time when 
painting is most adequate to the task of externalisation in visual terms of 
a pictorial space in which is depicted a subjectivity­laden version of the 
idealised classical human form. Hegel holds that Renaissance portraits 
depict their subjects with a balance struck between ideal external de­
meanour and individual personality. In essence, Renaissance portraiture 
plays the same role relative to painting that classical sculpture plays to art 
in general: it occupies a point of complete balance between conceptual 
content and form. The term he uses here, Persönlichkeit, denotes both 
‘personality’ and ‘personhood’; Hegel means both. Consider Raphael’s 
Portrait of Agnolo Doni [Fig. 5.1]. The sitter is presented as fully ethically 
present in the portrait, his character almost entirely available from the 
image. 5.1
Dutch painting is by comparison to the Renaissance inferior as art.36 
Dutch painting is, therefore, not as beautiful as its Renaissance counter­
part because the conceptual content of Dutch art is more advanced than 
is possible to show in painting. But Dutch painting is philosophically su­
perior to all other modes. Take portraiture. Here, Hegel writes, there is an 
increase in painterly technique to its very limit. Hegel’s point is not that 
Rembrandt is the superior to Raphael in terms of verisimilitude, whatever 
one thinks of that proposition. Rather, Hegel’s point is closer to some­
thing Clement Greenberg might have said (about very different art): that 
Dutch portraiture is about the paint as a reality unto itself. True, paint and 
painting are still engaged in rendering subjects in representational terms, 
but now the terms in question are inward and heartfelt, conveying the 
character of the subject by portraying the implacable depth of character 
not adequate to outward expression. Take Rembrandt’s Self-Portrait with 
Beret and Turned-Up Collar [Fig. 5.2]. The self­portrait is famous, even 
from among the over fifty self-portraits Rembrandt painted, in showing 
36 Hegel’s only trip to the Netherlands, undertaken in 1822, included visits 
to an unnamed gallery (probably the Maritshuis) in The Hague, as well as to 
artistic venues in Brussels, Amsterdam and to various unidentified churches. 
Hegel mentions seeing several large canvasses by Rembrandt and Rubens and 
works by van Eyck. He does not identify the works. For a description of Hegel’s 
trip, see Althaus 1992, 402–407. 
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5.1  Raphael, Portrait of Agnolo Doni, c. 1506 (63 × 45 cm). Oil on wood. 
Florence: Palazzo Pitti (Galleria Palatina). © Alinari / Art Resource, New York.
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spiritual and financial tribulation. But the effect of the painting is not 
worn entirely on its face. It is a painting of depth, part of its tremendous 
emotional effect coming from the palpable sense that in painting himself 
Rembrandt summoned up something reluctant within himself to portray 
his isolation. This summoning­up is realised formally with Rembrandt’s 
sculptural, non­mimetic use of paint. 5 2
I wish to suggest, however, that it is in connection to other genre 
painting that Hegel’s views on advanced painting come into sharpest 
focus. Depictions of the everyday receive praise for their portrayal of 
homespun rollicking celebration that is not in the final analysis licen­
tious. Works such as Steen’s The Merry Family [Fig. 5.3] are suffused with 
the spirit of the particularity [Besonderheit] of that community’s festivals, 
after which the hung­over celebrants shall wend their way to church.37 5.3
Hegel repeatedly emphasises the historical importance of the hard­
headed and hard­won independence of the Lowlands from Spain, a politi­
cal correlate to the subjectivity­enhancing passage from the externality of 
Catholic worship to the internality of Protestant prayer. That burghers, 
and not merely nobility, could value, purchase and display paintings (and 
above all else, paintings) is for him likewise remarkable and progressive. 
Moreover, still-life painting in Holland developed in the first market for 
art that was recognisably not structured around strict patronage. That 
is, most paintings were not commissioned; they were made and sold to 
‘anonymous’ buyers who prized the paintings because of their virtuosity in 
general, not because they were made to order. This caused painters to push 
the limits on technique within genres, at times with extremely nuanced 
and specific excellence.38 Attention to such social and political dimensions 
is something one might reasonably expect from Hegel, of course, but they 
go hand in glove with more recognisably aesthetic evaluation. These are 
depictions of a way of life that asserts the power of depiction itself to form 
that life by the utmost manipulation of painting’s inherent means. One 
might say that for him Dutch art casts a free eye back over the entire his­
tory of painting in order to redact as much as possible the dependency of 
37 They are, that is, visual counterparts to what Hegel says about end­state 
poetry in the section of the Lectures in which he treats what he calls ‘objective 
humor’.
38 For instance, Gerard Ter Borch (1617–1681), known for his luxurious depic­
tions of silk (cf. Grootenboer’s chapter in this volume, pp. 198–199). I owe the 
example to Hanneke Grootenboer, whose discussion of the complex interactions 
of the art market and genre in this period has been indispensable to me.
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5.2  Rembrandt van Rijn, Self-Portrait with Beret and Turned-Up Collar, 1659 
(84.5 × 66 cm). Oil on canvas. Washington, DC: National Gallery of Art,  
Andrew W. Mellon Collection, inv. 1937.1.72. © Alinari / Art Resource, New York.
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the material component of painting on reality: past the depiction of three 
dimensions in two and on to the depiction of the world in terms of mood. 
We saw that light, colour and shadowing are necessary for the very 
possibility of representation for Hegel and, therefore, are foundational 
to represent as such if what one is interested in representing is the foun­
dation of one’s representational enterprise. And that is in nuce the brief 
for Dutch painting for Hegel as one best reconstructs his views on the 
end of painting: it is the painting of the foundations of painting, which 
foundations can almost not be painted at all because they are foundations. 
Such painting does not require that there be anything special about what 
is painted – the subject of the painting need not be exalted. In fact, the 
sheer virtuosity of the painting in handling its physical and metaphysi­
cal bases is best on display when an ordinary subject matter is, through 
the mere painting of it, elevated to a spectacular visual experience. At 
its limit, this is the painting of the banal as far from banal. Dutch paint­
ing is technically superior to that of the Renaissance, then, not in terms 
of its subject matter or in terms of the adequacy of its technique to its 
5.3  Jan Steen, The Merry Family, 1668 (110.5 × 141 cm). Oil on canvas.  
Amsterdam: Rijksmuseum, inv. SK­C­229. © HIP / Art Resource, New York.
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subject matter. It is superior to all other forms of painting in terms of its 
reflexivity. It is, simply put, painting about painting. 
Hegel might have said that Dutch still life stands at the very end of 
painting for just these reasons and more.39 Still lifes are representations of 
natural objects, almost but not quite a return to natural beauty through art. 
Nature, however, is almost always intermingled with artefact in still life. At 
a minimum, there is one artefact in play even in paintings that are otherwise 
exclusively of natural objects, i.e. the table, the basis for the display nature. 
The idea of display is crucial.40 The objects of still lifes (at least those painted 
‘from life’), even those that are non­artefacts, are arranged to be painted and 
arranged in the painting of them. Still lifes always present nature in and out 
of natural context.41 Still lifes present nature as denatured by dint of human 
use. The natural articles are used, in the first instance, as the subject matter 
of the painting and, in the second, what is painted is also their use – their 
availability for human consumption. These are not related through mere 
coincidence; the meaning of the still life is consumption in two interlock­
ing dimensions: consumption is what is depicted and the painting presents 
itself, in virtue of that subject matter, as itself an article of consumption. 
39 Cf. Svetlana Alpers’ application of the concept of describing to Dutch 
painting of this period: Alpers 1983. Her approach is compatible with Hegel’s, 
as she allows in passing (ibid., 73 and n. 1). Both Alpers and Hegel hold that 
‘description’ does not rule out iconography – butterflies resurrected, diligent 
bees, etc. Their point is that even the icons are submitted to overall descriptive 
frameworks. 
40 Cf. Grootenboer 2003. Grootenboer convincingly argues that display is not 
the basic mode of the sub­genres of Dutch still life she considers; rather, the 
anamorphosis characteristic of such still lifes presents (not represents) depicted 
objects in their proximity, ibid., 21–60. This is connected to the phenomenon of 
displacement of the viewer, and thus of the visibility confronting the viewer – 
there is no one position relative to the depiction that the still life prescribes to the 
viewer for ‘maximal effect’. Instead, the viewer is implied as being both everywhere 
and nowhere at once: everywhere because the flatness and crowding of depicted 
elements imply that they might be seen from anywhere within the depicted space 
with equal visual ‘returns’; nowhere because no matter what possible vantage point 
one takes the ‘depth’ of the scene remains and thus the palpable sense of things 
not being visible. Grootenboer quite sensibly connects this way of seeing what 
is at stake in Dutch still lifes to Merleau­Ponty, whom I have also mentioned in 
passing. I do not believe that Hegel could so evacuate the idea of representation 
from his account of art that he would embrace this view of ontological plenitude.
41 See Woodall 2012 for a brilliant analysis of the social meanings in Dutch 
culture for such arrangement. 
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The burgher purchases the still life for his home as a memento lucri vel mori, 
which stands amidst the owner’s riches, attesting to his good taste, his 
knowledge of the mortal limitation of the worldly, or both.42 The painting 
is thus both a representation of riches, the expression of richness and an 
exemplification of riches (due to its own ‘market value’). Still lifes then are 
depictions of nature drawn away from itself for purposes of exacting regard. 
In this way, still lifes are autopsies of nature – of ‘dead nature’ [nature morte] 
as the French for ‘still life’ has it – that is, a way to present liveliness of na­
ture under condition of total submission to the liveliness of artist and paint. 
Norman Bryson writes that ‘still life is […] the great anti-Albertian 
genre’. Instead of a fenestra aperta on the world, the typical lack of point 
perspective in Dutch still life flattens the depiction and brings the depicted 
objects closer to sight, allowing the eye to course over them in a less 
restricted fashion.43 This felt proximity to the pictorial plane is conjoint 
with the display of objects within the still life, things whose use is all but 
exemplified in their display. This is especially true of the sub-genre of the 
‘breakfast still life’ [banketjestukken]. Examples such as Pieter Claez’s Still 
Life with Oysters [Fig. 5.4] and Jan van de Velde’s A Goblet of Wine, Oysters 
and Lemons [Fig. 5.5] portray the intimacy of the incipient meal and the 
rendering of vegetables, meats, cutlery and tableware so meticulously that 
close inspection attendant upon consumption is an open invitation. 5.4+5.5
Now, one might be tempted to downplay the case of the breakfast still 
lifes on account of the treatment of light and colour. One might argue, 
that is, that the typically muted diffusion of light over the canvas and the 
limited difference in hues do not exactly scream virtuosity.44 But that, I 
would argue, is precisely the point. Light and colour are so controlled that 
their mastery need not be trumpeted. Specifically, the mastery of light 
and colour consists in the way continuous gradients in the light­colour 
tandem affect the proximity of the picture plane to the viewer; the less a 
light source is indicated and the more the objects are imbued with light 
as if from within, there will be absent characteristic marks of perspectival 
42 To make things more complex, there is a sub­genre of Dutch still life that 
includes elements of the vanitas, indeed often the primary element, i.e. the hu­
man skull. 
43 See Bryson 1990, 71. Yet, one might also say, closer to home, that it also 
eschews Rembrandt in that what was to him expressive was the non­mimetic 
brushstroke. One might say that Dutch still life occupies a median point be­
tween such extremes: its brushstroke is expressively mimetic. 
44 See Hegel 2004, 214.
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viewing that distance the pictorial plane from the viewer.45 That there are 
only very discrete light sources and very subtle variations in colouring 
in the breakfast still lifes would be exactly what one would expect, given 
the requirements of Hegel’s colour theory, according to which light and 
colour are the same phenomenon viewed at two different levels of speci­
fication. Muted light is muted colour. Hegel writes that in Dutch painting 
this final and determining aspect of painting as a whole is the enlivening 
effect of beautiful colour for colour’s sake, made all the more present by 
the everyday objects depicted.46 But the manipulation of colour and light 
can be more overt in Dutch still life. This is shown when one turns from 
the simple and devotional breakfast scenes (what is ‘breaking fast’, if not 
simple and devotional?) to the extravagance of the so­called ‘ostentatious 
still lifes’ [pronkstillevens], many of which are banquet scenes – depictions 
45 Cf. Hegel 1968, XXIX.1: 480–481.
46 Hegel 1968, XXIX.1: 178.
5.4  Pieter Claesz, Still Life with Oysters, c. 1633 (37.8 × 53.2 cm). 
Oil on wood. Kassel: Staatliche Kunstsammlungen, inv. GK 437. 
© bpk Bild agentur / Kunstsammlungen, Kassel / Art Resource, New York.  
Reproduced in colour as Plate 2a.
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5.5  Jan van de Velde, A Goblet of Wine, Oysters and Lemons, 1662 
(40.3 × 32.2 cm). Oil on wood. London: National Gallery, inv. NG1255.  
© National Gallery, London / Art Resource, New York.
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of the feast at the ready for which overabundance is key. At the limit of 
ostentation such art may hinder ready domestic response and induce the 
idea that what is before one is a collection of difficult to obtain, luxuri­
ous items. Still another category of Dutch still life, still lifes of flowers, 
can revel in just this abundance – not merely the abundance of nature as 
such, but of the ability of the Dutch East India Company to make avail­
able a superabundance to those with means. Of particular importance 
are exotic flora of the Dutch colonies provisioned to local greenhouses, 
as in Ambrosius Bosschaert the Elder’s, Still Life of Flowers in a Wan-Li 
Vase on a Ledge with Flowers, Shells and a Butterfly [Fig. 5.6].
Flowers are often thought beautiful on their own and so can obscure 
a main point here. Let us return to the table. The objects depicted in such 
still lifes, both in virtue of being still in the way they are (killed, taken 
from nature for human use) and due in certain cases to their triviality 
when compared with human subject matter, can be beautiful only when 
beautifully rendered.47 A hare may or may not be beautiful when seen in 
mid­spring in the meadow, but it is not so dead and laid out on a table 
for dressing (as in Jan Weenix’s Still Life of a Dead Hare, Partridges and 
Other Birds in a Niche [Fig. 5.7]). In Hegel’s way of putting matters, still 
life has to turn the form of a Kantian aesthetic motto to other purposes, 
Lebendigkeit ohne Leben. Again, the key point is that beauty depends here 
on making, over and against the banal and dead. 5.6 and 5.7 
Back to flowers: say the flowers depicted are themselves beautiful, i.e. 
are not merely depicted as being so. What Dutch art – and Dutch still life 
in particular – does is compete with nature to make what is shown even 
more beautiful. As we mentioned, this is not the art of verisimilitude; 
the art itself must do better than nature relative to even natural beauty, 
not just measure up to it. This may seem a trivial point, but for Hegel it 
would be far from trivial. For what might from the standpoint of nature 
be deemed ‘excess beauty’ or even beautification, is the essence of beauty 
– i.e. the submission of nature at its aesthetic best to virtuosity. The same 
may be said for artefacts in still lifes. In table pictures and pronkstillevens 
there is present all manner of things that are products of high­order 
craft. The Netherlands at this period had estimable local craftsmanship 
in smithing, glassmaking and weaving. Moreover, what could not be 
made in the homeland the navy could procure (at substantial cost) from 
47 It would be instructive to compare what Hegel might have said more about 
still lifes with what Schelling does say about them, but I cannot pursue that 
here. See Schelling 1959, 193–194. 
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5.6  Ambrosius Bosschaert the Elder, Still Life of Flowers in a Wan-Li Vase on 
a Ledge with Flowers, Shells and a Butterfly, 1609–1610 (68.6 × 50.7 cm).  
Oil on copper. London: National Gallery, inv. NG6613. © National Gallery, 
London / Art Resource, New York. Reproduced in colour as Plate 3.
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far-flung colonial lands.48 Willem Claez Heda and Willem Kalf (Still Life 
with the Drinking-Horn of the Saint Sebastian Archers’ Guild, Lobster and 
Glasses [Fig. 5.8]) specialised in still lifes that are out to trump such finery 
by painting it better than it was made. As Bryson remarks, such painting 
expresses ‘Faustian ambition’.49 5.8
Dutch painting, placed under a Hegelian lens, is the most technically 
accomplished painting possible, a form of painting that pushes representa­
tion to the edge of what it is capable. This does not mean that Hegel judges 
the concept of representation to be elective for painting; he does not. Nor 
do I think – although this is a contested point – that he could countenance 
non­representational painting whose constant point of contact was its 
reactive stance towards representation and, more precisely, representation 
48 See Schama 1987, 160–163.
49 Bryson 1990, 105. Alpers 1995, 191–222 also drives this point home. 
5.7  Jan Weenix, Still Life of a Dead Hare,  
Partridges and Other Birds in a Niche, c. 1675  
(120 × 98.5 cm). Oil on canvas. Kiev:  
Museum of Western and Oriental Art.  
Wikimedia Commons.
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as a limit on painting. This is connected to a second point, i.e. that Dutch 
painting for him is essentially the depiction of the inconsequential. And 
both these points are connected to a third, i.e. that in Dutch art honest 
labour finds an ethical correlate in material consumption.
That the unexceptional, speaking properly, can be painted at all 
– i.e. that it can be art – is what is ultimately most arresting for Hegel. 
But there is a cost, for at this endpoint painting has ebbed in its overall 
meaning. It gives way to sensuous modalities that are less representa­
tional, perhaps even non­representational; and this tokens a diminution 
in cultural power.50 We began by reflecting on natural beauty and, in 
50 Technically speaking, music must involve Vorstellung for Hegel since it is a ro­
mantic art form and thus is ‘religious’ in its basic form. For Hegel representations 
5.8  Willem Kalf, Still Life with the Drinking-Horn of the Saint Sebastian 
Archers’ Guild, Lobster and Glasses, c. 1653 (6.4 × 102.2 cm). Oil on canvas. 
London: National Gallery, inv. BG6444. © National Gallery, London / Art 
Resource, New York. Reproduced in colour as Plate 2b.
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important part, have been considering the residue of Hegel’s treatment 
of natural beauty in his account of painting, ending up with paintings of 
nature explicitly denatured and, therefore, dead.51 There are other points 
that one might make. For instance, we have not lingered on the fact that 
the consumption, apart from its economic import, is implicitly tactile, 
gustatory and olfactory. The depicted and therefore manipulated sense 
of visual proximity, the form of closeness that is involved, pleads for an 
imaginative indulgence of these other senses. Hegel has some interesting 
things to say about touch, smell and taste, but the point again is that these 
less ‘abstract’ sense modalities are anchored in the past of the plastic arts: 
in architecture and sculpture, and their role in that regard is rehearsed 
again against the background of advancing subjective demand and the 
magisterial reformation of painting at its technical summit.52 
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HANNEKE  GROOTENBOER
THE SELF-CONSCIOUS IMAGE 
Painting and Hegel’s idea of reflection
INTRODUCT ION :  A  RETURN  FROM OTHERNESS
In 1975, Richard Estes painted Central Savings [Fig. 6.1]. We see the front 
of a spick­and­span diner on a typical Manhattan street corner. The 
degree of brightness suggests mid­morning – and the clock in the centre 
tells us that it is a quarter past ten – yet the diner is completely empty. 
At first sight, this seemingly banal picture demands very little from us 
as viewers. There are no symbols to decipher, no clues given as to what 
exactly is being depicted here. Why have we paused here, in the middle 
of the sidewalk, whereas other passers­by move on (we see their shadowy 
silhouettes briskly walking out of the frame)? What they remain unaware 
of we can see: overlaid upon the shiny red counter and its empty stools 
is the dazzling spectacle of a reflected cityscape extending behind us. 
What should, strictly speaking, have remained outside of our view is 
now contained within the diner. The dizzying doubling of reflections 
simultaneously bouncing off multiple shiny surfaces makes it difficult to 
determine what is inside and what is outside. Where, for instance, does 
the orange and red ‘banner’ actually belong? And what about the silver 
strips running along the ceiling to the right? Something has entered this 
space that refuses to position itself, that refuses to take sides (in or out?) 
but seems suspended in the middle, stretched out, as it were, over both 
areas. For a moment we forget that while looking through the large glass 
window, we are also looking at it. The bright red letters spelling ‘burger’ 
in reverse, projected at the window, are also projected into the space from 
outside. When we bend in to study them closely we note that they must 
be part of the diner’s front that falls outside this painting’s cropping. The 
backwards word has been projected into the space via its being doubly 
mirrored in the bank’s windows opposite the diner, such that this reflec­
tion brings it ‘back’ to the diner, and into this picture. Indeed, the term 
‘reflection’ comes from the Latin reflectere, which literally means ‘to bend’ 
and ‘to bring back’. The reflections, brightly articulated and translucent, 
are nonetheless somewhat impenetrable despite the transparency of the 
window. The result is a jumble of mirror images bouncing off one another. 
Are we being invited to reflect on reflection?1 6.1
In his writings on aesthetics, Hegel insists that the function of paint­
ing is not to imitate everyday life but to reflect Spirit through external 
forms so as to evoke reflection. Not an actual landscape, but one that 
has been rendered into a two-dimensional picture enables us to reflect on 
it, Hegel insists. Colours and shapes that make up a painting are never 
1 Only after I completed this chapter did I discover Aron Vinegar’s exciting 
essay (in Vinegar and Boetzkes 2014, 249–268), discussing ‘Reluzenz: On 
Richard Estes’, in which he links Estes’ work, in particular his reflections, to 
Heideggerian thought.
6.1  Richard Estes, Central Savings, 1975 (91.4 × 121.9 cm). Oil on canvas. 
Kansas City: The Nelson­Atkins Museum of Art, Gift of the Friends of Art, 
inv. F75­13. Photograph by Jamison Miller. Reproduced in colour as Plate 5a.
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meant to replace actual objects, but their transformation into images 
relieves them of their materiality: they become mere appearances that 
invite our contemplation. To denote such two­dimensional appearances, 
Hegel uses the term ‘scheinen ’, which in German means both to appear 
and to shine and which Knox translates as ‘pure appearance’. In Schein 
(shine), Hegel explains, the inwardness of consciousness (or Sprit) can 
fully express itself ‘in the reflection [Widerschein] of externality’ (Hegel 
1975, 801–802).2 In his Lectures on Fine Art, Hegel is preoccupied with 
painting’s capacity to ‘shine’. He implies that painting, more than any 
other medium, can show this inwardness through its appearance rather 
than its being. His most prominent example in this regard is seventeenth­
century Dutch painting, in particular its representations of objects of 
daily life that, while uninteresting in themselves, let their subject matter 
be ‘outshone’ by shine as such. 
I would like to suggest that the excessive use of reflection in Estes’ 
Central Savings is an indication that this painting may ‘appear’ in a 
Hegelian way, wittingly or unwittingly, as a reflection of a deeper con­
sciousness. I am interested in the extent to which we see the reflection 
of consciousness at play in Estes’ painting, which, very much like Dutch 
painting, deals with the banality of daily life. In Central Savings this 
quotidian surface has superimposed upon it an excess of multiple reflec­
tions, fixed by Estes in the form of a deep glow. However, Estes’ painting 
is fundamentally different from the works of seventeenth­century Dutch 
painting in one major aspect: it aspires to appear to be something else. 
Standing in front of Central Savings, we see a photograph even as we 
know we are looking at a painting. Our disorientation reveals how Estes’ 
picture has effortlessly overruled our authority as subject by managing 
to deceive our senses. What exactly does this image think it is? 
Playing with the limitations of its medium, Estes’ painting fits per­
fectly into a long art historical tradition, represented most famously by 
images such as Diego Rodriguez Velázquez’s Las Meninas [Fig. 6.2] and 
Jan van Eyck’s Arnolfini Portrait [Fig. 6.3] – self-reflexive images that 
often pose conundrums for their viewer through ambiguous reflections. 
In both the Velázquez and the van Eyck works, a mirror hanging on the 
back wall reflects figures occupying the space stretching out in front of 
2 For an extensive discussion of ‘shine’ and art, see John Sallis’ discussion 
of ‘Carnation and the eccentricity of painting’, in Houlgate 2007, 90–118. See 
also Vanhaelen 2012 for an excellent analysis of ‘shine’ in the works of Hegel 
and Barthes, discussed in relation to Dutch seventeenth­century painting.
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the painting, where we are expected to stand. These artworks present an 
unsolvable paradox to us as viewers, as we will forever be puzzled by the 
fact that these paintings, by not reflecting our image in the mirror, deny 
our viewpoint by the very configuration that enables us to see them from 
that position. Following Victor Stoichita, we could call these paintings 
‘self­aware’ images, and though they may be playful tricks, offering witty 
commentary on the nature of their own representation, they nonetheless 
seriously explore the possibilities and limitations of visual representation. 
I would like to use Hegel’s notion of self­consciousness to argue that in 
the context of the rich history of self-reflexive imagery, Estes’ work pushes 
this kind of self­awareness to extremes. Central Savings goes way beyond 
its ostensible limitations when it radically presents itself as something 
it is not, namely a photograph, making obvious reference to the ‘killing’ 
of painting by the invention of photography (as Paul Delaroche was fa­
mously said to have observed when seeing a daguerreotype for the first 
time). Photography is painting’s negation, its other. Therefore, in this 
essay, I would suggest that rather than being self-aware or self-reflexive, 
Estes’ painting is self­conscious through its portrayal of itself as its 
negative. I would like to argue that it attempts to ‘think’ itself as being 
not­painting, or rather, it ponders about how painting would appear as 
if it were photography. 6.2, 6.3
If we consider the grand narrative of realistic representation, we see 
that photography, entering history around 1837, was considered from the 
get­go as painting’s replacement, because it would patently put an end 
to the justification, aim and function painting had been understood to 
possess for centuries. Photography cast painting into a crisis from which 
it only slowly recovered through a long period of self­analysis called mod­
ernism. For this essay, I am less interested in what painting may have 
lost in its transformation in the wake of photography (such as the aura 
of authenticity, as Benjamin would have it) than in what it has gained in 
terms of consciousness. In particular, I am interested in understanding 
how Estes’ Central Savings can assist us to better grasp Hegel’s definition 
of thinking as a movement of a return to the self from otherness, which 
is, I suggest, a ‘merging’ of thinking self and self­as­object that we also 
see in Estes’ blending of painting and photography, a visual articulation 
of this movement as a return of painting from photography.
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6.2  Diego Rodriguez Velázquez, Las Meninas, c. 1656 (318 × 276 cm).  
Oil on canvas. Madrid: Museo del Prado, inv. P01174. © Museo Nacional  
del Prado / Art Resource, New York.
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6.3  Jan van Eyck, Portrait of Giovanni Arnolfini and his Wife, 1434 
(82.2 × 60 cm). Oil on wood. London: National Gallery, inv. NG186. 
© National Gallery, London / Art Resource, New York.
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NOT  YET  THOUGHT
When Hegel travelled to the Netherlands in 1822, he found it a wonder­
ful country.3 The cities of Holland were among the finest he had seen, 
he wrote enthusiastically to his wife: exquisite, well cared for and above 
all clean, as no rotten doors or broken windows could be found. ‘In the 
Hague and generally here, all the streets are filled with the finest shops, 
in the evening all the streets are lit up by their illuminations; endless 
assortments – gold, silver, porcelain, tobacco, bread, shoes – everything 
perfectly arranged in booths’.4 Hegel found in the streets of The Hague 
some of the neatly arranged, glimmering objects that he had observed 
in Dutch seventeenth­century paintings. What such paintings of tidy 
domestic interiors, busy scenes of street life and cheerful merry compa­
nies demonstrate for Hegel is not the subject matter of everyday life, but 
the way they appear: they shine. In particular in the chapter on romantic 
painting in his Lectures on Fine Art, he is fascinated by the lustre of metal, 
the shimmer of a bunch of grapes by candlelight, or a vanishing glimpse 
of sunlight through a window. ‘With what skill have the Dutch painted 
the lustre of satin gowns with all the manifold reflections and degrees of 
shadow in the folds, etc., and the sheen of silver, gold, copper, glass ves­
sels, velvet, etc.,’, he writes with rising amazement. His close observations 
partly lead him to determine that painting’s function is not to mirror 
the world but to ‘grasp this most transitory and fugitive material, and to 
give it permanence for our contemplation in the fullness if its life’ (Hegel 
1975, 599). The Dutch had fixed the most transitory nature of reflections 
not as a means of recording or describing the world (as Svetlana Alpers 
would have it) but as images offered for our contemplation. Hegel sees 
the manifold reflections in Dutch paintings as a kind of ‘echo’ of some 
kind of inner essence that shines through. It is through the shine of things 
that they make their ‘pure appearance’, uncoupled from their materiality. 
If we look, for instance, at a painting by Willem Kalf, we see how 
the artist has pushed ‘shine’ to extremes. Still Life with Oriental Rug 
[Fig. 6.4] is a decadently messy arrangement of luxury items from the 
four corners of the world. We see an obviously expensive, heavy golden 
3 On Hegel’s trip to the Netherlands, see also Rush’s chapter in this volume.
4 Hegel 1953, II: 362 (1813–1822); for an English translation, cf. Wiedmann 
1968, 8. Quoted from Michelson 1982.
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goblet surrounded by a delicate Wan-li porcelain bowl from China filled 
with exotic fruit from North Africa, a watch, a rug from the Middle 
East, and a heavy silver dish. A tall Venetian and a Roemer glass, both 
half-filled with wine, are placed behind this heap of costly objects. Com­
positions like this one are widespread among seventeenth­century still 
lifes; however, the deep black background that yawns behind his objects 
is characteristic of Kalf. Rather than giving us the empty wall that we 
usually see in such scenes, he chose this seemingly infinite darkness to 
maximise the effects of reflection. The objects in his paintings sparkle 
and glimmer like jewellery in a box, providing an absolute feast for the 
eyes, celebrating the virtuosity that lies in the creation of the image of the 
objects rather than the objects as such. Indeed, Goethe, writing about one 
of Kalf ’s paintings, famously remarked that if he had to choose between 
the (highly valuable) objects or the painting, he would definitely select 
the painting.5 But Kalf goes even further. Looking closely at the barely 
visible, tall Venetian glass, we see that it lacks an outline. Kalf, refraining 
from drawing the glass’s contours, decided instead to suggest its outline 
by painting only the reflection of light on its rims. Assuming that the 
whole glass is there, right in front of us, at first we fail to notice that we 
are actually seeing the spectre of the glass emerging from darkness by 
its sparkle alone. Sacrificing materiality for pure appearance in paint, 
Kalf has successfully transformed glass into Schein, in the double sense 
of seeming and shining. 6.4
Hegel must have had a similar work (and perhaps Goethe’s declara­
tion) in mind when he observed that realistic representation is capable 
of pressing on ‘to the extreme of pure appearance, i.e. to the point where 
the content does not matter and where the chief interest is in the artistic 
creation of that appearance’ (1975, 812). Painting can thus fix the light 
that is bouncing off already fleeting surfaces – ‘the appearances and re­
flections of clouds, waves, lochs, streams; the shimmering and glittering 
of wine in a glass’ – and thereby capture a particular liveliness. ‘Here 
painting leaves the ideal for the reality of life’, he insists (1975, 812). In 
the glittering in Kalf ’s glass, we see painting as lifting itself out of its 
materiality, of the glass as much as of its paint, out of any essence only 
to reflect that essence. 
Through this pure appearance of a painted object (rather than an 
object as such), Hegel sees something greater ‘shining through’, so to 
5 Quoted in Bryson 1990, 124–125.
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6.4  Willem Kalf, Still Life with Oriental Rug, c. 1660–1665 (65 × 54 cm).  
Oil on canvas. Oxford: Ashmolean Museum, bequeathed by Daisy Linda 
Ward, inv. A563 © Ashmolean Museum, University of Oxford.
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speak, in this case the inner spirit of the Dutch Republic, which was the 
freedom it had achieved on its own terms. For the Protestant philosopher, 
Dutch painting was the example par excellence of a perfect match between 
the subjectivity of the increasing self­consciousness of the Dutch burgher 
ruling his own country and the spirit of freedom permeating the young 
Republic, which had successfully thrown off the despotism of both the 
Spanish crown and the Catholic Church. The function of painting, or 
rather of shine, is to evoke contemplation in the viewer so that Spirit can 
realise itself through him/her by way of the viewer’s awareness of it. Paint­
ing, he writes, ‘opens the way for the first time to the principle of finite and 
inherently infinite subjectivity, the principle of our own life and existence, 
and in painting we see what is effective and active in ourselves’ (Hegel 1975, 
797, my italics). Hegel’s most daring passages in his Lectures occur where 
he argues for painting’s major role as a site for contemplation, or rather 
as a ground that ‘pictures’ the subject’s consciousness. The glittering of 
wine in the tall Venetian glass in Kalf ’s painting ‘sees’ the consciousness 
of a contemplating viewer as much as the viewer sees the typically Dutch 
form of individualised Republican freedom reflected in it. It is crucial for 
us to realise that this reflection of the subject does not occur ‘in’ painting 
or result from it, but rather it happens on the level of shine, the bounc­
ing of light off concrete glass. In that sense, shine is always on the move, 
somewhere in the middle between glass and its surrounding darkness, or 
between resonating the Spirit and reflecting the activities of the mind. 
Hegel must have had this ricochet structure of physical reflection in 
mind when he wrote, in the introduction to Lectures on Fine Art, that art 
stands in the middle between immediate sensuousness and ideal thought. 
He refers to a work by Gerard Ter Borch (1617–1681) to demonstrate how 
Spirit gets sensualised in art, not so much via coloured shapes but through 
the play of different patches of colours, resulting in the effect of an overlay 
of shine over the entire image. Based in the city of Deventer towards the 
east of the Netherlands, Ter Borch became known for his exquisite small 
genre pictures featuring elegantly dressed ladies engaged in conversa­
tion or reading letters. He prominently placed these female figures in the 
foreground of his compositions so that the satin of their gowns virtually 
coincides with the surface of the painting. Typical for Ter Borch is the 
careful attention he pays to texture, which makes the satin of the dresses 
the very subject matter of his painting. Studying the satin closely, Hegel 
noticed how each spot of colour is a different shade of grey, blue, white, 
or yellow; but seen from a distance, the effect produced is that of a soft 
sheen proper to actual satin. Unlike the highlights that we see, for instance, 
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in Vermeer’s interiors, which maintain their materiality as little blobs 
of white paint shaped by the point of a brush, the sheen in Ter Borch’s 
painting results from the interplay of colours. Like music, Hegel writes, 
it produces this painterly effect from such an interconnection of hues: ‘it 
is the juxtaposition alone’, he insists, ‘which makes this glistening and 
gleaming’ (Hegel 1975, 600). As an effect rather than a quality of painting, 
sheen is completely dematerialised in Hegel’s account. What emerges is 
an interweaving of various colours whose shine somehow starts loom­
ing over the painting’s surface. This then begins to serve as a metaphor 
for his definition of thinking as such. I suggest that standing in front of 
one of Ter Borch’s genre scenes, the philosopher recognised a similarity 
between philosophical and pictorial reflection. Just like the shine of Ter 
Borch’s satin supersedes the painted surface, floating halfway between 
materiality and Spirit, so too does an art work occupy a middle position 
between sensible and ideal thought. An art work, he writes, is ‘not yet 
pure thought, but, despite its sensuousness, is no longer a purely material 
existent either’ (Hegel 1975, 38). In the work of Ter Borch and Kalf we do 
not see consciousness ‘behind’ the depicted objects as if it were hidden 
meaning. Rather, consciousness ‘shines through’, taking off from the very 
surface of the painting that it produced. This ‘taking off ’ is what Hegel 
defines as liveliness: the animated play of colour that is like ‘objective 
music, a peal in colour’ where the Spirit manifests itself in thinking: ‘the 
spirit reproduces itself in thinking, in comprehending the world’, Hegel 
states. (Hegel 1975, 599–600). We could say that in the work of Kalf and Ter 
Borch, we see painting on its way to become thought. And this shiny route 
towards thought was to be continued, despite Hegel’s proclaimed end of 
painting, and whether or not Hegel would have liked it, in photorealism. 
SELF -CONSC IOUS  PA INT ING
Reflection and shine are the hallmarks of Estes’ œuvre [cf. e.g. Figs 
6.5–6.7], from his early­seventies shop fronts, or the wide­angled urban 
vistas with deep perspectives plunging down the streets, to his more 
recent icebergs and lake pictures. After having completed Bus with Reflec-
tion of the Flatiron Building in 1970, a work that would become known as 
his first photorealist painting, the young artist stated that ‘a thought … 
about reflection is that you’re looking at what isn’t there – the tactile 
and the visual reality do not coincide – they overlap. Since all objects 
reflect – glass and chrome only more so – perhaps you show the ways 
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things look the less you show how they are or how we think they are’.6 
In fact, Estes had discovered much more than the difference between 
objects and their appearance, or the blending of the visual and the tactile. 
Central Savings, and other paintings like it, demonstrate what usually 
only a photo camera can capture and our eye never pauses to take in: 
the constant flux and flickering of sunlight on (semi-)reflective surfaces 
that happens all around us while our bodies and eyes make their daily 
way through the world. 6.5­7
In 1972 Estes exhibited alongside Gerhard Richter and Jasper Johns 
in the ‘Realism’ section of Harald Szeemann’s celebrated Documenta V. 
Whereas Richter from that moment onwards was embraced as a darling 
of art criticism, Estes’ critical acclaim was short lived. Though he never 
declared himself to be part of a movement, Estes’ cityscapes were seen as 
belonging to hyperrealism or superrealism, a current that also included 
Chuck Close’s photo­based portraits, Robert Bechtle’s family snapshot 
6 I take the quotation from the artist’s statement in the catalogue accompany­
ing a 1968 exhibition in New York (Allan Stone Gallery): Richard Estes – Recent 
Paintings.
6.5  Richard Estes, Telephone Booths, 1967 (122 × 175.3 cm).  
Acrylic on masonite. Madrid: Museo Thyssen­Bornemisza, inv. 1977.93.  
© Museo Thyssen­Bornemisza / Scala / Art Resource, New York.
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6.6  Richard Estes, Double Self-Portrait, 1976 (60.8 × 91.5 cm). Oil on canvas. 
New York: The Museum of Modern Art, Mr. and Mrs. Stuart M. Speiser 
Fund, inv. 594.1976. © The Museum of Modern Art; licensed by Scala /  
Art Resource, New York.
6.7  Richard Estes, Nedick’s, 1970 (121.9 × 167.6 cm). Oil on canvas.  
Madrid: Museo Thyssen­Bornemisza, inv. 1993.10. © Museo Thyssen­ 
Bornemisza / Scala / Art Resource, New York.
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paintings, Robert Cottingham’s movie theatre fronts and Ralph Goings’ 
interiors of spick­and­span diners. Within a few years of Documenta V, 
photorealist art, although successful commercially, was largely disre­
garded as being as vulgar and tasteless as the prefabricated petty bour­
geois world of margarine, lollypops and bleak parking lots it took as its 
subjects. ‘All that remains is technique’, John Hughes wrote angrily in 
the early 1970s, ‘that elaborate, deadpan verismo which has propelled 
Photo­Realism into its popularity among those collectors who, wearied 
or intimidated by the ideological conflicts of the 1960s, have no appetite 
left for “difficult” art’.7 Hughes’ rant sums up what for many critics was 
photorealism’s greatest shortcoming: its superficiality. Apparently there 
was nothing deep or difficult about the obsession these artists shared to 
paint with painstaking exactitude the same subject over and over again on 
the basis of photos, or photonotes, as Estes preferred to call them. While 
the past fifteen years have seen a rising critical interest in photorealism, 
the work of Estes, Bechtle and Close has received relatively little scholarly 
attention. Hughes, like many art historians of his era, was not ready to 
see the ideological potential inherent in the analogy between deadpan 
realism and the zombie­like middle class attempting to snapshot their 
lives into action. Neither could he predict the immense flight photography 
would take (leading Vilhelm Flusser to claim that we currently live in a 
photographic universe), or foresee how photorealism anticipated the way 
photography would take over our perception of the world. With many 
others, he was stuck in a more traditional view of art when he wrote that 
‘to draw reality is still to examine thought itself ’, confirming what was 
by then a century­long denial by art historians of artists’ use of cameras 
to aid their pictorial practice. Yet it is precisely this prejudice about the 
so­called deadpan or thoughtless nature of copying which most commen­
tators observe as characteristic of photorealism, that I would like to argue 
against. Therefore, I would like to suggest that photorealism, in a world 
dominated by photographic imagery, provides an almost perfect commen­
tary on the role of painting – first after its death proclaimed by Hegel, and 
subsequently after its negation by the invention of photography. Indeed, 
we could say, in a Hegelian context, that photorealism resuscitates the 
illusionism resulting from creating an image of three­dimensional space 
onto a two-dimensional surface, which Hegel finds so essential for paint­
ing. After photography had ‘killed’ painting, eventually setting it off on 
7 Weinberg 2005, 51.
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a quest for pure materiality, photorealism emerged as a way for painting 
to revive itself, to become itself again, properly restored as a form of il­
lusionism that invites viewers once more to immerse oneself in it.8
If critics did anything, it was to explain away the extreme resemblance 
to photography as a lazy twentieth­century version of Baroque trompe 
l’œil painting that aimed at fooling the eye of the spectator. However, 
following Hegel’s notion of appearance to this extent, it is not difficult 
to see that in fact the opposite is true. Traditionally, early modern trompe 
l’œils are self­aware images par excellence: they are ambitious art works 
that aspire to literally become the objects they represent. Their greatest 
wish is to overcome their limitations as two­dimensional images so as to 
participate in the world as objects. Probably the most perfect embodiment 
of this aspiration is Reverse Side of a Painting by Cornelius Gijsbrechts in 
the late seventeenth century [Fig. 6.8]. This work was specifically made to 
be placed against the wall of a kunstkammer so that curious visitors would, 
turning it around, be disappointed to find the same image – the reverse 
of a painting – but this time in reality. We could say, with Stoichita, that 
this is the ultimate self­aware image, which in the wake of iconoclasm 
had achieved full awareness of its being – and of its nothingness. Even 
if we would present photorealist paintings as contemporary trompe l’œils, 
they possess everything Gijsbrechts’ tour de force lacks: a sense of depth, 
any hint of spectacle and, more importantly, reflections or shadows – no 
real light ever shines in trompe l’œils or from them. After all, the objects 
in these paintings are meant to arise out of nowhere so as to fool us, 
outsmarting our perception by putting us in our place. 6.8
Recalcitrant and thought­provoking as Reverse Side of a Painting may 
be, its disguise as an object produces a self-awareness that, however fit­
ting to early modern easel painting, is no longer relevant, I suggest, for 
paintings created after photography (and modernism, for that matter) – an 
invention that has resulted in as fundamental a shift in representation as 
in self­consciousness. (After all, what would our self­image be without a 
photo?) I would like to argue that the type of self-reflexivity at work in 
the photorealism of Estes possesses a different kind of complexity than 
Gijsbrechts’ trompe l’œil [Fig. 6.8] or Velázquez’s Las Meninas [Fig. 6.2], 
which moves away from a Baroque self­awareness towards a Hegelian 
self­consciousness. Further support for my argument can be found in 
8 An elegant discussion of the discrepancy between Hegel’s theory of painting 
and Greenberg’s deviant reading of it, resulting in his theory of abstract art, 
can be found in Houlgate 2000, 61–83.
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photorealism’s decision to present itself not as an object, as Gijsbrechts’ 
image does, but as painting’s negation. To grasp Estes’ Central Savings 
[Fig. 6.1] as a particular form of self­consciousness, we will look into 
Hegel’s critique of Kant’s philosophical reflection, from which the for­
mer’s notion of self­consciousness springs.
REFLECT ION  SEE ING  I TSELF
Kant defines reflection as that which ‘does not concern itself with objects 
themselves with a view to deriving concepts from them directly, but is that 
state of mind in which we first set ourselves to discover the subjective con­
ditions under which [alone] we are able to arrive at concepts’.9 Essential 
9 Kant 1968, 267; see also Gasché 2007, 18.
6.8  Cornelis Gijsbrechts, Reverse Side of a Painting, c. 1668–1672 
(66.4 × 87 cm). Oil on canvas. Copenhagen: Statens Museum for Kunst,  
inv. ms1989. © HIP / Art Resource, New York.
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for Kant is the notion that reflection has become the medium by which 
the mind can separate itself from the object, thinking the synthetic unity 
between concept and object as well as examining the difference between 
them – all the while observing the unity of this process of reflection as 
a whole. As Hegel famously points out, this is a rather tight structure 
whereby that which is being thought gets forever separated from the 
thinking being, while the whole construct is locked in a synthetic unity 
by the operation of reflection itself. The only way within Kant’s system 
to understand the nature of this dualism is to find a position outside the 
synthetic unity to further reflect on the problems caused by this reflec­
tion, which in turn will pose the same problem, thus setting in motion a 
series of reflections on reflections ad infinitum. Hegel notes that for Kant 
the understanding is an absolute and immovable finitude, which can 
reflect onto other things and onto reflection as such but cannot reflect 
onto itself. Within the Kantian system, the subject­object distinction is 
fixed. Consequently, Hegel reasons that Kant’s notion of understanding 
is unbending in the literal sense of being ir-reflective, as it is incapable of 
moving beyond the fixed subject-object opposition. 
Along with Fichte and Schelling, Hegel was among the first to point 
out that Kant’s ‘philosophical reflection’ is incapable of recognising in 
itself this fixation, but can only deepen any reflection – just as we see in 
a mise en abyme.10 In a way, we see a visualisation of this process in the 
groundless abyss of duplications of the diner’s red counter in Central 
Savings in infinite reverberation [Fig. 6.1]. Therefore, within Kant’s rigid 
structure, one is incapable of overcoming the separation between subject 
and object, or between a thinking being and its object of reflection. There 
is only one way to avoid plummeting into the mise en abyme of endless 
reflection. What the process of mirroring already permits, and Estes’ 
painting confirms, Hegel also fully realised (something, too, that Derrida’s 
notion of deconstruction would later provide): that a mirror reflecting 
an object also reflects itself in that object. What Estes’ Central Savings 
overstates through its double reflections – and Kant seems to forget – is 
that reflection always ‘meets’ itself in what it reflects. For instance, if we 
look at the left side of the diner, we see how over the red counter the 
reflection of the front of the diner in the windows of the Central Savings 
bank literally ‘bends back’ to itself when it gets re-reflected onto both the 
main glass window and the silver panelling within the restaurant. The 
10 For discussion, cf. Gardner’s chapter in this volume.
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diner’s reflected façade thus meets itself and ‘sees’ this meeting reflected 
in the material off of which it originally bounced. If we assume, for the 
sake of the argument, that Estes’ painting also doubles as a traditional 
mirror onto the world, it is here most dramatically that we start to see 
it crack. It is in the moment of this ‘self­seeing’ that this painting be­
comes truly self-conscious by finding, in the whirlpool of reflections, 
not a picture of the world but an image of itself in the process of reflecting 
itself. What we see is a bouncing of sorts: a reflection of a reflection that 
gets reflected back into its mirror image. I suggest that Estes’ paintings 
provide us with a contemporary version of the shine in Dutch painting 
that so delighted Hegel.
For Hegel, thinking is a movement whereby the self, in order to think 
about itself, needs to distance the thinking­self from the self­as­object 
about which it thinks. ‘When thinking, I am free because I am not in 
another, rather, I remain utterly in my own sphere, and the object, which 
to me is the essence, is in undivided unity my being­for­myself; and my 
moving about in concepts is a movement within myself ’. Thinking about 
the self is, then, a process of seeing the self as its negative, all the while 
identifying with it. The moment of the split between us thinking about 
the self and the self as different from itself is thus a movement from divid­
ing the self to returning to the self: ‘But in point of fact self­consciousness 
is the reflection out of the being of the world of sense and perception, 
and is essentially the return from otherness … As self-consciousness, it is 
movement; but since what it distinguishes from itself is only itself as itself, 
the difference, as an otherness, is immediately superseded for it’ (Hegel 
1975, 105). The result is not understanding; it is not man who reflects 
on being but being that knows itself through man, Jean Hyppolite aptly 
remarked.11 If we translate this situation to Central Savings we could say 
that the movement occurs on two levels. 
First, we see in the process of reflection how the letters bounce off, 
distancing themselves from themselves in their mirror image – but they 
bend back to the reflective surface, and it is this return from otherness 
that is ‘seen’ by the reflection, that makes it fully self-conscious in a 
Hegelian way. The self does not just do this on its own account, but 
it senses its deepest sense of self when it recognises itself most fully 
in superseding the difference between thinking being and object of 
thought. Thinking about ourselves thinking drives us as human beings 
11 Hyppolite 1997, 84.
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forth, or as Hegel succinctly writes, ‘self­consciousness is desire itself ’ 
(Phenomenology, § 167).12
Second, Estes’ painting as a whole mimics this structure: while it is 
painting, it appears as its negative, photography, and its many reflections 
show a deep awareness of this distinction. Further adapting the structure 
of self-consciousness as a movement, this ‘reflectedness-into-self ’ (as 
Hegel writes), Central Savings allows us to see how in self­consciousness, 
photorealism’s desire has been fulfilled: faced with another reflection, it 
first lost itself (as photography), then found itself (as painting). What 
happens next is that that the self, Hegel writes, ‘has superseded the other, 
for it does not see the other as an essential being, but in the other sees 
its own self.’ Folding onto itself, it ‘lets the other again go free’ (Phenom-
enology, § 179).
The question arises as to what exactly has freed itself in Estes’ work. 
As we have seen, Estes engages with two, partly intertwining metaphors 
for painting: that of a mirror of the world and that of a window onto 
the world. By letting the diner’s window partly coincide with the picture 
frame, Central Savings attempts to unify these metaphors [Fig. 6.1]. How­
ever, it also tries to overcome the distinction between both by allowing 
the reflections of space extending behind the viewer, made visible ‘in’ 
the window, to overlay the interior of the diner. The viewer seems to be 
caught up in between these two reflecting layers. Unlike in Las Meninas 
[Fig. 6.2], where the viewpoint lying outside the pictorial space opposite 
the row of courtiers is hinted at by the reflection of the king and queen 
in the mirror, in Central Savings the viewer finds herself paradoxically 
between the diner’s window and the reflections of the bank opposite it. 
And here the mirror cracks dramatically. If this were actually a photo­
graph, the viewer would see her reflection in the diner window. This is 
what Estes denies us. In fact, we as viewing subjects do not take part in 
the spectacle that we see: the reflections we see are between the painting 
and its appearance. Rather than placing us as viewers in a position to 
‘reflect’ and thus understand this painting, Estes shows us how painting 
understands itself, neither as window nor as mirror, but as the ultimate 
self-reflection. For something has started to disappear in this process: 
painting as a medium as such.
12 For an accessible explanation of Hegel’s notion of self­consciousness, see 
Pippin 2011.
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ESSENCE ’S  OWN SH IN ING
Much has been written in recent years about art’s post­medium condi­
tion. Art works might still be driven by the modernist urge for purity 
(if that ever existed) but art forms have become conflated to such an 
extent that one can no longer make clear distinctions between media. 
Art’s essence, therefore, must be found outside a specific medium. Estes’ 
painting has conflated the media of photography and painting, yet it has 
done so on the basis of another medium, that of philosophical reflection. 
Painting has recognised itself as photography in painting and as paint­
ing in photography, and all the while photography has equally emerged 
and appeared as painting. Both moments of reflection have been made 
possible by a third medium, that of reflection itself. This has enabled 
Estes – wittingly or unwittingly – to make a rather bold statement. He 
presents painting and photography not as opposites but as two sequential 
periods in the overall movement towards a perfect recording of reality (or 
essential copy, as Ernst Gombrich would have it). Estes’ work, and that of 
his followers, suggest that photography has continued painting’s project 
within the larger history of realistic representation, within which it first 
alienated itself from painting as its negation, then ultimately merged with 
it in photorealism, all the while retaining its otherness in the process of 
identification. In Hegelian terms, Estes’ statement belongs not longer to 
philosophical reflection but to speculative reflection, which is character­
ised by a boldness to think through oppositions. Hegel defines speculative 
reflection as the movement of reflecting itself-into-itself, when it becomes 
the totality embracing both reflection-into-self and reflection-into-other.13 
In this spectacularly ambiguous clash, something has been set free. What 
trompe l’œil painting always confirms, in its self-aware play with its being 
and its nothingness – its objecthood – is for photorealism no longer of 
any consequence, as the issue of its materiality or medium is vanishing. 
Attempting to define essence, Hegel writes in Science and Logic that the 
negation of essence is shine, as it is nothing in and of itself. However, as 
we have seen with Kalf ’s still life painting, shine is not something that 
is external to essence, but is deeply linked to it. The shine we see (in 
Kalf ’s still life or in the appearance of objects) is essence’s own shining. 
13 Gasché 2007, 63. 
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‘This shining of essence within it is reflection’, Hegel explains. In the 
immediacy of shine we see, in fact, being, or rather, being’s nothingness. 
Being is shine, Hegel writes, but he warns that ‘it is not that there is a 
shine of being in essence, or a shine of essence in being: the shine in the 
essence is not the shine of an other, but is rather shine as such, the shine of 
essence itself ’.14 We could say that in the very shine of Estes’ painting, we 
see the essence of painting, which is, according to photorealism, neither 
its materiality – despite Greenberg’s lifelong argument – nor its subject 
matter but, as Hegel pointed out, its capacity to reflect, to think.
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ROBERT  P I PP IN
HEGEL ON PAINTING
Hegel’s approach to the arts in his various Berlin lectures puts him in 
a unique position to address two very ambitious questions. First, given 
some view of the purpose and value of the practice of art making and art 
appreciating, what does it mean and what sense can we make out of the 
fact that there are different arts: visual, literary, musical? Second, what 
does it mean and what sense can we make of the fact that the ideals and 
standards of art making change so dramatically in different societies and 
at different times? These are the two ways Hegel organises his account: 
systematically and historically. Of course, the answer to both questions 
might well be: we can make no sense out of the variety of the arts. That 
is a contingent and wholly accidental fact that raises no interesting philo­
sophical question. And while the second question – what does it mean 
that aesthetic ideals change? – might be an interesting question, it too 
is not a philosophical or ‘aesthetics’ question and is not relevant to any 
interrogation of the nature and value of art in itself. It is a question for 
social historians and for them alone.1
Both of these issues are in play in Hegel’s account of the nature and 
significance of painting. Structurally, in one of Hegel’s beloved hierar­
chies, painting is to be understood as ‘between’ sculpture and music, 
doing, in some sense or other, better what sculpture is committed to 
doing, even as music, in some sense or other, does better what paint­
ing attempts. And, as is well known, Hegel’s historical schema claims a 
1 This is claimed, for example, in the first chapter of Wollheim 1987. For 
examples of what he is opposing (both of which show, to my mind, that the 
considerations behind Wollheim’s rejection are far too narrow and question­
begging), see Gehlen 1960 and Clark 1999. Wollheim’s ‘psychological’ theory 
depends on an isolation of the individual mindedness, that of the artists, which 
seems arbitrary and poorly motivated.
historical progression from symbolic to classical to romantic art. Painting 
is the ‘first’ romantic art, the art of a dawning modernity.2
At the basis of all such claims is one issue that emerges in Hegel’s 
account of painting. It is quite distinctive, potentially of great significance 
and deserves a hearing on its own. That issue is what he means by the 
role of the inner, or inwardness, or subjectivity, Innerlichkeit, uniquely in 
painting. What dimension of human subjectivity is manifest in, or made 
more comprehensible by, painting? Only an answer to this question could 
make it possible to understand what it might mean to ‘rate’ any treat­
ment of such a subject matter with respect to, for example, music. In the 
following I try to provide a preliminary answer to such a basic question.
First we need a survey of Hegel’s most important claims about paint­
ing. Some of them are extraordinarily unusual, and his treatment of Euro­
pean painting is highly selective. For example, the great French painters 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries play no role whatsoever: no 
Poussin, Chardin, Greuze, Gros, or even David;3 Hegel instead con­
centrates on Italian, German and Northern European, especially Dutch, 
painting, with an occasional reference to the Spanish.4 His main thesis 
2 We should pause to note the obvious: that Hegel’s two approaches – histori­
cal, and genre­systematic – do not always line up all that well. Hegel certainly 
does not believe that the only real art the classical age had was sculpture. It 
had literature, obviously, but because of a merely preliminary understanding 
of subjectivity, it could not produce what literature as a genre can best do, 
something finally realised in modern lyric poetry. I take no position here on 
the value or implications of such categorical problems and will concentrate on 
the core of his claim about painting.
3 This is all the more striking since there are plenty of comments about 
French drama, music, poetry and even French criticism. Hegel refers several 
times to Goethe’s translation of Diderot’s Essai sur la peinture. And Hegel did 
visit Paris in August of 1827. Yet there are still no references to French painting 
in the 1828/1829 lectures.
4 There is a large issue that I do not have the space to discuss (cf. the chapters 
in this volume by Rush and Grootenboer): namely, Hegel’s treatment of Dutch 
paintings (at least in Hotho’s compilation, although the remarks occur in the 
1826 lectures as well), and what appear to be his very positive remarks about 
the likes of van Eyck, Hemling and Scorel – remarks that seem happily resigned 
to mere displays of skill, and the portrayal of the self satisfactions (‘coziness’, 
‘cheerfulness’, ‘comfort’) of the rising bourgeoisie. See Hegel 1975, 598; 2013a, II: 
225–227. But Rutter 2010 has shown that this would be a very hasty inference. 
Occasionally an air of ‘repugnance’ creeps into Hegel’s account. 
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is stated directly at the outset. While classical sculpture does allow some 
manifestation of what he calls ‘a character’s spiritual individuality’, so 
that a Greek statue can be said to be ‘enlivened’, to manifest an inner life 
(compared with Egyptian statuary, for example), the mode of expression 
is limited to a material, external form, and the limitations of that exter­
nal form – marble, stone, clay, bronze – do not truly or fully allow the 
expression of a ‘person’s own subjective inwardness, the life of his heart 
[Figs. 7.1 and 7.2],5 the soul of his most personal feelings’ [Der Punkt der 
inneren Subjektivität, die Lebendigkeit des Gemüts, die Seele der eigensten 
Empfindung]. Accordingly, we can admire and study classical sculpture, 
but it ultimately leaves us cold.6 [Fig. 7.1] [Fig. 7.2]
To quote Hegel (1975, 797 – my emphasis; 2013a, III: 17):
For this reason we are at once more at home in painting. Painting, 
that is to say, opens the way for the first time to the principle of finite 
and inherently [in sich] infinite subjectivity, the principle of our own 
life and existence, and in paintings we see what is effective and active in 
ourselves [was in uns selber wirkt und tätig ist].
This last line sums up in a very compressed way Hegel’s main claim and 
sets the task: what is it to see an ‘in itself infinite subjectivity’, and so what 
is effective and active in us, in a painting, if that painting is a work of art?
Hegel will go on to claim later that it is precisely painting’s advantage 
in these respects, its ability to make visible this subjectivity, especially in 
its affective dimension [die Seele der eigensten Empfindung], which is also 
its limitation. Only some aspects of this self­related subjectivity can be 
made visible, and these aspects do not embody the ‘deeper truth’ of such 
subjectivity, a truth that cannot be fully manifest materially, visibly. (This 
will have something to do with Hegel’s famous claim that art, all art, has 
become for us a ‘thing of the past’.) This is largely due to the characteristic 
5 Knox almost always translates Gemüt as ‘heart’. Here the ‘liveliness of his 
temperament’ could also serve as a translation, even ‘the liveliness of his mind’.
6 For the point, cf. Heimann’s unpublished Nachschrift of the Vorlesung über 
die Philosophie der Kunst, edited by ed. N. Hebing: I refer here to p. 159 of the 
manuscript. I am grateful to Niklas Hebing, Birgit Sandkaulker and the Hegel 
Archiv for making this transcription available to me, and refer to it as ‘Hebing 
MS’ in the footnotes that follow (nn. 8, 11, 14 and 23). On the ways in which, 
according to Hegel, classical art must leave us ‘cold’, cf. Squire’s chapter to this 
volume, p. 128.
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7.1  Limestone Egyptian statue of Kai­pu­ptah and Ipep from Giza,  
c. 2400 BC (height 56 cm). Vienna: Kunsthistorisches Museum, inv. 7444. 
Wikimedia Commons.
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7.2  Greek bronze statue of a victorious athlete, c. 300–100 BC (height 151.5 cm). 
Los Angeles: Getty Villa, inv. 77.AB. 30. © The J. Paul Getty Museum: 
Villa Collection, Malibu.
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of self-conscious subjectivity that Hegel calls ‘infinity’. This is his way of 
insisting that the self ’s relation to itself in its experience is not a dyadic or 
subject­object relation. The self to which the self is related is the relating 
self. The relation is circular, not bi­polar, and so Hegel invokes the image 
of infinity. We shall return to the topic, but his canonical formulation is 
the following (Hegel 1975, 154; 2013a, I: 204–205):7
The animation [Beseelung] and life of spirit alone is free infinity; as 
such, the spirit in real existence is self­relating as something inner 
[für sich selbst als Inneres ist], because in its manifestation it reverts 
into itself and remains at home with itself. To spirit alone, therefore, 
is it given to impress the stamp of its own infinity and free return 
into itself upon its external manifestation.
By contrast, music’s mode of sensible embodiment is more adequate to 
less determinately material or visual dimensions of self­conscious subjec­
tivity, and poetry ultimately relies on a sensible embodiment that is even 
more ‘ideal’, in Hegel’s terms, relying on mere signs, a materiality with 
no inherent or natural connection to content.8 The trajectory is a greater 
degree of abstraction or ideality and more purely conceptual complexity, 
and so, in that sense, greater ‘success’, greater justice to such ‘in itself 
infinite subjectivity’.9 And this trajectory parallels, in the various material 
possibilities of outer expression, and in the changing subject matters ap­
propriate to any such materiality, greater and greater expressive adequacy 
7 See also the references to Hegel’s discussion of the subjectivity/infinity con­
nection in n. 18 below.
8 Cf. Hebing MS, pp. 163–165.
9 In one sense more abstract, because it transforms what Hegel calls ‘real ob­
jectivity’ into ‘intellectual objectivity’, and this largely because it is not bound 
to three­dimensional representation. It is an ‘abstract’ representation of three­
dimensionality (Hegel 1975, 796). But in another sense, spatial form is itself 
‘the most abstract thing in nature”’(Hegel 1975, 807) and so painting is in that 
sense less abstract, because ‘it is called on to express the inner life particularized 
in itself and therefore possessed of a wealth of varied specifications’. Cf. the 
contrast with sculpture in this regard (where sculpture’s materiality is called 
abstract, and contrasted with the particularity available for representation in 
painting), in the 1823 lecture notes of Hotho (see VPKN 1820/1821 and VPKN 
1823). See also VPKN 1820/1821, 155: ‘die Malerie ist eine abstrakte Kunst’. For 
more on the more modern notion of abstraction and its relevance to Hegel, see 
also Pippin 2002.
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in doing justice to what he also sometimes calls ‘Innigkeit’, or a self­related 
inwardness in its proper relation to the outer that has the connotation 
of ‘intimacy’ or ardour. (One could say: Innerlichkeit as ‘felt’ is the proper 
domain of painting.) As Hegel understands the issues, painting, as the 
first romantic art, is thus the first appropriate art of modernity, the first 
aesthetic manifestation of the ‘truth of such a self­related subjectivity, 
where ‘first’ means first in both the historical and systematic series Hegel 
has proposed.10
However, we should also note that Hegel is not completely consistent 
on the status of painting as a kind of prelude for, or initial version of, 
music and poetry. That dimension of subjectivity appropriate to paint­
ing he calls the ‘concentration of spirit in itself ’ (Hegel 1975, 815; 2013a, 
III: 40 – die Konzentration des Geistes in sich). We are not in a position to 
know what this means yet, but we do know from this passage that music’s 
greater abstraction, its near mathematical form, does not allow much of 
an external, perceptible manifestation of inner life (its materiality is more 
that of a vehicle), and poetry too can only provide something Hegel calls 
‘incomplete’. Painting alone can allow a full expression in the external of 
‘complete [affective or felt] inwardness [self­intimacy]’ [volle Innigkeit]. 
It is even able to make manifest something of the general significance 
of some ‘feeling’, even while portraying a concrete particular. These – a 
dialectical unity of inner and outer, and between universal and particu­
lar – sound like supreme Hegelian desiderata in general, and they would 
seem to elevate painting’s status, at least above the arts the materiality or 
externality of which is merely as a vehicle or even arbitrary.11
There is much more to Hegel’s account of painting than the central 
questions just summarised: What is the content or subject matter that 
is uniquely appropriate to painting? (Not to mention: is there one? That 
is, one?) And its subsequent implications: How is that subject matter 
apparent in religious, landscape, genre and portrait painting? Of what 
significance is painting’s capacity to express such content, or why is it 
important that painting be able to do this? Hegel has a lot of things to 
10 Another unmanageably large issue: one of the many synonyms for the 
Hegelian notion of modernity, especially important here, is ‘Christianity’. He 
is not referring primarily to post­sixteenth century Europe.
11 In the 1828/1829 lectures (Nachscrift Heimann), Hegel stresses such a point 
himself: ‘Das Schöne ist Allgemeines und besondres, Äußerliches, und nicht getrennt, 
sondern auf eine Weise, wo beide Bestimmungen sich verbinden’ (Hebing Manu­
script, p. 18)
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say about many other topics, such as two­dimensionality, colour, the 
differences between classical art and modern (understood as essentially 
Christian) art, and, as we have seen, about which European paintings 
best fulfil this distinctive purpose of painting, and, ultimately, about the 
fate of painting.12 But it is already very clear that he has a unique, radical 
and so quite controversial answer to a traditional question in aesthetics: 
given that not every painting or drawing, perhaps not every painting hung 
in a museum, is an art work, when, under what conditions, is a paint­
ing an art work? That answer is: when it involves a distinct treatment 
of a distinct subject matter. Such a claim about a subject matter is what 
makes Hegel’s claim so unusual. Painting can make appear (‘shine’),13 
can render in visible and ‘lively’ form the ‘liveliness’ of subjectivity or 
mindedness in its self­relatedness, a more abstract or logical term for 
human self­consciousness. That distinctive subject matter is described 
in such a wide variety of ways that it is a daunting task simply to arrive 
at some overview of these multiple descriptions of what he appears to 
think amount to variations on the same theme. 
In the first place, we can note that Hegel’s treatment of the issue of 
this subject matter sets his account off from many post­Kantian accounts, 
and this not merely because he is exclusively interested in fine art, not 
the beauty of nature. For while he freely uses the language of beauty (as 
in ‘the spiritual beauty’ [geistige Schönheit] in Raphael’s Madonnas), he 
also makes clear that beauty as such, and any putative distinct aesthetic 
pleasure in the beautiful, at least as these are traditionally understood, 
are not his topics, not what he regards as significant in art works. He tells 
us that ‘above all it is not the visible beauty [sinnliche Schönheit] of the 
figures but the spiritual animation [geistige Beseelung] whereby mastery is 
displayed and which leads to the mastery of the presentation (1975, 801; 
2013a, III: 21). In the 1820/1821 lectures, he notes, as if the claim were 
unproblematic (he declares it bekannt) that the beautiful is the represen­
tation of the true (VPKN, 23). While Hegel agrees with Kant that what 
is distinctive in aesthetic appreciation is that all practical or ‘interested’ 
relations to either the object or the scene depicted or to the art object 
have been suspended or cancelled, he is willing to go much farther than 
Kant’s disinterestedness as such, in characterising this non­practical 
relation, and claim that the art work requires of us a ‘wholly theoretical’ 
12 For a helpful discussion of these elements and more, see Houlgate 2000, 
61–82.
13 On the significance of the word, see Grootenboer’s chapter in this volume.
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[ganz theoretisch] response (Hegel 1975, 835; 2013a, III: 64).14 For Kant, of 
course, going anywhere near such an intellectual response in aesthetic 
appreciation would be to confuse determining and reflective judgment 
and so reduce the aesthetic response to treating the object as an instance 
of a concept, missing completely the element of ‘free play’ that makes 
it distinctive. But, as is clear throughout all versions of the lectures, by 
‘theoretisch’, Hegel does not mean straightforward concept application 
(much less scientific or empirical inquiry), but (and here a major question 
for his account, since this claim is hardly self­evident) he means a still 
sensible and affective recognition of lived dimensions of human subjectivity in 
their ‘liveliness’, something apparent already in his reference to spiritual 
animation, geistige Beseelung. Whatever such appreciation is, it involves 
something very different from the mere application of the ‘concept of 
liveliness’. For one thing, Hegel’s whole architectonic (with regard to 
‘Absolute Spirit’) assumes that the aesthetic manner of contemplative 
regard is different from the representational (or religious) manner, and 
the conceptual (philosophical) manner. A typical passage occurs in his 
discussion of poetry, which he credits, as he does all the arts, for over­
coming any ‘separation [Trennung] of feeling and vision from … intel­
lectual thinking’, and, in achieving this ‘liberation’ from ‘that separation 
between thinking, which is concentrated on the universal, and feeling and 
vision, which seize on the individual’, poetry and the other arts achieve 
the expression of ‘concrete liveliness [konkrete Lebendigkeit]’, and so a 
‘reconciliation [Versöhnung] with the universality of thought’ (1975, 1006; 
2013a, III: 281–282).15 These desiderata of art as such are most adequately 
realised in one way in Greek art, and in another, quite different way, in 
lyric poetry. Clearly, this assumes that there is a way for our intellectual 
or theoretical capacities to be engaged in such a sensible and affective 
appreciation of spiritual liveliness – one can even say here what it feels 
14 There is a more detailed discussion of Kant in Hegel’s 1820/1821 lectures: 
VPKN (1820/1821), 27–30; cf. also Hebing MS, pp. 16–18.
15 At Hegel 1975, 1128 (2013a, III: 437–438), Hegel is well aware of the Kantian 
problem. He notes that a philosopher (at least a philosophising ‘at peace with 
itself [berühigte]’) may ‘animate’ his understanding with his ‘feeling’, and ex­
change a mere philosophical comprehension with ‘the free play [freies Spiel] of 
particular aspects’. Schiller is his example. He also notes that art must ‘con­
ceal [verbergen]’ this ‘inner’ sensible unity lest art ‘fall into the prosaic tone of 
expounding them didactically’. There is a sense in which this is not all that 
different from Kant. See Pippin 1996.
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like to be a self­conscious being, how that dimension is ‘lived’ – and in a 
way that denies any strict distinction between determining and reflective 
judgments, which in turn denies (as he does vigorously and constantly 
since the first Jena writings) any putative strict logical separation of con­
cept and intuition in any experience, any claim that they are independent 
contributors to experience. That topic, far and away the most important 
topic in Hegel’s relation to Kant, would take us far afield16. What we need 
now is just to note that for Hegel art works can compel our attention in 
a way that involves some sort of epistemic component – a recognitional 
component in which we ‘sensibly­affectively’ experience important di­
mensions of our own subjectivity, now concretely expressed, and so 
engage in a kind of attempt at self­knowledge – the modality of which 
is tied to the unique embodiment of human subjectivity available in art.
But what is that unique embodiment? It is the embodiment of ‘self­
related subjectivity [für sich seiende Subjektivität]’ (1975, 802; 2013a, III: 24). 
Hegel is here specifying a dimension available to painting as a romantic 
art that is a specification of the general task he assigned to all art early 
in the introduction (1975, 30; 2013a, I: 51):17
Things in nature are only immediate and single, while man as 
spirit duplicates himself [verdoppelt sich], in that (i) he is as things 
in nature are, but (ii) he is just as much for himself; he sees himself, 
represents himself to himself, thinks, and only on the strength of 
this active placing himself before himself is he spirit [nur durch dies 
tätige Fürsichsein Geist ist].
Stated in another summary way (1975, 31; 2013a, I: 52):
16 See Pippin 1989, 2005 and 2014.
17 The passage specifies what has to be called a double doubling for Geist. First 
Geist distinguishes itself from its natural being, and so exists as both a natural 
and ‘spiritual’ being (what he will later call an ‘amphibian’), and second, Geist 
as such is ‘double’, or as conscious, always also self­conscious, in an unusual 
self­relation. Painting will also have a version of this dual doubleness. It de­
picts an object, but also expresses the artist’s ‘take’ or view on the object. And 
the beholder as well stands in a relation to the object both visually and also 
reflectively or ‘theoretically’, in the sense of aesthetic intelligibility I think Hegel 
is struggling to make clear. And any such dimension is also itself potentially 
self­conscious, as in philosophical aesthetics.
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The universal need for art, that is to say, is man’s rational need
to lift the inner and outer world into his spiritual consciousness as
an object in which he recognizes [widererkennt] again his own self. 
It is important to emphasise here that Hegel is saying that there is a 
crucial link between our own duality or self­relatedness and the duality 
in painting, essentially between whatever is depicted, and its ‘Schein’ or 
appearance, the distinctive way it shows up for the artist and us, the ‘take’ 
on it by the artist, made available to us. Only a self-conscious or reflective 
being can see a painted canvas as a painting, because only such a being can 
see both the physical properties of the object and the ‘mindedness’ inher­
ent in its appearance. As he says in the 1820/1821 lectures, echoing the 
‘widererkennt’ above, ‘the connection between us and the beautiful is that 
we see the nature of our own essence [die Nature unseres eigenen Wesens] in 
the beautiful’ (VPKN, 29–30). That essence is our own duality, the way we 
show up for ourselves in various self­conceptions that are not the result 
of any self­observation, any immediate presence of the self to itself, but 
since not immediate, always involve some not yet fulfilled realisation.18 
We are not simply what we are, or we need some self­conception to be 
what we are, in a way analogous to how a painting, or an object depicted 
in it, is not simply what it is, as it would be in ordinary experience. It is 
‘lifted’ out of nature in that sense and ‘idealised’.19 (One of the core claims 
in Hegel is that any such self­relatedness remains incomplete apart from 
its relation to another self­consciousness. This dimension is present in 
paintings­as­manifestations­of­subjectivity in the address to a beholder 
implicit in all paintings displayed or shown – i.e. all paintings. But this 
relation can only be proleptic and implicit in painting. It can be said to 
address us, but that address cannot be iterated in response to us.) What 
is so distinctive about painting is that it can make all this not only visible, 
but sensible in an affective sense as well. This is a difficult point to which 
we shall be returning frequently.
18 Cf. Pinkard 2017 and his language about what ‘shows up’ for us: this as 
something in the world, not the result of subjective projection.
19 As in the passage just quoted and Hegel 1975, 49 (2013a, I: 75).): ‘Of course 
we may often hear favourite phraseology [beliebte Redensart] about man’s duty 
to remain in immediate unity with nature; but such unity, in its abstraction, is 
purely and simply rudeness and ferocity, and by dissolving this unity for man, 
art lifts him with gentle hands out of and above imprisonment in nature [hebt 
ihn mit milden Händen über die Naturbefangenheit hinweg]’.
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The self recognised is said most often to be Gemüt, the human emo­
tional experience of the human, or ‘heart’, that dimension of its status 
as Geist (primarily ‘feeling’, captured best, as noted, by Innigkeit, where 
such a feeling is a kind of self­‘intimacy’), but it is often given a uniquely 
Hegelian gloss. A little later he characterises painting’s subject matter 
as ‘a reflection of spirit [Wiederschein des Geistes] in which the spirit only 
reveals its spiritual quality [seine Geistigkeit] by cancelling [aufhebt] the 
real existent and transforming it into a mere shining [Scheinen, or mani­
festing or seeming] of the spiritual [im Geistigen] for the spiritual’ (1975, 
805; 2013a, III: 27). This prepares the way for him to explain how such 
self­related subjectivity is ‘really’ the subject matter of painting even if 
the paining is a landscape or still life.
One more element: the ‘active for­itselfness’ [tätige Fürsichsein] men­
tioned earlier is characterised as a process of self­alienation in the external 
or material (in several dimensions throughout many aspects of Hegel’s 
work), and a return to itself. It has thus achieved, through some sort of 
struggle, which has presumably left some sort of visual and so pictorial 
traces, a ‘for itself ’ determinacy, a self­conception, that is, uniquely for 
humans (see the contrast above with things of nature) self­constituting 
(as above), and only thereby is ‘Geist’. The formula is: ‘the spiritual inner 
life … can come into appearance in the external only as retiring into itself 
out of it [die nur im Äußeren kann zum Vorschein kommen, als aus demselben 
in sich hineingehend]’ (1975, 805; 2013a, III: 27).20 [Fig. 7.3]
20 This notion of a self­constituting self­relation as human subjectivity helps 
explain Hegel’s highly unusual comments about the chief ‘physical element’ of 
painting: light. Light is said to be ‘pure identity with itself and therefore purely 
self­reposing, the earliest ideality, the original self of nature’. Light illuminates 
the painting; it does not move it or push or change it; it is not in a material 
relation to the object, but is the element within which, by virtue of which, the 
object can be what it is, intelligible; the relation is thus ‘ideal’. That is, it is the 
necessary element whereby the painting can be actually what it is potentially: 
visible. In different lights, the painting is different. The relation of the self to 
the self is also not a material but an ideal relation. That is, it is not a subject­
object relation (or observational) in a similar sense. Self­understanding allows 
Geist to be what it is as Geist, a self­constituting being; it is what it takes itself 
to be, is what it is only in the ‘light’ of this self­regard, and in that sense is an 
ideal being. In the 1823 lectures, Hegel calls light ‘subjective nature’ and ‘the 
physical I’ (VPKN, 473).
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This adds yet another layer to that dimension of subjective self­related­
ness available in painting. A revealing, if not quite typical, example of such 
a ‘return’ for Hegel is Correggio’s Mary Magdelene in Dresden – lost during 
the Second World War [Fig. 7.3]. The strange­sounding kind of ‘doubleness’ 
in the subjectivity represented best by painting, that externalisation and then 
return to inner repose, is described in her case as the depiction of a repentant 
sinner about whom we can say, ‘now’, or post­repentance, that the sin was 
not a true expression of her, not seriously [daß es ihr mit der Sünde nicht Ernst 
ist], even though only the rejection of sin could have made that clear. His 
full description of this ‘return to herself ’ is (1975, 868; 2013a, III: 106–107): 
The artist has left no traces of reflection on one of the circumstances 
which could hint back [zurückdeuten] to sin and guilt; she is uncon­
scious of those times, absorbed [vertieft] only in her present situation, 
and this faith, this sensitiveness, this absorption [Versinken] seems to 
be her entire and real character.
7.3  Antonio Allegri da Correggio, Mary Magdalen Reading in a Landscape, 
c. 1522 (29 × 39 cm). Oil on canvas. Formerly in Dresden (Staatliche Kunst­
sammlungen, Gemaeldegalerie Alte Meister, inv. 154), destroyed in the  
Second World War. © Alinari / Art Resource, New York.
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The implication is that nothing about her true nature, her ‘eigentlicher, 
ganzer Charakter’, could have been immediately or simply represented, 
and so her (or anyone’s) real character is apparent not in any representa­
tion of purity or innocence, in sinlessness or simple passive oubli de soi, 
but only in the results of a struggle with and rejection of (in this case) 
sin, a rejection that shows that even when sinning, she was no ‘sinner’.21 
Only thereby can the return to herself be marked by a confidence and 
self­possession so complete as to allow this visible mark of genuineness, 
deep absorption. To follow Hegel, we have to believe that in the painting 
itself – in, literally, what we can see – Mary Magdalene is neither inno­
cent, nor a guilty ex­sinner, nor self­deceived about her sinful past; that 
she has ‘returned’ to her self in a way marked by such self­possession 
that her complete absorption in the reading is a capacity she has earned 
or achieved. The genuineness of her self-understanding is reflected by 
her confident immersion in the book; shameless in her half-naked state 
and without a naïve indifference to death or the sufferings of Christ. 
I think one can see what he means. This is a valuable marker of the 
double or reflected subjectivity that Hegel singles out as the true object 
of painting. (That Mary’s absorption is not simple self­forgetfulness, but 
an implicitly self­related and achieved genuineness is partly achieved by 
her nakedness not manifesting innocence but something like a mature 
absence of shame, given what she has been though. Not a self­evident 
point, I concede.) 7.4
Another good example is given later, when Hegel discusses Raphael’s 
Transfiguration [Fig. 7.4]. He notes that the painting’s unity has been 
criticised because it seems two paintings stuck together, Christ’s ascen­
sion above, and the chaos surrounding the afflicted, blind child below. 
But Hegel speaks again of a ‘double action’, a duality that is actually a 
unity. The end of Christ’s visible presence on earth is also the beginning 
of his (higher, more ‘ideal’) spiritual presence, as he says, ‘wherever two 
or three are gathered’ in his name. He notes the two pointing gestures, 
one up towards Christ and the other towards the child, are indications 
of how Christ’s transcendence is fully compatible with his immanent 
presence, and so even the love of God for mankind requires the ‘logical’ 
21 This example carries more weight for Hegel than can be discussed here. It is 
a crucial example in his discussion of ‘The essentialities and determinations of 
reflection’ in the Logic of Essence, the second book of The Science of Logic, when 
Hegel tries to explain the claim in a remark that ‘the positive and the negative 
are the same’ (cf. Hegel 1999 and Hegel 2010).
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7.4  Raphael, Transfiguration, 1516–1520 (405 cm × 278 cm). Tempera on wood. 
Vatican: Pinacoteca Vaticana. Photograph reproduced by kind permission 
of the Archiv, Institut für Klassische Archäologie und Museum Klassischer 
Abgüsse, Ludwig­Maximilians­Universität, Munich.
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structure of separation or otherness as well as indwelling unity (1975, 
860; 2013a, III: 96).22
But Hegel does not stay at this level of abstraction. Another step 
greatly specifies this ‘subject matter’ and it quickly makes his position 
sound extreme and implausible. In explaining further this notion of 
‘withdrawing’ out of its suffering and into itself, and in contrasting the 
‘peaceful repose’ [ein stilles Ausruhen] of Greek heroes with the ‘bliss’ 
[Seligkeit] visible in painting (a bliss possible only after ‘conflict and 
agony’ and when a soul has ‘triumphed over its sufferings’),23 Hegel says 
something he repeats several times thereafter: that religious or ‘passion­
less’ [leidenschaftslos] love is the true, ideal subject matter of all painting. 
So the very best subject matter for painting, wherein it can best be what 
painting is (that is, in his typical formulation, when painting agrees 
with itself, when it is what painting essentially is) is in the depiction of 
‘the reconciliation of the individual heart with God’. Stated with all the 
flourishes (1975, 816; 2013a, III: 41):
The soul wills itself, but it wills itself in something other than what 
it is in its individuality and therefore it gives itself up in the face of 
God [sie gibt sich deshalb auf gegen Gott] in order to find and enjoy itself 
in him. This is characteristic of love, spiritual depth [Innigkeit] in its 
truth, that religious love without desire which gives to the human 
spirit reconciliation [Versöhnung], peace, and bliss [Seligkeit].
This contrast between Greek and modern art is interesting in itself. Hegel 
goes on to explain the inadequate notion of death in the Greek form of 
life, and the absence of religious love, as a further explanation of why 
sculpture is the ideal art of the Greeks, and painting is an essentially 
Christian art. But the subject matter claim is the essential one, and he 
goes very far with it (1975, 824; 2013a, III: 51).24:
22 The painting could even be read as a Hegelian allegory about the self­
transcendence of painting as an art. Christ’s physical departure opens the 
possibility of a higher spiritual presence in the communal life of Geist. He is 
‘seen’ more truthfully by the blind boy. This at least suggests something about 
the transcendence of painting in music and poetry.
23 Cf. also Hebing MS, p. 166.
24 Cf. also Hegel 1975, 539–540 (2013a, II: 155): ‘The true essence of love consists 
in giving up the consciousness of oneself, forgetting oneself in another self, 
yet in this surrender and oblivion having and possessing oneself alone. This 
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As the most perfect [vollkommensten] subject for painting I have 
already specified inwardly satisfied love, the object of which is not a 
purely spiritual ‘beyond’ [Jenseits] but is present, so that we can see 
love itself before us in what is loved. The supreme and unique form 
of this love is Mary’s love for the Christ-child …
Where does this all leave us? It first leaves us with a dizzying array of 
claims, all of which Hegel clearly thinks are related, and onto the same 
answer. Consider what we have seen: that painting ‘opens the way for the 
first time to the principle of finite and inherently infinite subjectivity’; that 
our relation to painting should be understood as ‘theoretical’, but in a way 
that presumes no ‘separation’ between the affective and the intellectual, 
and that involves a self­recognition on the part of the beholder; that paint­
ing concerns itself with ‘spiritual liveliness’ and ‘spirit’s concentration in 
itself ’; that the subject matter of painting is self­related subjectivity, an 
‘active for­itselfness’; or it is the human heart, temperament or Gemüt; 
that every painting transforms any ‘real existent’ into the spiritual; that 
this self­related subjectivity is, must be, the result of a withdrawal from 
some external suffering into a repose with itself; only thereby is it what 
it is; and that the paradigm instance of all these apparently disparate 
versions of such achieved self­conscious subjectivity is religious love, 
primarily of the Madonna for the Christ child.
Obviously, the first thing to say is that, assuming we can understand 
how all these accounts come to fruition in the claim about religious love, in 
what sense should we understand this account not to be an account of one 
type of painting, religious paintings about human­divine love, but as an ac­
count of what painting, with regard to its distinctness as an art, actually is?
Consider first, landscapes. How does Hegel include landscapes within 
what he calls ‘the absolute spiritual ideal’ as ‘the essential subject matter 
of painting’ [des absoluten geistigen Ideals als des wesentlichsten Inhaltes der 
romantischen Malerei] (1975, 831; 2013a, III: 60)? When Hegel contrasts 
an ordinary experience of a landscape with a painted landscape, he em­
phasises again that ‘what’ is being painted is not the landscape itself; is 
not a mere carefully mimetic representation of the world, at least not if 
the image is a work of fine art.25 The subject matter is actually, still, some 
reconciliation of the spirit with itself and the completion of itself to a totality 
is the Absolute …’
25 Stated more formally at Hegel 1975, 155 (2013a, I: 205): ‘Thus the truth of art 
cannot be mere correctness, to which the so­called imitation of nature is restricted; 
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dimension of human subjectivity, or in this case the affective, emotional 
meaning of the natural world, selected and displayed just this way so 
as to manifest various experiential states. In this sense the ‘objects’ of 
a landscape painting are not the mountains, rivers, or forests depicted, 
but a kind of significance that we can only see when nature is ‘doubled’, 
transformed into an appearance or ‘showing’ of such spirituality, a Schein. 
That is what a landscape painter does. In that respect his goal is not the 
conformity of the painting with nature but to show ‘the correspondence 
of the portrayed object with itself ’, which is said to be ‘reality ensouled 
for itself ’ [die für sich beseelte Realität ist] (1975, 834; 2013a, III: 63); that is, 
with what it is in its true (affective) significance. So even natural objects 
can be said to be both just what they are, in their immediate being, and 
reflected as what they truly are in their affective meaning, when treated as 
objects of painting. That is what he means by reality ‘ensouled for itself ’. 
It is ensouled because it is affectively intelligible; it means something 
affectively, and a great landscape can evoke that affective intelligibility 
in the scene; and so can avoid the implication of any mere subjective 
projection. Its intelligibility, its availability for a form of sensible or af­
fective intelligibility, is its ‘soul’, its ‘life’.26 Of course, such a notion of 
affective intelligibility assumes such controversial matters as there being 
intentional content to affective states, not to mention no ‘separation’ be­
tween thought and feeling, and those assumptions are worthy of several 
independent discussions.
Moreover, we are natural beings as well, and we experience in land­
scapes what Hegel calls an ‘echo of the heart’ [einen Anklang an das Gemüt] 
in the ‘free liveliness [Lebendigkeit] of nature’, liveliness being another 
synonym for ensouled, or intelligible in this emotionally available way. 
Moreover, Hegel emphasises the way a painted landscape can isolate and 
emphasise what he is willing to call the spiritual dimensions of nature, 
which is experienced by us as a correspondence of ‘Stimmungen’, moods 
in one sense, but a kind of natural attunement in a broader sense, a fit 
between an experienced emotion and some objective correlate. This is 
the affective-sensible version of the ‘fit’ between our demand for intel­
ligibility and the world’s being intelligible, the supreme principle of 
on the contrary, the outer must harmonize with an inner which is harmonious in 
itself, and, just on that account, can reveal itself as itself in the outer’.
26 In the 1823 lectures, Hegel remarks on how painting, more than any other 
art, combines the ‘two extremes’: the interests of the object, and the interests 
of subjective art (VPKN, 474).
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Hegel’s idealism, expressed most rigorously in his Science of Logic and 
in his confidence that the forms of thought just are the forms of being.
We are clearly dangerously deep into the distinctive vocabulary of 
Hegel’s speculative philosophy, but we can appreciate what he is after by 
concentrating on the fact that painting turns anything from what it is 
ordinarily or unreflectively experienced as into a ‘showing’ of something, 
a Schein. This is what he had meant in the passage, some of which was 
quoted earlier (1975, 805; 2013a, III: 27):
So painting does indeed work for our vision, but in a way that the 
object it presents does not remain an actual total spatial natural ex­
istent but becomes a reflection of spirit [Wiederschein des Geistes] in 
which the spirit only reveals its spiritual quality [seine Geistigkeit] by 
cancelling [aufhebt] the real existent and transforming it into a mere 
shining [Scheinen] of the spiritual [im Geistigen] for the spiritual. 
This claim allows us to connect the doubleness of painting [Wiederschein] 
– the fact that at work in an art painting is both the object depicted and 
the painter’s reflection of that object, and thereby what it shows itself 
as, in and by means of painting, its Schein – with the double subjectivity 
theme introduced in the first part here. The claim can be simply formu­
lated as: only in a world of self­conscious subjects could there be objects 
like painting, because only self­interpreting beings can recognise objects 
that embody such an attempted self­interpretation; or, only beings who 
can recognise that such self­interpretations can be false or inauthentic, 
can appreciate the task of a faithful interrogation of the self­relatedness 
embodied in an art work. The more general point that connects the two 
is Hegel’s denial that, while any form of human subjectivity is a reflected 
relation, a self­relation, no aspect of the self­relation is immediate, the 
simple presence of the self to itself. In the same sense, a painting (if 
it is art) is not a direct mimetic depiction, but a Schein, an appearing 
as, or a ‘minded view’. This issue is among the most complicated and 
possibly the most important in all of Hegel, so it is difficult to deal with 
economically. It goes to our first indication that painting is ‘about’ a 
potentially ‘infinite’ subjectivity, one of the several ways he characterises 
the true object of painting as a distinct art.27 The claim is that there is no 
27 See Hegel 2013b, §163: ‘When infinity is finally an object for conscious­
ness, and consciousness is aware of it as what it is, then consciousness is 
self-consciousness.’ And §178: ‘Self­consciousness exists in and for itself because 
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straightforward subject­object relation in this self­relation, even though 
there is some form of doubleness or separation of the self from itself, 
as well as a distinctive unity. The self­relation is not observational or 
any form of self­inspection. To say, however, that our self­relation is, 
on the contrary, self­constitutive, or that we are what we take ourselves 
to be, is not to say, however, that a self­constitution is uncontrolled and 
potentially arbitrary. Whatever any subject takes itself to be, any aspect 
of its practical identity, its self­avowals, expressions of deep commit­
ments and the like, is provisional, realised, Hegel claims, only in deeds 
that manifest their genuineness, or not (as in the case of exaggerated or 
self­deceived avowals, however sincerely made). His general formulation 
for this is that the inner can only truly be what it is, what it turns out 
to be, in the outer. 
There is more to be said about this inner­outer relation before things 
can get any clearer,28 but its relevance to painting is as immediate as its 
relevance to action. In the former case, any painting (again, if it is an art 
work; not all paintings are art works) is an outer for which we must seek 
the inner, even though that inner is just what is manifested in the outer. 
In the latter case, attempting to understand outer bodily movements re­
quires that we understand what inner intention rationalised the deed for 
the agent, although what that intention is is only at work and accessible 
in the deed itself (and not by asking the agent, or not reliably anyway). 
The most significant manifestation of the relation, the realisation of Geist 
as such in the outer, is the realisation of freedom, defined by Hegel as 
‘being­with­self­in the­other’, or paradigmatically, human love (Hegel’s 
chief example of realised human freedom.) That already suggests a link 
back to themes we have already seen.
But consider the bearing of all this metaphysics on painting. One way 
in which Hegel tries to bring all these themes together is in a discussion 
of the great importance of two­dimensionality in painting, especially as 
opposed to sculpture. That requirement means for Hegel that our themes 
and by way of its existing in and for itself for an other; i.e., it exists only as 
recognized. The concept of its unity in its doubling, of infinity realizing itself 
in self­consciousness, is that of a multi­sided and multi­meaning intertwining, 
such that, on one hand, the moments within this intertwining must be strictly 
kept apart from each other, and on the other hand, they must also be taken and 
cognized at the same time as not distinguished, that is, they must be always 
taken and cognized in their opposed meanings’.
28 See the discussion in Pippin 2014, 139–143.
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of a self­related or ‘doubled’ subjectivity (consciousness as always also 
self­consciousness) is of a piece with the kind of duality or internal self­
relatedness that makes a depiction an art work and not a mere pictorial 
record. He says about sculpture that it is relatively ‘indifferent’ to the 
spectator, independent of her, does not directly address the spectator 
since she can walk all around the statue from any point of view. Such 
an art work is ‘self­reposing, self­complete, and objective’ [innerlich auf 
sich Beruhende, Abgeschlossene und Objektive ist]. Here is what he says, by 
contrast, about painting (1975, 806; 2013a, III: 28):
Whereas in painting the content is subjectivity, more precisely the in­
ner life inwardly particularized, and for this very reason the separation 
[Entzweiung] in the work of art between its subject and the spectator 
must emerge [hervortreten] and yet must immediately be dissipated 
[auflösen] because, by displaying what is subjective, the work, in 
its whole mode of presentation, reveals its purpose as existing not 
independently on its own account but for subjective apprehension, 
for the spectator.
What he means by saying that there must be both an address to an 
independent spectator, and the cancelling or dissolution of that very 
separation, is important in everything he says afterwards, even if it is 
typical of Hegel to conjoin what appear to be incompossible require­
ments. It is yet another example of a duality that is also a unity.29 His 
overall point in the paragraph is to emphasise the value of the ‘idealising’ 
aspect of two­dimensionality, as if the worked over and so subjectively 
created depiction/illusion is what makes the ‘appearing’ aspect and so 
the duality inherent in painting possible. If a painting is a work of art, 
its unavoidability calls attention to its status as Schein, not a simple echo 
of the thing depicted. This dual aspect is what makes it possible for a 
painting to manifest the object as reflected or appearing to a subject (and 
so a separation with the beholder, something shown to the beholder) and 
that it is nonetheless the object’s appearing or Schein, and a dissolution of 
such a separation, an aspect that draws the beholder into that shining, 
requiring of her an articulation of what is appearance and what is ‘that 
29 It of course brings to mind Michael Fried’s Diderotian problematic: the 
painting’s fiction that it is indifferent to, closed off to, the beholder, even as it 
is clearly made to be beheld. See Fried 1998.
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which appears’, requiring, just by virtue of that mark of its subjectivity, 
an immersion into it in itself.30 
A realistic or mimetic statue is, on the other hand, like another ver­
sion of the object or person depicted, and has fewer (although by no 
means no) technical means for intimating either the artist’s subjectivity, 
or for inviting the viewer’s involvement in working out the appearance­
reality distinction. Hegel goes on in insisting on the effects of this two­
dimensional and idealising component. In painting (1975, 805; 2013a, 
III: 28):
The spectator is as it were in it from the beginning [von Anfang an 
mit dabei], is counted in with it, and the work exists only for this fixed 
point, i.e. for the individual apprehending it. Yet for this relation to 
intuition [Anschauung] and its spiritual reflection [geistigen Reflex] the 
pure appearance of reality is enough, and the actual totality of spatial 
dimensions is really disturbing [störend] because in that case the 
objects perceived retain an existence of their own and do not simply 
appear as configured artificially by spirit for its own contemplation 
[Anschauung – probably better translated as intuition or seeing].
This allows him to conclude as follows:
In painting, however, satisfaction does not lie in the objects as they 
exist in reality [im wirklichen Sein] but in the purely theoretical in­
terest [in dem bloß theoretischen Interesse] in the external reflection 
of the inner life, and consequently painting dispenses with all need 
and provision for a reality and an organization totally spatial in all 
dimensions.
The idea is that painting is uniquely capable of capturing in materially 
embodied, visible form (a manifestation of an outer with an inner) what 
we have been calling the duality inherent in human subjectivity, its 
characteristic ontological uniqueness. That Hegel claims that this is all 
possible only thanks to Christianity, that it is absent from the Greeks 
30 This is not to deny that such a ‘duality’ can be missed. Those art histo­
rians who think of art history as a science, or as exclusively concerned with 
authenticating the history of different techniques, technical innovations, the 
transmission of influence or patronage, miss it. As do those who think of this 
interpretive requirement as essentially reactive, as going on ‘in’ the interpreter.
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or non­Christian civilisations, is an issue we can leave for another day. 
Painting is distinctive because the inner­outer dimension of this phe­
nomenon is literally visible in painting, in painting’s material or outer 
expression, in a way that it is not so for music or poetry. Every art painting 
embodies a self­conception and can be said to be attempting to realise 
such a self­conception, a showing or appearing of what it takes itself to 
be. Its status, what it invites, is thus like a face or a gesture within the 
painting, intimating its other, what is appearing. This is why Hegel calls 
a painting a ‘thousand-eyed Argus’, like – but infinitely more difficult 
to interpret than – a human or two­eyed face (1975, 153; 2013a, I: 203). 
And in painting that which appears can both be seen and not be seen 
in the objects depicted. A musical note is not a representation like this 
(although in a different way, it can be said to have an outer and inner), 
and poetic language also bears meaning in a way in which such meaning 
is not visible in the letters and lines and sentences and paragraphs; they 
are mere vehicles. As noted, this also means for Hegel that painting’s 
ability to express such an inner is limited to what can be made visible, 
and that is only one dimension of this interiority. It has other dimen­
sions that require musical and poetic expression, not to mention religious 
representation and philosophical conceptuality.
And this dimension of subjectivity is treated by Hegel in a way that 
presumes a great deal of his full philosophical position. For, as we have 
seen, ‘subjectivity’ is used here elliptically, such that it does not ultimately 
refer to individual subjectivity alone, but such individuals in relations of 
dependence and independence with other subjects in a dynamic historical 
process Hegel treats as the progressive realisation of human freedom. In 
the aesthetics lectures, this is alluded to by Hegel’s rather indirect sug­
gestion that what true subjectivity consists in is a relation with another, 
which, while a relation of dependence, is also a self­realised true inde­
pendence, most manifest in relations of human love [bei sich selbst sein im 
Anderen], and supremely manifest when not subject to the contingencies 
of romantic love. That is figured here as divine or religious (‘passionless’) 
love, but could just as well be described as the philosophical love of the 
truth, and, reciprocally, the availability of truth as the object of such love. 
(In general, this is what I think Hegel is referring to when he refers to the 
divine. The god of the philosophers, in other words.) This means that 
in all such cases, because of its separation from itself, its struggle to be 
who the subject is, subjectivity must be depicted as in a struggle, leaving 
visible traces, a successful involvement with, immersion in, the external 
world and others, and then a return to itself. All painting thus captures 
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a moment in a fundamental narrative that has a certain logic, and which 
must be understood to understand the unique availability of moments in 
such a narrative in painting. Not all painting is ‘about’ such religious love, 
but in so far as all painting has as its final object self-related subjectiv­
ity, all subject matters are all potentially or an sich the full realisation of 
such subjectivity, whether they depict Madonnas and child, or evoke the 
human tonality or attunement of a still life or landscape. Such potentiali­
ties are intimated in any art painting in its relation to the doubleness of 
human subjectivity.7.5
This is all, of course, an abstract – perhaps insufferably abstract – 
account of the emotional power of painting. Let me close with a visual 
indication of its appropriateness. Consider Théodore Géricault’s Head of 
a White Horse, 1816–1817, now hanging in the Louvre [Fig. 7.5]. I want to 
suggest that the painting immediately and vividly brings to life Hegel’s 
dual claims about subjectivity and painting. What is so arresting about 
the painting is the incontrovertible subjectivity or deep interiority of 
the horse, ‘literally visible’, even while mysterious, requiring interpretive 
work. There is something, even given the exoticism and strangeness of 
the horse, with those huge nostrils, and its odd, almost carefully combed 
mane, all at once accusatory, wise, hesitant, both wary and knowing, 
uncertain if facing friend or foe, not to mention simply noble, in a pose 
of great dignity, in the expression of the horse, as if facing and seeking 
the ‘other’ without which, for Hegel, it cannot be the subject it is, and 
unsure about finding such a realisation. (A common theme I have tried 
to show elsewhere, in Manet a generation later.)31 One easily imagines that 
the horse is looking at a human being, in an expression understandably 
wary, figuring not only species wariness but an omnipresent human wari­
ness too. Seeing it this way (again, a way that can be missed if we take 
the painting as simply mimetic) is what it would be to understand the 
‘moment’ as a moment in the struggle or narrative required by Hegel’s 
account of a double subjectivity, here captured by the doubleness of the 
painting, showing the horse and intimating something not fully shown 
but still somehow visible. We see expressed, on the two­dimensional 
surface, the horse’s subjectivity; its interiority is visible and, one has to 
say, ‘felt’, even as it remains to­be­found, present as not present; and, 
given that the horse is not only looking at a fictionalised viewer, but that 
31 Pippin 2014.
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7.5  Théodore Géricault, Head of a White Horse, c. 1815 (65.5 × 54.5 cm). Oil on 
canvas. Paris: Musée du Louvre, inv. RF544. © Erich Lessing / Art Resource, 
New York. Reproduced in colour as Plate 4.
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the painting is directly facing (in Fried’s sense)32 the beholder, it presents 
the same inner­out dynamic on the surface of the painting as such, the 
same dynamic, a visible intimation of ‘inner’ meaning – about animality, 
species relations, wildness, and domesticity, trust, fear, even pride – and 
all of this not conceptually or discursively, but in a way I have called, I 
hope following Hegel, affectively intelligible
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T. J . C LARK 
BEAUTY LACKS STRENGTH 
Hegel and the art of his century
In the essay that follows I would like to ask the question: Is there an art – a 
nineteenth­century art – to which G.W.F. Hegel’s descriptions of world and 
consciousness apply? The descriptions I think most worth putting to the 
test – the particular passages in which the tug of war between actuality, 
negativity and Mind is stated in a way that I can imagine mattering to art 
(as opposed to art history) – are drawn largely from Hegel’s Phenomenology 
of Spirit (1807).1 For whatever the Phenomenology’s faults and peculiarities 
considered as a systematic exposition of philosophy, generations of read­
ers have found it incomparable as a staging of philosophical drama; and 
perhaps because this is the book’s essential character – that is, because its 
whole tempo and texture depend on constant crescendo and diminuendo, 
a blaring of exultant trumpets followed by long agony in the lower strings 
– it seems as if art, in Hegel’s argument, is never far away.
When art appears explicitly in the Phenomenology, as it often does, 
it is almost unfailingly treated by Hegel in ways that are devastating, 
scandalous, astonishing, and – for all the aesthetician’s obvious exclu­
sions – still a challenge to our understanding of art’s purpose. Inevitably 
I have in mind here the book’s unforgettable pages on Greek tragedy and 
the pains of individuation; but, just as much, its chapter on the Unhappy 
Consciousness; and the return of an avatar of that consciousness, in the 
section on ‘The World of Self­Alienated Spirit’, disporting itself in full 
late­Enlightenment delight­in­despair – in particular, the pages that build 
toward the entrance of Rameau’s nephew, where music itself, seemingly 
1 Hegel 1977. All citations in what follows are to this edition. This essay sticks 
closely to its original lecture form: it is open­ended and episodic, as lectures 
are allowed to be – a sketch, especially in its final sections, of a picture I hope 
one day to complete.
tearing apart its essential nature, gives voice to ‘the universal deception 
of itself and others; and the shamelessness which gives utterance to this 
deception is just for that reason the greatest truth’ (Hegel 1975, 317, § 
522). From there I move on to the section late in the Phenomenology called 
‘Religion in the Form of Art’, which dares to talk about the world of Spirit 
as it first objectified itself, long before Antigone; and my breath is taken 
away again by the section’s wild imaginative totalisations – especially the 
glimpses of Luxor, the sphinx, the pyramids. 
Consider, then, a plate from the great Description de l’Égypte, pub­
lished in Paris in 1809, just two years after the Phenomenology [Fig. 8.1]. 
Hegel, in the passage I quote below, seems already to have dreamt into 
verbal existence the Description’s bird’s­eye view of Memphis (1977, 
421–422, § 692):
The crystals of pyramids and obelisks, simple combinations of 
straight lines with plane surfaces and equal proportions of parts, in 
which the incommensurability of the round is destroyed, these are 
the works of this artificer … Thus either the works receive Spirit into 
them only as an alien, departed spirit that has forsaken its living 
saturation with reality and, being itself dead, takes up its abode in 
this lifeless crystal; or [and here is the text’s truly uncanny moment, it 
seems to me, as Hegel pictures the pyramids in relation to the Nile sun] they 
have an external relation to Spirit as something which is itself there 
externally and not as Spirit [to which the monuments are related] 
as to the dawning light, which casts its significance across them.8.1
This passage is greater as an effort at comprehension, I feel, than even the 
famous page that follows on the transition, in the art of the ancient Near 
East, from geometry and inscribed ornament to organism and animal 
vitality [Fig. 8.2] (Hegel 1977, 427–428, § 706–707):
It is neither the crystal, the form characteristic of mere Understand­
ing, which houses the dead or is illumined by a soul outside of it [the 
pyramids again], nor is it that blending of the forms of Nature and of 
thought which first emerged from the plant [that is, the proliferating 
ornamental energy of Egyptian or Assyrian low relief] … On the contrary, 
the Notion now strips off the traces of root, branches, and leaves still 
adhering to its forms, and purifies the latter into shapes in which the 
crystal’s straight lines and flat surfaces are raised into incommen­
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which it was blended; the animal is for the god merely an accidental 
guise; it steps alongside its true shape and no longer has any worth 
on its own account … By this very fact, the shape of the god in its 
own self strips off also the poverty of the natural conditions of animal 
existence, and hints at the internal dispositions of animal life melted 
into its surface and belonging only to its surface.
As an attempt to understand the relation between the divine and the ani­
mal in Egyptian art, and above all to grasp the full meaning of Egyptian 
art’s stylisation of the natural world – its melting of ‘the internal disposi­
tions of animal life … into its surface’ – this remains unrivaled. What it 
says about Egyptian religion may be wrong, even appallingly wrong. But 
this is because it sets itself the right kind of question – that posed by the 
difficulty of the objects addressed – to which a genuine answer is obliged 
to be recklessly hermeneutic.8.2
When I read the Phenomenology, in other words, I am with Francis 
Bacon in believing that ‘truth emerges more readily from error than from 
confusion’ – or from art­historical sorting and labelling, which sets the 
real alienness of Form aside.2
I realise that in thus bringing on one or two of my favourite moments 
from the Phenomenology, I am inevitably touching on one of the present 
volume’s main questions: namely, the place (the legitimacy) of Hegel’s 
kind of speculative, totalising interpretation in art history. But the ques­
tion I want to pursue from now on in this essay is somewhat different 
– connected, I think, but different. The question, to repeat, is whether 
the Phenomenology’s incomparable stagings of the drama of Mind and 
actuality, or of Mind and negativity, or of Mind and world, can be seen 
to have purchase on particular art objects – specifically, on the painting 
of Hegel’s own day. I take ‘Hegel’s own day’ to be an elastic category, 
certainly not bounded by his birth and death dates. For instance, I take 
it that the framework of Hegelian thinking – his model of consciousness 
and its objects, and his picture of history and temporality – persisted as 
a uniquely powerful matrix throughout the nineteenth century, so that 
figures as far away from Hegel in time as Friedrich Nietzsche, Stephane 
Mallarmé and Jacob Burckhardt (and I would say Marcel Proust and 
Wallace Stevens) are best understood as still struggling with his shade. 
Indeed, the last completed and most ruthless of the small array of pictures 
2 Spedding, Ellis and Heath 1869, 210 – cited in Kuhn 2012, 18.
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8.2  Diorite statue of the lion­headed Egyptian goddess, Sekhmet;  
New Kingdom, Eighteenth Dynasty, c. 1388–1351 BC. Probably made in  
Thebes, but subsequently re­used at the temple of Mut at Karnak.  
Turin: Museo Egizio. © HIP / Art Resource, New York.
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I shall invite you to think of in relation to the Phenomenology was done 
as late as 1906, very much in Proust and Mallarmé’s world: it is Henri 
Matisse’s Les tapis rouges [Fig. 8.3]. As an account of consciousness – or 
perception as consciousness – opening onto a world, Matisse’s canvas 
has all of the Phenomenology’s vehemence. It is true to the bloodcurdling 
phrase in the Lectures on the Fine Arts – to ‘the extreme that thinking is’.3 
You will forgive me for toying with the fancy that the strange blue­green 
shawl in the Matisse, twisted and folded across the two carpets’ red field 
– so irresistibly physiognomic, that fabric, with its final leonine profile 
even casting a shadow on the wall – might even be Hegel’s ghost.8.3
But is the extremism of the Matisse in pursuit of Hegel’s extremism? 
Could it even be intended to put an end to the Hegelian drama? Those 
seem to me the questions.
3 Hegel 1975, 156.
8.3  Henri Matisse, Les tapis rouges, 1906 (116 × 89 cm). Oil on canvas.  
Grenoble: Musée de Grenoble. Wikimedia Commons. Reproduced in colour 
as Plate 5b.
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We might begin to pose them by noting, in a preliminary way, that 
whatever else Les tapis rouges may be, it is certainly a kind of answer, 
aesthetically, to the famous passage in the Phenomenology about Beauty’s 
fundamental lack of strength. Beauty lacks strength, says Hegel, above 
all in its dealings with the negative – the negative of Life, which is also 
the negative that is in Life, and that in some strong sense is Life itself, 
grasped in its painful Truth. Beauty is a circle that remains self­enclosed. 
It cannot face the dissolution that is Thought. But ‘the circle that remains 
self-enclosed and … holds its moments together [fearing above all the 
reality of their difference, their opposition to one another] is an immediate 
relationship, one therefore which has nothing astonishing about it’ (Hegel 
1977, 18–19, § 32):
But that an accident as such, detached from what circumscribes it … 
should attain an existence of its own and a separate freedom – this is 
the tremendous power of the negative; it is the energy of thought, of 
the pure ‘I’. Death, if that is what we want to call this non­actuality 
[here is where my intuition of a ghostliness to Matisse’s green shawl can 
come to strike me as more than fancy] is of all things the most dreadful, 
and to hold fast what is dead requires the greatest strength. Lacking 
strength, Beauty hates the Understanding for asking of her what 
she cannot do. But the life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks from 
death and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather the life 
that endures it and maintains itself in it. It wins its truth only when, 
in utter dismemberment, it finds itself.
I think I am obliged to say straight away, for clarity’s sake – though this, 
in a sense, is to leap toward the conclusion of the line of thought I am 
developing – that Matisse’s painting seems to me entirely susceptible 
to description in Hegel’s terms, but also (and precisely because) its final 
picture of Beauty and deathliness and dismemberment is so deeply anti­
Hegelian. Beauty’s lack of strength, in other words, may be the key to its 
power – its willingness to have the world occur to it. It is just because 
Beauty is prepared not to ‘find itself ’ – not to repeat a circle of self-loss 
and self­retrieval – that it is, for Matisse, so strong in its weakness. The 
Understanding in Les tapis rouges is swaddled – muffled – in its shawl 
or shroud, trying above all to be One, hanging on to the possibility of 
totalisation. But Beauty, says the painting, is anti­totality. It is the scatter 
of points and particles, the buzz of confetti across the black and red, and 
the improbability of all those particles’ ending up being together – and 
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yet, look, they are together. It is Mind, says Matisse, that is ‘the circle 
that remains self­enclosed’ – the power that cannot resist the temptation 
to hold its moments together by some last trick of dialectic. Or rather, 
Mind as Hegel conceives it cannot. Mind as allowed to happen in paint-
ing – Mind as weakness, Mind as redness, Mind as particle storm – is a 
different matter. 8.4
The question I promised to pose in this essay was whether we have 
an art – a nineteenth­ or early twentieth­century art – to which Hegel’s 
descriptions of world and consciousness can be seen to apply. I seem 
to be implying that they only apply, in the art I take seriously, in the 
negative – they are what painting is out to annihilate. But for Hegel’s 
view of things to be worth refuting in this way – with Matisse’s special 
vehemence – surely in the first place there must have been pictures that 
exemplified it strongly, beautifully. And yes, there were. My example is 
Caspar David Friedrich’s Chalk Cliffs at Rügen, painted in 1818 (so firmly 
in Hegel’s timeframe), and I ask you to look at it with the Phenomenology 
ringing in your ears [Fig. 8.4]. The passage I choose is from near the 
beginning of ‘The Certainty and Truth of Reason’. It is a typical Hegel 
paragraph, with even a touch of sunniness to it – we have, after all, just 
exited from the Unhappy Consciousness (1977, 139, § 232):
Now that self­consciousness [has become] Reason, its hitherto nega­
tive relation to otherness turns round into a positive relation. Up till 
now it has been concerned only with its independence and freedom, 
concerned to save and maintain itself for itself at the expense of the 
world, or of its own actuality, both of which appeared to it as the 
negative of its essence [that is, as Thought]. But as Reason, assured of 
itself, it is at peace with them, and can endure them; for it is certain 
that it is itself reality, or that everything actual is none other than 
itself; its thinking is itself directly actuality …
And a few lines further on, famously – touching on the matter of per­
manence versus transience that was to become the lifeblood of French 
painting (1977, 140, § 232):
In thus apprehending itself, after losing the grave of its truth … 
[Reason] discovers the world as its new real world, which in its 
permanence holds an interest for it which previously lay only in its 
transience [remember that the Unhappy Consciousness had been alter-
nately panicked and fascinated by what it saw as the utter ephemerality of 
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8.4  Caspar David Friedrich, Chalk Cliffs at Rügen, 1818 (90.5 × 71 cm).  
Oil on canvas. Winterhur: Museum Oskar Reinhart am Stadtgarten.  
© bpk Bild agentur / Museum Oskar Reinhart am Stadtgarten,  
Winterthur / Hermann Buresch (photographer) / Art Resource, New York. 
Reproduced in colour as Plate 6.
247CLARK :  BEAUTY  LACKS  STRENGTH
the world passing by]; for the existence of the world becomes for self­
consciousness its own truth and presence; it is certain of experiencing 
only itself therein.
This is very beautiful, even in English, and I am hoping that native speak­
ers agree that for all its characteristic relentlessness it is also somehow 
delicate – or that its picture of world and consciousness is. Anyway, 
Friedrich makes it delicate. His picture of the colours of consciousness 
– the canvas’s pervasive white and pale blue – is touching, and I think 
entirely new. Permanence and transience, like the intelligible and the ac­
cidental in Matisse, are made into moments of one another. And Reason’s 
steps on the cliff path to Truth are tenderly, ironically rendered [Fig. 8.5]. 
The Rückenfigur looks out to totality straight away – for him infinity is a 
prospect, a spectacle, an image. But the man next to him with hat and staff 
wants the world to be closer – investigable, manipulable: he seems to be 
picking delicately at a flower or rare grass, or an insect in the grass; and 
he is naïve and absent­minded, far too near the edge of the cliff. Noth­
ingness is always just on the other side of things. No wonder the woman 
reaches out to him with a movement of caution, or maybe instruction, her 
left hand firmly gripping a branch. The ‘moments’ of consciousness in 
the world – easy totality, slightly dangerous absorption, a ‘care’ directed 
inevitably to one’s fellow humans – are allowed their separate existence 
here. But they are all steps on the road to non­easy totality. The paint­
ing’s structure is that totality [Fig. 8.4]. Its sheltering circle of rocks and 
branches is the shape of the world – which in turn is the shape of the eye – 
which is, time and again in Romanticism, the shape of the ‘I’, the form 
that subjectivity ‘naturally’ takes. And again, circularity is not necessarily 
the same as self-enclosure: Hegel and Friedrich insist on that. The leafing 
and bifurcating of the great circle; the fractal logic of the branch lines and 
greenery and eroded chalk – these are what knowing is, and what makes 
a totality as opposed to an empty Beyond. The frame is the world and 
our knowledge of it. The frame is actualised in the figures on the edge of 
the cliff: their to-and-fro of kinds of looking is totality personified.4 8.5
Compare Georges­Pierre Seurat’s Le Crotoy, Upstream [Fig. 8.6]. Com­
pare frame and world. The frame is Mind in the Seurat: the colours of the 
world are put there in the perspective of their ‘complementaries’, meaning 
4 The precise nature of the figures’ responses to each other is uncertain, of 
course – Friedrich refrains from spelling out a plot. My reading of the interac­
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ultimately the blues of infinity and the solar yellow of total illumination. 
The frame is the Understanding; and yes, Beauty – the grass and clouds 
and the strange marooned townscape – lacks strength by comparison. 
Between frame and world there can only be a total, irreducible gap, for 
all the work of theory to reconcile them (and Seurat with one side of his 
sensibility half­believed in that reconciliation). The frame that is Mind 
cannot be disposed of or leapt beyond; but the painting tells us that it 
stands at an absolute distance from the world’s occurrence. There will be 
no moment at which actuality ‘returns’ to Mind. The essential Hegelian 
proposition is being resisted: that is, the recognition that the world of 
otherness and pure event is Mind in its true actuality – is a ‘becoming-other 
that has to be taken back’ (Hegel 1977, 11, § 20). Hegel, when he writes 
this phrase in the Phenomenology, italicises ‘becoming­other’. I would 
put the stress rather on the necessity implied in the argument: the fact 
that, for Hegel, the falling of Mind into the accidentalness and transience 
of experience has to be taken back. Compare the section on ‘Beautiful 
Individuality’ in Lectures on Fine Art. ‘The soul too, as natural life, is a 
subjective but purely inner individuality, present in reality only implicitly, 
without knowing itself as a return into itself and by that means as inher­
ently infinite … Its manifestation achieves … only a formal life – unrest, 
mutability, concupiscence, and the anxiety and fear incident to this 
dependent life … The animation and life of spirit alone is free infinity … 
because in its manifestation it reverts into itself and remains at home with 
itself.’ And the lecturer, as so often, immediately repeats the point: ‘To 
Mind alone … is it given to impress the stamp of its own infinity and free 
return into itself upon its external manifestation, even though through 
this manifestation it is involved in restriction.’58.6
I think, to put it in a nutshell, that Seurat is out to resist the return 
here – the ‘taking back’ of the becoming­other. And in contrast to Cliffs 
at Rügen, there precisely cannot be any individuation, or figuration, of 
Mind in the world within – or infinitely far beyond – the frame. The bol­
lard in the foreground of Seurat’s The Channel of Gravelines makes the 
point almost comically [Fig. 8.7]: it is a parody of anchoring focalising 
consciousness, like the ghost or dwarf of a Friedrich Rückenfigur.8.7
And in all this Seurat is profoundly the voice of French painting’s 
enormous, relentless anti­Hegelianism. This is the point I shall make in 
conclusion. I want, by the way, to resist equating this anti­Hegelianism 
5 Hegel 1975, 154–155.
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with a break, or even a watershed, in the art of the nineteenth century 
– the kind of break we often call ‘modernism’. No doubt it has proved 
immensely productive to think of Hegel’s account of art’s history, and in 
particular his thoughts on art’s ‘pastness’ for modern culture, in relation 
to a line of art that did eventually take pastness to be art’s tragic fate. 
But my sense of the century is different. More and more, I see French 
painting of the later nineteenth century as in continuity with the art of 
Hegel’s day (the art we call Romanticism) – in continuity with it just 
because it went on struggling with its legacy. I look at Seurat’s Crotoy 
[Fig. 8.6] and see it as framing a reply to J.M.W. Turner’s Light and Co-
lour [Fig. 8.8] – very much still in Turner’s colour­theory terms, though 
determined to change Turner’s and Friedrich’s ocular circle into an 
implacable non­ocular square; just as I see Les tapis rouges [Fig. 8.3] as 
8.6  Georges Pierre Seurat, Le Crotoy, Upstream, 1889 (70.5 × 86.7 cm). Oil on 
canvas. Detroit: Detroit Institute of Arts, inv. 70.183. © Detroit Institute of 
Arts, USA (Bequest of Robert H. Tannahill)/ Bridgeman Images. Reproduced 
in colour as Plate 7.
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an answer to Eugène Delacroix’s Femmes d’Alger dans leur appartement 
[Fig. 8.9]. An answer, I stress. What the interior of the Algerian women 
had meant to Delacroix – the interior as ‘interiority,’ as the hidden 
revealed, as the dream space of desire and self­certainty entered into at 
last – had no doubt to be subjected in the Matisse to the full power of 
the negative, so that the interior could become otherness. But the models 
of mind that had structured Turner’s and Delacroix’s world­picture are 
still determinant: the extremism of the answers to them in Matisse and 
Seurat only makes sense if the models, the Hegelian dramaturgy, persist 
in the culture as dominant. In other words, I see the ruthlessness – the 
vehemence – of French painting’s late­century account of experience not 
so much as a leaping forward, out of the Hegelian habitus, into some 
kind of entirely present mere appearance of things – Seurat without the 
infinite frame, Matisse without the ghost in the winding­sheet – but 
as propelled by an interminable wrestling with a dead, but immortal, 
dialectic. 8.8,8.9
8.7  Georges Pierre Seurat, The Channel of Gravelines, Petit Fort Philippe, 1890 
(73.3 × 92.7 cm). Oil on canvas. Indianapolis: Indianapolis Museum of Art. 
Wikimedia Commons. Reproduced in colour as Plate 8.
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The ruthlessness and vehemence can take many forms. Do not be 
deceived (as most of our serious guardians of taste still are) by the seem­
ing weakness of Claude Monet’s answer to Mind. Its lack of strength 
is entirely deliberate, and ironic, and unnerving. ‘Lack of strength’ 
is Beauty’s best weapon against Totality. I am sure that Matisse and 
Seurat looked back on the nonchalant blandness of Monet’s La Gare 
Saint-Lazare: les signaux [Fig. 8.10] and wondered why, in comparison, 
they were still trapped inside the ‘unrest … anxiety and fear’ that Hegel 
had told them were qualities that went with simple sentience, mere 
‘natural life’. Matisse and Seurat’s whole artistic effort was directed to 
8.8  Joseph Mallord William Turner, Light and Colour (Goethe’s Theory) 
– The Morning after the Deluge – Moses writing the Book of Genesis, c. 1843 
(78.5 × 78.5 cm). Oil on canvas. London: Tate Gallery, inv. N00532.  
© Tate, London / Art Resource, New York. Reproduced in colour as Plate 9.
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escaping from that script of consciousness. But it was hard. How had 
Monet done it?8.10
This essay will not attempt to work out, or work through, the par­
ticular moves and gambits that French painting adopted in its battle with 
Hegel; and of course it is the particularity of the moves and gambits that 
matter, and make French painting (to use Hegel’s language) the ‘world­
historical’ event it is. Without the negation of Hegel becoming ‘manifest’, 
and taking such obdurate outward form – the form of Seurat’s frame, for 
instance, or of Matisse’s warping and flattening of interiority – the nega­
tion would mean little or nothing. A fuller version of this argument, it 
follows, would have as its task the redescription of the distinctive features 
of French art in specifically anti-Hegelian terms.
Let me simply enumerate some of the main heads.
First, and pervasively, there is French art’s pursuit of the instant, 
the instantaneous, conceived as an exit from Hegelian History – towards 
some new presence of Time, or towards a Time intercepted and replaced 
8.9  Eugene Delacroix, The Women of Algiers in their Apartment, 1834 
(180 × 229 cm). Oil on canvas. Paris: Musée du Louvre, inv. 3824.  
© Erich Lessing / Art Resource, New York.
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by an hors temps, or by some form of eternal recurrence, or by a pastness 
and presentness finally collapsed onto one another. Look at the signals in 
La Gare Saint-Lazare – clocks without hands, anti­timepieces [Fig. 8.10]. 
Remember the famous word ‘tarrying’ in the passage in the Preface to 
the Phenomenology on ‘tarrying with the negative’; and, equally a Hegel 
favourite, the word ‘lingering’ – ‘each moment is necessary, and … each 
moment has to be lingered over, because each is itself a complete indi­
vidual shape’ in world­history (Hegel 1977, 17, § 29). No lingering becomes 
French painting’s warcry.
Second, there is the long campaign of French art to rid representation 
of the clash, the polarisation, of optical opposites – of ‘moments’ in a dia­
lectical drama. Instead of light versus dark, then, let there be narrow, almost 
imperceptible shifts of tone, fragile evenness and equality, all­overness, 
de­differentiation. A dim clearing in the woods as Camille Corot did it 
– look, for instance, at his Rocks in the Forest of Fontainebleau [Fig. 8.11] – not 
a path leading on, out of the half­light, into sunshine and shadow. An art 
8.10  Claude Monet, La Gare Saint-Lazare: les signaux, 1877 (65 × 81 cm). 
Oil on canvas. Hannover, Niedersächsisches Landesmuseum. © Erich 
Lessing / Art Resource, New York. Reproduced in colour as Plate 10a.
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without foreground and background, as in Paul Cézanne’s House in Provence 
of c. 1885 [Fig 8.12]. An art – I recall here the great discussions of space in 
Cézanne that come down to us from Fritz Novotny – where everything in 
the world is made to exist in an uncanny middle distance, so that in some 
fundamental way it seems unrelated to ‘us’ (we viewers, we representatives 
of Mind).6 Not close to us, but not far away. Disregarding us – neither an 
‘outside’ to the ‘inside’ of an onlooker, nor, in spite of its strangeness, the 
figure of a fictive or notional world that is only real in its being-for-us.
Third … but here I stop the enumeration, for already you have an 
idea of its flight path.8.11, 8.12
Let me instead try to pin down the various features’ purpose. The 
‘instant’, to start with that, is ultimately a metaphor in French art for 
the spot of time that has been wrested back from being a ‘moment’ in 
6 Novotny 1938. Selections are translated in Wood 2000, 379–433.
8.11  Jean­Baptiste­Camille Corot, Rocks in the Forest of Fontainebleau,  
c. 1860–1865 (46 × 59 cm). Oil on canvas. Washington: National Gallery of 
Art, inv. 1963.10.110. Wikimedia Commons. Reproduced in colour as Plate 10b.
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Hegel’s sense, from being part of an unfolding towards truth. There is 
no ‘toward­ness’ in Seurat and Cézanne. The instant is outwardness, 
‘shining’, dispersal, appearance, the un­teleological, the unmediated, the 
unreturnable­from – and all these terms are to be valorised, not seen 
as false fragments of a whole. Always in Hegel, of course, the word ‘im­
mediacy’ comes with a qualification. ‘Sensuous determinations’, he says, 
‘have only powerless, abstract immediacy, or [mere] being as such’ (Hegel 
1977, 30–31, § 33). The Subject ‘supersedes abstract immediacy … the 
immediacy which barely is’ (Hegel 1977, 30, § 32). An ‘uncomprehended 
immediacy’ is still, for Mind, something not real. Immediacy encourages 
‘passive indifference’: difference and activity – ‘the suffering and labor of 
the negative’ – await (Hegel 1977, 28, § 30). But is not the point of French 
painting that all these insufficiencies end up being shown as sufficient – 
indeed, true? Incomprehension, indifference, abstract immediacy – those 
moments of Mind have to be given unanswerable aesthetic dignity, and 
thus ‘magicked’ (Hegel’s word) into declaring themselves the new form 
8.12  Paul Cézanne, House in Provence, c. 1885 (65 × 81 cm). Oil on canvas. 
Indianapolis: Indianapolis Museum of Art, inv. 45.194. Wikimedia Commons. 
Reproduced in colour as Plate 11.
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8.13  Claude Monet, Poplars (Wind Effect), 1891 (100 × 74.5 cm). Oil on canvas. 
Paris: Musee d’Orsay, inv. RF2002­30. © RMN­Grand Palais (Photographer: 
Hervé Lewandowski) / Art Resource, New York. Reproduced in colour as 
Plate 12.
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of totality. Consider Monet’s Poplars (Wind Effect) of 1891 [Fig. 8.13]. ‘The 
immediacy which barely is’, as Hegel calls it, is, in Monet, precisely what 
wins, in its very passivity, over the same paragraph’s ‘looking the negative 
in the face’ (Hegel 1977, 19, § 32). 8.13
I return to Matisse and sum up [Fig. 8.3]. For Hegel, artistic reduc­
tion – say, in Matisse’s case, the reduction of our complex orientation­
towards­the­world to a play of pure colour – is always the manifestation 
of a work of Mind. Reduction ‘withdraw(s)’ the viewer from ‘the profusion 
of details and accidents’, from ‘chance and externality’ and puts in their 
stead ‘pure appearance, produced by the spirit … the marvel of ideality … 
and an ironical attitude to what exists in nature and externally’.7 But 
Matisse is the least ironical of artists. He takes no distance from the world 
7 I am quoting from the section on nature in Hegel 1975, 156, 155, 163.
8.14  Paul Cézanne, Mont Sainte-Victoire from Les Lauves, c. 1906 (60 × 73 cm). 
Oil on canvas. Moscow: Pushkin State Museum of Fine Arts, inv. 3339.  
© HIP / Art Resource, New York. Reproduced in colour as Plate 13.
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he portrays – the very extremity of his displacements and substitutions, 
most notably of colour, throws us back into contact with the starting 
point, the apprehended. French painting, that is to say, stakes everything 
on a reduction that will register not as ‘mental’ but physical – an event, 
an occurrence, an ‘accident’ – a touch or a scatter, as of the Thing in 
Itself. ‘Only a formal life, unrest, mutability, concupiscence …’ We go on 
struggling with the paradox that in Matisse ‘concupiscence’ becomes the 
true form of restraint. But all French painting thrives on the paradox.
And this is why we resist it. We are all Hegelians, aesthetically speak­
ing. We cannot help but give the preference to the power of the negative, 
the temporal, the deathly. We compare a Monet Poplars [Fig. 8.13] to 
Cézanne’s Mont Sainte-Victoire from Les Lauves of 1906 [Fig. 8.14], and 
inevitably we warm – we sentimentalists of the negative – to the picture 
of becoming that seems to contain within it a darkness, a touch of dev­
astation, a ‘dismemberment’. Monet’s mere moment unnerves us. His 
assembling of the world has an ominous superficiality to it, a tragic glib 
brightness, which goes on distracting and nonplussing.8.14
But finally, Hegel can help us to understand the intensity – the aes­
thetic dignity – of an art dedicated to undoing his world­picture. For he is 
time and again monstrously good at giving form to exactly the visions of 
knowing that, in the end, he wishes us to leave behind, or to understand 
as partial, undialectical. Take the following passage from the Preface to 
the Phenomenology (Hegel 1977, 27, § 47):
Appearance is the arising and passing away that does not in itself 
arise and pass away, but is ‘in itself ’, and constitutes the actuality 
and the movement of the life of truth … Judged in the court of this 
movement, the single shapes of Spirit do not persist any more than 
determinate thoughts do, but they are as much positive and necessary 
moments, as they are negative and evanescent. In the whole of the 
movement, seen as a state of repose, what distinguishes itself therein, 
and gives itself particular existence, is preserved as something that 
recollects itself, whose existence is self­knowledge, and whose self­
knowledge is just as immediately existence. 
It is clear as we read these sentences in the Preface that the initial move­
ments of consciousness Hegel describes here – the arising and passing 
away – are for him no more than a ‘moment’ of comprehension, with 
always the true shape of Spirit calling them on. But the movements them­
selves are spellbinding – their actuality lives on the page. The sentences 
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are beautiful. We could easily tarry with them. We could, as I think the 
French did, make them the motto of a whole line of art.
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PAUL  A . KOTTMAN
HEGEL AND SHAKESPEARE ON  
THE PASTNESS OF ART
The charm dissolves apace;
And as the morning steals upon the night,
Melting the darkness, so their rising senses
Begin to chase the ignorant fumes that mantle
Their clearer reason.
William Shakespeare, The Tempest (1611) V.i.64–681
What if the first to notice that ‘art … is and remains a thing of the past’ 
were not G.W.F. Hegel – the philosopher to whom those words famously 
belong – but rather an artist, namely William Shakespeare? And what if 
the first person to notice that Shakespeare had been the first to recognise 
art’s abiding pastness were none other than Hegel himself?
Questions of ‘firstness’ to one side, and more to the point, what if 
Shakespeare and Hegel were right about art’s pastness? What, then, would 
they help us to understand?
This essay is devoted to exploring these hypotheses. My aim, in 
other words, will not be merely to prove these hypotheses to be correct 
– since even if they were accepted, we would still have to figure out their 
significance. My aim, rather, will be to show how these hypotheses might 
illuminate the meaning of the claim about art’s pastness.
Hegel’s interest in Shakespeare is evident from the very earliest writ­
ings of his to have come down to us, right through to his mature Berlin 
Lectures on Fine Art in the 1820s (hereafter Hegel, 1975).2 Already in Hegel’s 
1 I take all citations from the edition of Shakespeare 1992.
2 By ‘earliest writings’, I mean not only the gripping remarks on the ‘cau­
sality of fate’ in Shakespeare’s Macbeth – found in Hegel’s early text on ‘The 
Spirit of Christianity and its Fate’ (as that piece is now called). There is also 
lectures of 1823, 1826 and again in the lectures of 1828–1829, Hegel claimed 
that ‘art, considered in its highest vocation, is and remains for us a thing 
of the past […ist und bleibt die Kunst … für uns ein Vergangenes]’ (Hegel 1975, 
11).3 And in what might be called the epilogue to those lectures – which 
(in 1823, at least) included the repetition of the claim about art’s pastness, 
and (in the later lectures) named Shakespeare in culmination – Hegel 
addressed his audience directly (Hegel 2014, 439; Hegel 1975, 1236–1237):4
Now we have covered the range of art. For us, art in its seriousness 
is something bygone … 
the earliest text of Hegel’s to have come down to us – Hegel’s own rewriting 
of Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, composed when Hegel was around fifteen years 
old. Hegel 2002, X: 3–4. In his biography of Hegel, Terry Pinkard recounts 
that: ‘One of [Hegel’s] teachers, a Mr. Loeffler, gave him at the age of eight a 
present of Shakespeare’s works translated by Eschenberg, with the advice that 
although he would not understand them at that point, he would soon learn to 
understand them. (Hegel recorded years later in his teenage diary a laudatory 
remembrance of Loeffler when he died).’ Pinkard further claims that Hegel 
read some Shakespeare in English: ‘[Hegel] took great interest in the offerings 
in the various theaters in Paris. He was even able to see the great English actor 
Charles Kemble, and the legendary Irish actress Henrietta Smithson, perform 
Shakespeare at the newly opened English Theater in Paris; he followed the plays 
by reading along in the English editions he had procured …’ Pinkard 2000, 5, 
551–552. For more on the claim that Hegel read Shakespeare in English, see 
Jennifer Bates 2007, 20.
3 And: ‘… ihre Form hat aufgehört, das höchste Bedürfnis des Geistes zu sein ’ (Hegel 
1969, XIII: 25 and 142). For intellectual­historical context, see Danto 2004, 
535–540 – though I disagree with Danto’s chronology (moreover, I disagree 
that the issue is finally chronological). See also the discussion in Davies 2007, 
120, and passim; and also Annemarie Gethmann­Siefert’s prefatory discussion 
in Hegel 2014, 34, and passim.
4 The authenticity of Hegel’s Lectures on Fine Art – based on lecture notes from 
the last three of these lecture courses – is not an issue I can take up here. Still, 
it seems worth saying that Hegel’s Lectures are roughly as much ‘Hegel’s’ as the 
sources on which critical editions of Shakespeare’s Tempest are ‘Shakespeare’s’. 
(Just as Hegel’s Lectures were published several years after his death, so too the 
first edition of The Tempest appeared in the First Folio of 1623, seven years after 
Shakespeare’s death.) For a recent assessment of the textual issues in Hegel, see 
Annemarie Gethmann­Siefert’s introduction to Hegel 2014; also, the discussion 
in Speight 2014.
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Now, with the development of the kinds of comedy we have reached 
the real end of our philosophical inquiry … My one aim [throughout 
these lectures] has been to seize in thought and prove the fundamen­
tal nature of the beautiful and art, and to follow it through all the 
stages it has gone through in the course of its realization. I hope that 
in this chief point my exposition has satisfied you. And now when the 
link forged between us generally and in relation to our common aim 
has been broken, it is my final wish that the higher and indestructible 
bond of the Idea of beauty and truth may link us and keep us firmly 
united now and for ever.
At the close of his 2014 book, After the Beautiful: Hegel and the Philosophy 
of Pictorial Modernism, Robert Pippin suggests that Hegel’s valediction 
is ‘meant to call to mind Prospero’s farewell to his arts … at the end of 
The Tempest’.5
Now my charms are all o’erthrown,
And what strength I have’s mine own …
… Now I want
Spirits to enforce, art to enchant …
(Shakespeare, The Tempest Epilogue)
Entertaining Pippin’s suggestion that these passages should be read 
together, I want to discuss what these two ‘epilogues’ reveal, not only 
about what Hegel teaches us about Shakespeare, but also about how 
Shakespeare’s late work already acknowledges art’s ‘bygone­ness’ or 
‘pastness’. I will also try to do this by discussing Pippin’s treatment of 
Hegel’s claim in After the Beautiful, raising some questions about Pippin’s 
treatment of Hegel’s claim to make room for my own interpretation.
For the sake of motivating my discussion of Hegel and The Tempest, 
allow me first to make a few observations about Hegel’s remarks on 
Shakespeare, both at the end of the Lectures on Fine Art, and more gener­
ally. Second, I will discuss Hegel’s claim about art’s pastness, and offer 
my response to Pippin’s treatment of it. Third, I will offer some remarks 
5 The two ‘epilogues’ have been compared before; I ask the reader to enter­
tain the plausibility of the comparison. See Pippin 2014, 142–143, and Trüstedt 
2011, 65. I have made two earlier – and, to me, still unsatisfactory – attempts to 
discuss Prospero’s speech, in light of Hegel’s Lectures, in Kottman 2014 and in 
Kottman 2017a. The present essay thus represents my third attempt.
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about The Tempest, in the hope of making available for further discussion 
aspects of Shakespeare’s presentation of these issues.
I .
At perhaps the simplest level of interpretation, anyone who has even taken 
part in a university lecture course will recognise what Hegel is trying to 
accomplish with his parting words: he is hoping for applause. Hegel’s plea 
(‘I hope … my exposition has satisfied you’) is every bit as transparent as 
Prospero’s (‘… release me from my bands / With the help of your good 
hands / … or else my project fails, which was to please’). Lest we mistake 
this appeal for narcissistic neediness, however, we should note that nei­
ther Hegel nor Prospero is asking for an appreciation of who they are as 
individuals; nor are they merely soliciting an acknowledgment of their 
role in this context (professor, philosopher, actor, artist).6 Instead, both 
Hegel and Prospero (Shakespeare) seek a different kind of acknowledg­
ment. First, there would be the shared acknowledgment that a concluding 
stage of a collective activity – a theatrical drama, a lecture course – had 
been reached in a provisionally ‘satisfying’ way. The applause they solicit, 
in other words, would test whether that kind of acknowledgment has been 
earned. So, both appeals would also be subject to the kinds of failures 
and rejections that can attend human efforts of becoming answerable to 
one another’s acts and efforts.
While such an appeal could easily be nothing more than a cloy­
ing attempt to coerce an audience, or could unfold as a kind of empty 
social ritual or ‘show’ (as in those occasions where one feels ‘obliged’ to 
applaud), I see both Hegel’s and Prospero’s valedictory appeals as prob­
lematising such rituals. For one thing, given the novelty of what has just 
unfolded – namely: Hegel’s lectures, Shakespeare’s play – these appeals 
amount to an interrogation of their public: ‘Well, what do you all think?’
Put differently, both valedictories express an underlying presumption 
about a collectively shareable evaluation – a presumption, that is, about 
the relationship between performer and audience that allows for such a 
6 An interpretive tradition that seems to have begun with Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge and Goethe (in the very years in which Hegel was lecturing in Berlin 
and meeting regularly with Goethe) conflates Prospero and Shakespeare. 
Coleridge called Prospero ‘the very Shakespeare himself, as it were, of the 
tempest’. See Coleridge 1987, II: 269.
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collective experience (a dramatic play, a lecture course) to be meaning­
fully ‘shared’. This presumption is a feature of all dramatic art (and all 
university lectures), insofar as these must satisfy the minimal require­
ments for performative intelligibility in some time and place: a ‘common 
enough’ vernacular. But here Hegel and Shakespeare (Prospero) also plead 
for understanding, for ‘indulgence’ (Prospero), for ‘unity’ in the wake of a 
broken ‘link forged between us generally and in relation to our common 
aim’ (Hegel) – at the same time pointing toward an undetermined ‘future’ 
form of mutual understanding. So, their appeal is at least as much an 
aspiration as it is a presumption about shared conditions.
Second, both epilogues aim to demonstrably reflect – rather than 
merely assert, or describe – provisional conclusions to historical activities 
(art and philosophical ‘science’, respectively) that are attempts to render 
these practices intelligible from within.7 To bring an activity – like 
drama, or teaching – to a collectively acknowledged conclusion ‘as part of ’ 
its own doing, rather than consequent to some external interruption or 
end, is to test the self­determination of the practice itself, to assess the 
success or failure of any shared answerability for its results. Not only is 
this part of the aspirational dimension of the appeals, in the sense just 
mentioned, but it is also crucial to what Hegel calls his ‘science of art’, 
that fine art be understood to draw the line between itself and whatever 
falls outside it, that fine art be internally self-limiting.
Such self­limitation is also a possibility that belongs uniquely to the 
‘temporal’ or performing arts that Hegel places at the culmination of his 
discussion of romantic art: music and dramatic poetry. It is true that one 
can stop or ‘quit’ painting or sculpture – an individual can quit paint­
ing, make the last stroke with a brush; a culture can also stop making 
paintings. But the practice of the plastic arts themselves lack the means 
to achieve their own conclusion from within the temporal unfolding of 
act or practice itself; whereas the ‘end’ of music or drama can belong to 
its own activity (hence, Hegel thought, painting ‘pass[es] over into the 
sphere of music’). Hegel does not mention Aristotle in the context of his 
discussion of the differences between the plastic and the performing arts; 
but because Hegel often has Aristotle in mind, I think it is licit to evoke 
Aristotle’s treatment of this issue here. According to Aristotle, in the case 
of praxis, potentiality (dynamis) is internal to actuality (energeia) – which 
7 By this, I mean what Hegel describes in terms of the standpoint of reason 
(Vernunft) as distinct from what he calls the understanding (Verstand).
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means that actions have their ‘end’ in the activity itself.8 By contrast, in 
the case of movement (of which poiēsis is a subset) actuality is external 
to potentiality, and is defined by its relation to an end (telos) at which it 
terminates, an end that is external to the motion itself, which means that 
the motion itself (the activity inherent in the plastic arts) is incomplete 
(atelēs). And it is worth noting that Aristotle distinguishes between the 
performing arts (mousikē) and the plastic arts in this context, contrasting 
flute-playing to poiēsis.9 Still – if, for Aristotle, the act of plastic fabrica­
tion is incomplete, for Hegel it is the historical practice of the plastic arts, 
which, over time, passes over to the romantic arts of music and poetry 
for its completion.
Third, there is a propinquity of practical substance – not only of form 
or rhetoric – between the ‘epilogues’ of Hegel’s Lectures and Shakespeare’s 
Tempest.10 That is, Hegel here does something with Shakespeare that he 
does with no other artist that he mentions in the course of the Aesthetics 
lectures: Hegel imitates Prospero, by which I mean he displays a logi­
cal and practical affinity between his own activity (lecturing, offering 
a ‘science’ of the history of art) and Prospero’s Epilogue – in ‘enacted’ 
form as well as verbal content. As Pippin puts it (2014, 142), Hegel’s 
speech is ‘much like’ Prospero’s. Indeed, Hegel likens his own lectures 
to Shakespeare’s drama at, arguably, that drama’s own most self-reflexive 
moment: Prospero’s Epilogue so often having been heard as Shakespeare’s 
valedictory reflection on his own artistic career.11 Moreover, Hegel imi­
8 See Aristotle, Metaphysics 1050a35–1050b1.
9 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1050a30–35: ‘… in some [sciences] the end and the 
activity are the same, and there is not any other end beyond the activity; for 
instance, to the flute player the activity and the end are the same (for to play 
the flute is both his end and his activity); but not to the art of housebuilding 
(for it has a different end beyond the activity) …’, Aristotle, Magna Moralia 
1211b27. Similarly, Aristotle writes: ‘for one cannot in the same moment both be 
taking a walk and have taken it, nor be house­building and have house­built’. 
Incidentally, the example of ‘house­building’ also makes clear that poiēsis is, in 
general, a subspecies of kinēsis; see Aristotle, Metaphysics 1048b18–35.
10 Of course, Hegel’s echo of Shakespeare could be taken as nothing more 
than a means to summarise his main points, or as a way to show his love of 
Shakespeare – or, Hegel could just be ending with a ‘citation’ the way many 
orators do. But I am not convinced that these ‘rhetorical’ strategies explain what 
Hegel is doing here. There is, I think, a logical as well as a rhetorical affinity.
11 That Shakespeare’s Tempest was already being read as an allegory for 
Shakespeare’s reflection on his own artistic practice is evidenced in Goethe’s 
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tates Shakespeare in the act of concluding a series of lectures that he 
holds up as ‘doing’ distinctly wissenschaftliche work – as if insisting on 
the necessity of such imitation for a reflective, philosophical attention to 
the course of art’s ‘realisation’ (Realisation). And this seems connected 
to a core ambition of Hegel’s lectures: namely, to demonstrate (rather 
than merely report or describe) the emergence of modern/romantic art 
out of classical and symbolic art. For romantic art’s emergence and end 
to be ‘scientifically’ demonstrated, it must also have been somehow inter­
nally achievable (and, in that sense, re-enactable as well as teachable) in 
something like a dramatic education from the point of view of historical 
subjects (us, Prospero’s audience, Hegel’s students).12 At least, this is how 
I read remarks like: ‘For this reason my treatment of the subject could 
not consist in a mere criticism of works of art or an instruction for pro­
ducing them’, or ‘My one aim has been to seize in thought and to prove 
the fundamental nature of the beautiful and art, and to follow it through 
all the stages it has gone through in the course of its realization’ (Hegel 
1975 1237). As I will suggest later, something like this ‘re­enacted course’ 
is staged in The Tempest, too.
Related to this, Hegel imitates (or re­enacts) Prospero even as he 
explicitly disavows further analytical discussion or detailed exegesis of 
Shakespeare’s text. Immediately before pronouncing the Epilogue cited 
at length above, Hegel had claimed that ‘the modern world has developed 
a type of comedy which is truly comical and truly poetic’, before ellipti­
cally adding – as the very last sentence of the entire lecture course, just 
before the Epilogue: ‘As a brilliant example of this sort of thing, I will 
name Shakespeare once again, in conclusion, but without going into detail’ 
(Hegel 1975, 1236, my emphasis). Of course, students of Hegel’s Aesthetics 
– 1237 pages in its English translation – must have laughed at that last 
remark. After all, Hegel saw no reason not to ‘go into detail’ with respect 
to other art works and practices. He treats his students to lengthy and 
intricate discussions of Doric and Ionic columns, obelisks, the Memnon 
statues, for instance, and to long discussions of anatomical details in 
re­elaboration of The Tempest in Faust II, which was being composed in the 
years that Hegel was lecturing on art in Berlin (and meeting fairly regularly 
with Goethe). For a recent assessment, see Lee 2012, 198–210. 
12 Recall Josiah Royce’s famous suggestion that Hegel’s Phenomenology is a 
Bildungsroman, or Hegel’s own frequent characterisations of his enterprise as 
the self­education of consciousness. See Royce 1919, 147–150.
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classical Greek sculpture.13 And yet, Hegel does not ‘cite’ Shakespeare 
here, the way he – on the previous page! – had cited Molière’s Tartuffe; 
or, the way he had quoted from Shakespeare earlier in the lectures, when 
he wanted to praise Shakespeare’s skill at portraying his character’s ca­
pacity for self­distancing; or, the way he cites (in altered form) Schiller’s 
poem ‘Freundschaft’ at the end of the Phenomenology of Spirit; or, even 
the way he obliquely refers to Sophocles’ Antigone in his discussion of 
Greek Sittlichkeit in The Phenomenology of Spirit.14 In the Epilogues under 
consideration we seem to have moved from citation (even oblique cita­
tion) into – I am suggesting – something closer to practical imitation or 
‘dramatic­philosophical education,’ rather than art criticism. As if the 
self­limitation of art tumbled into the doing of the science of art.
I would also like to register one impression I have of Hegel’s Lectures 
overall, in this respect: Hegel seems to have thought that different histori­
cal stages of arts (symbolic, classical, romantic – as well as the different 
arts themselves) call for different kinds of insightful­critical accounts, not 
just for different judgments or criticisms. Some artworks call for scrutinis­
ing observations, attention to detail, while others call for something else, 
depending, in part at least, on our cultural­historical propinquity to them, 
on what we ‘owe’ them for our self­understanding. For example, in the 
case of Shakespeare, I take it, Hegel thought Shakespeare’s achievement 
13 The discussions are not as long as those found in, say, Winckelmann’s 
History of Ancient Art, but they are nonetheless striking for their attention to 
detail.
14 The last artist to be cited in the 1823 Hotho transcripts is Aristophanes, 
though the discussion of ‘comedy’ in those transcripts looks much like the 
discussion of Shakespeare at the close of the Knox translation. Hegel quotes a 
German translation of Shakespeare in a section of the Lectures on Fine Art called 
‘Symbolism of the Comparative Art­Form’. But there, Hegel seems to have 
been most interested in evidencing the way in which Shakespeare’s language 
reveals the achievement of a kind of self­reflection, or self­distancing from the 
immediacy of passionate feeling – ‘the freedom’ to present one’s own ‘fate to 
oneself in an image’ (Hegel 1975, 418–420). As Pippin has observed, Hegel’s 
citations of ‘literary texts’ (Schiller’s ‘Freundschaft’ is Pippin’s main focus, 
in part because Hegel alters the citation of Schiller) can be taken to serve an 
appropriately double purpose: ‘… the citation gives evidence for the indispens­
ability of the living, aesthetic dimension of experience for any philosophical 
account of norms … and the alteration … gives evidence that the completion 
and Aufhebung of aesthetic representation by philosophical reflection is just as 
indispensable’ (Pippin 2011, 119).
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could not be aptly understood just through an apprehension of formal 
characteristics or details of the plays – although that sort of apprehension 
might be sufficient for a scientific analysis of Doric columns, say. Rather, 
Shakespeare requires a different kind of account – something approach­
ing what I am calling his philosophical ‘imitation’ of Shakespeare. As 
if the aims of Shakespeare’s drama and Hegel’s philosophy of art were 
nearly identical at this moment (or, at least, mutually illuminated by 
being identified, by Hegel, with one another). By the same token, Hegel 
seems to regard the standpoint achieved in his lectures as a viewpoint in 
whose very achievement Shakespeare’s art itself plays a crucial role:15 ‘The 
philosophy of art is a greater need in our day than it was in the days when 
art by itself as art yielded full satisfaction. Art invites us to intellectual 
consideration, and that not for the purpose of creating art again, but for 
knowing philosophically what art is’ (Hegel 1975, 11, my emphasis). Or, as 
Hegel puts it near the end of his Science of Logic, ‘Philosophy has the same 
content and the same end as art’ (cited and discussed in Pippin 2014, 6–7).
Last, but not least, we should not forget the pride of place, as it were, 
that Hegel assigns to Shakespeare in the Lectures. Shakespeare is the 
last artist named at the very end of the Lectures, concluding the section 
on dramatic poetry, as if Shakespearean drama – and The Tempest in 
15 The principle of subjectivity or a character’s inner life, for instance, is not 
just a philosophical principle or social reality that is nicely illustrated, exem­
plified or expressed in the work of Shakespeare. Rather, for Hegel, it is one of 
the achievements of Shakespearean drama to have helped bring subjectivity to 
life – to have ‘enlivened’ our inner lives in ways that are intertwined with, but 
not reducible to, how ‘the right of subjectivity’ emerged historically in religious 
practices (like the veneration of the saints, and increased attention to the story 
of Christ­the­man) or political history (the way intimate aspects of domestic­
family members’ lives started to count as properly political concerns). Benjamin 
Rutter says this well when he notes that, for Hegel, ‘art is not a match for the 
culture, a mirror in the road, but the matrix for its self­understanding as a 
coherent form of life’ (Rutter 2010, 2). Hegel makes this point in the very same 
passage. He notes that in ‘the religious sphere’ and ‘the political sphere’ the 
‘interests of individuals’ are less and less ‘absorbed’ by the ‘substantial elements’ 
of family, church, state – but that dramatic­poetic­artistic works establish ‘the 
right of subjectivity’ as ‘the sole subject­matter’ in a way that is not reducible 
to the increasing privileging of subjectivity in, say, the objective political arena. 
Shakespeare, in short, can show us what subjectivity is or can be in ways that 
political history or religious traditions on their own cannot. See Hegel 1975, 
1223–1224.
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particular – were the conclusion of the history of art’s highest vocation 
in Hegel’s telling.
In part, Hegel saw dramatic poetry as ‘the highest stage of art and 
poetry generally’ because ‘in contrast to the other perceptible materials, 
stone, wood, colour and notes, speech alone is the element worthy of the 
expression of spirit’. And reading the opening of the section ‘Dramatic 
Poetry’ in the Lectures, it can seem that, for Hegel, dramatic poetry is ‘freer’ 
than the other arts because its medium – namely, speech and action – is 
from the start ‘spiritual’, human, de­naturalised.16 But before we prema­
turely conclude that Hegel and Shakespeare meant to leave art’s sensuous­
ness behind with dramatic poetry, we should recall the importance both 
place on theatrical representation. ‘Drama’, Hegel writes, ‘imperatively 
needs a sensuous presentation, and this can only be given artistically by 
actual performance in the theater’ (Hegel 1975, 1192).17
And we should consider other aspects of Hegel’s discussion of dra­
matic poetry, too. Drama might be also said to be ‘freer’ than the other 
arts when it comes to choosing its content: since its ‘medium’ or ‘form’ 
is human speech and action, it can comprehend the entire realm of the 
‘doable’ (actual and possible) in human affairs.18 Indeed, not only does 
Hegel rank dramatic poetry as the ‘highest stage’ of art; he also thought 
that among modern dramatists, ‘you will scarcely find any … who can be 
compared with Shakespeare’ (Hegel 1975, 1228). But in saying this, Hegel 
is, I think, not simply advancing a historical or ontological hierarchy of 
artistic media in which the medium of dramatic poetry just is (or turns 
out to be) freer, because de­materialised. Rather, Hegel also seems in­
terested in the way in which the historical achievement of certain kinds 
of dramatic poetry assess – somehow account for – art’s own becoming 
16 Prospero’s ‘art’, too, seems to function as an allegorical presentation of art’s 
denial of nature’s power to tell us what to do with natural elements. Think, for 
instance, of Prospero’s powers to conjure up storms, ‘negate’ nature, call forth 
the dead etc.
17 English translation modified. The German refers to ‘… einer vollständig 
sinn lichen Darstellung, welche sie kunstgemäß erst durch die wirkliche theatralische 
Exekution erhält ’.
18 As in Aristotle’s suggestion that tragedy is more universal than history, be­
cause it can portray potential as well as actual events. For Hegel, too, dramatic 
poetry could only (that is, historically could only) present and develop a ‘com­
plete and specific action’ by means of theatrical­sensuous representation – that 
is, by becoming something other than epic or narrative or lyric. See Kottman 
2014 and Kottman 2016, 6–10.
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history through a reflective account of art’s past-ness.19 Drama can contain 
music without being reducible to a musical performance, can contain 
spectacles and images of all sorts without being thereby reducible to the 
plastic arts. Moreover, drama can purposefully show this containment of 
other media as essential to its own specifically expressive power. Which 
is, of course, also what Prospero demonstrates in those scenes of self­
conscious ‘theatricality’ the first scene of the fourth act. Put another way, 
late romantic dramatic poetry – unlike the other arts Hegel treats – turns 
out to have no ‘ideal content’.20 Modern drama is, in this sense, better 
positioned than music or painting to embody art’s becoming past, because 
it is the only art in which the limitations of these other arts are internally 
and explicitly registered by (dramatic) art.
All this is perhaps best grasped with Shakespeare in mind.
Art’s highest vocation, it seems reasonable to think, is that to which 
Prospero had once aspired – ‘rapt in secret studies’ and ‘neglecting all 
worldly ends’ (Tempest I.ii.76, 89) – before being taught by fraternal be­
trayal, political upheaval and historical reflection that the vocation itself 
was no longer viable. One obvious image for art’s social non­viability 
being the exile of the artist to an island on which ‘art’ can continue in­
definitely, with supreme technical mastery (see Tempest IV.i), but bereft 
of its highest vocation.
By finally abjuring rough magic, breaking his staff and drowning his 
books, Prospero is not himself severing art from its highest vocation. 
Rather, by drowning his instruments and techniques, he is at last ac­
knowledging that art has already been separated from its highest vocation. 
In this way, art’s loss of vocation is internally registered by artistic means 
19 This feature of drama helps us see why the ‘historical’ (symbolic­classical­
romantic) and the ‘generic’ (Architecture­Sculpture­Painting­Music­Poetry) 
developmental structures do not and cannot be brought into alignment by any 
external ‘structure’ in Hegel’s account: only when the historical and generic­
developmental sequences are shown to have their apotheosis in an artwork’s 
historical achievement (I nominate Shakespeare for this status) can the devel­
opment of art be seen as both historical and generic –chronology, social history 
and medium­specific analysis cannot, on their own, bring this into view. In his 
book, Tragic Play: Irony and Theater from Sophocles to Beckett, Christoph Menke 
suggests that already Greek drama ‘for Hegel is on its way to a “no longer 
beautiful art” … In drama begins the end of art, within art’ (Menke 2009, xxx). 
I agree with Menke’s suggestion, but think it needs to be followed through to 
modern drama as the site of art’s becoming past (not just ‘on its way’).
20 I try to elaborate on this in Kottman 2016.
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as Prospero’s ‘project’ (as he calls it) – in Shakespeare’s play, in Prospero’s 
‘final’ display of art’s technical prowess – and by Prospero’s sealing the 
fate of the ‘object­remains’ of art: breaking his staff, drowning his books. 
Prospero, that is, aims to defend against art’s ahistoricity by destroying 
art’s (now) merely technical­instrumental means – so as not to let the 
possibility of art-making persist indefinitely, as refined technical craft, 
in ways that might blind us to the obsolescence of its highest vocation.21
Not only that. To bear witness to art’s abiding pastness – by warding 
off art’s indefinite continuance as consummately perfectible skill, in ways 
that threaten to obscure the pastness of art’s highest vocation – Prospero 
also sees to it that the material object­remains of his art not be left adrift, 
or in circulation, to suffer whatever fate the winds of history might bring. 
In other words, not only does Prospero defend against art’s ahistoricity 
by destroying art’s (now) merely technical­instrumental means; he also 
defends against a future for art­objects in which they can circulate as 
nothing more than material sufferers of historical fate – valued chiefly 
as collectables that bear the scars of their historical provenance, like the 
books in the library unpacked by Walter Benjamin (Benjamin 1969). 
Prospero does this not by incinerating his tools of art­power (as Caliban 
wanted to do) but by consigning his staff and book to the elements, where 
they will lose their identifiable markings, without however losing their 
sensuous objecthood. To acknowledge that art’s fate has been irrevocably 
sealed, Prospero seals the fate of art’s object­remains, too, returning them 
to whence they came – ‘certain fathoms in the earth … deeper than did 
ever plummet sound’ (5.1.55–56).
And lest we miss the significance of this, Shakespeare emphasises 
that Prospero’s staff and books – drowned and buried – will not one day 
reappear, like the ruins of Pompeii where, as Freud pointed out, ‘their 
burial had been their preservation’.22 Prospero’s staff and books persist of 
course – I am writing about them now, and have seen them drowned on 
stage and film many times – but they do not persist as ruins. They are 
neither the immortal material bearers of tradition, as ancient fantasies 
about sculpture and architecture once held, nor are they the endlessly 
dying ‘aura­less’ relics which happened to survive the loss of that tradition 
21 Hegel points to this same distinction: ‘We may well hope that art will always 
rise higher and come to perfection, but the form of art has ceased to be the 
supreme need of spirit’ (Hegel 1975, 103).
22 Freud 1953–1974, X: 176.
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– like the Roman antiquities Freud stored in his Biedermeier cabinet.23 
Instead of trying to ensure that his book and staff survive in exile, art­
objects adrift, Shakespeare – who made no efforts, so far as we know, to 
ensure that his written plays would survive his death – rescues the object­
reminders of art’s pastness by folding Prospero’s objects into the waves of 
history. The material objects of Prospero’s ‘art’ will not live forever, but 
neither will they die forever as exiled relics. If anything, Shakespeare leads 
us to see, these objects might be unrecognisably transformed by their 
loss at sea and perhaps become material bearers of post­artistic value: 
new treasures, not necessarily connected, recognisably, to the history 
of art. They ‘… suffer a sea-change / into something rich and strange’ 
(I.ii.403–4). Isn’t Shakespeare’s canonization itself one such sea­change? 
Like the modern humanities, which ‘study’ all kinds of cultural products 
washed ashore by the waves of history …?
For Hegel, too, art proper undergoes a ‘dissolution’ [Auflösung] that 
is followed by something more irrevocable: late romantic art’s ‘collapse’ 
[Zerfallenheit]. And Prospero’s Epilogue, like Hegel’s description in the 
operative passage, ‘passes over to the presentation of common reality as 
such’ (Hegel 1975, 576) – though this is a ‘common reality’ that does not 
fully appear within the horizon of art­making. This reality, Shakespeare 
seems to suggest, emerges as a ‘rich and strange’ reality, one whose 
emergence is predicated upon something both older and younger than 
art: metamorphosis. More on this below.
I I .
In order for Hegel’s claim about art’s loss of vocation to have been earned 
according to the ‘scientific’ standards that Hegel sets for himself in the 
Introduction to the Lectures, art’s becoming past would have to be part 
of the realised development of art that Hegel himself unfolds. Hegel 
cannot attribute art’s bygoneness to something entirely external to art’s 
own historical development. He can only declare art ‘a thing of the past’ 
if art’s becoming past is in some way also artistically registered, hence 
‘scientifically’ earned, within the historical development of art that Hegel 
considers himself to have presented.
23 So, the fate of Prospero’s books and staff might also form the basis of a 
rejoinder to Horowitz’s conclusions about the fate of art, as in his reading of 
Freud. See Horowitz 2001, 131–132.
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In the secondary literature, it is widely assumed that Hegel meant to 
identify the late romantic art of his own day as the moment when art’s loss 
of vocation was becoming artistically manifest.24 But this runs contrary to 
Hegel’s own assessment.25 Nevertheless, to my knowledge, no commenta­
tor has suggested that we look back to Shakespeare to better understand 
Hegel’s thesis about art’s pastness. Why not? Might this have something 
to do with our desire to see Shakespeare’s art as immortal, with our own 
philosophical Romantic view of modern art – a view from which Hegel 
took pains to distance himself? Since Hegel’s philosophy of art purports 
to earn its claims – including the thesis about art’s pastness – from the 
art­historical development it unfolds, we should at least look to the art 
prior to the emergence of Hegel’s own ‘science of art’ for a clue to Hegel’s 
meaning here. And given the structure of Hegel’s own lectures it should 
make sense, I think, to look to the culmination of the development as 
Hegel himself patently saw it – namely, to Shakespeare – for the fullest 
indication of how Hegel saw art’s loss of vocation as registered by art: 
‘the self­transcendence of art but within its own sphere and in the form 
of art itself ’ (Hegel 1975, 113).
By declaring that we have long since not been able to rely on the 
historical continuance of art-making to teach us art’s significance, to 
satisfy our most fundamental cognitive needs (which is not to say that 
art satisfies no important cognitive needs), Hegel issues a challenge to 
– he throws down a gauntlet in the face of – the contemporary human 
sciences. If we are to more adequately entertain the thought that Hegel 
24 Because I see no evidence for this assumption in Hegel’s Lectures on Fine 
Art, I wonder if is attributable to Hegel’s phrase, from the Philosophy of Right, 
that ‘philosophy is its own time comprehended in thought’. That is, I wonder 
if there is (in the secondary literature) a conflation of the task of philosophy as 
Hegel sees it (Hegel’s ‘science of art,’ in this case) and a central claim of that 
philosophy (that ‘art is and remains a thing of the past’). This assumption is 
by no means universal in the secondary literature, however. Stephen Houlgate, 
for instance, interprets Hegel’s thesis to mean that ‘modern, post­Reformation 
art fails to provide us with the same religious satisfaction that earlier ages were 
afforded by their art’. See Houlgate 2007, xxi, as well as the discussion by 
Gethman­Siefert in Hegel 2014 and Harries 1973–1974.
25 For, instance in the section on ‘the end of the romantic form of art’, Hegel 
writes: ‘No Homer, Sophocles, etc., no Dante, Ariosto, or Shakespeare can appear 
in our day; what was so magnificently sung, what so freely expressed, has been 
expressed; these are materials, ways of looking at them and treating them which 
have been sung once and for all … the rest is paler and paler’ (Hegel 1975, 608).
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was right, and thereby at least pick up the gauntlet, it might be useful 
to consider Shakespeare’s possible agreement with Hegel’s assessment.
To wit: in his 2010 book, The Moment of Caravaggio, Michael Fried 
alludes to what he calls an ‘immensely suggestive’ ‘comparison … of a dia­
lectical sort’ between the emergent absorptive strategies of Caravaggio’s 
early seventeenth­century paintings and Shakespeare’s dramas from the 
very same years.26 Fried does not pursue the comparison, but given his 
well­known development of the issue of ‘theatricality’ over many years, 
we might surmise that pursuing the comparison dialectically would 
mean, at a minimum, considering ways in which modern drama (at least, 
Shakespearean drama) might also contain or develop anti­theatrical strat­
egies – might register – or reflect on the issue of ‘theatricality’, as modern 
painting is said to do.27 If so, however, then such a dialectical comparison 
would trouble Fried’s own conclusion that the fate of art’s anti­theatrical 
strategies can be pursued metonymically by considering the history of 
modern painting, exclusively, as the modern art in which, as Pippin puts 
it, ‘the defeat of theatricality is an essential condition of the work’s be­
ing an artwork … where the existence of painting as an art is at stake’.28
Indeed, pursuing the comparison might allow us to make good on the 
suggestion that what is at stake in the history of modern painting – above 
all, its own struggles with what Pippin calls the ‘pressure on absorptive 
strategies in painting [which arise] because the actions and practices in 
the emerging modern world … that can compel genuine absorption might 
now be few and far between’ – is already registered within Shakespeare’s 
drama, as an emerging problem for modernist painting and, indeed, for 
all art (Pippin 2014, 92; emphasis in original). I have already alluded 
to those overtly theatrical­imagistic ‘spectacles’ that Prospero conjures 
26 Fried 2010, 229.
27 Fried seems to suggest as much, implicitly if not explicitly, in what he says 
about the difference between Shakespeare’s Protestant culture and Caravaggio’s 
Catholic Rome – and about ‘the exemplary figure of Christ’ in propria persona as 
‘a … guarantor of fine-grained meaning’ for Caravaggio. But he does not pursue 
the thought. See Fried 2010, 107.
28 I am citing Pippin’s recent gloss of Fried, in Pippin 2014, 85 – emphasis 
modified. I note, also, that Fried seems to have amended some of the formula­
tions in Absorption and Theatricality in his later work, to accommodate just this 
kind of dialectical comparison between paintings and stage plays. For instance, 
his famous formula from the 1980 text – ‘the primordial convention that paint­
ings are made to be beheld’ – becomes ‘the primordial convention that paintings 
(and stage plays) are made to be beheld’ in Fried 2011, 93.
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(The Tempest IV.i) – but we should note that those moments are blended 
with the ostensibly more ‘absorptive’ moments of The Tempest: Prospero 
confronting his usurping brother, dealing with Caliban, marrying off 
his daughter, Miranda, and so on. As if the challenge of discerning the 
genuinely absorptive from the theatrical just were part of the challenge 
that Shakespeare registered, while trying to make dramatic poetry in a 
modern, secular, market­driven world (assuming, of course, Shakespeare 
was doing more than concocting mere distractions, like bear­baiting or 
acrobatic circus acts). After all, the question for any commercially depen­
dent modern dramatic poet, like Shakespeare – who did not manifestly 
expect his own dramas to be received as artworks – is unavoidably: What 
non-religious actions or situations might, if depicted aright, compel an 
audience to pay money to sit through a play? And what would make it 
worth their time and attention, and not just their money? Once religiously 
sanctioned social rituals are no longer credibly binding, the emergent 
market­based social world – secular, capitalist modernity – requires any 
commercially viable theatre to ‘work out’ whether anything human beings 
might be depicted as doing is absorbing beyond offering a chance for an 
audience to be distracted or ‘entertained’ for a few hours.29
Shakespeare himself was not above turning out interludes that look 
like ‘mindless entertainment’ (as in the masques just mentioned), though 
over and over he seems also to have been interested in seeing whether 
such ‘theatricality’ might turn out to be compellingly interwoven with 
the stuff of what had once seemed to be purely absorptive moments. I 
mean, all the internal strife of ‘Shakespearean plots’, in which brother 
betrays brother, in which kingdoms are at risk, daughters grow apart from 
fathers, all once again gathered up and recycled in The Tempest as if to 
‘test’ the old formulae – or, I want to say, as if to work out what it might 
mean for all that (high­vocationally) ‘absorptive’ art to be and remain 
past, a bygone parade.
29 For example: the Christ figure, as Fried observes, did not hold the absorptive 
power for Shakespeare that the redeemer still held for Caravaggio’s audience. 
Think, too, of the Puritans of Shakespeare’s day, angrily denouncing the crowds 
as they abandoned the churches for a ‘sinful’ afternoon matinee of bear­baiting 
or a performance of As You Like It. Pippin usefully notes and discusses Hegel’s 
intriguing phrase herauszuarbeiten (‘to work out’) – for example, as when Hegel 
says, ‘the mode of artistic production was such that what fermented in these 
poets they could work out only in this form of art and poetry’ (Hegel 1975, 102). 
See Pippin 2014, 41–42.
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For Fried, the defeat of theatricality is the condition of art’s survival 
(at least, in the realm of modern painting). But I think Shakespeare is 
inducting us, right at the (Caravaggio) ‘moment’ at which Fried’s narra­
tion of modern art begins, into a world in which painting’s primacy in 
the arts has already become a ‘thing of the past’ – the world of capitalist, 
secular modernity, in other words, which Shakespeare’s London theatre 
knows all too well. As just indicated, I think that Shakespeare’s (artistic) 
registration of art’s pastness is one reason Hegel holds Shakespeare in 
such high regard, placing him (and ‘dramatic poetry’) at the end of the 
Lectures. Shakespeare knows – has learned, or taught himself – that new 
modes of recognition between audience and performer, new modes of 
intelligibility between human beings can no longer be achieved or evoked 
just through the structure of beholding, or the proffering of artistically 
absorbing content. This also squares with Hegel’s own account of paint­
ing, which focuses on Italian, German and Northern European painting, 
with an occasional nod to the Spanish, but mostly leaves out the paint­
ings ‘after Shakespeare’ that are Fried’s primary focus. Hegel, of course, 
acknowledged that painting could go on – even flourish as painting – after 
its loss of vocation as art. The ongoing adventure of painting as painting 
(as the high vocation of the aesthete, but no longer as fine art) is one way 
art’s pastness is manifested.30
We can get a preliminary sense for Shakespeare’s understanding of 
this, I think, by recalling the way in which his mature dramas continually 
present the challenges of mutuality and recognition in human affairs as 
open ended – as manifestly unsatisfied via available social, economic, 
political, familial forms of life, which themselves are shown to have 
fallen into ‘crisis’ (‘Elsinore’, ‘Lear’s Kingdom’, Prospero’s ‘Island’ and 
so on), and as unsatisfiable by the internal relation established between 
the drama and its audience.31 In other words, Shakespeare presents the 
challenges of mutuality as incompletely formed, both within the nascent 
social life of the early modern horizon, and by whatever artworks make 
30 I have already mentioned Fried’s work. T.J. Clark’s contribution to this 
volume might be read as proposing a history of French painting, in and after 
Hegel’s own lifetime, in which we catch a glimpse of painting’s afterlife (after 
painting has done all it can do as fine art, has annulled itself as art) but not all 
it can do as painting in legitimating its persistence; it is as if French painting’s 
significance (for us) were in part its abiding testimony to what is, finally, but 
a moment of Hegel’s philosophy of fine art.
31 For a longer discussion, see Kottman 2009.
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intelligible – and this double presentation is internal to Shakespeare’s 
drama, part of its own self­limitation.
Consider: The ‘high points’ of history painting or portraiture just be­
fore and after Shakespeare – Veronese, Titian, Velázquez or even David – 
are still routinely understood by contemporary scholarship as giving 
intelligible form to struggles for recognition to which (then) contem­
porary forms of life remained blind, via painting’s establishment of its 
own authoritative sphere.32 Shakespeare, however, took pains to show us 
that art’s authority is no longer safeguarded just by installing that sort 
of ‘spectator­beholder’ relation. I do not have the space to make good on 
this suggestion here, but – again, to get a sense of what I mean – recall 
Hamlet’s failed attempt to ‘catch the conscience of the king’ by staging 
‘something like the murder of my father / Before mine uncle’. In that 
scene, the dialectic of absorptive content (world­historical political­
familial­ethical crisis) and theatricality (Hamlet ’s ‘Mousetrap’ is the very 
paragon of theatricality) is brought to its breaking point, leaving us with 
no sense that – wherever the demands of mutual recognition remain 
open-ended, reflections on ethical life incompletely formed – art can come 
to the rescue and help us still. Rather, by already admitting a constant 
‘contamination’ of more ‘theatrical’ moments (Shakespeare’s appeals to 
the ‘groundlings,’ his meta­theatrical Masques and so on) with more 
absorptive content (the rotten state of Elsinore, of Prospero’s Milan and 
so on), Shakespeare over and over goes out of his way to show us art’s 
self­limitation: the pastness of the hope that the sensuous embodiment 
of unacknowledged claims on mutual recognition could be directed at 
a beholding audience in the hope of identifying or rectifying failures of 
mutual intelligibility (again, which is not to say that art no longer has 
any cognitive work to do).
The emergence of capitalist economies, state­sanctioned property 
rights, the collapse of hereditary monarchies (all of which undergird 
Claudius’ own ‘election’ to the throne), the expropriation of wealth from 
the Church and the rise of the ‘middle class’ in the wake of the Reforma­
tion and colonial trade, the spread of republican forms of government, 
32 I take my cue here from a train of thought suggested in Horowitz 2014. Fred 
Rush, in this volume, also notes that Hegel’s own history of painting inverts the 
traditional hierarchy of ‘history painting’, ‘portraiture’, ‘still lifes’ – and sees the 
end­state of painting in Dutch still lifes, roughly contemporary to The Tempest. 
Rutter 2010 notes Hegel’s dissatisfactions with the Dutch (a dissatisfaction 
Hegel did not feel with Shakespeare).
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class consciousness, the rise of the culture industry, nascent feminism 
(all of which are registered internally to Shakespearean drama’s self­
understanding, not merely as external historical facts) – all of this must 
matter to art’s changing sense of its own vocation. To think otherwise 
would be to treat art as immune to, internally resistant to, historical de­
velopments. Indeed, as I have already suggested, it was to prevent his art 
from becoming ahistorical – or historically irrelevant – that Shakespeare 
embedded art’s loss of vocation into his own drama. Whether in Hamlet 
or the Tempest, grasping that the challenges of mutuality and recogni­
tion are open­ended – seeing our own understanding of these challenges 
as incomplete, even lacking reflective form – requires seeing that the 
intelligibility of these challenges is not adequately ‘formed’ by art, not 
adequately apprehended by the relationship that art installs between 
audience and performer. And seeing that required a dramatic art that 
realised its own limitations, internally, in the ways to which I just alluded.
I am tempted to say, although this will require more explanation, that 
the significance of Shakespearean drama for Hegel just is Shakespeare’s 
artistic registration of art’s historical loss of vocation.
I I I .
According to the most common interpretation of Hegel’s claim about art’s 
pastness, Hegel’s point was that art’s significance as a social institution 
has weakened or faded for us, because the rationality that founds the ab­
stract norms of modern ethical life [Sittlichkeit] – above all ‘the distinction 
between state and civil society and the basic structures of modern civil 
society’ – represents ‘the achievement of reconciled relations of genuinely 
mutual recognitional status’ (Pippin 2014, 36).33 According to this inter­
pretation, to which Pippin subscribes, when Hegel says things like, ‘the 
conditions of our present time are not favorable to art’ (Hegel 1975, 10), 
he is believed to mean that ‘the basic structure of modern society had 
become at least incipiently rational … in a way that no longer required a 
33 This is not the only interpretation – there are other elements, too, such as 
the decline of ‘beauty’ in post­classical art or the increasingly arbitrary and 
quotidian ‘content’ of late romantic art – but it seems to be the most prominent. 
See also the discussions in Danto 2004; Henrich 2003a and 2003b; Rush 2010; 
Rutter 2010; Peters 2013 (on the ‘beauty’ question); and Sebastian Gardner’s 
contribution to this volume.
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distinctly sensible-affective comprehension … We have reached a form of 
self­ and other­understanding where there is nothing left to be “worked 
out”, no fundamental residual irrationality in the way we make claims on 
each other and about the world’ (Pippin 2014, 36–37).34
As Gregg Horowitz has observed, however, ‘this interpretation is at 
odds with another of Hegel’s key claims, that the reawakening of philosophy, 
that is, discursive rationality in its highest and most reflexive form, is 
itself responsible for the “higher estimation” of art in modern culture’.35 
And as Sebastian Gardner argues in his contribution to this volume, 
it is difficult to understand Hegel’s claim about art’s pastness without 
also recognising that Hegel’s insistence on philosophy’s (historical) 
transcendence of art amounts to a direct objection to post­Kantian Ro­
mantic attempts to demonstrate art’s cognitive superiority to philosophy 
(as well as Hegel’s rejection of the claim that ‘art’s cognition is equaled, 
but not surpassed, by philosophy’). That is, Hegel goes out of his way 
to emphasise something that – were Pippin’s interpretation of Hegel’s 
claim about art’s pastness correct – would be contradictory: namely, Hegel 
underscores that our ‘esteem’ for art does not fade but rather rises when 
art’s pastness comes into view. Our esteem for art increases, as Hegel 
puts it, when ‘the form of art has ceased to be the supreme need of spirit’, 
when we no longer ‘bow the knee’ before the statues of the Greek gods, 
or paintings of Christ and Mary.36 Contra Novalis, Schlegel, Schelling and 
Solger, art is newly alive and compelling to us, for Hegel, not because it 
continues alongside philosophy as a mode of cognition, but because art 
now can be seen historically, its highest vocation understood to be and 
to remain a thing of the past. Only when art is grasped as part of Spirit’s 
self­education – that is, by seeing art in historical perspective – can a 
‘science of art’ begin and rise to the heights it attains in Hegel’s system. 
34 For a similar view, see Danto 2004, 540.
35 Horowitz 2001, 59 (my emphasis).
36 Hegel writes: ‘We may well hope that art will always rise higher and come to 
perfection, but the form of art has ceased to be the supreme need of the spirit. 
No matter how excellent we find the statues of the Greek gods, no matter how 
we see God the father, Christ and Mary so excellently and perfectly portrayed: 
it is no help; we bow the knee no longer’, Hegel 1975, 1. 103. This passage is 
discussed by Pippin towards the end of After the Beautiful, where Pippin denies 
Hegel’s central claim about art’s having ceased to be the supreme need of Spirit. 
For Pippin, ‘Art … has clearly not ceased to be a supreme need of Geist’ (Pippin 
2014, 130); cf. Squire’s discussion in this volume, pp. 139–148.
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Against philosophical Romanticism’s strong aesthetic claim for art’s 
cognitive equality or even superiority to philosophy, Hegel’s claim is that 
our esteem for art in late modernity is intertwined with our apprehension 
of art’s pastness, and hence (at least in this respect) with philosophy’s 
transcendence of art’s cognition.37
The word ‘remains’ [bleibt ] – ‘art is and remains for us a thing of 
the past’ – is often elided in interpretations of Hegel’s dictum, includ­
ing Pippin’s, as Horowitz points out.38 Pippin does emphasise that the 
‘self­transcendence of art’ in romantic art means that, for Hegel, art ‘still 
enacts such transcendence as art’ – but in the same passage Pippin also 
suggests that Hegel meant to underline the ‘finality of the achievement 
of romantic art’ (2014, 36–37, my emphasis). And this judgment of ‘fi­
nality’ is (in Pippin’s view of Hegel’s view) underwritten ‘not because of 
some internal aesthetic feature of late romantic art that required such a 
reduced significance’ but rather because ‘the basic structure of modern 
society had become at least incipiently rational’ (Pippin 2014, 36–37). 
Here it is worth noting that this, too, seems at odds with Hegel’s own 
‘science of art’; for Hegel is at pains to emphasise that art’s limits are not 
imposed upon art by something outside art (natural or socio­historical 
conditions) – since, for Hegel, it is precisely art’s task to draw the line 
between itself and whatever falls outside it.39 So even if Hegel regarded the 
basic structure of modern society (objective spirit) as at least incipiently 
rational, that would still not be sufficient justification for him to declare 
art (a dimension of Absolute Spirit) a thing of the past. Hegel would still 
want to know how that incipient rationality had been taken up by art as 
part of its internal self­limitation.
37 As Gardner puts it, in his contribution to this volume, mentioning Pippin’s 
After the Beautiful as an example, ‘there is … a significant tendency in later 
history of art’s self­reflection that seems to take the side of philosophical Ro­
manticism’.
38 Pippin 2014, 8 and the second chapter of the same book; Horowitz 2001, 
59–60. See also Geulen 2006. Fred Rush, in his contribution to this volume, 
points out that: ‘Art that is past is not simply dead, nor is it merely of antiquar­
ian or nostalgic interest. Such art – indeed Hegel holds ultimately all art – is 
always with Geist in its being­past. Hegel’s doctrines of recollection (Wieder-
holung/Erinnerung) and reconciliation (Versöhnung) require this result’.
39 Gardner puts this point well in this volume: ‘Whatever has an effect on art 
must first be assimilated by art.’
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At any rate, the fundamental argument of After the Beautiful rests on 
Pippin’s assertion that Hegel was flat wrong on these two counts: that 
is, Pippin thinks that Hegel was wrong about the incipient rationality of 
the basic structures of modern society, and that this is partly why Hegel 
was therefore wrong about art’s pastness (Pippin 2014, 37):
In a word – and I shall simply assume that this does not need to 
be argued – this [namely, that ‘there is no fundamental residual ir­
rationality in the way we make claims on each other and about the 
world’] is all clearly as false a claim about European modernity … and 
that is being false means that … the realization of freedom would still 
require, in Hegel’s own terms, an attempt at the sort of understand­
ing just referred to: an objective embodiment and self­recognition, 
or the world of art. 
Hence, for Pippin (2014, 130), ‘Art … has clearly not ceased to be a su­
preme need of Geist’.
Pippin’s aim, then, is to unfold a narrative of modern art (painting in 
After the Beautiful; film in many of his other writings) according to which 
other central claims about art, which Pippin sees as Hegel’s truer or most 
important claims, can continue to function as guides to ‘the meaning of 
normative change in visual art’ (Pippin 2014, 31). Those claims are as 
follows: according to Pippin, ‘Hegel’s view was that the production or 
“externalization” of our ideas in artworks represents a distinct and, until 
very recently, indispensable form of self­knowledge’ (Pippin 2014, 32, my 
emphasis). [Note the phrase ‘until very recently’, contra my suggestions 
about Shakespeare’s place in Hegel’s Lectures, above.] By ‘indispensable 
form of self­knowledge’, Pippin means whatever ‘is presupposed as count­
ing for “reality” in our attempt to render the world intelligible’; in other 
words, our dynamic and fluid conceptual structure of experience.40 ‘In 
its full Hegelian glory’, writes Pippin (2014, 5), ‘the official formulation 
40 Pippin calls Hegel’s philosophy of art a ‘prelude to Hegel’s own speculative 
logic, where he claims constantly to be differentiating his approach from the 
fixed, formalizable, stable, self­standing notions of “the understanding” and to 
be proposing a more dynamic, fluid, “animated” account of conceptual interrela­
tion, and so conceptual content’ (Pippin 2014, 5). By using the term ‘prelude’, I 
wonder if perhaps Pippin means to refer to the 1831 Preface to a new edition of 
the Science of Logic, written just before Hegel’s death; the 1812 edition of Hegel’s 
Logic precedes Hegel’s 1820s Lectures on Fine Art by several years.
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of the approach is that art embodies a distinct mode of the intelligibility 
of the “Absolute”’.
Such ‘official formulations’ require more unpacking that I can manage 
in this short space.41 But one of Pippin’s condensations can be cited by 
way of explanation. ‘The central claim’ – as Pippin puts it (2014, 38–9) – 
concerns:
… the issue of the conditions of the possibility of the intelligibil­
ity of modern fine art in general and, given the increasing pressure 
modernist art places on conceptual articulation, or what we now 
call criticism, of modernist art in particular. That central claim is … 
the distinguishability and, more radically, the inseparability of con­
cept and intuition in experience and, similarly, a form of practical 
mindedness, intentions, in bodily movement in action. Hegel denied 
that the basic capacities needed to understand what we experience 
and what we do, active and passive capacities, were separable or 
separately contributing components of experience and action, as if in 
some two­step process. He maintained that, especially, any sensible 
passivity or sensible inclination could play whatever role it was to 
play only if conceptually informed, already determined in a way of 
some spontaneous discrimination. This claim … required a thorough 
reconsideration of the very possibility of intelligibility in experience 
and action (Hegel’s major project, as I understand him) … [This 
claim] especially associated the intelligibility of artworks with the 
intelligibility of bodily movements we count as actions, where suc­
cessfully circulating social norms are necessary for the content and 
the ascribability of the action to be fixed.
Pippin, then, takes Hegel’s most abidingly significant claim about art not 
to be his claim about art’s having become ein Vergangenes, but rather these 
other claims: that fine artworks function as ‘vehicles for the practical 
realization of the relevant speculative truth’, as sensuous modes for the 
intelligibility of the Absolute. Hence, Pippin’s gambit in After the Beautiful 
is to dissociate Hegel’s first claim from Hegel’s second claim. He even 
accuses Hegel of undermining, with his claim about art’s pastness, this 
41 See Pippin’s fuller discussion: Pippin 2014, 38–42. Pippin has taken up the 
question of Hegel’s appropriation and criticism of Kant’s understanding of the 
relation between concept and intuition for many years. For instance, Pippin 
1989 and 2004/2005.
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second and (for Pippin) ‘most important claim’ about art as an ongoing 
effort of making the Absolute intelligible.42 Having separated Hegel’s 
two claims, Pippin then feels entitled to conclude that the sensuous em­
bodiment in fine art of self- and other-understanding – mutuality, social 
subjectivity, self­reconciling spirit – is not a thing of the past at all, but 
is still being ‘worked out’ in modernist painting. ‘Modernist painting 
will begin to work out, in its uniquely aesthetic mode of intelligibility, 
the historical fate in modernity of the social subjectivity necessarily at 
issue in the painting’s address to the beholder’ (Pippin 2014, 22, emphasis in 
original). For Pippin, the normative ruptures in the visual arts that adhere 
in modernism can be ‘explained’ as ongoing artistic efforts to come to 
grips with the logic of social subjectivity and the demands of mutuality 
in late modern societies.43
I V.
There are, I think, three shortcomings or missteps in Pippin’s inter­
pretation of Hegel which – once identified – can help us begin to better 
illuminate the meaning and significance Hegel’s claim about the abiding 
pastness of art.44
The first of Pippin’s missteps is also identified by Horowitz. Namely 
that, in pointing to the incipient rationality of modern society, Hegel 
never meant – as Pippin claims – to suggest that ‘we have reached a form 
of self­ and other­understanding where there is nothing substantial left 
to be “worked out”, no fundamental residual irrationality in the way we 
42 Pippin calls the second claim, ‘the most important Hegelian contribution 
to a theory of art’ (Pippin 2014, 42). And later he says that he is ‘tempted to 
rest [his] whole case for the relevance of Hegel to these questions’ on that in­
terpretation (Pippin 2014, 49). 
43 Again, see the parallels drawn between Pippin’s conclusions and Gardner’s 
account of philosophical Romanticism in his contribution to this volume. 
Pippin himself gives the opening epigraph of After the Beautiful to Schelling.
44 Moreover, although this will not be my task here, once Hegel’s claim about 
art’s pastness is better illuminated, it might also be reconnected to his claim 
about art as a sensuous mode of apprehending the Absolute, thereby allowing us 
to see how Hegel’s full panoply of claims cohere precisely where Pippin wants 
to prise them apart. This might also help us to better measure Hegel’s position 
against those of his contemporaries, pace Gardner.
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make claims on each other and about the world’ (Pippin 2014, 37).45 I 
think Horowitz has the spirit (if not always the letter) of Hegel’s text 
right when he says, instead, that ‘from the standpoint of [Hegel’s] Ab­
solute Knowing … the problem of the unsatisfied demands of mutuality 
and recognition can never be solved once and for all’.46 In other words, 
Hegel’s point was not that the institutions of modern ethical life represent 
a historical moment after which ‘there is nothing substantial left to be 
“worked out”’. Just the opposite. For Hegel, the institutions of modern 
life represent the historically achieved awareness that the demands of 
‘self- and other-understanding’ can now be taken up reflectively in and 
as historical­institutional­ethical problems; that the problems that adhere 
in ‘self­ and other­understanding’ are products of human history; and 
that therefore the demands of mutual intelligibility in human affairs are 
themselves grasped in our historical practices, rather than as allegedly 
perennial questions (like the culture­nature problem).
It should be noted (Horowitz does not mention it) that Pippin 
certainly agrees that the demands of mutuality are not a ‘“problem” of 
the sort that will ever allow a “solution”’ (Pippin 2014, 95). But it is just 
because the demands of mutuality are open­ended, Pippin thinks, that 
art goes on without having ceased to be a supreme need of Geist. That 
is, Pippin’s attempts to marshal Hegel’s philosophy of art here and else­
where – in his interpretations of Hollywood films, for instance – depends 
upon the view that art continues to be a fundamental way in which the 
demands of mutual intelligibility are brought to light, given objective 
embodiment in a movie or a painting. But Pippin’s marshalling of Hegel 
in this way assumes the adherence of a kind of immunity in the attempt 
at understanding (art) from what is ostensibly being understood (the 
demands of mutual intelligibility in human affairs). A more dialectical 
procedure would have to take into consideration the ways in which art 
not only embodies (as Pippin 2014 argues) the increasingly complex 
45 In his earlier book (Pippin 2008), Pippin treats Hegel’s analysis of the mod­
ern state at length. In that book, overall, Pippin’s reading seems closer to the 
one I am proposing here. Namely, that Hegel sought to show that free agency 
is essentially norm­governed, intersubjective and institutional, and thus only 
possible within the social context of modern ethical life – which seems to be 
different from saying that there is ‘no fundamental residual irrationality in the 
way we make claims on each other and about the world’.
46 See also my discussion of Hegel in Kottman 2017b, esp. 165; cf. in particular 
footnote 206, where I read Hegel in this way. Here, I cite from Horowitz 2014.
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demands on mutuality and self­ and other­understanding in the mod­
ern world – but also registers and takes up within its historical unfolding 
whatever new demands on mutuality and self­ and other­understanding 
an increasingly complex modern world throws our way (hence, also, 
whatever sensuous­practical non­artistic forms such demands might yet 
take). Such a dialectic procedure is, I believe, what led Hegel to insist on 
art’s pastness. That is, Hegel saw that art was not only a means through 
which the historical demands of mutual intelligibility are themselves 
given an intelligible sensuous form (which is where Pippin stops), but 
that the form taken by the demands of mutual intelligibility in human 
affairs have become so various and differentiated as to resist objective 
embodiment in art, a resistance that artworks themselves came to some­
how register. This also means that one way to reckon with the demands 
of mutual intelligibility, historically­ethically­institutionally, just is to 
face up to art’s pastness. Put differently, art is so important to us now 
because its pastness is one of our most precious bearers of historically 
indexed demands of mutuality – of what meeting and failing to meet the 
demands of mutuality look like. I will go on to suggest that Shakespeare 
grasped this, too.
A corollary to this: the historical realisation that the demands of 
mutuality are being made intelligible in a range of social practices should 
prompt a reconsideration of which sensuous practices carry out this work, 
and how; of where they succeed and where they fail; how they begin and 
how they end. I take Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, for instance, to have been 
one effort to consider ways in which, say, the nuclear family or modern 
economic arrangements emerge as such practical domains. In another 
context, I have also suggested that sexual love should be taken as another 
sensuous mode of apprehending the Absolute.47 In this sense, Pippin is 
right to say that Hegel gives us no reason to think that practical efforts 
– including sensuous efforts, though not necessarily ‘artistic’ efforts – to 
make the Absolute intelligible have not ceased to be supreme needs of 
Spirit.48 But this, on its own, does not justify Pippin’s (or the Philosophical 
47 See Kottman 2017b.
48 Hegel of course excludes touch, taste and smell from the purview of the ‘two 
theoretical senses’ germane to fine art, ‘sight and hearing’, Hegel 1975, 38–39. I 
have tried to show how ‘touch’ – more precisely, how we touch one another – can 
indeed be a ‘supreme need of Geist’ in Kottman 2017b, 8, and passim. If, for 
Hegel, painting embodies an aspiration toward mutuality that is (at its purest) 
what he calls ‘passionless love’, then a not­merely­aspirational ‘working out’ of 
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Romantic) conclusion that, therefore, fine art ‘has clearly not ceased’ to 
be such a practice. In fact, I want to suggest that Hegel’s acknowledgment 
of art’s abiding pastness is an essential insight into the very challenge of 
grasping which practices might continue to ‘work out’ the demands of 
self­ and other­understanding, and how they do it. In other words, I think 
(and I think Hegel thought) that acknowledging art’s ‘becoming past’ is 
one way in which a reconsideration of which practices carry out the de­
mands of making the Absolute intelligible comes into view, historically.49 
For instance: implicit to the centrality of ‘love’ to romantic art (as Hegel 
sees it), is that love as a historical practice – as itself a historically devel­
oping sensuous apprehension of the Absolute (Kottman 2017b) – cannot 
come into view until after art in its highest vocation has stepped to the 
side. And, again, Shakespeare – in his way – grasped this, too.
Second, Pippin stresses that he sees a ‘Hegelian way’ of understanding 
art to entail a kind of analogy, if not an equivalence, between the ‘rela­
tion between an artwork and a beholder’ and a ‘subject­subject relation’ 
(86). Pippin’s suggestion – which he finds validated in Hegel’s image 
of the artwork as a thousand­eyed Argus, as well as in Fried’s work on 
‘beholding’ – is that ‘the kind of claim made on one by a work of art 
[has] much to do with the kind of claim made by another person, by the 
mere presence of another person’. So much so, Pippin thinks, that the 
‘modern logic of mutual subjectivity’ must somehow be embodied in 
modern art ‘as a sensible material object, [as] the continuing problem of 
the possibility of the sensible embodiment of sharable meaning, all in a 
context where the terms that set such a problem are not stable’ (95). [See 
Pippin’s contribution to this volume for more on this.]
Hegel, however, seems to have thought that the ‘modern logic of 
mutual subjectivity’ eventually gives rise to a form of life in which the 
deepest interests of individuals cannot be satisfied by seeking the right 
‘sensuous apprehension’ of the demands such interests place on behold­
ers, or on the relation between artwork and beholder. For Hegel, art 
does not achieve a speculative identity of inner and outer by continuing 
indefinitely as art, as a merely aesthetic phenomena, but rather by ‘an­
nulling itself as art’.
Put in terms of painting: although painting embodies (in its address 
to its beholder, as well as its thematic content) an aspiration toward 
that aspiration must belong to another sphere (to love as actualised freedom, 
rather than just to painting as aspiration to embody love).
49 See also n. 53, below.
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intimacy and mutuality or ‘love’, the actualisation of the speculative iden­
tity of self and other at work in love itself must – Hegel thinks – eventually 
take shape other than as the presentation of an art­object to an admiring 
beholder, although painting’s ‘working out’ of that bid for intimacy is one 
way that the aspirations of love first gain intelligible form, especially in 
Christian devotional painting.
After all, if Hegel had really held painting to be adequately analogous 
to the ‘modern logic of social subjectivity’, as Pippin suggests, then it is 
hard to see why Hegel would also have claimed that love is best grasped 
in painting only as the ‘passionless love’ of the Madonna for her child.
Consider: As Pippin points out in his contribution to this volume, 
‘“religious” or “passionless” [leidenschaftslos] love is the true, ideal subject 
matter of all painting’. We might simply call it parental love, which is what 
Hegel sees validated in Christian religion, too; namely, in its inversion 
whereby the privileged adoration of a transcendent ‘God’ by his ‘people’ 
is superseded by the adoration of a concrete, imminent child by his 
mother.50 Hegel sees this realised in the history of painting, as Christian 
painting overcomes the ‘iconoclasm’ according to which the Divine (as 
transcendent) cannot be represented pictorially, in favour of seeing the 
‘Divine’ as ‘love reconciled and at peace with itself … spiritual subject-
matter in the form of actual and bodily human beings, and therefore the 
object of this love must not be painted as a purely spiritual “beyond” 
but as actual and present … above all the Madonna’s love for her child, 
as the absolutely suitable ideal subject for this sphere’ (Hegel 1975, 819). 
Painting, that is, achieves a new view of the ‘divine’ as passionless love for 
a child, rather than the iconoclastic (non­artistic) adoration of a Divine 
beyond. As Hegel points out elsewhere, love as ‘mutual subjectivity’ can­
not flourish in modernity unless parents love their children more than 
children love their parents.51 Perhaps it is helpful here to note, too, that 
artists often regard their works as their ‘children’ – and that painting is 
often figured as a kind of ‘giving birth’ or ‘labor of love’. These metaphors 
– for they cannot be literally true (to destroy an artwork is a travesty, but 
it is not a murder) – might be taken as a clue to grasping the way in which 
paintings can demand a form of attentiveness that is significantly akin 
to the attentiveness required for the devotional love of children, in the 
sense that beholding fine paintings entails the attribution of an absolute 
50 See, for instance, the discussion in Hegel 1975, 816–827.
51 ‘On the whole, children love their parents less than their parents love them’: 
Hegel 1991, §175, Addition, 213. For more on this, see Kottman 2017b, 168–169. 
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value and passionless devotion to what is beheld – lovingly passionless, 
not merely disinterested (in Kant’s sense) – without the expectation that 
the love be ‘returned’ in kind from the artwork (or the child). This, I take 
it, is part of Hegel’s spin on Kant’s notion of disinterestedness.
At any rate, before we go as far as Pippin does with this analogy, we 
should note that while Hegel emphasises that the passionless devotion 
entailed in beholding ‘Christ the child’ as the most ‘important object of 
love in paintings’ (Hegel 1975, 820), Hegel nevertheless does not see this 
as adequate to comprehend ‘subject­subject’ relations tout court.
Indeed, Hegel is clear that the ‘mutual subjectivity’ of love cannot be 
restricted to such passionlessness devotion; he goes on to discuss the ‘heat 
of passion’ in dramatic and poetic presentations of love (Hegel 1975, 566–
568). The Madonna’s passionless love is, in other words, only how the 
art of painting best grasps love­as­divine – inadequately and incompletely 
with respect to the fuller ‘modern logic of mutual subjectivity’, wherein 
love comes to necessarily include passion, caprice, the individual’s ‘heart 
for love and … right to become happy through it’ (Hegel 1975, 568).
Hegel’s larger point, then, seems to be that the ‘modern logic of 
mutual subjectivity’ ultimately reveals – contra Pippin’s claim – the in­
sufficiency of the art of painting’s analogousness to that very logic. And 
if Hegel’s ‘science of art’ is to be true to its name, then that insufficiency 
must also somehow show up in art. Which is why Hegel must then go on 
to emphasise the insufficiency of poetry and drama, too, when it comes 
to the sensuous comprehension of love’s intense, passionate contingency. 
[For example: dramatic art is no longer fine art when it devolves into 
merely the depiction of the ‘supreme contingency’ of passionate love, as 
Hegel puts it, ‘[or] in the … caprice which has neither universality nor 
any scope beyond itself … [and] which freezes us despite all the heat of 
passion in its presentation’ (Hegel 1975, 568).]
In such passages, Hegel seems to be suggesting that it is dramatic-
poetic presentations of love – and not painting’s presentations – which 
instructively manifest their own failure to sensuously comprehend love 
as the modern logic of mutual subjectivity or ‘spirit as infinite subjectiv­
ity’. Put another way, in part because painting cannot annul itself from 
within its own activity, dramatic poetry is called for – if art is to bring to 
an end (not just be forced by external circumstances to conclude) its task 
of sensuously embodying the logic of mutual subjectivity – such that 
our grasp of art’s becoming past might yet instruct us with respect to the 
demands of ‘the modern logic of social subjectivity’, the ethical task of 
shared intelligibility in ‘subject­subject’ loving relations (Pippin 2014, 86).
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In other words, art’s becoming past with respect to the demands of 
comprehending ‘love’ is one way that we might continue to learn what 
love’s demands can yet entail.52
V.
Pippin’s third misstep, then, at which I have already hinted, is to conclude 
that Hegel’s claim about art’s pastness arose from Hegel’s belief about 
the incipient rationality of modern social life, rather than from Hegel’s 
explicit statements about what his ‘science of art’ requires: namely, that 
grasping art ‘scientifically’ means grasping art as self-limiting, as a self­
determining practice in its historical unfolding. [Which is not to say that 
the history of art is free from socio­historical determination, but rather 
to say that such determination is taken up by art, internal to its own 
development, and not just passively reflected in art.]
As already mentioned, Hegel’s statements in this regard involve both 
a thesis about art – namely, the way in which fine art subjects itself to 
limitations that are registered internally by art as art’s own limitations – 
and about philosophy in Hegel’s time, namely, that the now­possible 
science of art sees its most essential condition of possibility in art’s 
pastness. One way that Hegel begins building a bridge between these 
two statements lies in the basic features of his account of romantic art, 
since the historical advent of romantic art itself entails the recognition – 
internal to art – that ‘art proper’ (classical art) has ‘dissolved’. So, before 
turning to Shakespeare, let me briefly outline the relevant features of 
Hegel’s account of this.
Recall that, for Hegel, all art, as spiritual activity, distinguishes itself 
from nature. Fine artworks, which Hegel’s philosophy of art seeks to elu­
cidate, bear within themselves Spirit’s self­distinguishing from nature. In 
order to clarify the relation between Spirit and nature, Hegel’s philosophy 
of art tracks the distinction between Spirit and nature that is at work in 
art itself – again, so that this philosophy might be genuinely ‘scientific’ 
52 In Kottman 2017b, I track ways in which ‘love’ finds its reflective form in 
artworks – especially poetic­literary works – but in a way which (I hope) also 
demonstrates that art is not, finally, entirely adequate to this task, and hence 
that love ought to be seen as itself a dimension of Absolute Spirit, reflectively 
but incompletely grasped in artistic (or religious or philosophical) presenta­
tions.
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in the clarification and systematisation of its own foundations.53 Because, 
for Hegel, this entanglement of nature and art is intrinsic to art, art never 
fully disentangles itself from sensuous nature; its ongoing entanglement 
with nature is part of its self­constitution as art, its self­distancing from 
nature.54 ‘In artistic production the spiritual and the sensuous aspects 
must be as one’ (Hegel 1975, 39). However, art becomes art, not in view 
of these sensuous­natural properties, but only insofar as it has received 
‘the baptism of the spiritual’ – even though that Taufe only occurs in the 
realm of nature (in sensuous making, and our sensual experiencing).
This means – and here I partly disagree with the interpretation 
offered by Julia Peters in this volume – not that ‘spirit is nature’, but 
rather that, in art, the claims of spirit appear as if they were the claims 
of dead nature. Dead nature is not itself animated; but artworks make 
dead nature appear as if it were animated. Nevertheless, dead nature’s 
appearance as ‘spirited’ (in artworks) is just that – a ‘pure appearance’, 
one which is the ‘offspring of spirit’. This is why Hegel thinks that, in 
order to become art proper, art must advance to what he calls the ‘classi­
cal’ moment: the ‘anthropomorphism’ of classical Greek sculpture. For, 
the anthropomorphic moment of classical art finally permits Hegel to say 
that dead nature, despite appearances, is inanimate. Classical sculpture, 
especially, drives home the lesson that dead nature is bereft of spirit. Art 
proper, in other words, is the moment when animism (‘nature is spirit’) 
becomes untenable. Classical art, we might say, is spurred as spiritual 
activity by our (rather traumatic) perception of dead nature as unspirited. 
53 I have in mind such moments as when Hegel says: ‘These preliminary 
remarks on beauty in nature and art, on the relation of the two, and the exclu­
sion of the former from the scope of our proper subject, should dispose of the 
idea that the limitation is due merely to caprice and arbitrariness. The proof 
of this relation should not come here yet, since its consideration falls within 
our science itself and is therefore not to be further explained and proved un­
til later’ (Hegel 1975, 3). Or, a little later (Hegel 1975, 11): ‘… my view is that 
philosophizing is throughout inseparable from scientific procedure. Philosophy 
has to consider an object in its necessity, not merely according to subjective 
necessity or external ordering, classification, etc.; it has to unfold and prove 
the object, according to the necessity of its own inner nature. It is only this 
unfolding which constitutes the scientific element in the treatment of a subject’. 
See the discussion in Horowitz 2001, 58–59.
54 Hegel 1975, 35: ‘… the work of art presents itself to sensuous apprehension. 
It is there for sensuous feeling, external or internal … just as nature is, whether 
the external nature that surrounds us, or our own sensitive nature within’.
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This is why classical art is the stage at which art comes into its own as 
art; classical art finally faces up to this constitutive perception of dead 
nature not as merely heterogeneous or ‘other’, but as cold, spiritless or 
geistlos, deprived of Geist.55
Now, in order for romantic art to have grown out of the dissolution 
of classical art in the way Hegel seems to think it did, it cannot emerge 
merely as the denial that classical art really was art proper (since that 
would just announce romantic art’s view of itself as proper art, something 
Hegel clearly does not mean to say). Instead, romantic art must somehow 
be continuous with the achievement and dissolution of classical art: which 
means that romantic art takes root in the realisation that Geist is not 
reducible to sensuous­natural immediacy, that Geist is free to determine 
what it does with sensuous immediacy, and hence that Geist involves itself 
in sensuous immediacy without forfeiting its own actuality. But why then 
should romantic art bother with such an involvement at all? 
One possible answer is that late romantic art embodies an increasing 
de­naturalisation or ‘spiritualization’ of our self­understanding, by show­
ing that we are less and less dependent upon – less needful of – artistic 
expressions that work with ‘natural’ or sensible media. And that lessen­
ing need is something that art itself must teach, such that the strained 
relation between Geist and sensuous immediacy is both the catalyst and 
internal combustion of romantic art – a generative instigation, rather than 
a blockage. According to this view, art had to be practised – indeed, with 
the enormous generative output that is romantic art (namely, most of what 
we take to constitute the history of fine art) – but in such a way that the 
‘need’ for romantic art can be revealed to produce its self­transcendence.
But another answer leads in the direction to which I gestured in 
speaking of Shakespearean ‘sea­change’ and metamorphoses: namely, 
the pointing to a possible future in which art’s becoming past (as reg­
istered in, by and as ‘art­project’) does not mean a future in which the 
fundamental needs of Geist no longer require sensuous form, but rather 
a future in which our primary sensuous forms of reflection – in their 
highest vocation, in response to the deepest needs of Geist – are no longer 
recognisable as properly artistic. Such a future requires, therefore, that 
art recognisably become past.
55 Hence, I would prefer to reverse Peter’s claim in this volume. The nature 
that is spirit’s ‘own’ is spiritless nature. Art proper is how we acknowledge and 
come to grips with nature as empty of spirit.
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In conclusion, then, a brief discussion of The Tempest might afford a 
bit more illumination of this.
Consider Prospero’s ‘art’ as Shakespeare’s presentation of late ro­
mantic art, in the sense just briefly sketched: a reflective presentation 
of the emergence of Shakespeare’s own drama (The Tempest) from out 
of Prospero’s study and practice of all the arts. As in Hegel, so too for 
Prospero, this entails the lesson that nature does not determine what 
is to be done with nature’s elements. Recall Prospero’s own words (The 
Tempest V.i.41–50):
I have bedimm’d
The noontide sun, call’d forth the mutinous winds,
And ’twixt the green sea and the azur’d vault
Set roaring war: to the dread rattling thunder
Have I given fire, and rifted Jove’s stout oak
With his own bolt; the strong-bas’d promontory
Have I made shake, and by the spurs pluck’d up
The pine and cedar: graves at my command
Have wak’d their sleepers, op’d forth, and let ’em forth
By my so potent Art … 
But beyond this, we can see that Shakespeare’s real dramatic interest – I 
mean, his interest in Prospero’s ‘art’ and in the achievement of our de­
naturalisation as a dramatically motivational predicament – lies in the 
manifestly social­historical (human) consequences of this lesson. As if 
the very experience of natural elements – the storm, the waves, the air – 
must now be regarded as springing from our artistic accomplishments.
In this way, we are brought to see that the result of Prospero’s hy­
perbolic art lies not just in the storms he whips up but – as Miranda, 
and the rest of us find out – in the stirring social consequences and 
recognitive efforts that Prospero’s art, at its apotheosis, tries to achieve. 
Two examples: first, Miranda, as Hegel pointed out (Hegel 1975, 582), is 
‘ignorant’ of what she is, because she is ignorant of the historical demands 
of human sociality generally. Miranda, that is, is still related primarily 
to her all­powerful father who loves her passionlessly, just as Prospero’s 
passionless love tumbles into his fraught desire to help Miranda find 
satisfying, passionate love with Ferdinand. And Prospero seeks at first 
to realise that desire artistically – to literally ‘frame’ Miranda’s view of 
Ferdinand, to lift the curtain on that ‘brave new world’ (I.ii.405–505), to 
‘produce’ their love affair the way one might ‘direct’ a play (a recurrent 
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theme in Shakespeare, where lovers are often ‘set up’ to fall in love). 
Second, Prospero desires to make himself newly known to his traitor­
ous brother, Antonio, to finally gain his recognition as the rightful duke 
– while likewise acknowledging his brother in something approximat­
ing forgiveness. And this ‘conscience­catching’, too, is something that 
Prospero initially tries to bring about artistically – literally stupefying 
Antonio and his cohorts by means of a ‘spell’, as if to literalise a kind of 
extreme aestheticism, or ‘beholder of art’ position (III.iii.88–91):
My high charms work,
And these mine enemies are all knit up
In their distractions: they are now in my power;
And in these fits I leave them … 
Or consider the following (V.i.11–17):
The King
His brother and yours, abide all three distracted …
Brimful of sorrow and dismay …
… Your charm so strongly
  works ’em.
There is, Shakespeare seems to have thought, more than a little sadism in 
Prospero’s art – it often borders on torture.56 As if the spectactor­beholder 
relation concealed the pitilessness of the artist who knowingly induces 
the beholder to stupefaction [‘thy brains … boil’d within thy skull … 
spell­stopp’d’ (V.i.59–61)] which, in the end, inhibits or even forecloses 
a more fully human relationship between artist and audience – a human 
relationship which would require the artist to step aside as artist, to break 
the ‘spell’ of the artwork.
Of course, Shakespeare goes out of his way to present just that – the 
dissolving of the artistic bond – as the ‘end’ of Prospero’s artistic project, 
for the sake of better meeting recognitive requirements in other forms of 
sensuous mediation (V.i.31–68):
56 The initial storm itself bears more than a little resemblance to waterboarding; 
see Kottman 2009, ch. 4.
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My charms I’ll break; their senses I’ll restore.
And they shall be themselves.
…
… This rough magic
I here abjure …
… The charm dissolves apace;
And as the morning steals upon the night,
Melting the darkness, so their rising senses




Begins to swell; and the approaching tide
Will shortly fill the reasonable shore,
That now lies foul and muddy
In speaking of the self­cancellation and dissolution of romantic art, Hegel 
notes the way in which it ends – almost as if he were describing Prospero’s 
efforts – ‘with the artist’s personal productive mastery of every content 
and form’ in order that art might ‘pass over to the presentation of common 
reality as such’ (Hegel 1975, 576). All of this is emphasised by Shakespeare 
in explicit terms, with the result of Prospero’s ‘dissolved’ charms being 
the newly lively and vibrant presentation – the re­introduction – of hu­
man beings to one another; such that the demands of mutuality might be 
taken up anew in the wake of the spellbinding charm’s pastness, might 
break through art’s self­concluding moments and thereby change art’s 
form into something else entirely (V.i.74–75):
Flesh and blood,
You, brother mine … 
Or, again (V.i.108–165):
For more assurance that a living Prince
Does now speak to thee, I embrace thy body …
… howsoever you have
Been justled from your senses, know for certain
That I am Prospero …
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… No more yet of this;
For ’tis a chronicle of day by day,
Not a relation for a breakfast, nor
Befitting this first meeting.
Or, most famously, as if now Shakespeare’s audience were already being 
addressed directly (V.i.181–184):
–  O, wonder!
How many goodly creatures are there here!
How beauteous mankind is! O brave new world,
That has such people in’t!
–  Tis new to thee. 
The spell dissolves, then, such that we might come to grasp how things 
between us actually stand. But if Prospero is to risk appearing to others 
as otherwise than an artist – if it is to be a risk and not merely a further 
demonstration of his unlimited artistry – then that ‘letting go’ of art must 
be a farewell to art’s highest vocation as a sensuous presentation of the 
Absolute. To appear as otherwise than an artist requires a sensuous form 
of ethical reflection ‘after’ art – lest Prospero’s new ‘appearance’ be taken 
for yet another demonstration of artistry.
So, finally – as if Shakespeare’s drama, as if all of art history, had 
been a preparation for this moment – a human being stands forth, and 
steps away from the ‘art’ he made and from what that art itself wrought 
(Epilogue, 1–3):
Now my charms are all o’erthrown,
And what strength I have’s mine own
Which is most faint … 
Even at this point, another moment is still required. The sensuous pre­
sentation that separated the play from our own lives must cancel itself. 
Not so that we might stand ‘face­to­face’ without forms of sensuous 
mediation, but so that the formal variety of sensuous apprehensions of 
the Absolute – their metamorphoses ­­ might begin to be collectively 
acknowledged. We are therefore asked to acknowledge that Prospero is 
no longer an artist, and that the ‘play’ as high­vocational artwork now 
remains a bygone thing (Epilogue, 4–10):
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I must be here confin’d by you
… Let me not
…
… dwell
In this bare island by your spell;
But release me from my bands
With the help of your good hands … 
… hence, we are no longer acquitted from the obligation to take up 
Shakespeare’s non­artistic demands on our responsiveness.
Only when art is seen to step to the side, in this way, can ‘the higher 
and indestructible bond of the Idea of beauty and truth’ link us. Only 
after charms dissolve, such that art’s pastness might come into view, 
can art’s historical accomplishment at last be appreciated in the ways 
that Hegel and Shakespeare explicitly call for – not on bended knee, but 
in our esteem, in our Geisteswissenschaften, our forms of ethical life, our 
true applause.
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INGV I LD  TORSEN
THE FUTURE OF HEGELIAN ART HISTORY 
On the body in late modern sculpture
A feature that shapes the history of art as told by Hegel is the short­
coming of the body – central to the visual art forms of sculpture and 
painting – when it comes to expressing the increasingly complex and 
abstract subject matter of art. The body is the form Spirit takes when it 
is expressed in visual art; but the body’s inadequacy with respect to the 
content it is to make manifest is a reason why Hegel’s history of art is a 
history of decline, culminating in Hegel’s famous claim that art ‘remains 
for us a thing of the past’.1 Still, the body remains important in the visual 
art of the twentieth and twenty first centuries and as such continues to 
challenge a Hegelian narrative. There are bodies and features of embodi­
ment in modernist and contemporary art that Hegel could probably never 
have imagined. One reason why he could not have imagined them is due 
to the historical changes in our conceptions of what bodies are, which 
features are significant for the body’s look and which bodies are worthy 
of aesthetic attention. Another reason is the advent of abstraction in art, 
which radically changes the rendering of the human body: consider the 
gradual deconstruction the body’s look undergoes from early cubist works, 
folding out the body’s different sides and curves onto the flat surface of 
the canvas; Giacometti’s coarse, elongated, figures [e.g. Fig. 10.1]; and de 
Kooning’s ferocious women, where the aggressive brush stroke radically 
changes the expression of the voluptuous body. Further, abstraction 
makes possible expression of embodiment without a recognisable human 
figure – art can express what it is like to be embodied, without presenting 
us with a human body or figure at all. Imagining what Hegel would have 
thought about the art of the future is of course to entertain a counterfac­
1 Hegel 1975, 11.
tual, and the historical Hegel might very well have been horrified by much 
contemporary art, and not recognised it as art at all. Still, attempting to 
think about the present in the light of Hegel’s philosophy of art is a way 
of gaining new perspective both on our time and on his theory.10.1
The underlying issue of this paper is the possibility of a Hegelian 
understanding of art after Hegel. I focus on sculpture, the art form that 
Hegel thought most successfully expressed Spirit in body, through what 
he called the classical Ideal. In order for Hegel’s theory to be relevant 
for the future of sculpture, however, I suggest that we amend his theory 
with respect to the body. I address the issue by asking two different 
questions, that is: ‘What is a body?’ and then further, ‘What can be 
expressed through embodiment in art?’. Moreover, I use resources from 
the phenomenological work of Merleau­Ponty to suggest answers that 
alter the Hegelian narrative. I will show that phenomenology can offer 
a philosophically interesting account of embodiment that can vindicate 
the body, both as subject matter for late modern art and as character­
istic of the ontology of artworks themselves. Applying Merleau­Ponty’s 
understanding of the bodysubject to sculpture also suggests an alterna­
tive history of art after Hegel that can preserve some of the strengths 
of Hegel’s philosophical theory while granting a relevance to the art of 
Hegel’s future. 
THE  HUMAN BODY  AS  SCULPTURE ’S  FORM
Hegel’s arguments for the decline of visual art are based on claims about 
the shortcoming of the form of such art. Briefly put, the shortcoming is 
due to the limitations of what kind of content or subject matter can be 
expressed through the body: this is highly limited in the case of sculpture, 
and only somewhat better in the case of painting. Both genres fall short 
of capturing Spirit in its most complex and autonomous being. I will here 
concern myself primarily with sculpture.
In his analysis of sculpture, Hegel assumes that the human figure is 
‘the fundamental type for its productions’.2 This type, or form, is given 
to us by nature, and not devised by sculpture itself. This implies that 
the artist is dependent on nature and consequently constrained both in 
terms of formal possibilities and subject matter. Formal inventiveness and 
2 Hegel 1975, 713.
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10.1  Brassaï (Gyula Halász), Giacometti’s Studio, 1948 (29.5 × 20.5 cm).  
Gelatin silver print. Paris: Musée National d’Art Moderne, Centre Georges 
Pompidou, inv. AM2012­173 (photograph by Georges Meguerditchian).  
© CNAC / MNAM / Dist. RMN­Grand Palais / Art Resource, New York.
305TORSEN :  THE  FUTURE  OF  HEGEL I AN  ART  H ISTORY. 
development are not really possible, given that sculpture uses a form (the 
human body) that is extrinsic to the practice of art and which the genre 
is not free to manipulate or determine at will. The form also affects the 
possible content of the sculptural artwork. Hegel writes:3 
… since the sculptor’s material makes the portrayal necessarily an 
external one in a three­dimensional solid, the content of sculpture 
cannot be spirit as such, i.e. the inner life, immersed in itself and re­
verting out of the object to close with itself alone, but the spirit which 
in its opposite, the body, is just beginning to become conscious of itself. 
And further:
… for this reason, sculpture must take, as its subject matter, out of 
the objective content of spirit only that aspect which can be completely 
expressed in something external and corporeal, because otherwise it 
selects a content which its material cannot adopt or bring in to ap­
pearance in an adequate way.
As we know, these constraints do not make it impossible to make fabulous 
sculptural artworks. The Ideal of classical Greek sculpture successfully 
contains the positive characterisations of sculpture. These works express 
Spirit, but the truth they instantiate is what Hegel names ‘the objective 
side of spirit’ – these works are not about subjectivity as finite selves or 
individual egos, instead ‘… sculpture has to present the Divine as such 
in its infinite peace and sublimity, timeless, immobile, without purely 
subjective personality and the discord of actions and situations’.4 The 
Ideal of classical sculpture offers us ‘the eternal element in gods and men, 
divested of caprice and accidental egotism’.5 
Hegel’s position is not that sculpture reduces its subject matter to the 
human being represented as mere animal life. For Hegel, the body is not 
‘only’ nature (Hegel is after all not a dualist in this respect); the human 
body is infused with Spirit and great sculpture reveals it thus. Rather, 
3 Hegel 1975, 713, emphasis mine.
4 Hegel 1975, 712. By contrast, painting presents a body in a situation and can 
represent some aspects of agency, which makes it better in terms of expressive 
power; see below. 
5 Hegel 1975, 713. For further discussion, see the chapters by Peters and Squire 
in this volume.
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the only thing that could be successfully (as in fully and adequately) ex­
pressed in a three­dimensional body is Spirit at home and at rest in its 
externality, in its physical life­form. Spirit can only be partially manifest 
in this body – so much of what it is, its inwardness and its complex, free 
extension into the social world, cannot sit comfortably in such sculpted 
bodies. It is precisely the embodiment, ‘the perfect interfusion of meaning 
and shape’ between form as the body and content as the individuality 
of Spirit, that marks the shortcomings of sculpture. If an artist tries to 
give expression to more complex spiritual life in sculpture, which is the 
case in the transition to romantic art, the artist will always be left with a 
work that is unbalanced and wherein the content is pushing beyond the 
confines of the form. If you want motivation, volition, action, or individual 
character traits and psychological depth, you had better look for another 
form, in other words.
There are of course also bodies in the romantic art of painting. 
These bodies are, however, surrounded by landscapes and settings, 
which makes it possible to portray situations, which again allow the 
artwork to reveal a much richer sense of subjectivity, including, im­
portantly, aspects of agency. As visual art develops into late romantic 
painting, the bodies on the canvas become increasingly unimportant. 
This is evident in, for example, Hegel’s description of the ‘magic’ of 
sfumato, resulting in ‘an inherently objectless play of pure appearance … 
so fine, so fleeting, so expressive of the soul that they [the colours] begin 
to pass over into the sphere of music’.6 In this most extreme formulation, 
it seems to be almost accidental to the artwork that there are bodies in 
these paintings; instead, visual art approaches the less ‘bodily’ genres 
of music and poetry.
By the time Hegel’s art history ends, it appears as if the body has been 
wholly surpassed and left behind by art (it plays no role in the forms of 
music or poetry). And the reason for that is not arbitrary – in Hegel’s 
narrative a form is left behind as a candidate for revealing truth because 
it is inferior, not the stuff of the real questions that bother us and that 
must be confronted in the present. So, the art forms for which the body 
is central are not just different, but worse, in the sense of less relevant, 
by the time Hegel is lecturing in Berlin.
Obviously, after 1820 there are still bodies in art. We might respond 
to this fact in a manner similar to the response one could give to someone 
6 Hegel 1975, 848.
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pointing out that artworks are still being made after the declaration of 
the end of art: the point of Hegel’s analyses of both was never about 
existence, but about the meaning of art when it is important and plays an 
indispensable normative role. The mere presence of bodies is no chal­
lenge to the claim that the peak of the body in art was actually more 
than two millennia ago, when the body was able to provide a fitting form 
for its content in Greek sculpture. However, when the body ceases to be 
necessary to the form of visual art, that is, when abstraction becomes 
a possible form, there is also a proliferation and multiplicity of bodies 
like never before: In the art of the last hundred years there are bodies of 
all sizes and shapes, bodies of colour, unfit bodies, ugly bodies, bodies 
that are incomplete, and formed plastic material that merely gestures 
at body parts or flesh. Why is the body still giving shape to the artist’s 
material, at a historical point when the artist is free to shape his or her 
material without the constraint of nature on the chosen form? How can 
the presence of so many and different bodies in the art of late modernity 
be accommodated by the Hegelian narrative? These are the questions 
to which I now turn.
STRATEG IES  AF TER  HEGEL
Here are four possible strategies for dealing with Hegelian philosophy of 
art in the wake of the history of art after Hegel:
One is to say that Hegel is obviously just wrong, and that art as it 
continued after 1830 offers so many counterexamples to central assump­
tions in Hegel’s theory that we are better off thinking of it as falsified 
than trying to develop or nuance the theory to encompass these cases. 
Another is to say that Hegel is basically right – the human body has 
less potential as a form with respect to the content that it can engage, 
which does not mean that it is not interesting, but it means that it does 
not satisfy our highest need. We can think of this strategy as parallel to a 
way to respond to the end of art thesis in Hegel: the body and representa­
tion of human embodiment have clear shortcomings as formal conditions 
for visual art, but that does not mean that the body cannot play some role, 
nor does it mean that the continued presence of body in art presents a 
counterexample to the theory. However, making sculptures or paintings 
is a practice whose important moment has passed.
A third strategy is to say that Hegel got the form of visual art wrong. 
That is, when Hegel assumes that the human figure is characteristic of 
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the form of sculpture or painting, he is just mistaken, lacking the ability 
to imagine what the future possibilities of these genres are. If we cor­
rect for this error with respect to the formal constraints, then we also 
open the possibility that there might be other cases of successful unity 
between form and content than, for example, the Greek statue or the 
Renaissance religious painting. This is a possible way to save Hegel’s 
theory and make it interesting for modernist art. Abstract visual art 
might, for example, be just the appropriate form for Spirit’s attempt 
at self-reflection and self-determination that characterises freedom in 
modernism, that is, the content we want to see manifest in the art of late 
modernity. Such a strategy is compatible with an influential narrative of 
the sculpture of high modernism: with the advent of modernism, we are 
no longer confused by representational subject matter and the connec­
tion between sculpture and body is severed once and for all. Instead, we 
are able to decipher what sculpture really is about just from an analysis 
of the formal possibilities of the medium: sculpture is about space, 
exploring the different relations of the three­dimensional by drawing 
on relation, force, vectors. By this, I mean what Michael Fried called 
sculpture’s ‘syntax’ – and one might cite as an example Anthony Caro’s 
Prairie (1967) [Fig. 10.2].7 Here is Greenberg on the importance of space 
(first published in 1958):8 
Until lately sculpture was handicapped by its identification with 
monolithic carving and modeling in the service of the representation 
of animate forms … The human body is no longer postulated as the 
agent of space in either pictorial and sculptural art, now it is eyesight 
alone, and eyesight has more freedom of movement and invention 
within three dimensions than within two.
Greenberg is explicitly opposing what he believes to be the distinguishing 
features of sculpture with the human body. The body is what hinders 
sculpture from realising its potential, both when it is thought to be 
sculpture’s form and when it is thought to be important for the experi­
ence of sculpture.10.2
The final strategy – the one that I want to pursue – is to hold on to 
Hegel’s thesis about the centrality of the body in sculpture, but consider 
7 Fried 1998. 
8 Greenberg 1993, 59.
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that Hegel got the body wrong. In other words, I want to suggest that the 
form is not quite as constrained as Hegel imagines it to be and, conse­
quently and more speculatively, that what this form can make manifest 
for us in terms of subject matter is not limited in the manner he describes 
in his analysis of the classical Ideal. I will suggest that the presence of 
bodies, in new, unthought varieties, is a sign that there are issues of em­
bodiment and subjectivity that are still worth working through for Spirit 
at this stage in history. I will hence hold on to two central premises from 
Hegel’s art history: the form of sculpture is tied to the human body and 
the goal of art is truth – a reflective inquiry which provides insight and 
aids a developing actualisation of who we are. I will turn to phenomenol­
ogy, more specifically to Merleau-Ponty’s account of the bodysubject, to 
give these two claims content. As a result, a different story about mod­
ernist sculpture (understood as sculpture after Hegel) will take shape.
The first two strategies seem to be the least interesting, condemning 
either Hegel or contemporary art to irrelevance. Dismissing Hegel, as per 
the suggested first strategy, is of course what many artists and thinkers 
have done over the last 200 years. In order to justify not just relegating 
Hegel to the history of philosophy, it is necessary to show that it is actually 
10.2  Anthony Caro, Prairie, 1967 (96.5 × 582 × 320 cm). Private collection  
(previously displayed in Houston, Texas: Menil Collection). 
© Courtesy of Barford Sculptures Ltd.; photograph by John Goldblatt.
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fruitful, not just for saving Hegel, but for our own understanding of our­
selves and our art, to take up this seemingly outdated, grand, systematic 
theory. The second strategy appears unpromising, since it is one that 
basically demotes art after Hegel as either something not that important, 
something other than art or as failed art. With Hegel, one could say, for 
example, that making naturalistic sculpture is making art, but of a less 
important kind, or that making artworks like for example Anthony Caro 
or Louise Bourgeois have done, is making something that cannot really be 
sculpture, given Hegel’s definition. If one is interested in contemporary art, 
this conservative strategy then seems to be a rejection of the subject one 
is interested in. It might be the strategy that is most faithful to the text, 
but this kind of fidelity would also come at a high price, since it would 
basically amount to an admission that Hegel is less relevant for the late 
modern and contemporary art that many of us still find very interesting.
I take the third and fourth strategies to be providing reasons for why 
it is worth it still to consider modified versions of Hegel’s theory. The 
third strategy is a way to insist on Hegel’s continued relevance by main­
taining many of the core tenets of Hegel’s theory, but revising Hegel’s 
understanding of the form of the different visual arts by including ab­
straction as a possibility of the form. This is the strategy I understand 
Robert Pippin to have pursued, most explicitly articulated in the article 
‘What was abstract art? (From the point of view of Hegel)’.9 Pippin’s 
several readings of early modernist artworks, most recently in After the 
Beautiful, reveal this to be a fruitful approach.10 In After the Beautiful, 
which is a defence of the relevance of Hegel’s theory for understand­
ing modernist art, Pippin considers phenomenology, and the work of 
Merleau­Ponty and Heidegger in particular, as Hegel’s most promising 
contender. When arguing in favour of Hegel, one of Pippin’s claims is 
that phenomenology has an impoverished account of what he calls aes-
thetic intelligibility, that is, ‘an aesthetic way of rendering intelligible and 
compelling a variety of issues of the deepest importance to philosophy’.11 
This is because the phenomenological readings emphasise art’s disclosive 
abilities on the level of ontology, as the event or ‘happening’ of being 
and/or meaning itself, allowing for less multidimensional interpretation 
of artworks, whereas his version of a Hegelian theory allows us also to see 
artworks as addressing socio­historically sensitive questions of identity 
9 Pippin 2005, 279–306.
10 Pippin 2014.
11 Pippin 2014, 2.
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and to give an account of how this can happen aesthetically, hence giv­
ing space for complex readings of both form and subject matter and how 
they necessarily are related.12 
My suggestion in this essay, and the strategy I want to pursue here, 
is a response to Pippin’s criticism. I aim to respond not by arguing about 
the details of Pippin’s criticism of phenomenology, but rather by showing, 
positively, how phenomenology can offer a different account of embodi­
ment, selfhood, intelligibility and their relations than what is discussed 
by Pippin, and that this account can in fact help us describe and make 
sense of late modern art.13 Hence the third and fourth strategies can be 
seen as contenders for how to amend Hegel’s theory in order for it to still 
be relevant to our late modern art. 
THE  BODY  OF  PHENOMENOLOGY
My aim is to propose a phenomenological rethinking of Hegel’s narrative. 
The first step in doing so is to ask: What is the body that gives form to 
sculpture? I am going to turn to Merleau­Ponty for an answer, as provided 
in his early work.14 In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau­Ponty gives 
us an account of our being as embodied, expressive, intentional beings, 
what he calls bodysubjects. A living, human body is always that of a body­
subject. This body is intentional, in that it is open to the world through 
perception, and its perception is always directional, never merely receptive 
or passive.15 The body is directed towards its surroundings as something 
that both conditions it and is already anticipated by it, hence there is no 
question of priority or grounding one way or the other. The bodysubject is 
12 For the comparison, and eventually the shortcomings of phenomenology 
vis-à-vis Hegel’s theory, see Pippin 2014, esp. 114–130.
13 I discuss the parallels and differences between a Heideggerian and a Hegelian 
approach to modern, non­representational art in Torsen 2014.
14 Some of what I will present as original in Merleau­Ponty’s account of the 
body anticipates features that will be developed in his later ontology. Particu­
larly his notion of flesh and the status of alterity would be relevant, but these 
themes also move us further from a recognisable Hegelian outlook. For reasons 
of space, I do not discuss Merleau­Ponty’s later work here. 
15 This is of course a very broad­strokes characterisation of the project of the 
book. More nuanced introductions to Merleau­Ponty’s project can be found in 
Barbaras 2004, Carman 2008 and Romdenh­Romluc 2010.
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always outside itself and the world is always that of bodysubjects.16 A key to 
understanding this being­in­the­world of a bodysubject is the notion of a 
body schema. A body schema is a proprioceptive matrix that gives orienta­
tion to perception and action, but which is also pliable, responding to an 
environment and a historical context through what we can think of as a 
kind of feedback­loop of embodied, intentional agency.17 The account is not 
merely of a bodysubject in general, as a kind of embodied transcendental 
subject, since Merleau­Ponty also describes, through analysis of anomalies 
and normal behaviour, how habits, social roles and the complex identities 
of late modern individuals are sedimented into our bodies as they modify 
our body­schema. Such schema, decisive for the bodysubject, are upon 
reflection available to the first person point of view, can be described 
discursively and can also be used to make sense of bodily behavioural pat­
terns, as observed by third parties. The strength of the phenomenological 
approach and the notion of the body schema in particular can be seen in 
the way it has helped articulate different experiences of bodily existence. 
In addition to the illumination of the various pathologies discussed in 
Phenomenology of Perception, this is apparent, for example, in Iris Marion 
Young’s descriptions of the posture and movement characteristic of femi­
nine bodily comportment and in Franz Fanon’s description of how the 
white gaze changes his own being through a racialised body schema.18
Merleau­Ponty’s account of the bodysubject and of embodied per­
ception were recognised as productive for interpreting the development 
16 For Merleau­Ponty this is not an abstraction, but the most concrete starting 
point of the phenomenological description: ‘The ontological world and body 
we uncover at the core of the subject are not the world and the body as ideas; 
rather, they are the world itself condensed into a comprehensive hold and the 
body itself as a knowing­body’ (Merleau­Ponty 2014, 431). 
17 In Phenomenology of Perception, the concept of body schema is developed 
in order to make sense of the puzzles presented by various anomalies (most 
famously the case of visual agnosia exhibited by Gelb and Goldstein’s patient 
Schneider after suffering brain injury) where traditional mechanistic or psy­
chological explanations fall short and a different understanding of the living 
body is needed. See especially the analysis of ‘The spatiality of one’s own body 
and motricity’ in Merleau­Ponty 2014, 100–148. In the last decades, there has 
been much more empirical research on proprioception, much of which appears 
to fit nicely with Merleau­Ponty’s claims about the conditions making possible 
embodied subjectivity. For an introduction to the relationship between contem­
porary research on embodiment and phenomenology, see Gallagher 2005. 
18 Young 1980; Fanon 2008. 
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of sculpture since the advent of minimalism, were thought to enrich the 
philosophical understanding of our experience of sculpture and of how 
the art form works more generally and were also influential for many of 
the artists of the 1960s.19 For both minimalist artists and the art historians 
who tried to understand their work, phenomenology was an important ally 
to critique the high­modernist narrative of sculpture represented by Fried 
and Greenberg. A well-known illustration of this influence is Rosalind 
Krauss’ essay ‘Richard Serra, a translation’, where Krauss gives a sketch 
of how Merleau­Ponty’s work informed the development of minimalist 
sculpture in the US, and where she shows how Richard Serra’s own de­
scription of one of his sculptures, Shift (1970) sounds like an analysis of 
the phenomenology of perception.20 This phenomenological turn, as Alex 
Potts calls it, maintains the relevance of the body in art, but the relevant 
embodiment here is ours, that is, that of the spectators. Such an approach 
shifts the site of the subject matter of the work of art, locating it in the 
interplay between work and audience, and it thereby entails rejecting the 
kind of work­based ontology of art that Hegel’s theory represents. 
However, there is yet another dimension to Merleau­Ponty’s notion 
of the bodysubject that I am interested in and that I believe is particularly 
promising for thinking about the development of sculpture in the last 
century, offering an alternative to the modernism­minimalism dichotomy 
in recent art history. This dimension of the bodysubject might seem as 
the inverse of the intentionality and embodied mindedness extending 
into the world that is usually emphasised in treatments of Merleau­Ponty, 
and I refer to it as the body’s anonymity or ‘thingliness’. It is brought 
out by the fact that there is an ambiguity to the body, which consists in 
the bodysubject being both an in­itself and a for­itself as Merleau­Ponty 
characterises it, both a thing and a subject.
The ambiguity of the bodysubject is not easy to capture, since it 
is hard to think this twofoldness and it is rarely noticed in everyday 
experience. Instead, we usually grasp the body as one or the other: in 
so much of our skilful coping the body is inconspicuous; in normal 
situations when we go about our business the body is permeated by our 
agency and almost invisible to us. In breakdown situations on the other 
hand, or in the study of pathologies, the body becomes obstructive; it 
is approached as an object, from the outside. However, the ambiguity is 
19 See Potts 2000, especially 207–234 (the sixth chapter, on ‘The phenomeno­
logical turn’). 
20 Krauss 1986, 261–276, esp. 264.
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not captured by shifting between an internal and external experience of 
the body. Merleau-Ponty writes that ‘… as an object before thought, the 
body is not ambiguous. It only becomes ambiguous in the experience 
which we have of it, pre­eminently in sexual experience, and through the 
fact of sexuality’.21 What Merleau­Ponty is after is an ambiguity that is 
accessible from first personal experience and that is revealing of subjec­
tivity itself. He insists the ambiguity is real, and hence not something 
that can be explained away, however tempting that might be.22 Instead, 
the experience calls for accepting our being both subjectivity and ‘stuff ’ 
as simultaneous and not available to non­ambiguous conceptualisation. 
What Merleau­Ponty points to in his analysis of sexual experience is 
how we in our sexual being become aware of ourselves as both subjectivity 
and ‘stuff ’, and how the significance of the sexual experience is anchored 
in this anonymous existence. We can add to Merleau­Ponty’s claim that 
part of what makes the experience interesting and desirable is precisely 
that it brings out the ambiguity and makes our ‘thingliness’ not just an 
obtrusive fact or an obstacle to be overcome. This ‘thing’ that I am is 
not an object: it is still me, and I am body. When my body is embraced, 
I experience its depth, its self­enclosed thickness and the place it takes 
up in the world. An embrace is not merely a gesture that recognises 
one’s subjectivity, which could be equally well expressed in a sentence; 
the embrace is a recognition and appreciation of one’s bodily existence. 
When touched this way, I am made aware of and recognised as a being 
that is not merely intentionality or meaning or expressive existence, but 
also importantly incarnated. Here is how Merleau­Ponty describes this 
ambiguous dimension of embodiment:23
Even when the subject is normal and engaged in inter­human situa­
tions, insofar as he has a body, he continuously preserves the power 
to withdraw from it. At the very moment when I live in the world, 
when I am directed toward my projects, my occupations, my friends, 
or my memories, I can close my eyes, lie down, listen to my blood 
pulsating in my ears, lose myself in some pleasure or pain, and lock 
myself up in this anonymous life that underpins my personal one.
21 Merleau­Ponty 2012, 206.
22 This is a central theme through the many different discussions in Phenom-
enology of Perception and the urge to disambiguate is what leads both archetypes 
of philosophical positions, the empiricist and intellectualist, astray. 
23 Merleau­Ponty 2012, 203.
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In other words, the bodysubject embodies the possibility of being ‘mere 
flesh and blood’ and this being is available to first personal experience. 
Merleau­Ponty also describes the body as ‘the possibility for my existence 
to resign from itself, to make itself anonymous and passive’.24 In sexual 
experience we understand how this possibility of our existence can take 
on positive valence, even though it is a feature that mutes our subjectivity, 
making us one with the anonymous ‘stuff of the world’.
What follows from this description of ambiguity is that the notion 
of selfhood implicit in the phenomenology of the bodysubject is one that 
comes in degrees and can be more or less anonymous. It also means that to 
understand what a bodysubject is is to recognise the opacity and anonymity 
that is, if not at the heart of the matter, at least subtending and always a 
‘modality’ of being a subject. Subjectivity is neither something that brings 
a corpse to life or forms the otherwise shapeless matter, nor something 
that sublates and leaves the body behind, but is made up of all these mo­
ments of the human, embodied being. The following quotation illustrates 
the complexity of human embodied being, with its moments of thingliness 
and intentionality, matter and consciousness. The context here is how we 
shift within the spectrum of possibilities of what it is to be a subject:25
Even if I am absorbed in the experience of my body and in the soli­
tude of sensations, I do not achieve a complete suppression of every 
reference to the world that is included in my life; at each moment 
some new intention springs forth from me, whether it be toward 
the objects that surround me and fall before my eyes, or toward the 
instants that arrive and push back into the past that I have just lived 
through. I never fully become an object in the world; the density of 
being of a thing is always lacking for me, my own substance always 
runs away from me through the inside, and some intention is always 
foreshadowed.
I now want to apply this phenomenological, first-personal account of 
the body to the understanding of sculpture. The phenomenology of the 
bodysubject shows that there is potential for developing the form that 
is ‘given’ to art by nature, beyond what had been the case by the time of 
Hegel. By developing the form, we can also expand our understanding of 
24 Merleau­Ponty 2012, 202.
25 Merleau­Ponty 2012, 203 (translation modified).
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what is implied by the artist’s choice of the human body as a form, and 
of what an artistic treatment of the body is trying to do, that is, what the 
subject matter of a sculpture can be. 
THE  AMB IGUOUS  BODY  AS  SCULPTURE ’S  FORM
On the phenomenological account, being human is an ambiguous 
existence that moves between the two poles of actualised, individual 
intentionality on the one hand, and a more minimal, anonymous being, 
on the other; between full-fledged, free subjectivity and a silent in-itself. 
The anonymous being stays with us and remains integral to the account 
of subjectivity. It is a constant modality and not something to be over­
come. The body as a form in art would include the full scope of these 
possibilities, hence a phenomenological account of the body allows for a 
revaluation of visual art, accepting Hegel’s premise that the human body 
is central to these art forms. The next step is now to ask: How shall we 
relate phenomenology’s body to our understanding of sculpture?
When it comes to the case of traditional representational sculpture, it 
seems that the account of the always intentionally directed bodysubject is a 
good description of the body in sculpture (and one that seems compatible 
with Hegel’s own description of, for example, the sculpted body of a Greek 
god). When we perceive such a sculpture the pose is understood as the 
pose of an agent in an environment that offers affordances to which this 
pose responds; the carved muscles signal readiness to move and act in a 
space that is imbued with meaning. We perceive embodied subjects and not 
merely ‘body objects’ in isolation, nor symbols of interiority or conscious­
ness, which would be the contrasting models for understanding the body. 
The insistence on the ambiguity of the body emphasises that a di­
mension of the bodysubject is beyond the linguistic – more thing than 
subject proper – and hence a physical art form such as sculpture might be 
particularly well­suited to capture it. However, in order to do so, features 
of embodiment that are primarily first personal, that are characterised by 
depth, opacity and a sense of resting in itself, need to find an expression 
through the forming of three­dimensional material. To bring out this 
anonymous dimension in sculpture, we need a body that is formed in a 
manner that seems quite alien to the Greek ideal: instead of all the parts 
coming together in a manner that forms a beautiful unity, the embodied 
subject might be best portrayed as dissolving, as having vague boundaries, 
and/or in a material that can almost appear unformed.
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During the very same period when sculptures like those of Anthony 
Caro and David Smith were hailed as purely exploring vector space, a variety 
of very different abstract sculptural works were also made, works that I will 
suggest as candidates for capturing the ambiguous experience of embodi­
ment. One example is Louise Bourgeois End of Softness of 1967 [Fig. 10.3], 
a work whose crumpled, almost crawling, surface gives an experience of 
inaccessible enclosed­ness despite the shiny surface of its material. 10.3
It is difficult to articulate what the work looks like, exactly: its shape 
is not easily available to conceptualisation, in other words, but the work 
seems to invite a reaction that is felt, even if hard to discursively express. 
The form cannot quite be captured visually, but is experienced as organic 
and almost moving. I would venture that this sculpture gives an outward 
expression to an experience the viewer can recognise as having felt, in­
side. In other words, the sculpture captures a first-personal experience 
of embodiment. Bourgeois continues to explore the depth and opacity 
of bodies, sculpted or lived, in works such as Germinal (1967) [Fig. 10.4], 
Cumul I (1968) [Fig. 10.5] and as well as in her many upright, oblong 
figures that look like a amalgam of shuttles, torsos and female genitalia 
(see for example Woman in the Shape of a Shuttle (1947–1949), Pillar (1949) 
and the Echo­series (2007)). 10.4, 10.5
Seen in the light of Bourgeois’ vast œuvre, these sculptures are border­
ing on abstract objects, but they still have clear reference to the human body. 
Compared with her later cells and other installation and assemblage pieces, 
they are more like traditional sculptures, understood as self­contained, 
unified works. Hence, they are analogous to bodysubjects, in their more 
minimal, anonymous modality. Further characteristics of the ambiguous 
body, as described in the previous section on Merleau­Ponty’s body, seem 
fitting to other works by some of Bourgeois’ contemporaries: density, fluid­
ity and opacity are characteristic of Lynda Benglis’ Wing (1970) [Fig. 10.6].26 
Of course, none of the mentioned works literally look like the human 
body. However, my suggestion is that the features that I have pointed to 
are features of embodiment.27 They do not mimic the external look of the 
human form, but we recognise them as features of our own embodied 
existence that Merleau­Ponty brought attention to when trying to describe 
26 Folds, fleshiness and inaccessible form likewise characterise Hanna Wilke’s 
Untitled I (1970).
27 In 2007, Cheim & Read Gallery in New York had a show of sculptures by 
Bourgeois and Benglis, describing the work in the following way in their press 
release: ‘Both artists created organically shaped, often grotesque amorphous 
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forms. Both reference the undulating, layered landscape of the body and its 
private, internal anatomy while connecting to the ripe fecundity of the natural 
world, and the earth’s own internal brewing and bubbling’.
10.3  Louise Bourgeois, End of Softness, 1967 (17.8 × 51.8 × 38.7 cm). 
Bronze with gold patina. Owned by the Easton Foundation. 
© The Easton Foundation / VAGA, New York / BONO, Oslo 2017; 
photograph by Christopher Burke. Reproduced in colour as Plate 14.
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10.4  Louise Bourgeois, Germinal, 1967 (14.3 × 18.7 × 15.9 cm). Marble.  
Owned by the Easton Foundation. © The Easton Foundation / VAGA,  
New York / BONO, Oslo 2017; photograph by Allan Finkelman.  
Reproduced in colour as Plate 15.
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the mute, thingly dimension of our embodiment. Facing these works is 
analogous to the experience of a body where the intentional subjectivity 
has withdrawn and we are instead witnessing ‘this anonymous life that 
underpins my personal one’.28 What we face are beings more like us than 
‘the mere objects’ of minimalism or the visually appealing structures of the 
formalist sculptures of high modernism.29 And as with bodysubjects, these 
sculpted bodies cannot but help to hint at gesturing – ‘the density of being 
a thing is always lacking … and some intention is always foreshadowed’.30
28 Merleau­Ponty 2012, 203.
29 Contrasting Bourgeois with Minimalism, Potts writes: ‘there is in her case 
no lingering unease that the integrity of the work might be compromised by 
the use of striking body images, or by creating a situation where a powerful 
psychic or affective charge takes over a viewer’s response’ (Potts 2000, 361).
30 Merleau­Ponty 2012, 203.
10.5  Louise Bourgeois, Cumul I, 1968 (51 × 127 × 122 cm). Marble, with  
wooden base. Paris: Centre Pompidou. © The Easton Foundation / VAGA, 
New York / BONO, Oslo 2017.
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Someone might object, noticing that all the examples I have suggested 
are by women artists, that what these works have in common is representa­
tion of female bodies or, perhaps, that the works would be best understood 
as making some feminist point about bodies. This line of interpretation 
could be thought of as taking up another aspect of Merleau­Ponty’s analy­
sis of the bodysubject, for example, how social identities – here, women’s 
identities specifically – are embodied, and how a bodyschema might be 
gendered. However, the mere fact that the artists are female does not mean 
that the works have to do with femininity or feminism. Instead, the works 
at hand are varied and abstract enough that it seems forced to say that they 
are about femininity rather than about sculpted objects and embodiment 
10.6  Lynda Benglis, Wing, 1970 (170.2 × 150.5 × 152.4 cm).  
Cast aluminum. New Orleans: New Orleans Museum of Art.  
© Lynda Benglis / VAGA, New York / BONO, Oslo 2017.
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more generally.31 The shared features of many works by women artists from 
this period may imply, rather, that these women were especially attuned 
to subject matter of ambiguous embodiment and recognised it as more 
pressing or relevant [e.g. Fig. 10.7].32 10.7
If this extended, phenomenological conception of the body is part of 
the form of sculpture, then what kind of subject matter does it allow the 
work to engage? Since the minimal dimension of embodiment is precisely 
characterised by withdrawal from the social world and resisting intention­
ality, agency and freedom, Hegel would say that it really cannot convey 
much about Spirit. And, in a sense, he is right – these are not sculptures 
that we can easily say are rich in discursively available content. If we 
accept that these works are bodies, in a wide sense, then their subject 
matter is neither freedom, agency, nor social identity, and precisely this 
negative point could be said to be part of what is thematised. What art 
that presents these kinds of bodies can do is to insist on this anonymous 
dimension of embodiment by trying to express it, and thereby making 
this aspect of embodiment its subject matter. 
As mentioned at the outset, Hegel is no dualist and also recognises 
that being a body is part of the human, and one might argue that 
Hegel’s account of human subjectivity has room for the insights of 
Merleau­Ponty’s phenomenology of the body.33 Terry Pinkard likens the 
fluency and seamlessness of the being­in­the­world of Merleau­Ponty’s 
bodysubject to Hegel’s description of the subjectivity characteristic of 
animal life, which involves ‘a prior form of self­acquaintance that, as 
Merleau­Ponty puts it, is that of a “subject­object,” a body perceived 
from the “inside” of subjective quasi animal awareness that projects out­
wards its intention to act in the world’.34 This kind of self­acquaintance 
31 Potts notes how there has been a ‘regendering of the persona of the sculptor … 
it [nowadays] makes little sense to ask whether certain forms of sculpture or three­
dimensional art should be seen as distinctively feminine or masculine’ (Potts 2000, 
357). Potts concludes his big work on sculpture with Bourgeois and sees her work 
as coinciding with this change in both the practice and the perception of sculpture. 
32 Other artists from the same period whose work could be said to express the 
ambiguity of embodiment or the coming to be of gesture out of the anonymity of 
the body include Yayoi Kusama [cf. Fig. 10.7] and Eva Hesse, but also some of the 
works by male artists such as Isamu Noguchi and Eduardo Chillida. (For none of 
the mentioned artists do I claim that all of their works are best understood thus.)
33 I am grateful to T.J. Clark for pressing me on this point. 
34 Pinkard 2012, 26.
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10.7  Yayoi Kusama, Snake, 1974 (30.5 × 650.2 × 25.4 cm). Mixed media. 
Private collection, © Yayoi Kusama. Reproduced in colour as Plate 16.
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is a moment in Hegel’s account of human self­consciousness. In other 
words, there is no necessary contradiction between Merleau­Ponty’s 
phenomenology of the bodysubject and Hegel’s account of human be­
ing. However, in the Aesthetics, the systematic picture is accompanied 
by a historical one, and the latter appears very explicitly to deny any 
lasting relevance of the body in art, as if understanding ourselves as 
ambiguous really would amount to a lack of self­knowledge, or at best a 
provisional knowledge, that has since been superseded. Hegel contends 
that contemporary culture ‘produces this opposition in man which 
makes him an amphibious animal, because he now has to live in two 
worlds which contradict one another’, but the cure for such a situation is 
not appreciating one’s amphibiousness as the ambiguity of subjectivity; 
rather, it must be reconciled.35 Put otherwise, returning to insist on the 
importance of animal life in us, in the way my interpretation suggests 
some modern sculptures do, is regressive.
Further, this art, as I have characterised it, accepts as relevant an 
experience of opacity. What has been introduced into the subject matter 
35 Hegel 1975, 54.
10.8  Detail of Yayoi Kusama, Snake, 1974 (30.5 × 650.2 × 25.4 cm).  
Mixed media. Private collection, © Yayoi Kusama.
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of art, then, is something that is not fully accessible to thought, and 
this subject matter should perhaps even be understood as an outright 
rejection of the possibility of self­knowledge, if that means becoming 
completely transparent and intelligible to ourselves. This would be a 
most un­Hegelian admission and could be understood as reintroducing 
the sublime as relevant in late modern art, if we think of the sublime 
as naming something that overwhelms and goes beyond our cognitive 
capacities.36 This is something Hegel would understand as a regression, 
since sublimity in art is a symptom of an inability to express and hence 
make clear one’s subject matter.37 As Pippin puts this point, contrasting 
Hegel’s outlook with that of phenomenology:38 
To be is to be intelligible; there cannot be anything in principle un­
knowable. (The failure of meaning is therefore, for Hegel, always itself 
determinately comprehensible, for a historical society, at a time, in a 
certain relation to its own past).
The phenomenological account, on the other hand, suggests that what we 
are dealing with is not a provisional vagueness, but a perennial ‘darkness’ 
in our very being. 
CONCLUS ION
Consider the following passage from Virginia Woolf ’s To the Lighthouse 
as a literary example of attempting to capture the range of the embodied 
self:39
36 The sublime is a notoriously vague term in art theory, but in the case of 
Merleau­Ponty’s bodysubject and the sculptures discussed it seems to be un­
derstood best as something inaccessible to cognition, a self­contained core that 
gives a sense of depth or weight to the body. 
37 Hegel 1975, 482–483: ‘… what alone has the look of the sublime is the abstract 
universal which never coincides with itself in anything determinate …’. On 
Hegel’s view of the sublime, see Pippin 2005, 294: ‘Hegel regarded the experi­
ence of the sublime as historically regressive, an indication of a much less well 
developed understanding of “the divine” …’.
38 Pippin 2014, 130.
39 Woolf 1964, 72.
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… it was a relief when they [the others] went to bed. For now she need 
not think about anybody. She could be herself, by herself. And that 
was what now she often felt the need of – to think; well not even to 
think. To be silent; to be alone. All the being and the doing, expansive, 
glittering, vocal, evaporated; and one shrunk, with a sense of solem­
nity, to being oneself, a wedge­shaped core of darkness, something 
invisible to others. Although she continued to knit, and sat upright, 
it was thus that she felt herself.
On my Merleau­Ponty­inspired reading, the experience of oneself as ‘a 
wedge­shaped core of darkness’ is not due to some temporary inability of 
self­knowledge on the part of Woolf ’s heroine, perhaps due to shortcom­
ings in her ability to be at one with her ‘expansive being and doing’, in­
tensified by her social situation. Instead, I would venture that what it is to 
be oneself, any self, is also opaque and ‘dense’ in the manner described.40 
If, by pointing to ‘a wedge­shaped core of darkness,’ or giving expres­
sion to the opacity and depth that is part of our being, this ‘unthought’ 
dimension of the ambiguous body becomes a content of art, as I am 
suggesting, then it is clear that these artworks are quite far from what 
Hegel imagined as art’s task, with respect to what it is we need art to 
make manifest for us. What these works offer their audiences are not 
the most complex or modern configurations of freedom and Spirit, but 
an enduring feature of our being, the anonymous or dark matter that 
remains part of who we are. If we accept these works as relevant (and 
not merely as detours or misunderstandings) and if we accept that their 
form and subject matter are suitably understood along the lines I have 
suggested, then this implies that things have developed fairly differently 
from what Hegel imagined 200 years ago, or more precisely, that a dif­
ferent form, subject matter and hence different history of sculptural art 
after Hegel is possible. 
One of the strengths of Hegel’s aesthetics is that it aims to give a 
story of why art is important, that is, why it conveys an important subject 
matter in a fitting form at a given point in history. This is an ambitious 
criterion for a theory, but it is also one that can justify art as deeply sig­
nificant and an occasion for truth. This criterion, that it should be pos­
sible to articulate why art answers a general need (as opposed to a merely 
40 Galen Strawson reads this passage in a similar manner, although in a dif­
ferent context, arguing against a narrative theory of the self: Strawson 2012.
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aesthetic or art­intrinsic need), is necessary to explain the artist’s choice 
as embodying relevant content for us in our time. If my phenomenological 
alternative is to live up to this criterion of Hegelian theory, it should be 
able to give an account of why these sculptural works represent a choice 
and a way to sculpt that is of significance now (in a wide conception of 
‘now’ that spans the last hundred years). It would take some work to fully 
develop an answer to why it is historically pertinent to try to express aes­
thetically this ambiguity of embodiment as a feature of human existence, 
but here are a few suggestions:
 1. It might be that an overly theoretical approach to our self­understan­
ding has come to be felt as falling short and sculpture functions as 
a kind of corrective. 
 2. Or it might be that these bodily works occasion an appreciation of the 
preconditions for our own psychological and social identities, that is, 
of aspects of our being that are more basic. 
 3. Or a certain humility might be needed in our time, and sculpture 
reminds us of our embodied limitations. 
 4. Or these works might convey a recognition of our belonging to nature 
in a conception of nature where it is not fully captured by our best 
empirical science. 
 5. Or they might answer some existential need to see externalised that 
depth and darkness that we know from inside ourselves.
I take it that these are all plausible possible ways of trying to articulate 
the importance of bodily ambiguity as subject matter for art in our time. 
They are not mutually exclusive, so it may even be that two or more of 
them in combination might provide the historically relevant justification. 
My point is not to defend any one of them, or indeed any combination, 
but rather simply to show that the bodies at work in these sculptures 
can be given an interpretation, in which they, precisely because of their 
ambiguity, express something important for and about human beings. A 
common feature of my brief interpretations of these works is that they are 
resisting a certain kind of intelligibility and insisting on the importance 
of making thematic a dimension of ourselves that is barely available 
to the language of philosophy. Before the advent of modernism, this 
aspect of human existence is neither familiar from visual art nor from 
theoretical treatments. But it just might be that this is most needed for 
understanding ourselves. By re­evaluating the body, we can understand 
late modern sculpture as able to address other questions than the more 
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familiar modernist narrative about abstraction and autonomy and thereby 
we are also able to tell a different history about modernism, in which other 
works become paradigmatic. 
In sum, turning to phenomenology’s re­evaluation of the body allows 
for a re­evaluation of sculpture, since the form has a different potential 
and hence lends itself to a different subject matter than what Hegel imag­
ined. If we inscribe this alternative account of late modern sculpture in a 
Hegelian narrative, which recognises the need for making the ambiguity 
of human selfhood manifest for us, then choosing the body as form can 
be understood not as a mere continuation of a tradition of sculpture that 
is basically less significant, if not antiquated, but rather as a historically 
relevant artistic choice that makes it possible to express something im­
portant and true about who we are – we who are still embodied creatures, 
stuck with the ambiguities of our amphibian nature. 
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SEBAST I AN  GARDNER
ART’S LOSS OF VOCATION 
Hegel and Philosophical 
Romanticism
What follows examines Hegel’s disagreement with other post­Kantians 
concerning the philosophical significance of art. The contemporaries with 
whom I take Hegel to be arguing include all of those who accord to art 
the kind of unbounded cognitive significance denied it by Hegel’s thesis 
that art has lost its highest vocation – thus, in the first instance the Jena 
Romantics, Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel, whom he attacks with unchar­
acteristic vehemence; in addition Schiller, Schelling and Solger, who are 
also criticised, albeit in more moderate terms, by Hegel; and by implica­
tion also, though Hegel does not talk about them in the relevant respect, 
Hölderlin, Schleiermacher and Victor Cousin.1 For convenience, using a 
1 I include Schiller, although he figures somewhat uncertainly in Hegel’s dis­
cussion. One complication is that though Schiller certainly affirms a future for 
art that Hegel rejects, it lies in moral psychology and its political correlates, 
not in metaphysical knowledge. What Hegel might have been expected to claim 
therefore is, first, that the historical vision and political problematic of Schiller’s 
Letters is overtaken in his Philosophy of Right, and, second, that Schiller’s aes­
thetics are defective in so far as he, like Kant, allows beauty to remain a mere 
non­actual Ought, bereft of Is­ness. Yet what Hegel says in the Introduction 
of the Aesthetics is that Schiller grasps in a philosophically superior way the 
unity that Kant intimates – ‘This unity of universal and particular, freedom 
and necessity, Spirit and nature, which Schiller grasped scientifically as the 
principle and essence of art and which he laboured unremittingly to call into 
actual life by art and aesthetic education […]’ (1975, 62 [1970, XIII: 91]). Hegel 
however does not tell what makes Schiller’s achievement notably scientific 
(nor what differentiates him from Schelling, who may presumably be credited 
with the same achievement). That Schiller does not truly break through into 
term which has gained currency and is particularly apt in the context 
of Hegel, I will refer to this standpoint as ‘Philosophical Romanticism’.2
The opposition of Hegel qua alleged hyper­rationalist to Romantic 
non­ or anti­rationalism is a canonical reference point in philosophical 
discourse. My engagement with it here focuses narrowly on the question 
of Hegel’s success, or not, in establishing his loss­of­vocation thesis. 
What I will seek to show, through rational reconstruction of the histori­
cal disagreement, is the thinness of Hegel’s self­distinction from his Ro­
mantic contemporaries; which may be thought to give ground either for 
(re)claiming Hegel as a Romantic malgré lui, or alternatively for rewriting 
the Hegelian art­narrative in such a way as to dissociate him cleanly from 
the Romantic standpoint.
THE  PUZZLE  POSED  BY  HEGEL’S  THES IS
The general notion that art possesses a special cognitive capacity, overtak­
ing natural consciousness and capable of rising to metaphysical heights, 
takes hugely different forms in the tradition stretching down from clas­
sical German philosophy to the present, and the sort of basis offered for 
it varies greatly, but it recurs again and again in late modern philosophy,3 
and in this long perspective, Hegel clearly occupies a singular place, both 
lending his weight to the tradition and, it would seem, seeking to extin­
guish it pre­emptively. The puzzle is how Hegel can seemingly want to 
have it both ways. I will suggest that, although Hegel’s thesis concerning 
art’s loss of vocation undeniably has force – it mandates certain expecta­
tions and invalidates others – the justification he offers for it turns out on 
close examination to rest on a relatively fine point concerning what counts 
the speculative and falls victim to aestheticism is confirmed by Hegel’s later 
discussion of Schiller’s ‘Die Götter Griechenlands’ (1975, 506–507 [1970, XIV: 
113–114]): Schiller is described as merely straining against the aufgeklärten Ver-
stand and as led to art, and to the Greeks, by his feeling of the unfulfilled need 
of Reason. Schiller receives no treatment in Hegel’s Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy. 
2 Which is not to say that my usage corresponds neatly with that of others. 
The lines of division between pro­ and anti­Romantics are various and intri­
cate: compare, e.g., Geuss 2005 (especially chapters 11–12), and Eldridge 2001 
(especially the introduction).
3 For an overview, see Gardner 2007.
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as an adequate comprehension of spirit in its relation to sense; and that 
once this has been appreciated, and once appropriate distinctions have 
also been drawn among the contemporaries with whom he is arguing, it 
becomes unclear why Hegel’s position on art should be regarded (why 
he himself should have regarded it) as deeply differentiated from that of 
(at least some of) his Romantic contemporaries. After having explained 
how one might arrive at this conclusion, which will take up most of the 
space available, I will point briefly to one respect in which the subsequent 
history of art may be thought to cohere with this assessment.
The topic is of course bound up with several large issues, including 
(first) the place of art in Hegel’s system; (second) the exact meaning of 
Hegel’s declaration that art has lost its highest vocation; and (third) 
Hegel’s general metaphysical philosophical disagreements with Schlegel, 
Schelling and others in the Philosophical Romantic camp. So let me first 
say something quickly about each of these.
Regarding the place of art, the point to be highlighted is that art 
appears to undergo a different fate and to play a different kind of role 
in Hegel’s system from that played by other, comparable items. The 
highest form of Objective Spirit, and the penultimate form of Absolute 
Spirit – respectively the world­history of states, and revealed religion – 
continue to maintain themselves intact as they undergo their concluding 
transition, without reacting back on themselves. There is no final form 
of religious consciousness that shares the structure of late romantic art, 
since the insight that spirit is incompletely grasped in revealed religion 
does not induce it to retract its claim to truth. And the ultimate limitation 
of Objective Spirit – that it leaves spirit still in need of comprehension 
of its own absoluteness – does not lead modern social life to pass over 
into a new form, or manifest itself as a new moment in universal history. 
By contrast, art is envisaged, not quite as a ladder to be used and thrown 
away, but at any rate as incorporating within itself, in the full develop­
ment of its romantic form, recognition of its own failure to reach as far 
as it intends – whence its ‘collapse’, Zerfallen.4
4 The classical undergoes ‘dissolution [Auflösung ]’ (Hegel 1975, 502 [Hegel 
1970, XIV: 107]), as does the romantic. But the latter’s dissolution is followed 
by ‘the collapse of romantic art [das Zerfallen der romantischen Kunst ]’ (Hegel 
1975, 595 [Hegel 1970, XIV: 222]) and ‘the decay and dissolution of art itself 
[Zerfallenheit und Auflösung der Kunst selbst]’ (Hegel 1975, 576 [Hegel 1970, XIV: 
198]), in which ‘the sides, whose complete identity affords the proper essence 
of art’, fall apart (Hegel 1975, 576 [Hegel 1970, XIV: 198]).
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If we take Hegel not to be offering mere heuristic schemas, but as 
tracking the self­thinking of art, religion and so on, then the explanation 
cannot simply be that transitions in Hegel are not all uniform. The ques­
tion, then, is whether there is any internal systematic reason why the fate of 
art should differ in this respect from that of socio­political life and revealed 
religion, and the answer is not to be found at the surface of Hegel’s texts.
Since much discussion of the loss­of­vocation thesis holds aside or 
assigns a minor role to his argument with Philosophical Romanticism, 
it is worth spelling out the reasons for regarding it as the focal point. 
To interpret art’s loss of vocation as having anti-Romantic significance 
is to map Hegel’s treatment of art directly onto his high­level claim 
concerning the necessarily all-comprehensive or ‘infinite’ character of 
the Concept – the claim which Schelling in the 1830s and 1840s, and 
later thinkers influenced by him, attack head on.5 Separating them, by 
contrast, makes Hegel’s thesis harder to understand. As has become clear 
in recent discussion,6 the loss of vocation involves not one but several 
ideas. These include: the inferior beauty of post­classical art; art’s loss of 
social authority and its looser integration with ethical life; the unavoid­
able internal complexity of the modern artwork; modern art’s domination 
by subjective humour; the objective arbitrariness of content consequent 
upon the modern artist’s new subjective freedom vis à vis content; and 
valorisation of the contingent everyday world.
It is not difficult to recognise these as a collection of convergent and 
perhaps mutually reinforcing claims concerning the distinguishing features 
and predicament of modern art. What is not so clear – if Philosophical 
Romanticism is not Hegel’s target – is why they should be taken to point 
collectively towards the lesson that art has lost its highest vocation. Hence 
my suggestion that, if Hegel’s thesis is to be sustained as a distinct further 
5 Indeed Schelling cites Hegel’s loss­of­vocation thesis in his late writings as 
evidence of Hegel’s narrow rationalism: Schelling 1994 [1833–1837], 128–129 and 
135–136 [Schlegel 1991, X: 119 and 127–128], and 1972 [1832–1833], 234–235. That 
said, Schelling ultimately agrees with Hegel, more or less, concerning art’s loss of 
vocation, for reasons which overlap with Hegel’s: 1) the unsurpassability of Greek 
art; 2) the contingency of modern art’s content; and 3) the surpassing of art by 
Christian religion. See Schelling 2007, 166–169 [Schlegel 1991, XI: 241–242].
6 See Henrich 2003a; Rush 2010; Houlgate 2013; and Peters 2015 (especially 
the sixth chapter). Henrich 2003b, 157, distinguishes Hegel’s claim that art has 
as a matter of fact come to an end from his justificatory claim regarding its 
future potential.
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systematic claim within the philosophy of art in its own right, and not re­
solved back into the several more determinate claims just mentioned, then it 
should be understood as asserting the point in the development of spirit at 
which certain competing, aestheticist forms of post­Kantianism are seen off.
Since little would be gained for our understanding of Hegel’s phi­
losophy of art by merely rehearsing the case of Schelling and other critics 
against the hegemony of the Concept, and the replies available to Hegel, 
it makes sense to ask if there is some other way in which their disagree­
ment concerning art might be pursued, which will avoid reducing it to 
the purely general metaphysical issue. One obvious suggestion is that we 
should ask instead to what extent Hegel’s account of modern art accords 
with the way in which it has as a matter of fact attempted to understand 
itself – the idea being that, even if Hegel were to be allowed to have settled 
the pure metaphysical issues, it remains possible that there are aspects of 
modern art’s self­understanding for which Philosophical Romanticism 
provides a superior articulation. Even if this is, as I will argue, what 
the historical record shows, it cannot be concluded without further ado 
that Hegel is simply wrong about art’s loss of vocation, since the option 
remains of construing his theory as essentially revisionary, as a critique 
of modern art­consciousness or tendencies within it, and perhaps also 
as an occasion for attempting to extend the Hegelian narrative in a way 
that will explain the persistence of Romanticism. Nonetheless, any such 
result would hold considerable interest.
FROM KANT  TO  PH I LOSOPH ICAL  ROMANT IC ISM
To turn now to the main issue – Hegel’s justification for declaring that 
art has lost its vocation – it will help to rehearse quickly some of the 
leading formulations of the Philosophical Romantic position that Hegel 
is rejecting, in order to get an accurate measure of what Hegel needs to 
establish in relation to his contemporaries.
The natural place to start is with Kant’s analysis of art, which is 
pre­Romantic but provides the prototype for much of the theorising that 
follows.7 In Kant’s account, a work of fine art is a composite in which a 
sensory presentation, in addition to meeting the condition of beauty by 
7 Key passages are Kant 2000 [1790], §59, 225–228 (V: 351–355), on symbolic 
presentation; and §49, 191–195 (V: 313–317), and §57 Remark I, 217–219 (V: 
341–344), on aesthetic and rational ideas.
335GARDNER :  ART ’S  LOSS  OF  VOCAT ION
virtue of its form, also (as he puts it) ‘occasions much thinking’, and by 
virtue of its indefinite suggestive power, and the impossibility of bringing 
the thinking that it elicits to any conclusion, points onwards to the su­
persensible. The two components of the work are therefore (i) what Kant 
calls an ‘aesthetic idea’, that is, the sensory product of the imagination, 
working in association with concepts of the understanding; and (ii) an 
idea of the supersensible or unconditioned, or Idea of Reason, typically a 
moral idea. The two are aligned in such a way that the former expresses the 
latter. What the sensory presentation relays, therefore is strictly speaking 
a mere idea, and not its object. The manner in which it does so – that is, 
the way it makes virtue, justice or whatever apparently present to us, and 
gives it life – is not something that can be grasped discursively. (Which is 
another reason, in addition to beauty, why fine art presupposes genius.) 
It follows that ‘[a]n aesthetic idea cannot become a cognition’,8 just as an 
Idea of Reason cannot be supplied with a corresponding cognised object.
Kant’s conception of fine art is bound up therefore with his view of 
the limits of philosophical cognition, without which fine art would lack 
all interest (just as beauty would be impossible): aesthetic presentations 
are a further part of the large Kantian package of things that we have to 
make do with, given that we have no insight into any real connection of 
nature with the supersensible. When, however, this general Kantian claim 
comes to be challenged by the following generation, aesthetic presenta­
tion, far from being discarded, gains in importance, and Kant’s reason­
ing is in effect put in reverse: the possibility and actuality of aesthetic 
presentation is taken as a positive ground for thinking that the bounds 
of human cognition cannot lie where Kant supposes.
In its initial phase, this redevelopment takes two forms. The pre­
eminent systematic formulation is Schelling’s well­known account, in 
his 1800 System of Transcendental Idealism, of the work of art as the ob­
jectification of intellectual intuition or intuitive intellection – the mode 
of cognition which Kant says we cannot have. Whereas Kant envisages 
the sensory component of the work of art as a would­be window on to 
the supersensible which we can think­but­not­know, Schelling’s claim is 
that the work of art displays to us their actual point of union; the work is 
an object, of a singular sort, accessible to the subject, and which displays 
the real unity of the sensible and supersensible, and nature and freedom.
8 Kant 2000 [1790], 218 (V: 342).
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The other systematic formulation is the Jena Romantics’ reconcep­
tion of art in terms of the specific kind of negative aesthetic presentation 
which Kant introduces in the context of the sublime.9 The Jena Romantics 
invert Kant’s reasoning: what he regards as a mere shortfall in the power 
of sense to ‘present’ the unconditioned, they argue, is just what allows it 
to qualify as a positive, higher cognition.10
Abstracting from all the details, the idea common to the Jena Ro­
mantics and Schelling in 1800 is that works of art project a content or 
cognitive meaning, of a kind which discursive thought can recover once 
it has been made available by the artwork, but which could not have been 
originally secured by discursive means, and which cannot be validated 
discursively without reference back to the (experience of the) artwork. 
Hence Schelling’s claim:11
If aesthetic intuition is merely transcendental intuition become ob­
jective, it is self­evident that art is at once the only true and eternal 
organ and document of philosophy, which ever and again continues 
to speak to us of what philosophy cannot depict in external form […] 
Art is paramount to the philosopher [Die Kunst ist eben deßwegen dem 
Philosophen das Höchste].
Hegel of course rejects this. And he also rejects the distinct, weaker ver­
sion of Philosophical Romanticism – which belongs to its second phase – 
according to which the cognitive achievement of art can be matched by 
philosophy without being superseded. This is Schelling’s position in his 
later (1803–1804) lectures on the philosophy of art. Schelling arrives at 
it, not by weakening his claims for art, but by strengthening his claims 
for philosophy. This is the work of what he calls his Identity Philosophy, 
which provides the outlines for Hegel’s own version of absolute idealism. 
Schelling now describes his system in its entirety as an ‘ideal­realism 
which has become objective’ [objektiv-gewordener Idealrealismus], which 
9 Kant 2000 [1790], General Remark, 149–157 [V: 266–275].
10 I emphasise that this is a selective reconstruction, which picks out only one 
of the several conceptions of art found in Novalis and Schlegel (between whom 
there are also important differences). An exegetically intricate issue surrounds 
the correct understanding of Early German Romantic claims regarding the 
absolute; see Nassar 2013.
11 Schelling 1978 [1800], 231 [Schlegel 1991, III: 627–628].
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is nothing other than a System der Kunst.12 Equality of art and philosophy 
– each taken as a different medium for presenting the relation of the world 
to the absolute – is also (with some complications) Solger’s position,13 
and (perhaps) that of Goethe.14 It surfaces too, in a different version, in 
Schopenhauer, though he is not on Hegel’s horizon.
To make clear that there are indeed quite different ways in which 
Hegel’s Romantic contemporaries enter a claim for the significance for 
art which Hegel contradicts, here are some quotations, the first from 
Schelling’s lectures on the philosophy of art:15
We must remind ourselves here that the philosophy of art is actually 
general philosophy itself, except presented in the potence of art. Thus we 
will understand the way in which art lends objectivity to its own 
ideas in the same way we understand how the ideas of individual real 
things become objective in the phenomenal realm. Or we might put 
it thus: our present task, which is to understand the transition of the 
aesthetic idea into the concrete work of art, is the same as the general 
task of philosophy as such, namely, to understand the manifestation 
of the ideas through particular things.
The section from which this comes deals with the question of how the 
‘universal content’ of art becomes ‘the true material of a particular work 
of art’,16 and Schelling goes on to explain how the various fundamental 
antitheses – universal and particular, and so on – which form antinomies 
for our ordinary understanding, are resolved within art in the same way 
as within philosophical reflection, namely through the location of the 
so­called ‘point of indifference’ between them. The artist is therefore 
engaged on solving philosophical problems, albeit not under that descrip­
tion: as Schelling puts it, the ‘artist of genius is autonomous’, ‘subject to 
no law but his own’, and philosophy comes to recognise this, because 
12 In Über den wahren Begriff der Naturphilosophie (1801) [Schlegel 1991, IV: 86, 
89 and 92].
13 Solger tends to blur art and revealed religion, and has variable views about 
their relation to philosophical cognition.
14 On the strength of some of his remarks about symbolism and the expression 
of concepts in images.
15 Schelling 1989 [1802–1804], 98 [Schlegel 1991, V: 480]; emphasis added.
16 Schelling 1989 [1802–1804], Part I, chapter 3.
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it too operates according to the highest principle of autonomy.17 Earlier 
Schelling claimed to find in art what he found missing from philosophy; 
now his claim is that philosophy, precisely because it can satisfy its own 
needs, is able to behold its mirror image when it looks at art.
We find another, succinct statement of the idea of a strict parallel­
ism of art with philosophical reflection, such that both exhibit one and 
the same form, in Fichte (even if the idea is not one to which he himself 
attached much importance):18
[O]ne cannot express what fine art does in any better way than by 
saying that it makes the transcendental point of view the ordinary point 
of view. − The philosopher elevates himself and others to this point 
of view by means of work and in accordance with a rule. […] [F]rom 
the transcendental point of view, the world is something that is made; 
from the ordinary point of view, it is something that is given; from 
the aesthetic point of view, the world is given, but only under the 
aspect of how it was made.
Compare these statements from Schelling and Fichte with the following, 
derived from a passage in Novalis’ Fichte Studies (1795–1796):19
Philosophy is originally a feeling. The philosophical sciences concep­
tualise the intuitions of this feeling […] Thus philosophy always needs 
something given − it is {merely} form […] Philosophy does not admit 
of construction. The borders of feeling are the borders of philosophy. 
Feeling cannot feel itself.
It is easy to see how – with the motive of equipping feeling with the means 
to ‘feel itself ’, and so of overcoming its borders, or of showing these to be, 
in Kant’s language, only borders [Grenzen] and not limits [Schranken] – 
one might advance from this point to Schlegel’s provocative statement 
that, ‘Where philosophy stops, poetry has to begin’;20 and thence perhaps 
17 Schelling 1966 [1803], 148 [Schlegel 1991, V: 349].
18 Fichte 2005 [1798], 334. The same idea is employed by Schopenhauer in The 
World as Will and Representation.
19 Novalis 2003 [1795–1796], 13. Novalis’ journals would not of course have 
been known to Hegel, but the line of thought encapsulated here is repeated 
throughout Early German Romantic writing.
20 Schlegel 1991 [1800], 98.
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one further step, to Schlegel’s conception of irony as an all­subsuming 
principle which gives appropriate recognition to reflection’s dependence 
on feeling and other limitations.
The point, therefore, is that in Novalis and Schlegel the case ‘against 
philosophy’ is built into the case ‘for art’: the fortunes of art rise, as and 
because those of philosophy decline. For Schelling and Fichte, by contrast, 
philosophy comes to recognise that the knowledge that it has gained by 
hard discursive work was present all along, in a different form, in art. It 
is clear that the former presents Hegel squarely with a target that would 
motivate his loss­of­vocation claim, but whether this is also true of the 
latter remains to be seen.
To recapitulate, four positions are in play: (i) Kant’s position that art 
does not qualify as philosophical cognition in any genuine sense (its real 
importance is moral); (ii) the strong aestheticist claim for art’s cognitive 
superiority and the dependence of philosophy on art (Schelling in 1800 
and the Jena Romantics); (iii) the weaker claim that art’s cognition is 
self-standing and equalled, but not surpassed, by philosophical reflec­
tion (that is, Schelling in 1803–1804, Fichte, Solger, Schopenhauer); and 
finally (iv) Hegel’s claim for philosophy’s transcendence of art’s cogni­
tion. And to each of these a different conception of the work of art cor­
responds: (i) as mere symbolisation of an Idea of the unconditioned; (ii) 
as an objectified intellectual intuition or as in some other way achieving 
the positive cognition of the unconditioned unavailable to philosophy; 
(iii) as paralleling philosophical cognition, providing a different mode of 
presentation of the same content; and (iv) Hegel’s conception of the late 
romantic form of art as aware of having lost its highest vocation, which 
is what must be considered next. 
HEGEL’S  CONCEPT ION  OF  THE  LATE  ROMANT IC  WORK  OF  ART
Kant’s and Hegel’s aesthetics are standardly presented as forming a stark 
contrast,21 but if we compare their conceptions of fine art with respect to 
their structure, the basic similarity is striking. This is what Hegel’s remarks 
21 With respect to art, Kant’s horizons are set by neoclassicism; the works that 
he considers exemplary (Milton) look backwards rather than forward; Sturm 
und Drang represents in his eyes a threat; and the overall shape of art is static 
and fixed by nature and morality, which anchor it and supply all of its content. 
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on Kant’s aesthetic theory lead us to expect.22 In the introduction to the 
lectures, under the heading ‘Historical Deduction of the Concept of Art’, 
Hegel goes patiently through the Four Moments of Kant’s Analytic of the 
Pure Judgment of Taste, saying of them that they express the unity re­
quired by the ‘absoluteness of reason’: the beautiful work of art ‘cancels’ the 
‘cleavages’ of freedom and nature, universal and particular, understanding 
and sense, and concept and reality. The Kantian work of art does a better 
job than Kantian theoretical and practical cognition, according to Hegel, 
because within it sense is neither ‘subsumed’ nor ‘dominated’ by freedom: 
‘Therefore thought is incarnate in the beauty of art […] the material is not 
determined by thought externally, but exists freely on its own account […] 
nature and freedom, sense and concept, find their right and satisfaction all 
in one.’23 The flaw in this ‘apparently perfect reconciliation’ Hegel locates 
not within Kant’s account of the structure of fine art but in the philosophical 
gloss that Kant puts on it, that is, the status that Kant claims for the work of 
art. This, along with everything else pertaining to Kant’s attempt to unify 
reason, is inadequately defined by Kant as merely subjective, ‘the point of 
view of a reflection which judges’ only ‘subjectively’. Kant has supplied 
nonetheless ‘the starting point’ for ‘the true comprehension of the beauty 
of art’: it remains for us, Hegel says, to achieve a ‘higher grasp of the true 
unity of necessity and freedom, particular and universal, sense and reason’. 
Again, the fundamental correction needed to Kant’s aesthetic theory lies 
not directly within the philosophy of art, but in general metaphysics.
Now of course achieving this ‘higher grasp’ – through general meta­
physics – brings vast changes in its wake, including art’s whole historici­
sation, but thus far Hegel’s trajectory seems indistinguishable in terms of 
its general outline and qua strategy from that of Romantic post­Kantian 
aesthetic theory. Hegel substitutes pure conceptual thinking for Kant’s 
Ideas of Reason, thereby supplying the unconditioned as presented in 
beautiful art with full reality; and he disposes of Kant’s fundamental dual­
ism of sense and intellect, allowing the relation of aesthetic and rational 
ideas, which for Kant remains a purely subjective correspondence, to be 
recognised as a comprehended and fully actual identity. The upshot, as 
Hegel says, is that Kant’s concept of an intuitive intellect – which, Hegel 
Hegel by contrast, looking over the narrow horizon set up by the eighteenth­
century concentration on taste, recognises the impetus for development within 
art and liberates it from Nature and morality qua mere law of individual action.
22 Hegel 1975, 56–61 [Hegel 1970, XIII: 83–89].
23 Hegel 1975, 60 [Hegel 1970, XIII: 88–89].
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implies, is in any case appealed to implicitly in Kant’s aesthetics24 – ceases 
to be a mere ‘postulate’, and is found to have reality in beautiful art, un­
derstood as the unity of spiritual content and sensible form.25
In terms of its internal metaphysical structure and the systematic role 
that it plays – that is, leaving aside all the metaphysical content that fills 
it out – no difference from Schelling has yet emerged, and it does not 
do so, I think, until the final phase in the development of romantic art.
One crucial revision in post­Kantian aesthetics, foregrounded by 
Hegel but already explicit in Jena Romanticism and Schelling, is the richer 
reflexive conception of the work of art, the idea that it incorporates an 
understanding of itself. Kant’s gloss on the work of fine art as the expres­
sion of rational ideas remains external to the artwork itself: it does not 
‘know’ that it is a mere subjective Darstellung. For the Jena Romantics, 
by contrast, aesthetic presentation achieves its cognitive target by way 
of its self-reflection, just as for Schelling what distinguishes the work of 
art metaphysically from a natural organism is that in it we are presented 
with an intellectual intuition which is conscious of itself as such. And all 
of this, modulo all the specific differences of philosophical formulation, 
is preserved in Hegel’s conception of the romantic artwork: romantic art 
itself understands the relations between the sensory and non­sensory 
components of the work, in increasingly complex and sophisticated ways, 
and it knows itself to be doing this, whereby it is distinguished from the 
unknowing, self­blind work of classical art. And yet, on Hegel’s account, 
the romantic development leads to the realisation that the relation which 
defines its art-project cannot be bridged in a way that will yield satisfac­
tion: it culminates with the insight that art is subject to, as Hegel puts it, 
a ‘limit in itself ’.26 This therefore is the point at which Hegel’s conception 
24 Hegel 1975, 57 [Hegel 1970, XIII: 84].
25 Hegel 1975, 114–115 [Hegel 1970, XIII: 156].
26 ‘Die Kunst hat noch in sich selbst eine Schranke und geht deshalb in höhere For-
men des Bewußtseins über. Diese Beschränkung bestimmt denn auch die Stellung […]’ 
(Hegel 1975, 102 [Hegel 1970, XIII: 141]). The highest art is deficient because the 
limitedness of art makes it so [sie ist nur mangelhaft, weil die Beschränktheit der 
Kunst sie dazu macht]; Hegel 2000 [1828], 28. On the evidence of the 1805–1806 
Philosophy of Spirit, this conviction was fully formed in Hegel’s Jena period: 
Hegel 1983 [1805–1806], 174–175 [Jenaer Systementwürfe III: 254–255]. Hegel’s 
case here for art’s limitation, in so far as it goes beyond the familiar point about 
intuition and immediacy, is hard to grasp: Hegel complains of ‘the modern 
formalism’ in art and suggests some actual contradiction in art.
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of the late romantic work diverges from that of his predecessors, and 
which needs to be elucidated.27
If we look at the several suggestions in Hegel’s texts as to where the 
crucial self­subjection­to­limitation might stem from, two stand out: (i) 
the sensory condition on art’s truth (its being bound to immediacy and 
intuition); and (ii) the surrounding context of modern critical reflection. 
The first is internal to art and the second external. Hegel presents each as 
if it were individually sufficient, but he also implies their interconnection, 
which comes into view if we zoom out and contemplate Hegel’s bigger 
picture. There is however a considerable distance to be covered between 
Hegel’s overarching claim concerning modern reflection’s knowing itself 
to be beyond nature’s sensuous immediacy, and his specific claim about 
art’s self­limitation. That modern self­consciousness as a whole is able 
to juxtapose artworks with purely intellectual objects which cannot be 
translated into artistic form, and employs forms of reasoning which no 
artwork could reproduce, cannot be directly relevant. The self­limitation 
of art cannot in any case be the direct effect of importing into it something 
from outside – whatever has an effect on art must first be assimilated 
by art. Modern consciousness as a whole may set higher value on other 
forms of spirit, but unless art­consciousness can understand the measure 
employed here as impinging on its own project, it cannot bend its knee to 
them.28 If the context of modern reflection is to put rational pressure on 
art – if there is to be a self-reflection within Romantic art that constitutes 
the moment of art’s knowledge of its loss of vocation – then this needs 
to show up in its internal unfolding, which must mean that it does so in 
the way that late Romantic art comes to understand its commitment to 
the medium of sense.29
27 See Henrich 2003a, 75–76, concerning Hegel’s differentiation from Früh-
romantik. 
28 So even if it is true that art­consciousness is superseded, and that modern 
consciousness as a whole knows this, still it remains unexplained how this 
superiority can be registered internally by art as its own limitation: in its own 
terms, the late romantic artwork knows itself to be dynamically complex, 
spanning freedom and nature and all of the other cleavages, but not defectively 
so. If Hegel’s thesis about late romantic art is weakened to the claim that the 
modern work of art merely ‘contains a tension’, then this is of course accepted 
by the Philosophical Romantic, who will claim that dynamic internal complex­
ity signals not a lack of philosophical reconciliation but on the contrary its 
philosophical truth.
29 The point is made by Peters 2015, 122–123.
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Contingent failures on the part of art – the repeated judgment of 
later generations that the art of their predecessors has been in some 
particular way inadequate, or Hegel’s own assessment of recent art as 
tending towards arbitrariness and particularity – will not serve here: 
the case might indeed be made that art comes to know its limitations 
through an ordinary induction from its own history of repeated failure, 
but this cannot be Hegel’s story.30 However, two obstacles stand in the 
way of supposing that romantic art comes to be confronted with neces-
sary limits on its deployment of sense materials. The first is simply 
Hegel’s own compelling account of what seems art’s (hitherto) indefi­
nitely extendable potential for development: the trajectory of art as he 
recounts it involves continual construction ex nihilo and seems to show 
that what counts as ‘giving artistic form to spiritual content’ is not sub­
ject to closure. The second is Hegel’s general anti­Kantian (so­called) 
‘conceptualist’ position on sensory knowledge, his denial that sense is 
fundamentally heterogeneous with thought: which suggests, on the face 
of it, that sensory materials should be regarded as having indefinite 
plasticity for thought, an unbounded capacity for being ‘spiritualised’, 
as Hegel puts it.31 The problem in short is that, having rejected Kant’s 
30 Arguably it must be Arthur Danto’s view that art comes to an end through 
a kind of empirical learning, since he does not embed art’s narrative in any 
broader dynamic of reason. Danto takes Hegel to be posing a challenge: namely 
to explain how, if it all, claims for the significance of art can be sustained with 
a good conscience under the conditions of modern reflection. This is of course 
a fair question, which Hegel makes urgent and to which Danto returns a fasci­
nating answer, but without explicating Hegel’s own loss­of­vocation thesis.
31 Hegel writes: ‘These sensuous shapes and sounds appear in art not merely 
for the sake of themselves and their immediate shape, but with the aim, in this 
shape, of affording satisfaction to higher spiritual interests, since they have the 
power to call forth from all the depths of consciousness a sound and an echo in 
the Spirit. In this way the sensuous aspect of art is spiritualised [vergeistert] since 
the Spirit appears in art as made sensuous [versinnlicht]. But precisely for this 
reason an art­product is only there in so far as it has taken its passage through 
the Spirit and has arisen from spiritual activity’ (Hegel 1975, 39 [Hegel 1970, 
XIII: 61]). Two things in this passage may be thought to intimate art’s inherent 
limitation. Hegel implies (i) that it is only because and in so far as the sensible 
can elicit a response (‘echo’) in Spirit that it qualifies as spiritual; and (ii) that 
art needs to make Spirit sensible. However, the first must be discounted in so 
far as it is not in general Hegel’s way to analyse arthood dispositionally, while 
the second exploits an ambiguity in Versinnlichung and is inconsistent with 
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sense/intellect dualism, Hegel does not seem well placed to show that 
sense itself imposes limits on (i) what might count as a ‘realisation of 
spirit in a sensory medium’, or (ii) the scope which sense materials af­
ford for being spiritualised.
The full difficulty emerges when it is asked how the end of day mo­
ment of loss of vocation is related to that of the original formation of Ro­
mantic art. Romantic art cannot coherently revoke its original premises, 
nor can the loss of vocation be simply a direct logical consequence of art’s 
coming to full knowledge of these. In any case, the project of romantic 
art appears on the face of it fully coherent: it is grounded on the insight 
that spirit is not itself sensuous, and that this leaves it free to determine 
its relations to sense, from which it need not recoil and which pose no 
threat of degradation; its independence and autonomy do not stand in 
need of proof, and spirit knows, in its later stage if not at the outset, that 
it can relate itself to sense without compromising its own reality.
That such an undertaking is furthermore purposive – that spirit, 
though able to enjoy self­assurance independently of sense, should also 
want to know itself through a positive relation to sense – must also be 
a premise of romantic art. This follows from the consideration that, if 
Hegel’s narrative of art is not to fracture, romantic art must be able to 
relate itself back to classical art and retain the memory of it in a way 
that motivates rather than stultifies its own endeavour: if romantic art 
cannot understand itself as carrying over the ambition and achievement 
of classical art, in its own modified terms, then either it cannot make 
a beginning (for there is nothing for it to grow out of), or it can do so 
only by repudiating its predecessor – that is, by declaring that classical 
art was abortive, that its simple unity was an illusion, and that it is only 
Hegel’s statements elsewhere that what is sensuous for Romantic art is nothing 
merely natural. The sheer fact of the non­sensuous nature or essence of Spirit 
would indeed limit art, if art were bound to represent Spirit as having a sensory 
nature or as dependent on sense – and this limitation would be unavoidable, 
if art’s project were to arrive at Spirit by beginning from the side of sense (as if 
retracing the path from Philosophy of Nature to Philosophy of Spirit). But once 
it has been established that Spirit in its essence is not sensuous – this being 
the reconfiguration that defines its (late) romantic form – art does not begin in 
sense rather than Spirit, and so cannot encounter this limitation. Hegel himself 
formulates the key point: art ‘has for its condition the self­consciousness of the 
free Spirit, hence the consciousness that the sensory and merely natural lacks 
independence in the face of Spirit, and so makes the sensory and natural into 
nothing more than the expression of spirit’ (2007, 561–562 [Hegel 1970, X: 371]).
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now that art proper can begin. In which case, instituting itself afresh – or 
perhaps reinstating the symbolic, from a position which no longer strains 
to achieve knowledge of spirit – romantic art is freed from the shadow 
of classical beauty, again making it hard to see how it might come to 
consider itself as having lost its vocation.
What Hegel seems to require is a tension within the relation of sense 
and spirit in romantic art that, having served as its dynamic, can reveal 
itself ultimately as also its endpoint, but which does not amount to such 
a vicious contradiction that it stymies romantic art at the outset. And 
yet Hegel’s loss­of­vocation argument seems to assume the impossibility 
of there being anything between complete identity, and symbolisation: 
Hegel talks as if the spirit/sense relation in art had to be either absolutely 
rationally necessary (the unqualified form-content identity of classi­
cal art) or fundamentally arbitrary. Passages in Hegel’s discussion of 
romantic art – where for example spirit seems unable to recognise itself 
in any relation to sense without recoiling into inwardness – hint at his 
assumption of this dichotomy.32 The same assumption seems present in 
the third and concluding stage of symbolic art at the point where, Hegel 
says, the concept of ‘the symbol proper’, das eigentliche Symbol, once for­
mulated, drops away, ceasing to provide an overarching conception for 
art and becoming a minor element in the classical and romantic, in the 
form of mere fable, parable, allegory, simile, etc., where the two sides, 
sensuous shape and spiritual meaning, are not ‘moulded into one another 
[ineinandergearbeitet]’ but connected only by ‘a subjective third thing’, 
namely ‘the invisible subjective activity that is making the comparison’.33 
Yet the existence of middle ground between these extremes is by Hegel’s 
own account the premise of romantic art and, as said, appears to follow 
32 E.g., Hegel’s opening formulation of the concept of art in the Encyclopaedia 
Philosophy of Mind, §556: the finite moment of art, the concrete shape in its 
‘natural immediacy’, is ‘transfigured by the informing mind for the expression 
of the Idea’ but remains ‘only a sign of the Idea [nur Zeichen der Idee]’ (2007, 
259 [Hegel 1970, X: 367]). The assumption seems to show itself again when 
Hegel asks whether the sub­class of late romantic works which aim to present 
contingent reality in a portrait­like [porträtartig] manner, i.e., with attention to 
its prosaic mutability and without relation to the Ideal, ‘are still to be called 
works of art’ (Hegel 1975, 596 [Hegel 1970, XIV: 223]), adding that romantic art 
is portrait­like ‘more or less throughout [mehr oder weniger überall]’.
33 See Hegel 1975, 317–322 [Hegel 1970, XIII: 411–418], Hegel 1975, 431 [Hegel 
1970, XIV: 18]), and Hegel 1975, 303 [Hegel 1970, XIII: 393]
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from Hegel’s general position on the dualities of appearance/reality and 
sense/concept.34
Locating the source of art’s recognition of its own limitation is there­
fore the first problem. Another, which grows directly out of it, concerns 
how, even granting the self­limitation, late romantic art is supposed to 
conceive itself. This is where the self­understanding of the artwork, the 
reflexive dimension, creates difficulty. It seems Hegel must say both that 
the late romantic work understands itself in Kantian fashion, that is, 
as a ‘merely intended infinitude’, nur gemeinte Unendlichkeit,35 a sensory 
presentation necessarily inadequate to its projected object, and that it 
must also understand itself in the terms of Philosophical Romanticism – 
since its projection of a cognitive relation is what defines its vocation as a 
form of spirit, and to abandon that aspiration would be self­nullifying (or 
alternatively would, as said above, make romantic art as fundamentally 
different from classical art as revealed religion is from art).36 If so, then 
late romantic art appears a hybrid in which contradictory conceptions are 
superimposed, giving it the structure of what Hegel in the Phenomenology 
of Spirit calls an Unhappy Consciousness, which alternates ceaselessly 
between two opposed forms, in one of which consciousness avows its 
own mere subjectivity, while in the other it lays claim to absolute va­
lidity. A divided self­consciousness in which each side represents the 
defeat of the other may avoid disintegration and even achieve a kind of 
metastability, in so far as external forces hold it in check, which might 
be supplied by the characteristic forms of reflection of modern life, and 
the philosophical knowledge of art which Hegel says we now have need 
of. But this seems more a matter of forceful containment than reconcili­
ation, and does not correspond to the end­state of romantic art as Hegel 
describes it.
34 Again, extrapolating beyond the text: Hegel’s supposition may be that 
Philosophical Romanticism lacks a positive account of Spirit­sense ‘realisation’ 
that gets beyond Kant’s inscrutable isomorphism of sensory form and Idea, 
reflecting the fact that there is no such self­standing relation; his complaint 
being, in other words, that the claims of Schelling and others tell us only what 
the Spirit­sense relation in the work is supposed to count as, but nothing about 
what it consists in. But again, this would seem to overshoot, by implying that 
the entire development of romantic art has been guided by an illusion.
35 Hegel 1983 [1805–1806], 175 [Jenaer Systementwürfe III: 254].
36 Or, as a further alternative, it would leave art in the same kind of situation 
as Socialist Realism puts it in – that is, requiring art to resolve itself into craft.
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If we now recall the distinction drawn earlier of different forms of 
Philosophical Romanticism, we arrive at a suggestion for what may, in 
some part, underlie Hegel’s loss­of­vocation thesis. In so far as Philo­
sophical Romanticism builds the failure of philosophy into the success 
of art, it is, as said earlier, quite clear how it motivates Hegel’s loss­
of­vocation thesis, and also clear that the two considerations to which 
Hegel appeals – viz., the limitations of sense, and the context of modern 
reflection – have force: since Novalis and Schlegel, in Hegel’s view, have 
no genuine concept of absolute spirit, they in effect revert to the symbolic 
form of art and set themselves the impossible task of squeezing knowl­
edge of the infinite out of sense, in full modern reflective awareness of 
its finitude, a paradoxical endeavour which can result only in a mere 
‘pretence of knowing’.37 But the situation with the weaker form, which 
maintains art in its highest vocation without requiring philosophy’s 
failure, is quite different, and demands a different justification for the 
loss­of­vocation thesis. That Hegel was disposed to assimilate all Philo­
sophical Romanticism to the strong form is suggested by his treatment 
of Schelling in his lectures on the history of philosophy, the implication 
of which is that Schelling’s philosophy never managed to get beyond the 
reliance placed in the 1800 System on the ‘oracle’ of art.38 One place where 
Hegel does come close to engaging with the weaker form of Philosophical 
Romanticism – his real competitor, I have been suggesting – is his late 
review of Solger’s Posthumous Writings, where he distinguishes carefully 
those tendencies in Solger which align him with Schlegel, from those 
which, Hegel allows, qualify as genuinely speculative, though lacking 
adequate formulation.39 But Hegel gives no hint as to what would happen 
37 As said of Schlegel in Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy (Hegel 
1995, 507 [Hegel 1970, XX: 416]).
38 In the Lectures on the History of Philosophy Hegel appears to reason that 
Schelling remains unwittingly committed to the aestheticism of the 1800 System 
in so far as he later continues to fail to fulfil the demands of absolute knowing 
in any other, non­aesthetic way: see Hegel 1995, 524–525, 540 and 542 [Hegel 
1970, XX: 433–435, 449 and 454].
39 Hegel draws a distinction, roughly aligned with my two forms of Philosophi­
cal Romanticism, between Solger and Tieck on the one hand, and Friedrich 
Schlegel on the other, on the basis of their different attitudes to philosophy: 
Schlegel claims to stand ‘on the highest peak of philosophy’, whereas ‘Tieck’s 
irony remains free of charlatanry in its relation to philosophy’ and Solger’s irony 
‘leaves the highest speculative principles as well as the axioms of concrete truth 
unharmed’ (Hegel 2000 [1828], 373 and 391 [Hegel 1970, XI: 234 and 260]).
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to Solger’s claim for the cognitive equivalence of art and philosophy if 
Solger’s metaphysics were not inadequate.
Let me conclude this section with a methodological observation. 
I have been talking somewhat as if ‘the romantic form of art’ were an 
independent entity which relates to other forms of spirit as one indi­
vidual does to others, such that a clear line can be drawn between what 
is internal and external to it, and of which it is proper to require the full 
rational coherence demanded of a single mind. In this there is admittedly, 
as noted earlier, an artifice, but it does not falsify Hegel’s procedure. Art 
falls within the sphere of absolute spirit, not mere unconscious natural 
processes, and if Hegel’s sequence of forms of consciousness is not 
merely a descriptive schema for ordering data, then the demand placed 
on each Gestalt to exhibit rationality and follow a unitary narrative must 
be taken seriously: the requirement that each form of consciousness 
show its adequacy under interrogation, is the very means by which we 
determine whether it lives up to the demands of the whole (indeed it is 
the means by which we arrive at the whole). Arguably there is a general 
tension in Hegel between, on the one hand, his practice of identifying 
historical developments with thought­sequences, and on the other his 
commitment to regarding rationality not as fully given ab initio but as a 
gradual achievement, as there is also between his practice of discriminat­
ing fundamentally different forms of spirit, and his requirement that they 
be coherently interrelated. Be that as it may, honouring Hegel’s dialectic 
makes it appropriate to press hard on art’s self­consciousness.
THE  PERS ISTENCE  OF  PH I LOSOPH ICAL  ROMANT IC ISM  
IN  ART IST IC  MODERN ISM
It is safe to say that theoretical discourse about the arts from the late nine­
teenth century all the way through high modernism becomes increasingly 
eclectic, wide ranging and experimental in terms of the resources that it 
draws on, and the formulations that it ventures – in comparison with, 
say, eighteenth­century aesthetic discourse, which appears by contrast 
relatively uniform in its vocabulary, and tighter in its conceptual focus. 
What this seems to indicate (among other things) is an intensified felt 
need for theoretical articulation of artistic experience and practice, along 
with increased difficulty in satisfying it. This raises difficult questions 
concerning the role and status of reflections about art in the modernist 
period, but what matters for present purposes is simply, in the first place, 
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the fact of this diversity, along with, second, the peculiarly indeterminate 
status of late modern art discourse – in short, the fact that thought about 
art does not settle down but accelerates and diffuses, manifesting deep 
uncertainty concerning the warrant for claims about art and their relation 
to other kinds of discourse.
The further point to be drawn out concerns the philosophical char­
acter of an important subset of ideas about art entertained in the broad 
modernist period. There is no mistaking the recurrence of certain pow­
erful theoretical motifs in the art literature of modernity, which become 
prominent in the late nineteenth century and thereafter keep a firm 
hold on thinking about the visual, literary and musical arts: the ideal of 
abstraction; the integrity of pure form as a product of artistic intuition; 
the self-sufficiency of the artwork and its incommensurability with other 
objects; the correlative identification of music as the condition to which 
art aspires. These notions appear plainly at odds with the relatively 
circumscribed, world­orientated tasks that Hegel sets for the art of the 
future: the thousand­eyed Argus surveying humanity, and attention to 
the prose of everyday life, ‘the finite things of the world’.40 These leave no 
room for doubt about the seriousness of his thesis. The claims of artistic 
modernism, however, are standardly accompanied, not by any acknowl­
edgement of a higher authorising standpoint, but by assertions of the 
autonomy of artistic cognition: what is claimed for art is truth relating to 
the unconditioned that does not derive from any overarching theoretical 
world­view.41 Which consorts with the fact that the major philosophical 
figures most often referenced in the art literature of modernism are either 
outright Philosophical Romantics or reflect its Ideengut – Schopenhauer, 
Nietzsche, Bergson.
To plot the actual historical relation of artistic modernism and Philo­
sophical Romanticism would of course far exceed the space available, but 
the high points are easily identified. Taking it that the development of 
abstraction constitutes the most pronounced feature of pictorial modern­
ism, it is of high significance that, various studies have emphasised,42 the 
40 Hegel 1975, 594 [Hegel 1970, XIV: 221].
41 In the writings of, for example and among many others, Maurice Denis, 
Rémy de Gourmont, Téodor de Wyzewa, Julius Meier­Graefe, Gauguin, Braque, 
Mondrian, Malevich, Kandinsky, de Chirico, Barnett Newman, Adolph Gottlieb 
and Mark Rothko. Relevant extracts are collated in Chipp (ed.) 1968 and 
Harrison and Wood (eds.) 1998.
42 See Rosenblum 1975; Tuchman and Freeman (eds.) 1986; and Golding 2000.
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European avant­garde was soaked in theosophical, Romantic­philosoph­
ical and other sundry intuitionist­cum­mystical intellectual legacies, and 
that these, by elevating art to a higher ontological/symbolic plane, ener­
gised the pursuit of formal innovation. Here are passages marking two 
high points in this development. The first is from Kandinsky’s seminal 
and highly influential Concerning the Spiritual in Art (1912):43
Form alone, even though totally abstract and geometrical, has a power 
of inner suggestion. A triangle (without the accessory consideration 
of its being acute­ or obtuse­angled or equilateral) has a spiritual 
value of its own. In connection with other forms, this value may be 
somewhat modified, but remains in quality the same. The case is 
similar with a circle, a square, or any conceivable geometrical figure. 
As above, with the colour red, we have here a subjective substance 
in an objective shell.
The second, postdating Kandinsky by three and a half decades, is from 
Barnett Newman, who reaffirms in unqualified (now Emersonian) terms 
the metaphysical significance of pictorial abstraction:44
43 Kandinsky 1977 [1911], 28–29. Wilhelm Worringer, in Abstraction and Empathy 
(1908), another highly influential text of the period, argues that art’s trajectory 
is metaphysical and that the art which answers to our deepest metaphysical 
needs (‘transcendental art’) is antithetical to the classical ideal. The art that 
Worringer describes as offering the highest aesthetic satisfaction corresponds 
to what Hegel calls the symbolic, but has a different, Schopenhauerian meaning: 
it expresses alienation from and refuses reconciliation with nature.
44 Newman 1992, 163–164. Newman is here responding to Clement Greenberg’s 
questioning of the school’s putative ‘metaphysical’ content. In other texts from 
1947 (‘The ideographic picture’ and ‘The first man was an artist’) Newman 
declares, employing language that seems to come straight from the Oldest 
System­Programme of German Idealism, that the ‘basis of an aesthetic act is 
the pure idea’, ‘the pure idea is, of necessity, an aesthetic act’, ‘only the pure 
idea has meaning’; the aesthetic act is a ‘postulate’ that ‘always precedes the 
social act’ (Newman 1992, 108 and 158). The inaugural 1943 New York Times let­
ter of Rothko and Gottlieb (and Newman) has the same import: abstract works 
express ‘complex thoughts’, ‘intrinsic ideas’ concerning a subject­matter ‘which 
is tragic and timeless’ (Harrison and Wood (eds.) 1998, 561–563). Rothko asserts 
his continuity with the Romantic concern with the ‘transcendental’, describing 
his pictures as ‘dramas’ ‘in an unknown space’: the picture must be ‘miraculous’, 
‘a revelation’ (Harrison and Wood (eds.) 1998, 563).
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The American [abstract expressionist] artists under discussion create 
a truly abstract world which can be discussed only in metaphysical 
terms. These artists are at home in the world of pure idea, in the 
meanings of abstract concepts, just as the European painter is at 
home in the world of cognitive objects and materials. And just as the 
European painter can transcend his objects to build an abstract world, 
so the American transcends his abstract world to make that world 
real, rendering the epistemological implications of abstract concepts 
with sufficient conviction and understanding to give them body and 
expression […] To put it philosophically, the European is concerned 
with the transcendence of objects, the American is concerned with 
the transcendental experience.
It is of further importance that the nineteenth­century sources of abstrac­
tion overlap substantially and intermix with those of literary modernism 
– the French development from Baudelaire via Mallarmé up to Valéry, 
and thence to Eliot and Stevens45 – and that this unitary node should 
also be heavily invested with, and indebted to, the nineteenth century’s 
recognition of music as an artistic absolute, for which correspondingly 
absolute cognition can be claimed.46
45 See Friedrich 1960/1985, and Lacoue­Labarthe and Nancy 1988. The latter 
is conceived as an archaeology of a conception that ‘determines the age we live 
in as the critical age par excellence’ and that ‘still delimits our horizon’ (Lacoue­
Labarthe and Nancy 1988, 16). Of particular interest regarding abstraction as 
a common force in poetry and painting, indebted to Romantic idealism, is 
Ragg 2010. The convergence and mutual imbrication in modernism of the 
arts of painting, music and literature, and of their respective theories, is an 
additional and un­Hegelian development: their de­differentiation signals ab­
solutist ambitions, as if the plural arts were attempting to (re)combine in order 
to (re)constitute Art in the singular – as Schelling suggests Kunst is properly 
conceived, in parallel with the self­differentiating oneness of Nature (1978 
[1800], 231 [Schlegel 1991, III: 627]).
46 The topic receives a comprehensive treatment in Bonds 2014, and its rel­
evance to my argument warrants a summary of his conclusions. Bonds explains 
that, in Wagner’s original usage, the specific concept of ‘absolute music’ does 
not denote music qua cognising the absolute but rather pure instrumental 
music that has become ‘autonomous through and through’, whereby it attains 
in Wagner’s estimate too high a level of abstraction, isolating itself from society 
and withdrawing from life (Bonds 2014, 131–135). Wagner’s polemical usage 
gave way rapidly however to one that was neutral, and in his seventh chapter 
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That artistic modernism should orient itself in the direction of Philo­
sophical Romanticism has a certain straightforward intelligibility: if its 
task, whatever it (or they) may be exactly, requires that it picture itself as 
‘unbounded’, then the ideology of Philosophical Romanticism fits the bill, 
not by dint of supplying an intellectual authority, but by denying that art 
has need of one. This yields a peculiar yet altogether intelligible situation 
in which the burgeoning discourse surrounding art, seeking to provide 
it with the theoretical home that it fails to find elsewhere in the ideology 
of the modern world, finds itself best fulfilled by a type of theory which 
instructs art that, being cognitively self-sufficient, it has no need of theory. 
To acknowledge this strand in the self­understanding of modern art is of 
course not to claim it as the most important, let alone the only one, nor is 
it to affirm that Philosophical Romanticism provides either insight into 
the real underlying historic dynamic of artistic modernism, or a fruitful 
Bonds surveys those in the late eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth 
century who subscribed explicitly to a conception of music as disclosive – as 
‘oracle’ rather than ‘oration’ – which eventually became a commonplace. In­
cluded in this impressive list are Herder, Wackenroder, Tieck, Jean Paul, both 
Schlegels, Schelling, Hoffmann, Grillparzer and Hanslick (on the strength of the 
final paragraph of the earlier editions of his Vom Musikalisch-Schönen), along 
with less well­known figures, such as Wilhelm Heinse, F.H. von Dahlberg, 
C.F.D. Schubart, F.G. Hand, K.F. Krause, Gustav Schilling and Theodor 
Mundt; Wagner too subscribes to the disclosive conception after his discovery 
of Schopenhauer in 1854 (Bonds 2014, 238–241). Bonds notes Hegel’s dissent 
(2014, 120 and 148–149). Of particular interest is Bonds’ discussion in his 
ninth chapter of Hanslick’s uncertainty regarding what he should say about 
the ‘spiritual content’ [geistiger Inhalt] found in ‘tonally moving forms’ [tönend 
bewegte Formen], which he had identified in the first and second editions, 
betraying the influence of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie (Bonds 2014, 194–195), 
with cognition of ‘the infinite’ and ‘the universe as a whole’: Hanslick needed 
the affirmation in order for the value of music to be not merely formalistic, 
and in order for music’s specific beauty to belong to beauty in general, but it 
opened him to the charge (levelled by Zimmermann) of contaminating ‘pure 
music’. What emerges from Bonds’ study is the constancy of the commitment 
to music’s absolute significance from the middle of the nineteenth century 
until the very recent present (Bonds suggests the year 1970): the assumption 
may have undergone different formulations, but it was never in dispute in the 
arguments between Hanslick and Wagner, nor those between Wagnerians and 
early twentieth­century composers. As Bonds suggests, if music’s autonomy is 
meaningful, i.e., is not to reduce to a mere ‘play with tones’, then the ‘premise 
of transcendence in music’ admits of no real alternative (2014, 292).
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way of elucidating particular modernist works.47 The point is simply that, 
with reference back to Hegel’s argument with his contemporaries, there is 
at least one significant tendency in the later history of art’s self-reflection 
that seems to take the side of Philosophical Romanticism.
CASE  STUDY :  B I FOCAL  F IGURES  IN  BÖHME , SCHLEGEL  AND  ARP
Opportunities abound for illustrating the persistence in artistic mod­
ernism of the proprietary themes of Philosophical Romanticism, but 
the following – borrowed almost in its entirety from a fascinating essay 
by Harriett Watts48 – provides a clear and compelling case of pictorial 
modernism engaging with the romantic absolute.
The writings of seventeenth­century mystic Jakob Böhme held huge 
interest for the Jena Romantics, Schelling and others of the period drawn 
to philosophico­theological innovation; Böhme encouraged and assisted 
the recasting of Spinoza’s Deus sive Natur in the innovative terms of the 
new idealism.49 Watts unearths from Böhme’s treatise, Forty Questions of 
the Soul (1632), a diagram [Fig. 11.1] that represents the divine eye as a 
circle divided into two, with ‘the resulting arcs placed back to back and 
rotated in opposite directions’, each forming its own domain, one of light 
and one of darkness. One eye thus becomes two eyes, which propel one 
another through their mutual opposition. At the centre, their point of 
contact, lies the divine spark, its ignition generating ‘the outer circle that 
contains and unifies the entire system’.50  11.1
47 The literature here is of course vast. As a counter to the transcendent(al)ist 
or spiritual interpretation of pictorial abstraction, see for example Clark 1999, 
chapters six and seven, Fer 2000 and Pippin 2013. The contributions in 
Crowther and Wünsche (eds.) 2012 advance a novel interpretation of abstract 
art as internally related to nature. This coheres with the Romantic reading in 
so far as the nature in question – from which abstraction is made, and which 
artistic creativity re­manifests – is that of Naturphilosophie; see the first paper 
in the collection, by Wünsche.
48 Watts 1986. 
49 It is indicative that Hegel, though he grants Böhme a substantial place in the 
history of modern philosophy (Hegel 1995, 188–219 [Hegel 1970, XX: 91–119]), is 
sharply critical of his unmethodical and unsystematic (‘pictorial’ and ‘barbaric’) 
metaphysics, and hesitates to credit them with speculative meaning.
50 Watts 1986, 246.
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11.1  Jakob Böhme, Vierzig Fragen von der Seelen Urstand, Essenz, Wesen, Natur 
und Eigenschafft, was sie von Ewigkeit in Ewigkeit sei (ed. B. Walter: Amsterdam, 
1682), p. 27. Photograph by Sebastian Gardner.
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Geometrical forms and their dynamic properties recur, Watts notes, in 
Schlegel’s writings. As Marshall Brown’s enlightening study makes clear, 
concepts of shape are generally indispensable to the Early German Ro­
mantics, for whom geometrical figures serve to articulate reflective notions 
which pose difficulties for pure conceptual thinking.51 Specifically, Romantic 
texts deploy the idea­cum­image of two vectors, one centripetal and one 
centrifugal, jointly composing a circle that closes back on itself to form 
its own point of origin, and which in its expansive movement creates and 
comprehends the chaos to which its unitary centre point is opposed. Watts 
draws attention to the following fragment from Schlegel’s 1799 notebook:52
The ellipse, the circle, the parabola and hyperbola are but explosions, 
developments of the point, which must be conceived in a highly mys­
tical fashion. In the primitive point is duality. Ellipse the first symbol 
of the same; circle and parabola but deviations.
That these notions are for Schlegel not merely fanciful can be seen from 
the use he makes of bifocal diagrams in his lectures on transcendental 
philosophy, where the basic form of his metaphysics and its correspond­
ing epistemology are represented as a double movement of division and 
unification [Fig. 11.2].53 11.2
Turning now to pictorial modernism: Jean Arp, Watts informs us, had 
a lifelong interest in Böhme – he gave a reading from Böhme’s Aurora 
at the Dadaist Cabaret Voltaire in 1917 – and the two­foci structure of 
Böhme’s metaphysics, Watts suggests, re­emerges in Arp’s characteristic 
figures [e.g. Fig. 11.3]. 11.3
Of course this falls short of proving an unbroken chain of causality 
in the history of art­and­ideas, or the need for a Philosophical Romantic 
iconography for abstract art.54 All the same, it counts for something that 
51 A practice Hegel attacks: see Hegel 1970 [1830], 38–39 (§259Z) [Hegel 1970 
IX, 53–54].
52 Quoted in Brown 1963, 172; from Schlegel 1963, 304 (Philosophische Lehrjahre, 
no. 1322). For more on the ellipse in Kant and post­Kantian thought, see Ameriks 
2012, esp. the Introduction, and 283–286 on Hölderlin’s ‘excentrische Bahn’. 
53 Taken from Schlegel 1991 [1800–1801], 19 and 25.
54 It may for instance be denied that the Böhmian resonances properly belong 
to what Hegel would identify as the art­meaning. The same question is raised 
by the iconographic significances of Dutch still life: see the contribution to this 
volume by Fresh Rush.
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a direct thematic route can be plotted from Böhme’s intellectual intu­
itions – via his discursive formulations and diagrammatic representation 
of his metaphysics, and Schlegel’s doctrine of shapes and visualisation 
of transcendental philosophy – to early explorations in pictorial abstrac­
tion on the part of an artist known to have had a well developed interest 
in Böhme.
Returning to Hegel, we find that his treatment of the aesthetics of 
geometry displays just enough sympathy with the notion that geometrical 
forms are intrinsically metaphysically meaningful to make us wonder if 
there might not after all be a basis within his aesthetics for accrediting 
twentieth­century abstract art with the kinds of meanings that, Watts’ 
study indicates, would suggest themselves to a suitably re­historicised 
Early German Romantic. Geometrical form is not, in Hegel’s view, 
meaningless, and its metaphysical – that is, extra­mathematical and 
supra­quantitative – meaning is related, internally and rationally, to its 
intuitable properties:55
Now, however, in more detail, from the rather abstract form of 
regularity [Regelmäßigkeit] we must distinguish conformity to law 
[Gesetzmäßigkeit], since it stands at a higher stage and constitutes 
the transition to the freedom of life, both natural and spiritual. Yet, 
55 Hegel 1975, 138 [Hegel 1970, XIII: 184–185].
11.2  Illustration from Friedrich Schlegel’s Transzendentalphilosophie  
(ed. M. Elsässer: Frankfurt am Main, 1991), p. 57. Photograph by Sebastian 
Gardner (with kind permission of Felix Meiner Verlag).
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11.3  Jean Arp, Woodcut print (Variante de Arntz) from Cinéma calendrier 
du coeur abstrait, 1921 (25.2 × 20.6 cm). New York: The Museum of Modern 
Art, Louis E. Stern Collection. © The Museum of Modern Art; licensed by 
Scala / Art Resource, New York.
358
regarded by itself, conformity to law is certainly not the subjective 
total unity and freedom itself, though it is already a totality of essential 
differences which do not simply present themselves as differences and 
opposites but in their totality display unity and connection. […] Now 
if we see these differences associated in their completeness, we are 
satisfied. In this satisfaction there lies the rational element, the fact 
that sense is gratified only by the totality, and indeed by the totality 
of differences demanded by the essence of the thing. Yet once again 
the connection remains as a secret bond which for the spectator is 
partly something to which he is accustomed, partly the foreshadowing 
of something deeper [tieferen Ahnung].
Hegel works his way next through various geometrical forms – parallel 
lines, the triangle, the circle, and the ellipse – in each case determining 
their adequacy as forms of identity-in-difference, before settling first on 
the oval and then, finally, on Hogarth’s line of beauty as the highest form:56
Of higher freedom, with inner conformity to law, is the oval. It con­
forms to law, but it has not been possible to discover the law and to 
calculate it mathematically. It is not an ellipse; the upper curve dif­
fers from the lower one. Yet even this freer natural line, if we bisect 
it along its major axis, still provides two equal halves.
 The final supersession of the purely regular in the case of confor­
mity to law occurs in lines similar to ovals, which nevertheless, when 
divided along their major axis, provide unequal sections, in that one 
side is not repeated on the other, but waves otherwise. An example of 
this kind is the so­called ‘waving’ line which Hogarth has called the 
line of beauty. Thus, for example, the lines of the arm wave differently 
on one side from the other. Here is conformity to law without mere 
regularity. This kind of conformity to law determines the forms of 
the higher living organisms in a great variety of ways.
 Now conformity to law is the essential quality which settles 
differences and their unity, but, on the one hand, it only dominates 
abstractly and does not let individuality come in any way into free 
movement; and, on the other hand, it lacks the higher freedom of 
subjectivity and therefore cannot bring into appearance the animation 
and ideality thereof.
56 Hegel 1975, 139–140 [Hegel 1970, XIII: 186–187].
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Hegel sustains, then, his contention that free individual subjectivity is 
missing from even the highest geometrical figure; which is why these 
passages occur in the chapter on natural beauty. Hegel would deny there­
fore that spirit in the twentieth century can rediscover in geometrical 
forms, through the mediation of art, a realisation of ‘something deeper’ 
which meets its need, and is not made redundant by any other form of 
absolute spirit.
CONCLUS ION
The claim that art has lost its vocation can be read, on the one hand, not 
as a strict part of Hegel’s history of art­consciousness but as a counter­
assertion to the Philosophical Romantics, whereby Hegel simply points 
out that by his own lights their investment in art is misguided. So consid­
ered, Hegel’s target is exclusively and merely philosophical, and his claim, 
whether or not it is true, creates no interpretative puzzle. But Hegel also, 
on the other hand, wants the loss of vocation to be registered within art; 
indeed this is part of his argument for the loss­of­vocation thesis, which is 
supposed to emerge not by direct derivation from general metaphysics on 
high but from consideration of art’s actual history. The claim to historical 
explanation is open to doubt, I suggested, in so far as one central strand in 
art’s self-reflection after Hegel gives strong sign of being drawn back to the 
type of self­understanding that the loss­of­vocation thesis makes unavail­
able. But in any case, history aside, I argued that the crux of the case for 
the loss­of­vocation thesis is elusive, whence the puzzle concerning Hegel’s 
understanding of the (self­understanding of the) late romantic work. 
If this is correct, then there appear to be two options, namely those 
indicated at the outset. Relinquishing the loss­of­vocation thesis allows 
Hegel’s own conception of the late romantic artwork to coincide with 
that of some of his contemporaries, bringing to an end his argument with 
Philosophical Romanticism in its weaker form within the philosophy of 
art, and moving it back up to the level of general metaphysics.57 If on 
the other hand the thesis is sustained, then the situation, Hegel must 
recognise, is that late romantic art has lost its vocation but does not know 
57 See Schaeffer 2000, especially chapter 3. Schaeffer attaches little importance 
to the end of art thesis and proposes that what really distinguishes Hegel from 
his aestheticist contemporaries is the historical­systematic character of his 
version of the speculative (i.e., Romantic) theory of art.
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it – or if it does, it needs to pretend otherwise. In which case we have in 
modern art­consciousness, I suggest, a kind of Unhappy Consciousness.58 
This is, I think, Adorno’s assessment, which can be taken independently 
from Adorno’s own theoretical claims about art, and seems both inde­
pendently plausible – there is surely something right about the idea that 
what we have come to want from art borders on incoherence – and also 
a result that makes sense from the standpoint of Hegel’s contemporary 
reinterpretation: in so far as the general Hegelian narrative needs to get 
to grips with the persisting self­dissatisfactions of modernity, modern 
art can be regarded as giving these symptomatic expression, hence as 
providing a place to start on the diagnostic task.59
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PAUL  A . KOTTMAN
ENVOI 
The art of Hegel’s  
aesthetics
As my co­editor Michael Squire notes in his introduction to this volume, 
the conference at which the papers collected here were first delivered was 
motivated in part by the recent rise of ‘global art history’ and by renewed 
calls for ‘comparativist’ approaches to the world’s various art practices 
and traditions.1 Our shared appreciation for Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die 
Ästhetik was rooted in our interest in the very meaning and possibility 
of a contemporary, potentially global ‘human science’ of art history – 
of an inquiry into the very meaning of human art­making, across eras 
and regions, that does not necessarily entail or require the making of 
more art.
Recognising Hegel in this way is, of course, not a novel enterprise. 
Hegel’s Lectures on Fine Art are widely acknowledged to be essential to 
very constitution of the discipline of what we now call art history. Already 
for E.H. Gombrich, Hegel was the very ‘father of art history’, and one of 
the distinguishing features of Hegel’s approach to art is his eschewal of 
a general theory of aesthetic experience or aesthetic judgment in favour 
of a historical treatment of art, one whose systematic categories (‘sym­
bolic’, ‘classical’, ‘romantic’) are developmental and narrative rather than 
analytical.2 In fact, Hegel’s denial of the total autonomy of the aesthetic, 
and his insistence that art, like religion, is a social­historical institution 
connected to the commitments and values of whole social worlds has 
1 For overviews, see Elkins 2006; Moyn and Sartori 2013; D’Souza and Casid 
2014. Cf. Squire’s introduction to this volume, pp. 50–51.
2 See Gombrich 1984; Pippin 2008; Pinkard 2007; Summers 2007.
become – in general terms – a reigning orthodoxy in the study of art 
and literature across the humanities. In that sense, Hegel’s influence is 
everywhere. Nevertheless, relatively little attention is paid nowadays to 
Hegel’s Lectures themselves by art historians (or by scholars of literary 
history or theatre history). Just over a century ago, A.C. Bradley wrote 
that: ‘Since Aristotle dealt with [poetics], and, as usual, drew the main 
features of his subject with those sure and simple strokes which no later 
hand has rivalled, the only philosopher who has treated it in a manner 
both original and searching is Hegel’.3 A century after Bradley, Hegel’s 
writings now stand at a certain remove from the concerns of the ‘main­
stream’ contemporary study of literature and the arts.
What accounts for this?
The sheer difficulty of making sense of Hegel’s philosophical idiom is 
an obvious obstacle, of course, as is the challenging nature of the claims 
he makes. Increasing disciplinary specialisation in areas of study across 
the human sciences – hardly unique to art history or to Hegel scholar­
ship – is another obstacle: our conference in fact sought to bring into 
public conversation experts in adjacent ‘subfields’ who otherwise might 
not be talking to one another. Also, while the reception of Hegel was 
enormously important to the intellectual climate in France, Germany and 
Italy throughout much of the twentieth century, the study of Hegel has 
returned to prominence among Anglophone philosophers only in the past 
forty years or so. And even within Anglophone scholarship, the Lectures 
on Fine Art have been far less discussed than, say, Hegel’s Phenomenology 
of Spirit or his Elements of the Philosophy of Right.
But leaving these circumstantial issues to one side, it seems worth 
examining deeper assumptions at work within art history, or within 
the reception of Hegel more broadly, which prevent a more sustained 
reflection on Hegel’s importance to contemporary art history. At the 
same time, it seems worth asking whether such assumptions can be 
answered by those who think that Hegel should continue to matter to 
anyone interested in the study of human art­making. Because the con­
tributions to the present volume collectively and individually respond 
to such questions, I want to conclude the volume by gathering up some 
thoughts on these issues.
Two sources of suspicion about Hegel’s approach to the history of art, 
from within art history’s own self-understanding, are readily identifiable. 
3 Bradley 1909, 69.
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First, there is the suspicion that Hegel’s approach is simply too ‘Eurocen­
tric’ – not only in its privileging of the Graeco­Roman­Christian heritage, 
but in the way in which Hegel also seeks to justify his marginalisation of 
the artistic production of peoples in Africa, Asia or the Americas. A re­
lated worry is that, even if one were to expand the conception of artworks 
under consideration to include non­western works in the kind of narra­
tive Hegel tells – for example, by arguing that Hegel’s understanding of 
‘classical’ art can apply to the development of architecture and sculpture 
in ancient China as well as Greece – the use of a category like ‘classical’ 
to speak of non­western traditions itself is sometimes thought to amount 
to a kind of intellectual colonialisation.4
Second, there is a more general scepticism about the very existence 
of ‘fine art’ – that is, a scepticism about the very existence of artworks or 
practices of general significance for human cognition, works which are 
hence not just bearers or expressions of localised cultural outlooks and 
traditions, or of other social contests for power. Consider, for example, 
the rise of ‘visual studies’ or ‘cultural­media studies’ – and their eschewal 
of any reference to ‘Art’.5 In literary studies, too, the issue of canon­
formation is nowadays often said to be the result of the competing social 
interests that go into the ‘construction’ of national identity or linguistic 
tradition, rather than an ongoing debate about what counts as a significant 
work of literature and why – apart from the way in which the dissemi­
nation of certain texts can matter to the kinds of contests for control of 
the social agenda that go into ‘nation building’ or into the formation of 
a diaspora.6 So, there is deep scepticism about the very existence of fine 
art within the very disciplines that study artworks.
Third, aspects of Hegel’s own art­historical narrative have seemed 
questionable – worth ‘leaving behind’ – even to those who otherwise see 
Hegel’s work as of enormous significance: above all, Hegel’s famous claim 
that art, in its highest vocation, is and remains a thing of the past has 
seemed to many highly contestable, if not downright wrong.
4 For a discussion of the methodological objections to this kind of ‘colo­
nialisation’, see Conrad 2016, as well as Conrad’s forthcoming essay, ‘Everyone 
should be Greek in his own way: the global quest for beauty in the nineteenth 
century’ (shown to me by the author, who provided permission for this men­
tion); cf. also Masuzawa 2013, for an analogous objection to the category of 
‘world religions’.
5 See van Eck and Winters 2005; Davis 2011.
6 See, for instance, Apter 2013.
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By way of tying together the thematics of this book, and given the 
way these themes also recur in the volume, my postscript offers some 
final thoughts on these three issues in turn.
I .
First, there is the justifiable dissatisfaction with what Hegel says about 
the study of arts (and, indeed, about the study of history) beyond the 
Graeco­Roman and Christian­western tradition. Or, for that matter, 
even from within the Graeco­Roman and Christian­western tradition 
– as Squire notes in his contribution – insofar as Hegel’s ‘ideas about 
the divine, the Incarnation, and the centrality of Christian faith’ can be 
said to have ultimately ‘ideological underpinnings’ in Hegel’s deeply 
Protestant thinking.7
As Whitney Davis notes in his contribution to this volume, it is 
‘uncontroversial that for many art historians Hegel’s art history of­
fers little – beyond fodder for post­colonial critiques – to the study 
of arts outside the Graeco­Roman and Christian­modern western 
traditions, including the arts of ancient Persia, India and Egypt to 
which Hegel devoted many words in his Lectures on Fine Art and 
elsewhere’. As even Hegel’s most ardent defenders recognise, Hegel 
is guilty of what we nowadays call ‘Orientalism’. At issue, then, is 
not whether Hegel’s lectures on fine art display cultural prejudices 
and empirical ignorance – they do. At issue is whether Hegel’s 
philosophical ‘science of art nevertheless offers something of worth 
to humanists – something without which our very conception of the 
humanities would be different – once the shortcomings of his writ­
ings on world history and world art are acknowledged and held, as 
it were, at arm’s length. In his recent treatment of these very same 
concerns, Terry Pinkard puts it this way: ‘Pointing out just how far 
from reality are Hegel’s characterizations of Africans, Chinese and 
other peoples is a bit too easy, a bit too much of an exercise of the 
proverbial shooting fish in a barrel. That neither excuses Hegel nor 
exonerates him, but once one has moved beyond the pros and cons 
of Hegel apologetics, it is more fruitful to ask what the philosophical 
7 For a superb discussion of Hegel’s ‘Protestant’ education and formation, 
and its importance to his philosophical positions, cf. Dickey 1987.
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views were behind his dismissive and admittedly Eurocentric view 
of the world …’8
 Davis takes up precisely that challenge in his chapter, and thus 
provides a helpful touchstone for considering such objections to Hegel’s 
approach. In his examination of Hegel’s treatment of Egyptian art – es­
pecially his criticism of Hegel’s treatment of the symbolism of animals – 
Davis seeks ‘to reconcile the anthropocentric narrative given by Hegel 
to [non Graeco­Roman] cultural traditions of the self­recognition of 
theriomorphic individuality and subjectivity’. That is, Davis sees Hegel’s 
Eurocentrism as a form of anthropocentrism, visible in his privileging of 
a certain (Greek) kind of anthropomorphism in classical sculpture. For 
Davis, this amounts to an unwarranted restriction on what the proper 
image of the human is. Davis’ worry, in other words, is not only that 
Hegel’s account of the transition from symbolic to Egyptian to classical 
art (especially Greek sculpture) cannot withstand a robust encounter with 
the deliverances of ‘a worldwide anthropology of art’, but that Hegel’s 
anthropology itself – in the privilege it gives, in its self­constitution, to 
the significance of the apprehension of a certain (Greek) image of the 
free­standing human form – is eminently correctable. ‘In this (more 
inclusive) world history’, Davis writes, ‘the Absolute is not always seen 
on the model of a human being even if it is the inner depth of the world 
counter-reflecting the inner depth of humanity.’
This envoi is not the place to adjudicate such claims, but because 
Davis’ contribution is in some ways the most contrarian within the 
context of this volume, it seems useful – editorially – to examine some 
implicit points of dialogue between Davis and other contributors on this 
very question. For instance, to better understand the significance of the 
human form in Hegel’s discussion of classical Greek sculpture, Julia 
Peters suggests in her own contribution that ‘there is an entire part of 
Hegel’s mature system which is dedicated to showing that nature is in and 
of itself inherently spiritual: [namely] Hegel’s Anthropology, the first part 
of his Philosophy of Subjective Spirit in the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical 
Sciences’. On Peters’ reading of Hegel, ‘the task of classical art is to show 
that … the inherently spiritual nature in question is human nature, [which 
is why] on Hegel’s account classical art revolves around the human figure 
as its main form and content’. In Peters’ view, however: ‘Hegel abstains 
from attempting to give a reductive explanation of what makes human 
8 Pinkard 2017, 52; cf. Squire’s introduction to this volume, pp. 45–50.
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bodily features apt for the manifestation of spirit, or to present and apply 
a positive, conceptual criterion for ideality.’ Rather than take the human 
body mimetically (‘as a model’, as Davis puts it), Hegel is said by Peters 
to take ‘a negative approach by describing in contrast which features are 
detrimental to ideality in a sculpture’. For Hegel, she argues (p. 121):
the manifestation of spirit in a human natural body is to a certain 
extent an irreducibly aesthetic property … A classical Greek sculpture, 
then, insofar as it displays ideality, is on the one hand modeled after 
human nature. But it is not just a faithful replication of whatever the 
artist finds in human nature. Rather, it presents the human body in 
such a way that it is turned into as thorough a manifestation of spirit 
as possible – this is what it means to idealize it.
Davis notes this last point, too, when he points out that human beings are 
‘representing’ as well as ‘sensing’ creatures, and so can make an idealising 
image of themselves in ways that animals cannot. What Davis wants to 
contest, however, is the uni­directionality of the developmental transition 
from symbolic to classical as ‘visible’ in the historical transition from the 
Egyptian jackal­headed Anubis to the Greek statue of an athlete in a fully 
human shape. For Davis (p. 88):
the Absolute is not always seen on the model of a human being even 
if it is the inner depth of the world counter-reflecting the inner depth 
of humanity. The bison, the lion, the jaguar or the jackal is – perhaps 
collectively are – the Absolute, as apprehended as and by a subjectivity 
that does not always display human shape.
That is, Davis sees no reason to accept Hegel’s claims about the su­
persession of Egyptian­symbolic art by Greek classical sculpture as ‘art 
proper’, because he finds the anthropological underpinnings of Hegel’s 
argument – which Peters offers as a justification for Hegel’s approach to 
Greek sculpture – to be themselves suspect.
Readers of this volume can decide for themselves whether Peters’ 
reading of Hegel’s anthropology answers Davis’ concerns. In the context 
of this envoi, however, I wish to note that, if the terrain on which a debate 
over the right kind of art­historical narrative connecting the jackal­headed 
Anubis to the Greek statue of a human athlete is a consideration of how 
the sensuous embodiment of the Absolute undergoes intelligible trans­
formations in formal features over time – and if it matters to that debate 
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whether the artwork grasps the ‘human’ in ‘animal’ form or not – then 
the debate itself is already Hegelian, meaningful only within the kind of 
philosophical­anthropological framework Hegel offers.9
I would like to offer one further editorial intervention on these is­
sues. It is true that, for Hegel, the most appropriate content of sculpture 
– of art proper – is the free­standing human body, as both Davis and 
Peters note. But Hegel thinks that the artform of sculpture also teaches 
us something about the significance, to our overall self-understanding, 
of our apprehension of the human form in those statues that is not just 
available anthropologically – not available, that is, only via an anthro­
pological apprehension of the human form. The debate between Davis 
and Peters over Hegel’s underlying anthropology and its significance for 
his philosophy of art illuminates, in other words, only part of Hegel’s 
story. After all, Hegel also goes out of his way to present art (a dimen­
sion of Absolute Spirit) as a form of understanding that comprehends 
the anthropological stance (a dimension of Subjective Spirit), not the 
other way around.
At issue for Hegel, then, is not only the appropriate content for art 
(human or animal Gestalt) but also the form in which that content is 
grasped (in this case, the human Gestalt wrought of dead nature, marble, 
stone). For Hegel, it is true, the human body is the proper content of clas­
sical sculpture – ‘[that which] in nature belongs to the spiritual in and for 
itself ’ (Hegel, 1975, 78) – but it is also true that the human body, despite 
appearances, does not belong to the art form itself since the statue is not 
living flesh, but rather dead nature, heavy matter: or, more precisely, dead 
nature that has received the ‘baptism of the spiritual’. Art’s task, as Hegel 
9 T.J. Clark makes a related point in his contribution to this volume, when he 
remarks on Hegel’s treatment of ‘the art of the ancient Near East, from geometry 
and inscribed ornament to organism and animal vitality’ in the Phenomenology 
of Spirit. Clark writes (p. 242): ‘As an attempt to comprehend the relation be­
tween the divine and the animal in Egyptian art, and above all to understand 
the full meaning of Egyptian art’s stylization of the natural world – its melting 
of “the internal dispositions of animal life … into its surface” – [Hegel’s reading] 
remains incomparable. What it says may be wrong, even appallingly wrong. But 
this is because it sets itself the right kind of question – that posed by the full 
difficulty of the objects addressed – to which a genuine answer is obliged to be 
recklessly hermeneutic. When I read the Phenomenology, in other words, I am 
with Francis Bacon in believing that “truth emerges more readily from error 
than from confusion” – or from art­historical sorting and labeling, which sets 
the real alienness of Form aside.’
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sees it, is to ‘bring the spiritual before our eyes in a sensuous manner’ – 
which, in the case of the statues under consideration, means in stone or 
marble as forming an external shape. I take this to mean that, for Hegel, 
inanimate nature (hard material) appears reanimated in statues; while 
the reappearance of Geist (the human Gestalt) in Greek sculpture satisfies 
(more fully than do prior works) Geist ’s demand to grasp itself in the 
inflexible foreignness of dead nature. But this also means that classical art 
presumes and embodies a grasping of nature’s spiritlessness – its deadness, 
lifelessness – as that which Geist must somehow endeavour to overcome 
(never fully successfully) in order to know itself. Hegel’s ‘classical art’ thus 
seems to me also to be the art of Geist disturbed by its perception of dead 
nature’s inanimacy, disturbed by the perception of death as natural and by 
the perception of nature as a realm of decay and destruction. Unlike the 
fashioning of mummies or care for the dead – wherein Geist responds to 
the natural ‘fact’ of death by seeming to grasp it in a human ‘deed’ – the 
art proper to sculpture embodies Geist ’s constitutive inability to bear 
its alienation from nature, even as that alienation (and our inability to 
bear it) at the same time is now grasped as a fundamental condition of 
Geist ’s own existence – which Geist must not only ritually confront but 
also ‘work through’ in art proper.
Let me next draw attention to another, related dialogue that emerges 
in the pages of this volume. ‘In order to reconcile the anthropocentric 
narrative given by Hegel to cultural traditions of the self­recognition of 
theriomorphic individuality and subjectivity’, writes Davis, ‘we would 
have to jettison Hegel’s view of animals (both in nature and as represented 
in works of art) as “inexpressive” – as not showing inner life.’ But was 
it, finally, Hegel’s view that animals ‘as represented in works of art’ do 
not show ‘inner life’? And if not, then was Hegel’s Eurocentrism really 
restricted by its supposed anthropomorphism, after all?
In his treatment of Théodore Géricault’s ‘Head of a White Horse’ 
[Fig. 7.5], 1816–1817, Robert Pippin sees a visual manifestation of Hegel’s 
dual claims about subjectivity and painting. What is so arresting about 
Géricault’s painting, writes Pippin, is (p. 234):
the incontrovertible subjectivity or deep interiority of the horse, 
literally visible as if facing and seeking the ‘other’ without which for 
Hegel, it cannot be the subject it is, and unsure about finding such a 
realization … One easily imagines that the horse is looking at a hu­
man being, in an expression understandably wary, figuring not only 
species wariness but an omnipresent human wariness too.
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Like Peters, Pippin also emphasises that at issue for Hegel is not the 
isomorphic appropriateness of horse­form or human­form in any ‘model­
like’ sense, but rather the achievement of a distinctive kind of intelligibil­
ity in the sensuous embodiment of the artwork for a human beholder.10 
‘We see expressed’, writes Pippin, ‘on the two­dimensional surface, the 
horse’s subjectivity; its interiority is visible and, one has to say, “felt”, 
even as it remains to-be-found, present as not present … it presents the 
same inner-outer dynamic … about animality, species relations, wildness, 
and domesticity, trust, fear, even pride – and all of this not conceptually 
or discursively, but … following Hegel, affectively intelligible.’
Of course, Géricault is historically far downstream from the ancient 
Egyptian material which Davis treats, and it is worth asking whether 
Hegel himself would have endorsed the interpretation of Géricault’s horse 
that Pippin provides. Not because the worth of Pippin’s interpretation 
should be judged by whether it is faithful enough to the letter of Hegel’s 
text, of course, but precisely because Pippin’s interpretation forces us to 
raise the right kinds of questions about Hegel’s text – not just to ‘get right’ 
what Hegel said, but to get at why he said it, and at what it might mean 
for us (two centuries later) that Hegel said what he said.
 After all, Pippin’s own view is that the fine art of painting contin­
ued through Hegel’s day, and continues in some sense even through the 
modernist revolution of Manet and Cézanne (arguably the most radical 
break in the history of painting), contrary to Hegel’s own claims about 
art’s having become ‘a thing the past’.11 That Géricault horse is a masterful 
painting seems incontrovertible; but the larger question – for Davis, as 
for Pippin, as for Hegel – is whether that painting amounts to something 
like fine art, whether it achieves the kind of cognitive work without which 
10 Fred Rush also argues, in his contribution to this volume, that ‘what makes 
such perception of beauty [in Dutch still lifes] possible for Hegel is an isomor­
phism between one form of life and another: between the liveliness of the object 
and a conscious form of liveliness that is responsive to that liveliness’. And 
in a similar vein, Hanneke Grootenboer’s contribution extends this to Hegel’s 
discussion of natural landscapes – ‘The transformation of a three­dimensional 
landscape into a two­dimensional picture that creates the illusion of nature, 
rather than actual nature enables us to reflect on it.’ Colours and shapes in 
paintings, she notes, ‘are never meant to replace actual objects, but their trans­
formation into images … invite(s) our contemplation’. And this is true, she 
argues, even when the painting is a painting of a photograph.
11 See Pippin 2014; for a discussion, see my contribution to this volume.
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we humans might be unintelligible to ourselves. To put the question the 
other way around: does such an artform (oil on canvas) in its proffering 
such a content (that horse) make manifest something of unavoidable 
significance for human self-understanding? Or, does the painting’s sig­
nificance manifest only as what Davis calls ‘unbounded morphological 
productivity in the particulars’ as ‘reciprocal of the unavailability of their 
universal to absolutely clear conception’?12
By the same token, we should ask whether, or how, the practice of 
painting allows for the perception of ‘inner life’ in the ‘faces’ of animals, 
as distinct from what we can ‘see’ in the three­dimensional jackal­headed 
Anubis, in ways which draw us into the meaning of Hegel’s art­historical­
developmental account of the emergence of romantic art out of classical 
and symbolic art in terms of the supersession of sculpture by painting. 
Furthermore, even if it is granted that painting has realised something 
of fundamental cognitive importance for human beings in its historical 
development, then does it follow that painting, contra Hegel’s own view, 
continues to do so into Hegel’s time and beyond? I will try to say a bit 
more about these questions toward the end of this short intervention.
I I .
As mentioned at the outset, there is a second, deeper scepticism about 
Hegel’s philosophy of fine art: an ethos of cultural relativism in the 
contemporary humanities at large is now manifest in doubts about the 
very existence of ‘fine art’. Again, think for example of the rise of ‘visual 
studies’ or ‘cultural­media studies’ – and their eschewal of any refer­
ence to ‘art’.13 That is, there is abiding scepticism that there even are 
works of universal significance for human cognition, works which are 
hence not just reflective of localised cultural outlooks, nor just pieces 
of ‘historical­cultural productions and practices’ of a more generalised 
sort from which any number of various interesting conclusions might 
be drawn. Davis, as just mentioned, takes a sceptical position when he 
suggests that: ‘Unbounded morphological productivity in the particulars 
is the reciprocal of the unavailability of their universal to absolutely 
clear conception.’
12 ‘Perhaps’, says Davis, begging the questions I am trying to get into view, 
‘one might have advised Hegel to leave his entire philosophy of art just there’.
13 Cf. Squire’s introduction to this volume, esp. pp. 50–51.
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There are a number reasons for this scepticism about the fine arts 
– and, indeed, about the value of hermeneutic approaches to artworks, 
which look not only for embodied reflections of the values of human soci­
eties at some time or place, but for a matrix for the understanding of the 
deepest self­understanding of those societies, all with a view toward the 
even larger questions of how we come to understand ourselves, to make 
ourselves intelligible in an incipiently collective ‘world­historical’ way.
One reason for this scepticism, nowadays at least, is that new technol­
ogies – photography, film, digital media – manifestly proliferate in ways 
which seem to break decisively with the coherence of any past tradition 
of art­making. For Hegel, and for much of the nineteenth century, the 
effects of this transformation in the conditions of human productivity 
had not yet made themselves felt. But now, goes one line of thinking, 
the best we can do is to consider how the specific limitations of various 
technical media or instruments are being developed and explored in a 
range of social­cultural practices, across eras. As David Wellbery has 
recently observed, while the nineteenth century witnessed the expand­
ing influence of Hegel’s idealist historical-narrative philosophy of art, 
recent decades have instead witnessed a kind of return to pre­Hegelian 
Enlightenment aesthetics – to the Laocoon of Lessing, to Kantian ‘beauty’ 
and neo­Kantian ‘aesthetic categories’, for instance – alongside the rise 
of ‘media studies’, in light of the development of ‘technological media 
that shape and extend our sensate capacities’ in ways that are seen to call 
for a renewed attention to notions of ‘medium-specificity’, but without 
Hegel’s historical­systematic framing (symbolic, classical, romantic) of 
the different arts; and, indeed, in ways that are ‘resistant to hermeneutic 
appropriation’.14
Another reason is that the kind of inquiry to which Hegel’s science 
of art aspires can seem an overblown response to the basic questions his 
lectures raise. As Pippin notes in his contribution to this volume, Hegel’s 
ambitions allow him to advance powerful theses about such fundamental 
questions as: what sense can we make out of the fact, that there are many 
arts; architecture, painting, music, poetry? Or, what does it mean, what 
sense can we make of the fact, that the ideals and standards of art­making 
change so dramatically in different societies and at different times? And 
as Pippin goes on to observe (p. 211):
14 Wellbery 2005, 211. For more on the resistance of art to hermeneutic ap­
propriation, see Gumbrecht 2004. On the return of ‘beauty’, see Nehemas 2000; 
on ‘new’ aesthetic categories, see Steiner 2001 and Ngai 2015.
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the answer to both questions might well be: we can make no sense 
out of the variety of the arts. That is a contingent and wholly ac­
cidental fact that raises no interesting philosophical question. And 
while the second question, what does it mean that aesthetic ideals 
change, might be an interesting question, it too is not a philosophi­
cal or ‘aesthetics’ question, is not relevant to any interrogation of the 
nature and value of art in itself. It is a question for social historians 
and for them alone.
In the terms offered by Hegel, such a sceptical position amounts to 
saying not only that there is no such thing as ‘art proper’, but also that 
there never was any such thing as schöne Kunst – much less a ‘beautiful’ 
‘art proper’ that is manifest, as Hegel claims, above all in the artworks 
of classical Greece. What a global history of art teaches, from this point 
of view, is that there are (or have been) only various kinds of ‘symbolic’ 
production, which take unboundedly various forms in different times and 
places. Davis, for instance, takes this to amount to ‘the unavoidable doubt 
whether there is a problem in the very first place’ – that is, to ‘doubt about 
the presence of symbol; doubt about the symbol of presence’, or what 
Davis calls the ‘primal doubt’ as to whether there really is any question 
of universal (human) meaning posed by the production of, say, Egyptian 
funerary practices, Egyptian architecture or Egyptian writing.
It is easy to appreciate why a certain ethos of cultural relativism is 
methodologically necessary for the historian (or archaeologist, or anthro­
pologist, or ethnographer or ‘cultural studies’ scholar). Like the natural 
scientist, she must test hypotheses or ‘hunches’ about cultural­historical 
processes or products, without deciding in advance which objects of study 
might yield the deepest insights for a particular purview or within a field 
of study. Everything should be on the table, in other words, and distinc­
tions between ‘fine art’ and ‘less-than-fine-art’ seem to work counter 
to that principle – insofar as they are seen to amount to mere cultural 
prejudices that impede the objective aims of any human-scientific inquiry.
Still, we should remember that different methodologies in the hu­
man sciences are not just neutral­objective means for studying various 
historical or cultural objects; different methods of human inquiry are as 
much conceptions of objects of study as they are tools for their assess­
ment. The questions and answers we offer whenever figuring something 
out also shape whatever we are trying to know. In treating an expanding 
and open­ended variety of cultural objects and historical phenomena, 
then, we also need to ask what these things themselves are ‘thinking 
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about’ – how they might make sense of us, of our inquiry, not just how 
we might make sense of them. That fine artworks are not just objects of 
scientific inquiry – that fine artworks are themselves sensuous modes of 
apprehension, achievements in the human struggle to make our world and 
ourselves intelligible – is indeed what Hegel’s art­historical philosophical 
‘science of art’ sets out to demonstrate. Lacking this kind of self­aware 
‘scientific’ approach, which Hegel urged his students to adopt, the possible 
virtues of broadened cultural inquiry in the humanities can quickly turn 
from doubts about whether there is such a thing as ‘fine art’ – sensuous 
embodiments of the highest vocation to make human life and its world 
intelligible – into a self­defeating scepticism about the very possibility 
of human knowing.15 As Hegel put it:16
What we are dealing with in logic is not a thinking about something 
which exists independently as a base for our thinking and apart 
from it, nor forms which are supposed to provide mere signs or 
distinguishing marks of truth; on the contrary, the necessary forms 
and self­determinations of thought are the content and the ultimate 
truth itself.
I I I .
This takes me to the third issue that I want to discuss, namely the validity 
of Hegel’s own historical approach, in what he calls his ‘science of art’. In 
contrast to many of his contemporaries, Hegel strove to provide stringent 
criteria for what counts as fine art – that is, an account of which works 
merit the attention which Hegel lavishes upon them, and why, from the 
‘scientific’ point of view of Hegel’s historical narrative.17 In this sense, with 
15 To ward off such scepticism, Hegel tells his students that ‘this much at 
least will be granted at once, that Spirit is capable of considering itself and of 
possessing a consciousness, a thinking consciousness, of itself and everything 
originating in itself ’ (Hegel 1975, 12).
16 Hegel 2010, §54.
17 This is not to say that Hegel’s actual account lives up to his own criteria: 
the assumption of this volume, in putting art history in dialogue with Hegel, is 
to take up challenges of doing Hegelian ‘science’ without giving Hegel himself 
the final word on the specific art­historical claims involved in meeting that 
challenge.
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respect to the stated ambitions of his philosophy of fine art, as Sebastian 
Gardner notes in his contribution to this volume, Hegel stood apart from 
his contemporary philosophers of art in several ways.
The idea common to Hegel’s ‘Philosophical­Romantic’ contempo­
raries writes Gardner, ‘is that works of art have a content or cognitive 
meaning, of a kind which discursive thought can recuperate once it has 
been made available by the artwork, but which could not have been 
originally secured by discursive means, and which cannot be validated 
discursively without reference back to the (experience of the) artwork’. 
We can see this most readily in F.W.J. Schelling’s claim that artworks 
display the actual unity of the sensible and supersensible, of Nature and 
Freedom:18
If aesthetic intuition is merely transcendental intuition become ob­
jective, it is self­evident that art is at once the only true and eternal 
organ and document of philosophy, which ever and again continues 
to speak to us of what philosophy cannot depict in external form […] 
Art is paramount to the philosopher [Die Kunst ist eben deßwegen dem 
Philosophen das Höchste].
Hegel seems to agree with Schelling when he says that Geist ‘generates out 
of itself works of fine art as the first reconciling middle term between pure 
thought and what is merely external, sensuous, and transient, between 
nature and finite reality and the infinite freedom of conceptual thinking’ 
(Hegel 1975, 8). However, as that phrase ‘first reconciling middle term’ 
indicates, Hegel in fact rejects Schelling’s view of art as ‘ever and again 
[speaking] to us of what philosophy cannot depict’. Art, for Hegel, had 
been just that – a middle term between external sensuousness and the 
realisation of pure thinking. Moreover – as Gardner points out – Hegel 
‘also rejects the distinct, weaker version of Philosophical Romanticism 
according to which the cognitive achievement of art can be matched by 
philosophy without being superseded’. Hegel’s philosophy of art should 
thus, Gardner claims, be seen to assert ‘the point in the development of 
spirit at which certain competing, aestheticist forms of post­Kantianism 
are seen off ’.
Unlike the Romantics, then, who esteemed art precisely because of 
its alleged ongoing parity with, or superiority to, philosophy as a mode 
18 Schelling 1978, 231.
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of cognition, Hegel thought that our rising esteem for art as a funda­
mental form of human cognition was only justified because art’s highest 
vocation in this regard was now a ‘thing of the past’ [ein Vergangenes]. ‘It 
cannot be concluded without further ado’, Gardner suggests, ‘that Hegel 
is simply wrong about art’s loss of vocation, since the option remains of 
construing his theory as essentially revisionary, as a critique of modern 
art-consciousness or tendencies within it, and perhaps also … in a way 
that explains the persistence of Romanticism.’
Gardner’s intriguing suggestion – that Hegel’s loss of art thesis 
anticipates the persistence of Romanticism in our own day, both within 
philosophies of art and in modern art’s own attempts at self-justification 
and self­understanding – tumbles into the concerns of my own contribu­
tion, in which I argue that we who work in the contemporary Geisteswis-
senchaften have more to gain from supposing that Hegel and Shakespeare 
were right about art’s historical loss of vocation than from supposing that 
they were wrong, or from supposing that art continues indefinitely as a 
supreme need of Geist.
Rather than return to my own contribution, however, let me try to 
come full circle – and return to Davis’ provocative claim: ‘Unbounded 
morphological productivity in the particulars is the reciprocal of the 
unavailability of their universal to absolutely clear conception.’ I want 
to return to this claim, because there is a way in which Davis’ statement 
– although Davis himself might disagree – is almost a Hegelian thought. 
I say ‘almost’, because Hegel’s thought, in this regard, was more 
historically situated than that of Davis. For Hegel, ‘unbounded morpho­
logical productivity in the particulars’ is not the mark of ‘the unavail­
ability of their universal to absolutely clear conception’ as a matter of 
ahistorical principle. Rather, such unbounded productivity is itself one 
way in which we have taught ourselves – in the making of those products, 
over time – that fine art practices are not adequate in perpetuity to the 
demands of sensuously apprehending the Absolute.
After all, our current apprehension of the unavailability of the Ab­
solute to any formally appropriate sensuous embodiment is itself one 
reason why Hegel (already two centuries ago) saw fine art’s highest 
vocation as having become a thing of the past. That is, for Hegel, the 
history of ‘unbounded morphological productivity in the particulars’ – 
a.k.a. the long historical parade of the production of sensuous forms 
that the Lectures examine, running from pre­art symbolic artefacts down 
through ‘art proper’ and its ‘dissolution’ up through (we can now add, 
after Hegel) modernism and our increasing apprehension of unbounded, 
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global morphological productivity – is itself one way in which we have 
taught ourselves, over time, that a future in which art’s becoming past (as 
registered in, by and as ‘art­project’) does not necessarily mean a future in 
which the fundamental needs of Geist no longer require sensuous form 
– or ‘unbounded morphological productivity’. But the history of art, in 
Hegel’s view, points to a future in which our primary sensuous forms 
of reflection – in their highest vocation – are no longer recognisable as 
artistic. Such a future requires, Hegel thought, that art recognisably be­
come past – just as he also thought that our recognition of this pastness 
went hand in hand with the way in which art taught us these lessons over 
time. Our philosophical esteem for art rises, Hegel thought, when art’s 
highest vocation becomes past.
Of course, there are many further discussions and disagreements to 
be aired about this. But perhaps the highest compliment to be paid to 
the strength of Hegel’s philosophy of art is not – as the truism about 
‘imitation being the sincerest form of flattery’ has it – that Hegel’s phi­
losophy of art has inspired so many imitations and rooted itself so deeply 
in our own orthodoxies in the humanities. Instead, that so many have 
felt compelled to refute Hegel is perhaps the surest sign of the enduring 
significance of Hegel’s Lectures.
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